FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 20-50345
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
v. 5:20-cr-00071-
RGK-1
JONATHAN EDWARD CHARLES
ANDERSON, AKA Johnathan
Anderson, AKA Johnathan Edward OPINION
Anderson, AKA Jonathan Charles
Anderson, AKA Jonathan Edward
Anderson, AKA Jonathan Edward Cha
Anderson, AKA Jonathon Edward
Anderson, AKA X Rage,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 10, 2022
Pasadena, California
Filed December 29, 2022
Before: Sandra S. Ikuta, Kenneth K. Lee, and Danielle J.
Forrest, Circuit Judges.
2 UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON
Per Curiam Opinion;
Partial Dissent by Judge Lee;
Partial Dissent by Judge Forrest
SUMMARY *
Criminal Law
The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying
Jonathan Anderson’s motion to suppress a handgun found
during an inventory search of his truck, vacated a condition
of supervised release, and remanded, in a case in which
Anderson entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon
in possession of a firearm.
Anderson was stopped for a license-plate violation, and
deputies from the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s
Department (SBCSD) discovered that he had an expired
driver’s license and a long criminal history. The deputies
conducted an inventory search before towing Anderson’s
truck, and, after finding a handgun under the driver’s seat of
his truck, arrested Anderson for being a felon in possession
of a firearm.
The panel held that the district court did not err in
concluding that the government established that a valid
community caretaking purpose existed for impounding and
inventorying Anderson’s truck before the search was
conducted. The panel wrote that the deputies had an
*
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON 3
objectively reasonable belief that Anderson’s truck, which
he had parked in a private driveway, was parked
illegally. The panel noted that the district court found that
the homeowner wanted the car off the property and that there
was no one available to move Anderson’s truck because
Anderson did not have a valid license, he had no passengers
with him, and he told the deputies he was not from the area
where he was stopped. The panel wrote that the district court
did not clearly err in finding that the deputies spoke to the
homeowner before conducting the search. Because this
finding is entitled to deference, the panel wrote that no
remand is required.
The panel disagreed with Anderson’s assertion that the
deputies’ inventory search was invalid because they failed to
comply with the SBCSD’s standardized inventory search
procedures. The panel wrote that the inventory search was
conducted pursuant to a standard policy, and was performed
in good faith, not solely for the purpose of obtaining
evidence of a crime; therefore, the government’s interest in
protection of property and protection of the police
outweighed Anderson’s expectation of privacy in the
contents of his car, and the search was reasonable for Fourth
Amendment purposes.
Applying United States v. Magdirila, 962 F.3d 1152 (9th
Cir. 2020), the panel vacated a risk-notification condition of
Anderson’s supervised release, and remanded for the district
court to craft a condition that accords with Anderson’s
criminal history.
Dissenting in part, Judge Lee agreed that the inventory
search was lawful, but would remand to the district court the
issue of whether the officers spoke with the homeowner to
verify that Anderson’s car was unlawfully parked outside his
4 UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON
house before searching Anderson’s car, given conflicting
testimony and the district court’s inaccurate characterization
of the record.
Dissenting in part, Judge Forrest agreed that a valid
community-caretaking purpose existed to impound the truck
and conduct an inventory search, but disagreed that the
deputies conducted a valid inventory search. She wrote that
the Fourth Amendment is violated where, as here, officers
are required to prepare a full inventory of the property found
during a search of an impounded vehicle and they inventory
only that property found that has evidentiary value such that
the administrative purposes animating the inventory-search
exception are subverted, and there otherwise is no indication
that administrative purposes motivated the “inventory”
search.
COUNSEL
Gia Kim (argued), Trial Attorney; Ashwini S. Mate, Deputy
Federal Public Defender; Cuauhtemoc Ortega, Federal
Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Los
Angeles, California; for Defendant-Appellant.
Byron R. Tuyay (argued), Assistant United States Attorney,
Office of the United States Attorney, Riverside, California;
Bram M. Alden, Assistant United States Attorney, Criminal
Appeals Section Chief, Office of the United States Attorney,
Los Angeles, California; Tracy L. Wilkison, Acting United
States Attorney; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON 5
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Defendant Jonathan Anderson was stopped for a license-
plate violation, and deputies from the San Bernardino
County Sheriff’s Department (SBCSD) discovered that he
had an expired driver’s license and a long criminal history.
