Reed v. Butler - Case Law

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 124,991

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

NOAH D. REED,
Appellant,

JEFF BUTLER, Warden,
Appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Butler District Court; JOHN E. SANDERS, judge. Opinion filed December 16, 2022.
Affirmed.

Kristen B. Patty, of Wichita, for appellant, and Noah D. Reed, appellant pro se.

Fred W. Phelps Jr., deputy chief legal counsel, Kansas Department of Corrections, for appellee.

Before ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., GARDNER and CLINE, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Noah Demetrius Reed appeals the district court's summary
dismissal of his K.S.A. 60-1501 petition, finding it failed to state a claim for which relief
could be granted. On appeal, Reed makes arguments not supported by facts alleged in his
petition and fails to allege shocking and intolerable conduct or a mistreatment of a
constitutional stature, as is required for a K.S.A. 60-1501 petition. We thus find no error
in the district court's summary dismissal of his petition.

1
Factual and Procedural Background

In February 2021, a $600 payment from the United States Treasury was deposited
into Reed's inmate trust account. A couple of months later, a $1,400 payment from the
United States Treasury was deposited into Reed's inmate trust account. Reed alleges the
payments were "apparently" stimulus money payments from the Consolidated
Appropriations Act and the American Rescue Plan Act, respectively.

After the Kansas Department of Corrections (DOC) confiscated or garnished most
of that money, Reed submitted grievances disputing the amounts deducted. He then
submitted a "Special Kind of Problems" grievance alleging the DOC was retaliating
against him for filing his previous grievances. The warden at El Dorado Correctional
Facility and the DOC Facility Management office both responded and refused to take
further action on Reed's grievances because Reed's complaints were "not an emergency"
and did "not constitute difficult or complex problems justifying treating them as special
problems."

In October 2021, Reed filed multiple documents indicating he was petitioning for
writ of habeas corpus under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-1501. In January 2022, the district
court reviewed and summarily dismissed Reed's petition. The district court held Reed
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because: (1) habeas corpus was
an improper avenue for many of Reed's complaints, such as monetary disputes or
personal injuries; (2) Reed did not adequately allege any constitutional claims; (3) Reed
made no atypical complaints of imprisonment; and (4) Reed's complaints about housing
him and monitoring gang activities involve typical prison administration so they were
"best left to the proper penological authorities."

When Reed moved for reconsideration, the district court construed Reed's motion
as a motion to alter or amend its ruling, and it denied relief. Reed appeals.

2
Did the District Court Err in Summarily Denying Reed's K.S.A. 60-1501 Petition?

Reed contends the district court erred in summarily denying his K.S.A. 60-1501
petition because garnishment of his economic impact payments violated his rights under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Reed also filed a
pro se brief, despite the fact that he is represented on appeal by counsel, adding an Eighth
Amendment claim. See State v. Holmes, 278 Kan. 603, 620, 102 P.3d 406 (2004) ("While
a party has the right to represent himself or herself or be represented by counsel, he or she
does not have the right to a hybrid representation."). The State correctly responds that
money damages may not be awarded in a habeas corpus proceeding. See Foster v.
Maynard, 222 Kan. 506, 513, 565 P.2d 285 (1977). Thus we focus solely on Reed's
constitutional claims.

To state a claim for relief under K.S.A. 60-1501 and avoid summary dismissal, a
petition must allege "shocking and intolerable conduct or continuing mistreatment of a
constitutional stature." Johnson v. State, 289 Kan. 642, 648, 215 P.3d 575 (2009). "[I]f,
on the face of the petition, it can be established that petitioner is not entitled to relief, or
if, from undisputed facts, or from uncontrovertible facts, such as those recited in a court
record, it appears, as a matter of law, no cause for granting a writ exists," then summary
dismissal is proper. 289 Kan. at 648-49. See K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-1503(a). The district
court relied on this legal authority here. We review its summary dismissal de novo. 289
Kan. at 649.

