HUME
v.
BOWIE.
No. 1107.
Supreme Court of United States.
Submitted February 6, 1893. Decided March 20, 1893. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.*249 Mr. Enoch Totten for the motion.
Mr. Walter D. Davidge and Mr. S.T. Thomas opposing.
*252 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court:
This case comes before us on a motion to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction, upon the ground that the judgment brought here by the writ is not a final judgment. Baker v. White, 92 U.S. 176; Rice v. Sanger, 144 U.S. 197; Brown v. Baxter, 146 U.S. 619. The question involved is one of power, for if the court had power to make the order, when it was made, then it was not a final judgment, as it merely vacated the former judgment for the purpose of a new trial upon the merits of the original action. If the court had no jurisdiction over that judgment, the order would be an order in a new proceeding, and in that view final and reviewable.
*253 The rule is unquestionably correctly laid down in Müller v. Ehlers, 91 U.S. 249, that when judgment has been rendered, and the term expires, a bill of exceptions cannot be allowed, signed and filed as of the date of the trial, in the absence of any special circumstances in the case, and without the consent of parties or any previous order of court. But it is always allowable, if the exceptions be seasonably taken and reserved, that they may be drawn out and signed by the judge afterwards, and the time within which this may be done must depend upon the rules and practice of the court and the judicial discretion of the presiding judge. Dredge v. Forsyth, 2 Black, 563; Chateaugay Iron Co., Petitioner, 128 U.S. 544.
The Supreme Court of the District had power to prescribe rules upon the subject, and had done so. Under those rules, whenever the judge was unable to settle the bill of exceptions, and counsel could not settle it by agreement, a new trial followed as matter of course. If, therefore, in this case, the bill of exceptions was open to be settled at the time of the granting of the new trial, the power to grant the latter existed. If the bill were settled, the court in general term could hear the case, and if reversible error were found, could set aside the judgment; and if the bill could not be be settled, the judgment was necessarily so far in fieri as to be susceptible of being vacated under the rule. Ordinarily where a party, without laches on his part, loses the benefit of his exceptions through the death or illness of the judge, a new trial will be granted. N.Y. Life & Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 8 Pet. 291, 303; Borrowscale v. Bosworth, 98 Mass. 34, 37; Wright v. The Judge of the Detroit Superior Court, 41 Michigan, 726; State v. Weiskittle, 61 Maryland, 48; Benett v. P. & O. Steamship Co., 16 C.B. 29; Newton v. Boodle, 3 C.B. 795; Nind v. Arthur, 7 Dowl. & Lowndes, 252. And here the rule is so prescribed.
The rules also provided that the terms of court might be prolonged by adjournment for the purpose of settling bills of exceptions, and an order was accordingly entered prolonging the term at which this judgment was rendered, for the purpose of doing that in this case. This was equivalent to *254 the practice in many jurisdictions of entering an order granting additional time, after the expiration of the term, in which to settle such bills. The provision as to the prolongation of the term for the particular purpose is a mere difference in phraseology and not of the substance, and the question as to the close of the term in other respects is quite immaterial.
It is argued that, as Rule 2, fixing the terms of the Circuit Court, provides that the May term shall not continue beyond the second Saturday in July, except to finish a pending trial, the order extending the term under Rule 62, for the special purpose of settling bills of exceptions, beyond the limit fixed by Rule 2, could not extend such term beyond the commencement of the succeeding term, which was in this instance the third Monday of October, 1888. The May term, it is said, must necessarily have come to an end, either by the act of the justice who held it, or by operation of law through the efflux of time and the commencement of the succeeding term. But we are of opinion that under these rules the term may be continued indefinitely by order of court, so far as the settlement of bills of exceptions is concerned, and concur in the views of the Supreme Court of the District expressed in Jones v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 18 Dist. Col. 426, where it was held that Rule 62 was valid, and that while it would be more proper to specify the time to which the term might be extended under the provisions of that rule, yet an omission to do so did not invalidate the order.
It is to be remembered that the Supreme Court of the District sitting at special term and the Supreme Court sitting in general term is still the Supreme Court; that the judgment of the general term setting aside a verdict and judgment at law, and ordering a new trial, is equivalent to remanding the cause to the special term for a new trial; that an appeal from the special to the general term is simply a step in the progress of the cause during its pendency in the court; and that, though the judges may differ, the tribunal remains the same. Metropolitan Railroad v. Moore, 121 U.S. 558, 573; Ormsby v. Webb, 134 U.S. 47, 62. Some other judge must act on a motion for new trial by reason of inability created by death, *255 and while this order was entered at a term subsequent to that at which the judgment was rendered, it was entered in a matter kept within the control of the court by the order of prolongation. Mr. Justice Merrick, if living, might have settled the bill of exceptions in the case in April, 1889, at the time the motion under consideration was made, and inasmuch as, because of his decease, the bill of exceptions could not be settled by him, and counsel could not settle it by agreement, Rule 64 applied. At all events, the court had power to carry that conclusion into effect, and this being so, the order that it entered awarding a new trial was not a final judgment.
The distinction between Phillips v. Negley, 117 U.S. 665, and this case is, that there a verdict and judgment had been taken against the defendant and no motion was made or proceeding had at that term for the purpose and with the view of setting aside the judgment. The litigation was at an end upon the adjournment of the term and the successful party discharged from further attendance.
The result is that the writ of error must be
Dismissed.