The deputies conducted an inventory search before towing
Anderson’s truck, and, after finding a handgun under the
driver’s seat of his truck, they arrested Anderson for being a
felon in possession of a firearm. Anderson moved to
suppress the handgun, arguing that the deputies violated the
Fourth Amendment because the inventory search was
invalid. The district court denied his motion, and Anderson
entered a conditional guilty plea retaining his right to appeal
the suppression decision. The district court sentenced
Anderson to a prison term followed by three years’
supervised release. Anderson appeals the denial of his
suppression motion and one of the conditions of his
supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we affirm the district court’s suppression order
and vacate as unconstitutionally vague Standard Condition
14 of Anderson’s term of supervised release.
I
A
At approximately 2:00 a.m., SBCSD Deputy Daniel
Peterson noticed the license plate on Anderson’s truck was
partially obscured in violation of California Vehicle Code §
5201, so he initiated a traffic stop. According to Deputy
Peterson, after he activated his lights, Anderson abruptly
turned onto a dead-end street and accelerated to the end of
6 UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON
the road. Deputy Peterson called for backup and alerted
dispatch that Anderson was “slow to stop” and “pulling into
an apartment complex.” About 30 to 45 seconds after
Deputy Peterson initiated the stop, Anderson pulled into the
driveway of a home and got out of his truck.
Deputy Peterson believed that Anderson was attempting
to flee and confronted him at gunpoint. He instructed
Anderson to turn around, put his hands up, and kneel down.
Anderson, who disputes that he was trying to flee, complied
with the request and repeatedly asked why he had been
pulled over. Shortly thereafter, Deputy Kyle Schuler arrived
and handcuffed Anderson. Anderson told the deputies that
he was parked in the driveway of “a friend” and that his
license was expired. He also stated that he did not see
Deputy Peterson’s overhead lights and that he was not from
the area. Deputy Peterson radioed dispatch. 2:05 a.m.,
dispatch informed the deputies that Anderson had an expired
license and was a career criminal.
The parties dispute what happened next. According to
Anderson, Deputy Peterson began searching his truck within
seconds of learning that he was a career criminal. The
deputies claim that the search did not happen immediately
and Deputy Peterson only picked up Anderson’s keys from
where he had thrown them in the lawn. At this point in the
incident, Anderson is heard on Deputy Peterson’s belt
recording saying: “You can’t check my truck . . . why can
you search my truck?” The deputies told Anderson that they
were going to tow his truck because he did not have a valid
license and that they needed to conduct an inventory search.
The deputies refused Anderson’s request to have a friend
come get his truck.
UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON 7
After detaining Anderson in the back of a patrol car, the
deputies testified that before they started the search, Deputy
Schuler spoke to the owner of the home where Anderson
parked to confirm whether he knew Anderson. Anderson
claims that the deputies did not talk to the homeowner until
after they completed the inventory search. There is no
dispute that the homeowner did not know Anderson and
wanted Anderson’s truck removed from his driveway.
During the inventory search, Deputy Peterson found a
loaded handgun under the driver’s seat and arrested
Anderson for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The
entire incident, from when Deputy Peterson noticed
Anderson’s obscured license plate to when he called in the
gun to dispatch, lasted approximately seven minutes.
Deputy Schuler stayed at the scene after Anderson was taken
to jail to complete the requirements of the SBCSD Manual,
which provides a standard administrative procedure for an
inventory search. According to the SBCSD Manual, when a
deputy stores or impounds a vehicle, the deputy “shall
[c]omplete two (2) CHP 180 Forms,” which include “an
inventory of any personal property contained within the
vehicle,” and “the signature, date, and time of the arrival of
the tow truck driver.” The deputy must also “[e]nsure that
the report is immediately completed and processed.”
In complying with these requirements, Deputy Schuler
completed most of the information required by the CHP 180
form, including checking off boxes to show the presence of
two radios and a firearm in the car, although he did not
document other property in the car, such as two pairs of
sunglasses, a watch, a box of tools, and a bottle of cologne.
Deputy Schuler also filled out the portion of the CHP 180
form for indicating existing scratches, dents, and damage to
the truck. As required by the SBCSD Manual, Deputy
8 UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON
Schuler included the tow truck driver’s signature and time of
arrival on the CHP 180 form. The deputies submitted the
form for processing the same day. In addition to filling out
the form, the deputies took photographs of property found
inside the car, including a speaker, iPhone cord, and tools,
and also completed a police report documenting that a
compact disc, gun, holster, and ammunition were found in
the car.