Fifth Amendment Takings Claim/CAA

For his Fifth Amendment takings claim, Reed contends the district court did not
determine whether any of the amounts deducted from his economic impact payments
provided him with a "dollar-for-dollar benefit."

3
This argument relies on language in the Consolidated Appropriations Act (CAA).
26 U.S.C. § 6428A (2020). That Act provided a second round of economic impact
payments: $600 per eligible adult, plus $600 per qualifying child. 26 U.S.C. § 6428A(a).
Subsection 272(d) of Title II of division N of the CAA, which has not yet been codified
into the United States Code, specifies that "no applicable payment shall be subject to,
execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or the operation of any
bankruptcy or insolvency law." Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. No.
116-260, § 272(d)(2)(A), 134 Stat. 1182, 1972 (2020). Payments made "electronically by
direct deposit through the Automated Clearing House (ACH) network" must be issued
"using a unique identifier that is reasonably sufficient to allow a financial institution to
identify the payment as an applicable payment." CAA § 272(d)(2)(B), 134 Stat. at 1972-
73. But even if the applicable payment lacks a unique identifier, the financial institution
must, "upon the request of the account holder," treat the funds "as exempt from a
garnishment order." CAA § 272(d)(2)(C)(ii), 134 Stat. at 1973.

Reed relies on Beal v. Davids, No. 1:21-cv-522, 2021 WL 2934835 (W.D. Mich.
2021), where an inmate alleged the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
improperly seized his $600 economic impact payment issued under the CAA to pay his
debts. The district court considered the CAA and found that while Title II of the CAA did
not define the term "financial institution," the court presumed that the MDOC operates as
a financial institution under Title II because it "administers the trust accounts of the
prisoners in its custody," "accepts the relevant payments from the federal government,"
and "appears capable both of effectuating garnishment orders and of notating exempt
payments." 2021 WL 2934835, at *5. The court then found the plaintiff had stated a
plausible claim for relief against the warden:

"Plaintiff's complaint and attachments suggest that Defendants [the warden and
employees] seized on a technicality—that his payment arrived as a federal refund rather
than as an encoded economic impact payment. Yet, the Defendants appeared to act in

4
three capacities simultaneously: the financial institution obligated to treat Plaintiff's funds
as exempt under Title II, a creditor to whom Plaintiff owed debts, and the State agency
capable of directing a garnishment of Plaintiff's funds to pay the creditor. That conflict
could plausibly give Defendants a reason to justify seizing Plaintiff's funds to pay his
debts. However, Title II provides a secondary method for protecting relevant payments
from garnishment. Plaintiff appears to have employed that secondary method when he
sent his kite on May 3, 2021[, in which he requested that the Ionia Correctional Facility
and the MDOC treat his $600 payment issued under the CAA as exempt from
garnishment].
"In short, Title II arguably mandated the Defendants—corrections officers at the
financial institution holding Plaintiff's funds—treat $600 of Plaintiff's funds as exempt
from garnishment. Plaintiff alleges that they did not. Although a safe harbor provision of
Title II, exists, . . . Plaintiff's allegations suggest that Defendants do not qualify. Thus,
Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a claim under Title II, Section 272. [Citation
omitted.]" 2021 WL 2934835, at *5-6.

Relying on the CAA and Beal, Reed seems to argue that the garnishment of his
two U.S. Treasury payments constituted a taking of private property under the Fifth
Amendment. And because the government garnished the payments without providing an
"adequate post-deprivation remedy," Reed contends the CAA violated his due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

But Reed makes these constitutional arguments for the first time on appeal. In his
K.S.A. 60-1501 petition, Reed alleges violations of his rights under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, but he did not argue an
impermissible taking under the Fifth Amendment. And his Fourteenth Amendment claim
did not argue an inadequate post-deprivation remedy but only a liberty interest in relation
to his claim of intentional inflection of emotional distress. Reed's petition is similarly
silent on any claims related to the CAA and whether the warden impermissibly garnished
his payments under the CAA. So his arguments on appeal are new.