B
The government charged Anderson with a single count
of felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Anderson moved to
suppress evidence of the firearm on the grounds that the
inventory search was unconstitutional. First, he claimed that
the deputies lacked a valid “community caretaking purpose”
when they conducted the search. Second, he argued that the
deputies violated California law when impounding his truck.
Third, he argued that, even if there was a valid community
caretaking purpose, the search was invalid because the
deputies did not follow SBCSD procedures in conducting the
search and they had an impermissible investigatory motive.
After the suppression hearing, during which the deputies
and the homeowner testified, the district court held that the
search was proper and denied Anderson’s motion. The
district court found that Anderson did not have a valid
driver’s license and that the homeowner did not know
Anderson or want the truck on his property. Regarding
whether there was a valid community caretaking purpose for
impounding the truck, the key question for the district court
was “whether or not [the deputies] searched the car before or
after they talked to the homeowner” and learned that he did
not know Anderson. The court noted that “there [were] a lot
UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON 9
of discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimony.” But
based on “the credibility and looking at what [was]
speculative and what [was] the evidence,” the court found
that the record established that the deputies did “talk to the
homeowner before they searched the car.” 1 The district
court did not address whether the deputies complied with
California law or SBCSD policy or whether they had an
impermissible motive for the search.
Anderson entered a conditional guilty plea reserving his
right to appeal the suppression order, and the district court
sentenced him to 77 months’ imprisonment and three years’
supervised release. The district court imposed numerous
standard conditions as part of Anderson’s supervised release,
including that he “notify specific persons and organizations
of specific risks posed by [him] to those persons and
organizations.”
II
We review de novo a “district court’s rulings on motions
to suppress.” United States v. Barnes, 895 F.3d 1194, 1199
(9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). The “district court’s
underlying factual findings” are reviewed for clear error.
United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 608 (9th Cir. 2016). A
factual finding is clearly erroneous when it is “illogical,
1
The court also noted that even if the deputies did not talk to the
homeowner first, the doctrine of inevitable discovery “may play a part in
this.” The government does not rely on this doctrine on appeal, nor did
it below. Therefore, even if that theory were plausible, “[i]t is the
government’s burden to show inevitable discovery, so its failure to make
the argument prevents us from upholding the denial of the suppression
motion on that theory.” United States v. Ngumezi, 980 F.3d 1285, 1291
(9th Cir. 2020).
10 UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON
implausible, or without support in the record.” United States
v. Spangle, 626 F.3d 488, 497 (9th Cir. 2010). Where
“testimony is taken, the district court’s credibility
determinations are given special deference.” United States
v. Arreguin, 735 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
A
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures” and provides
that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment’s “essential
purpose” is “to impose a standard of ‘reasonableness’ upon
the exercise of discretion by government officials, including
law enforcement agents, in order ‘to safeguard the privacy
and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.’”
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (citations
omitted). The Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
standard “is not capable of precise definition or mechanical
application,” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979), and
“each case must be decided on its own facts.” South Dakota
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 (1976) (citation omitted).
As a general rule, the government must obtain a warrant
based on probable cause in order to conduct a search, but
there are exceptions to this requirement. See Mitchell v.
Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2534 (2019). The Supreme
Court evaluates the reasonableness of a warrantless search
“by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.” Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654.
One “well-defined exception to the warrant
requirement” is the inventory search. Illinois v. Lafayette,
UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON 11
462 U.S. 640, 643 (1983); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S.
367, 371 (1987). This exception arises under the community
caretaking exception to the warrant requirement for seizure
of property. See United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135,
1140–41 (9th Cir. 2012). “Under the community caretaking
exception, ‘police officers may impound vehicles that
jeopardize public safety and the efficient movement of
vehicular traffic.’” Id. at 1141 (quoting Miranda v. City of
Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir.2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). “[T]he reasonableness of the
impoundment depend[s] on whether the impoundment fits
within the authority of police to seize and remove from the
streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety
and convenience.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[I]mpoundment serves some ‘community caretaking’”
purpose if a vehicle is “parked illegally, pose[s] a safety
hazard, or [i]s vulnerable to vandalism or theft.” Id. (internal
citation omitted). For example, a community caretaking
purpose exists where a vehicle is blocking parking lot spaces
“in a manner that could impede emergency services” to a
building and neither the driver nor any passenger is legally
able to move it. See United States v. Torres, 828 F.3d 1113,
1120 (9th Cir. 2016). Impoundment is also justified where
a vehicle is parked in “the middle of the street,” United
States v. Johnson, 889 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2018), left
in a public parking lot without anyone to retrieve it, see
Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1025 (9th
Cir. 2009); Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473,
1477 n.4 (9th Cir. 1993), or totaled and lying in a ditch, see
United States v. Garay, 938 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2019).
Conversely, “[a]n officer cannot reasonably order an
impoundment in situations where the location of the vehicle
does not create any need for the police to protect the vehicle
12 UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON
or to avoid a hazard to other drivers.” Miranda, 429 F.3d at
866 (citation omitted). One such location is where a vehicle
is parked in its owner’s driveway, even though the owner
drove without a valid driver’s license. See id. at 865–66.
Nor is there a valid community caretaking purpose justifying
impoundment where a vehicle is legally parked in a
residential neighborhood and there is no evidence that it
would be susceptible to theft or vandalism. See Cervantes,
703 F.3d at 1141–42; United States v. Caseres, 533 F.3d
1064, 1075 (9th Cir. 2008).
B
“Once a vehicle has been legally impounded, the police
may conduct an inventory search, as long as it conforms to
the standard procedures of the local police department.”
Cervantes, 703 F.3d at 1141 (citations omitted). An
inventory search of a vehicle is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment because the government’s legitimate interests
in conducting such a search “outweigh[] the individual’s
privacy interests in the contents of his car.” Lafayette, 462
U.S. at 647. According to the Court, “the expectation of
privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less
than that relating to one’s home or office.” Opperman, 428
U.S. at 367. Weighed against this lowered expectation of
privacy, the government has a legitimate interest in “the
protection of the owner’s property while it remains in police
custody; the protection of the police against claims or
disputes over lost or stolen property; and the protection of
the police from potential danger.” Id. at 369 (citations
omitted).
Because inventory searches are non-criminal in nature,
they need not be justified by probable cause, which “is
peculiarly related to criminal investigations, not routine,
UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON 13
noncriminal procedures.” Id. at 370 n.5 (citation omitted).
“The probable-cause approach is unhelpful when analysis
centers upon the reasonableness of routine administrative
caretaking functions, particularly when no claim is made that
the protective procedures are a subterfuge for criminal
investigations.” Id.
The Court may impose safeguards on a warrantless
search “to assure that the individual’s reasonable expectation
of privacy is not ‘subject to the discretion of the official in
the field.’” Prouse, 440 U.S. at 655 (citing Camara v. Mun.
Ct. of City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 532
(1967)). In the context of an inventory search, the
individual’s privacy interest is protected by routine
administrative procedures that limit an officer’s discretion in
conducting the search. See id.; see also Lafayette, 462 U.S.
at 648 (holding that a warrantless search of an arrestee’s
person and effects incident to booking the arrestee is
reasonable when it is “part of the routine procedure incident
to incarcerating an arrested person”). Even if the officers
have some discretion in conducting an inventory search, the
search remains reasonable “so long as that discretion is
exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of
something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal
activity.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375. While inventory
procedures “do not define constitutional rights,” they do
“assist courts to determine whether an inventory search is
legitimate, as opposed to pretextual,” because a search that
materially deviates from established procedure may raise the
inference that it was merely “an excuse to rummage for
evidence.” Garay, 938 F.3d at 1111.
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
test, the issue is whether the inventory search is pretextual,
not whether it fails to achieve full compliance with the
14 UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON
administrative procedures. “[R]easonable police regulations
relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith
satisfy the Fourth Amendment,” even if the police
implementation of standardized inventorying procedure is
“somewhat slipshod.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 369, 374. For
instance, Bertine upheld the validity of an inventory search
even though the officer “failed to list $150 in cash found in
respondent’s wallet or the contents of a sealed envelope
marked ‘rent,’ $210, in the relevant section of the property
form,” made “no reference to other items of value, including
respondent’s credit cards, and a converter, a hydraulic jack,
and a set of tire chains, worth a total of $125,” failed to list
the “$700 in cash found in respondent’s backpack, along
with the contraband,” among other failings. Id. at 383
(Marshall, J., dissenting). We have adopted the principle
that “administrative errors should not, on their own,
invalidate inventory searches: ‘There must be something
else; something to suggest the police raised “the inventory-
search banner in an after-the-fact attempt to justify” a simple
investigatory search for incriminating evidence.’” Garay,
938 F.3d at 1112 (citations omitted). The failure to complete
an inventory form or “other comparable administrative
errors” does not invalidate the search if there is no evidence
that the “the officers were rummaging for evidence.” Id. at
1111–12.