5
Appellate courts generally do not consider new issues, or constitutional
challenges, for the first time on appeal. See State v. Daniel, 307 Kan. 428, 430, 410 P.3d
877 (2018). Although this rule has some exceptions, a party must argue why those
exceptions apply. See Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 36);
State v. Phillips, 299 Kan. 479, 493, 325 P.3d 1095 (2014) (finding appellate court may
consider argument raised for first time on appeal if [1] new argument involves question
of law arising on proved or admitted facts that is finally determinative of case, [2]
consideration of new argument is necessary to serve ends of justice, or [3] district court's
judgment may be upheld as right for wrong reason). Reed has a duty to explain why he
did not raise his constitutional challenge below and why this court should consider his
constitutional challenge for the first time on appeal. See State v. Godfrey, 301 Kan. 1041,
1043-44, 350 P.3d 1068 (2015) (appellant's violation of Supreme Court Rule 6.02 is akin
to improperly briefing argument). Reed has failed to satisfy that duty so we would
usually refuse to consider his claim on appeal.

Still, when reviewing a K.S.A. 60-1501 petition, we must determine whether
Reed's "'alleged facts and all their inferences state a claim, not only on the theories which
the plaintiff espouses, but on any possible theory.'" Hill v. Simmons, 33 Kan. App. 2d
318, 320. 101 P.3d 1286 (2004) (quoting Foy v. Taylor, 26 Kan. App. 2d 222, 223, 985
P.2d 1172 [1999]). Thus, we consider whether the facts in Reed's petition support the
claims he raises on appeal, despite his failure to raise them to the district court.

Our review of the facts in Reed's petition shows he does not state a claim for
relief. Reed's argument makes too many assumptions without supporting facts. He simply
assumes the payments were provided under the CAA, without asserting as much, and
then assumes the garnishment of such money would constitute a Fifth Amendment
violation. For example, Reed's K.S.A. 60-1501 petition seems to contend his stimulus
payments were improperly garnished, but he does not allege facts necessary to support

6
this claim under the CAA. For example, even if we assume that the payments were made
under the CAA, Reed fails to allege:

• That the funds taken from his inmate trust account consisted of
stimulus payments, stating at times that his inmate trust account "consisted
solely of veterans administration and social security disability benefits."
• That the payments were issued with a "unique identifier" that
sufficiently allowed the DOC to identify the payments as applicable
payments under the CAA. CAA § 272(d)(2)(B), 134 Stat. at 1972-73.
• Alternatively, that the payments lacked a unique identifier, but he
requested the DOC to treat the funds "as exempt from a garnishment order."
CAA § 272(d)(2)(C)(ii), 134 Stat. at 1973.
• That the DOC used his impact payments improperly rather than for
permissible reasons such as paying Reed's restitution, court fines, fees, and
costs. See Hayes v. Graves, No. 4:21-cv-00347-LPR, 2022 WL 822881, at
*5-6 (E.D. Ark. 2022) (finding no Fifth Amendment taking because
"prisoners are provided with a 'dollar-for-dollar' benefit when their stimulus
funds are used to pay off their existing court fines, fees, costs, or
restitution").

But even if Reed's petition asserted all the necessary facts above, he errs by
assuming such claims are proper under K.S.A. 60-1501. To state a claim for relief under
K.S.A. 60-1501 and avoid summary dismissal, Reed's petition must allege "shocking and
intolerable conduct or continuing mistreatment of a constitutional stature." Johnson, 289
Kan. at 648. Reed does not contend the alleged garnishment of his payments were
shocking or intolerable conduct, and he did not show the alleged garnishments were a
"continuing mistreatment of a constitutional stature" because he did not meet his burden
of proving an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.

7
Fourteenth Amendment Claim

Reed's due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment argues that "the
district court did not determine that all deducted impact payments went towards
restitution, court fines, fees, and costs." Reed relies on Hayes and other cases which
found due process was satisfied for confiscated economic impact payments put towards
restitution, court fines, and costs, but not for payments towards other funds. Hayes, 2022
WL 822881, at *6; Cody v. Clark, No. 4:22-CV-04010-KES, 2022 WL 1568871, at *15
(D.S.D. 2022).