Moreover, an “otherwise reasonable inventory search” is
not invalid merely because the police have a mixed motive
for the search. See id. at 1112–13. When an inventory
search would have occurred in the absence of a motive to
search for evidence of a crime, “the mere presence of a
criminal investigatory motive or dual motive—one valid,
and one impermissible—does not render an [inventory]
search invalid.” United States v. Magdirila, 962 F.3d 1152,
UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON 15
1157 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). So long as the police did
not act “in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation,”
an inventory search is valid. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372
(emphasis added).
In sum, once the government has established that the
vehicle in question was impounded for a valid community
caretaking purpose, see Cervantes, 703 F.3d at 1141;
Johnson, 889 F.3d at 1125, an inventory search does not
violate an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights if: (1) it is
conducted pursuant to a standard policy (even if compliance
with the policy is less than perfect); and (2) it is performed
in good faith (meaning it is not conducted solely for the
purpose of obtaining evidence of a crime). See Cervantes,
703 F.3d at 1141; Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372. When the
inventory search meets these criteria, the government’s
legitimate interests outweigh the intrusion on the
individual’s privacy interests.
III
We address two questions: whether the government
impounded the vehicle in this case pursuant to a valid
community caretaking purpose, and whether the inventory
search was valid. We conclude that the government satisfied
its burden and the district court did not err in denying
Anderson’s motion to suppress.
A
We begin with the impoundment issue. Although
California law authorizes impoundment of a vehicle where
the driver does not have a valid driver’s license, Cal. Veh.
Code § 14607.6, this alone does not establish a valid
community caretaking purpose that satisfies the Fourth
Amendment. See Miranda, 429 F.3d at 864–66. The
16 UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON
deputies must have had an objectively reasonable belief that
Anderson’s truck was “parked illegally, posed a safety
hazard, or was vulnerable to vandalism or theft.” Cervantes,
703 F.3d at 1141. We conclude that they did. As the district
court found, Anderson parked his truck in a private
driveway, and the homeowner “wanted the car off the
property” because the homeowner did not know Anderson.
Additionally, there was no one available to move
Anderson’s truck because Anderson did not have a valid
driver’s license, he had no passengers with him, and he told
the deputies that he was not from the area where he was
stopped.
Anderson does not dispute that his truck could not stay
where he parked it. Rather, he argues that the district court
clearly erred in finding that the deputies knew that before
they searched his vehicle because Officer Peterson’s belt
recording, combined with timestamps from the dispatch log,
demonstrate that it was impossible for the deputies to have
talked to the homeowner before searching the truck. He
contends that because Deputy Schuler can be heard on the
recording up until Deputy Peterson started searching, he
could not have talked to the homeowner before the search.
Alternatively, he contends that even adopting the
government’s timeline of events, the recording and the
dispatch log show that the deputies would have had, at most,
two minutes and 10 seconds to speak with the homeowner,
locate the firearm, and call it in to dispatch. 2 Anderson
2
While Anderson’s brief claims deputies had “one minute and 50
seconds,” this appears to be based on a mathematical error as the brief
bases this time calculation on the gap between Deputy Schuler being last
heard on the recording, 2:06:36 a.m., and Deputy Peterson calling in the
serial number of the firearm into dispatch, 2:08:46 a.m.
UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON 17
argues that this timeline is both impossible and inconsistent
with the homeowner’s testimony at the suppression hearing
that it took him a minute or two to wake up and answer the
door and that he spoke with Deputy Schuler for “several
minutes.” We disagree that the district court clearly erred in
finding that the deputies spoke to the homeowner before
conducting the search.
Although the district court could have provided more
reasoning, it is evident from its findings that it credited the
testimony of the deputies over the homeowner’s testimony
based on “judging the credibility” of the witnesses. We must
give special deference to the district court’s credibility
determinations, and we cannot conclude that it was illogical
or implausible for the district court to reject the
homeowner’s time estimates and give more credit to the
deputies’ accounts. Arreguin, 735 F.3d at 1174. Nor was it
illogical or implausible for the district court to conclude that
the deputies talked to the homeowner and located the firearm
in the span of two minutes and ten seconds. The
conversation with the homeowner occurred on his front
porch near Anderson’s truck, and the firearm was found
under the driver’s seat, not some obscure or hard-to-reach
location.
In light of our special deference to the district court’s
credibility determinations, we reject Judge Lee’s argument
that the case should be remanded “to resolve the potentially
inconsistent evidence and to provide a more detailed
explanation.” KKL Dissent at 23. Although the district
court noted “a lot of discrepancies and inconsistencies in the
testimony,” it made a finding that the “only evidence before
[it] at [the] time, other than speculation, from the testimony
of the witnesses, is that [the deputies] did talk to the
18 UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON
homeowner before they searched the car.” Because this
finding is entitled to deference, no remand is required.
Anderson also disputes that a valid community
caretaking purpose existed because he told the deputies that
he had a friend who was available to move the truck more
quickly than a tow truck could, but the deputies refused to
allow him to contact his friend. This argument likewise fails.
Even if Anderson did have a friend who could have retrieved
his truck, an officer “is not required to consider the existence
of alternative less intrusive means when [a] vehicle must in
fact be moved to avoid the creation of a hazard or the
continued unlawful operation of the vehicle.” Miranda, 429
F.3d at 865 n.6 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Again, the Fourth Amendment’s ultimate concern
is reasonableness. See id. at 864–65. The friend was not
present, and Anderson lied to the deputies at the outset by
claiming that a “friend” lived in the house where he parked.
The deputies had also learned by this point that Anderson
had a significant criminal history. Under these
circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the deputies to
impound Anderson’s truck rather than allow him to
supposedly call an unknown person at 2:00 a.m. to retrieve
it for him. See Torres, 828 F.3d at 1119 n.2.
Finally, Anderson asserts that the deputies acted
unreasonably because California law permits impoundment
only “[i]f a vehicle is illegally parked so as to block the
entrance to a private driveway and it is impractical to move
the vehicle from in front of the driveway to another point on
the highway.” Cal. Veh. Code § 22651(d) (emphasis added).
But California law also provides that if “a driver is unable to
produce a valid driver’s license on the demand of a peace
officer,” a vehicle “shall be impounded regardless of
ownership.” Cal. Veh. Code § 14607.6(c)(1). Because
UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON 19
Anderson had an expired license, the deputies were not
required by state law to determine whether it was impractical
to move his truck before impounding it.
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not err in
concluding that the government established that a valid
community caretaking purpose existed for impounding and
inventorying Anderson’s truck before the search was
conducted.
B
Having established a valid community caretaking
function, we turn to the inventory search issue. Anderson
asserts that the deputies’ inventory search was invalid
because they failed to comply with the SBCSD’s
standardized inventory search procedures. Again, we
disagree, because the inventory search of Anderson’s car
was conducted pursuant to a standard policy, and was
performed in good faith, not solely for the purpose of
obtaining evidence of a crime. See Cervantes, 703 F.3d at
1141. Therefore, the government’s interest in protection of
property and protection of the police, Opperman, 428 U.S.
at 367, outweighed Anderson’s expectation of privacy in
“the contents of his car,” Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 647, and the
search was reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.
We first consider the deputies’ compliance with the
standardized policy, the SBCSD Manual, which serves as
“guidelines which have been established to assist the officer
in making his decision.” The deputies completed each of the
four steps of their responsibilities when impounding vehicles
as set out in the SBCSD Manual. As required by these
guidelines, Deputy Schuler filled out two CHP 180 Forms,
including checking off boxes to show the presence of two
radios and a firearm and indicating existing damage to the
20 UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON
truck. Additionally, Deputy Schuler documented “the
arrival of the tow truck driver” on the CHP 180 form, and
submitted the CHP 180 forms for processing the same day.
Although the CHP 180 forms did not list every piece of
property in the car, the deputies also took photographs of
property found inside the car and completed a police report
documenting other items found in the car. See supra at 7–
8. 3
Second, the deputies’ substantial compliance with the
procedures in the SBCSD Manual supports the conclusion
that the deputies performed the search in good faith, meaning
it was not conducted solely for the purpose of obtaining
evidence of a crime. See Cervantes, 703 F.3d at 1141.