Yet, as in his Fifth Amendment claim, Reed makes no attempt to argue that the
DOC confiscated his funds but failed to apply them to restitution, court fines, or costs. At
the pleading stage, to state a claim for relief, it is Reed's burden to allege that the DOC
violated the law, not the DOC's burden to show that it did not.

Our standard for reviewing a district court's dismissal of a K.S.A. 60-1501 petition
requires us to "accept as true the allegations in [the] petition in order to determine if the
facts alleged and their reasonable inferences state a claim for relief." Schuyler v. Roberts,
285 Kan. 677, 679, 175 P.3d 259 (2008). Reed has not alleged that the correctional
facility improperly garnished his CCA payments by applying those for purposes other
than restitution, court fines, and costs. Reed's failure is fatal to his claims under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.

Eighth Amendment Claim

In his pro se brief, Reed argues the DOC violated his rights under the Eighth
Amendment. Although Reed's argument is difficult to decipher, he seems to argue prison
officials violated the Eighth Amendment "pursuant to wanton negligence, and substantive
limitation of property" by retaliating against him for complaining about the improper

8
garnishment of his stimulus funds. Yet that issue is inadequately briefed so we consider it
waived or abandoned. See State v. Gallegos, 313 Kan. 262, 277, 485 P.3d 622 (2021)
(issues not adequately briefed are deemed waived or abandoned).

Reed also argues, however, that prison officials were guilty of deliberate
indifference. But Reed's petition makes no claim of deliberate indifference. He did,
however, generally argue a violation of the Eighth Amendment. So again, we ask whether
Reed's "'alleged facts and all their inferences state a claim, not only on the theories which
the plaintiff espouses, but on any possible theory.'" Hill, 33 Kan. App. 2d at 320 (quoting
Foy, 26 Kan App. 2d at 223).

Viewed liberally, Reed argues on appeal that prison officials failed to protect him
from violence and harm, which resulted in "deliberate indifference" under the Eighth
Amendment. And prison officials can violate the Eighth Amendment by their deliberate
indifference to protecting inmates from violence and harm. See Bowers v. Bellendir, No.
124,020, 2022 WL 259187, at *3-6 (Kan. App. 2022) (unpublished opinion); Astorga v.
Leavenworth County Sherriff, No. 122,387, 2020 WL 6533282, at *9 (Kan. App. 2020)
(unpublished opinion).

The "governing test" for a deliberate indifference analysis includes both objective
and subjective components. Bowers, 2022 WL 259187, at *4. The objective component is
met if the prison official's deprivation of the inmate's liberty interest is "'sufficiently
serious.'" 2022 WL 259187, at *4 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.
Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 [1994]). The Farmer Court found that for claims "based on a
failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions
posing a substantial risk of serious harm." 511 U.S. at 834. "The subjective component is
met if a prison official 'knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety.'" Darnell v. Simmons, 30 Kan. App. 2d 778, 781, 48 P.3d 1278 (2002) (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

9
Reed alleges new facts in his brief on appeal that, if taken as true, may satisfy the
objective prong because he claims prison officials "fail[ed] to intervene during a vicious,
gang-related jailhouse assault" on him in 2017 at the El Dorado Correctional Facility. His
argument on appeal focuses on this "extensive physical attack from more than three
inmates." But Reed did not allege these facts in his K.S.A. 60-1501 petition. And Reed
fails to meet the subjective component as well, as he does not allege in his argument or in
his petition that DOC officials knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his safety.
The district court thus did not err in dismissing Reed's K.S.A. 60-1501 petition for failing
to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.

The district court did not err in summarily dismissing Reed's K.S.A. 60-1501
petition because even assuming the facts alleged in Reed's petition are true, his petition
does not allege "shocking and intolerable conduct or continuing mistreatment of a
constitutional stature." See Johnson, 289 Kan. at 648.

Affirmed.