Although the deputies did not fill out the form completely or
perfectly, we note that any gaps in the deputies’ inventory
are much less significant than the gaps in the inventory
prepared by the officers in Bertine, 479 U.S. at 383
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (failing to list over $1000 in cash,
contraband, and multiple other items of value), or the
inventory prepared in Garay, 938 F.3d at 1110 (listing only
firearms), both of which were held to be valid inventory
searches. In light of Bertine, the deputies’ mere deficiency
in complying with the SBCSD Manual is insufficient to
establish that the search was pretextual and that the deputies’
sole motive was to search for evidence of a crime. 479 U.S.
at 372. As we have previously explained, the defendant must
3
Judge Forrest errs in ignoring the deputies’ good faith compliance with
the four steps of the SBCSD administrative procedures and instead
basing her arguments on the incompleteness of the property list, DJF
Dissent at 27, 30–31, given that neither the Supreme Court nor we have
placed much weight on such deficiencies. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375;
Garay, 938 F.3d at 1112.
UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON 21
show “something else; something to suggest the police
raised ‘the inventory-search banner in an after-the-fact
attempt to justify’ a simple investigatory search for
incriminating evidence,” Garay, 938 F.3d at 1112 (citations
omitted). Neither Anderson nor Judge Forrest offers any
additional evidence (beyond the deficiency in preparing a
full inventory) that the deputies’ inventory search was
merely “an excuse to rummage for evidence.” Id. at 1111. 4
Judge Forrest errs in focusing on “how much deviation
from a department’s inventory-search policy” the Fourth
Amendment allows, DJF Dissent at 25, because an
administrative policy does not define Anderson’s
constitutional rights. Contrary to Judge Forrest’s dissent, the
“rule of law” applicable to an inventory search is not an
administrative policy or a procedural manual, but rather the
Fourth Amendment itself, which protects citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Under the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness standard, the question is not
how the deputies’ performance compares with the officers in
other cases, compare DJF Dissent at 29, with Garay, 938
F.3d at 1111–12, and Magdirila, 962 F.3d at 1158, but the
extent to which the deputies’ noncompliance raises the
inference that their sole motive was to obtain evidence of a
crime. Where, as here, an inventory search is conducted
pursuant to a standard procedure, and there is no evidence
that the inventory search was conducted solely for the
4
Instead of identifying additional evidence, Judge Forrest can point only
to the officers’ incomplete inventory itself as suggesting “that something
else drove the search,” DJF Dissent at 31. But this is not enough under
our caselaw.
22 UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON
purpose of finding evidence of a crime, the search does not
violate the Fourth Amendment.
IV
Finally, Anderson challenges a standard condition
imposed as part of his term of supervised release that
requires him to “notify specific persons and organizations of
specific risks” that he poses “to those persons and
organizations.” Because Anderson did not raise this
challenge in the district court, we review for plain error.
United States v. Cope, 527 F.3d 944, 957 (9th Cir. 2008).
In Magdirila, we held that a supervised release condition
with identical language to the one imposed on Anderson was
unconstitutionally vague. 962 F.3d at 1158–59. The
government concedes that Anderson’s challenged standard
condition should be vacated and remanded consistent with
our prior holding. Therefore, as in Magdirila, we vacate
Standard Condition 14 imposed as part of Anderson’s term
of supervised release and remand for the district court to
“craft a supervised release condition that accords with
[Anderson]’s criminal history.” Id. at 1159.
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part;
REMANDED for resentencing.
LEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part.
The community-caretaking exception allows law
enforcement to search a vehicle that is parked illegally, poses
a safety risk, or may invite vandalism or theft. United States
v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010). But law
enforcement cannot invoke this exception to conduct a
UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON 23
warrantless search of a car lawfully parked in a residential
driveway. The dispute here is whether the police officers
spoke with the homeowner to verify that Jonathan
Anderson’s car was unlawfully parked outside his house
before searching Anderson’s car.
The district court held that the “only evidence before the
Court at this time, other than speculation, from the testimony
of the witnesses, is that they did talk to the homeowner
before they searched the car.” But in reality, the record
appears much murkier and quite contradictory. I dissent in
part because I would have remanded this issue to the district
court to resolve the potentially inconsistent evidence and to
provide a more detailed explanation. 1
According to the dispatch log and the audio recording,
the officers would have had, at most, about two minutes and
10 seconds to talk to the homeowner, search Anderson’s car,
find the gun underneath the seat, and then call dispatch. As
the per curiam opinion points, two minutes may have been
enough time for law enforcement to do just that. But the
homeowner testified that it took him one or two minutes to
answer the door, and that he spoke with the officer for about
three to five minutes. Thus, under the homeowner’s
timeline, the officers likely could not have talked to him
before searching the car. The homeowner also curiously
testified that he spoke with Officer Peterson (who searched
the car), not Officer Schuler (who testified that he spoke with
the homeowner).
In short, the record reflects competing and contradictory
testimony about whether the officers spoke with the
1
I agree with the per curiam opinion that the inventory search was
lawful.
24 UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON
homeowner before searching the car. Certainly, there is
more than “speculation,” as stated by the district court, on
this question. The district court may have very well
discounted the testimony of the homeowner and Anderson,
and instead found the officers more credible. But given this
morass of conflicting testimony and the district court’s
inaccurate characterization of the record, I would have
remanded this issue to the district court for further fact-
finding and analysis. Cf. United States v. Crawford, 372
F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting the “twin aims of
deterrence and judicial integrity” under our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence).
I thus respectfully dissent.
FORREST, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part.
I agree with the court that a valid community-caretaking
purpose existed to impound Anderson’s truck and conduct
an inventory search. I disagree, however, that the deputies
conducted a valid inventory search. As a result, I would
reverse the district court’s denial of Anderson’s motion to
suppress and vacate his conviction.
The inventory-search exception is born of
administrative, not investigatory, goals. See Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371–72 (1987). It is permissible for
law enforcement to enter and search an impounded vehicle
when that “process is aimed at securing or protecting the car
and its contents.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,
373 (1976). A law enforcement officer’s compliance with
his department’s standardized inventory-search procedures
assists courts in determining whether the inventory search is
UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON 25
a valid administrative action or a pretext for investigatory
action. See id. at 375 (noting that whether an officer follows
“standard procedures in the local police department . . . [is]
a factor tending to ensure that the intrusion would be limited
in scope to the extent necessary to carry out the caretaking
function”); United States v. Garay, 938 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th
Cir. 2019) (explaining that department “policies do . . . assist
courts to determine whether an inventory search is
legitimate, as opposed to pretextual”). This is so because
standardized procedures limit an officer’s discretion and
“ensure[] that impoundments are conducted on the basis of
something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal
activity.” United States v. Torres, 828 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th
Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
see also Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (“The
individual police officer must not be allowed so much
latitude that inventory searches are turned into a purposeful
and general means of discovering evidence of crime.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
The question here is how much deviation from a
department’s inventory-search policy does the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness inquiry allow? The Supreme
Court instructs that inventory searches need not be “totally
mechanical.” Wells, 495 U.S. at 4. More directly, we have
held that precision is not required: “minor noncompliance
with department policies does not invalidate an otherwise
lawful inventory search.” United States v. Magdirila, 962
F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2020). Rather, an inventory search
will be held invalid on this basis only if it “materially
deviate[s] from department policy.” Id. (citing Garay, 938
F.3d at 1111).
Garay is instructive. There, the defendant led officers on
a high-speed chase that ended with him crashing in a ditch.
26 UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON
938 F.3d at 1110. Before towing the defendant’s totaled
vehicle, the officers performed an inventory search and
discovered two loaded firearms, ammunition, and cell
phones that they removed and booked into evidence. Id. The
only property that the officers listed on the inventory report
were the firearms. Id. at 1110. But the officers also “checked
a box on the relevant inventory form indicating that items of
potential value were in the car before identifying and
booking the items recovered from the car as
‘evidence/property.’” Id. at 1112. The defendant challenged
the inventory search because the officers failed to provide a
complete property list, as required by department policy. Id.
at 1111.
We rejected this challenge, concluding that the officer
had complied with department policy “in material respects.”
Id. at 1112. Because “the site was in effect a crime scene, the
items in the car were sensibly treated as evidence.” Id. at
1111–12. And by removing and safeguarding the contents of
the car as evidence before towing it from the crash site, the
officer fulfilled “the essence of an inventory search.” Id. at
1111. That is, under the circumstances of that case, where
the car was effectively a crime scene, the officer’s failure to
prepare a complete inventory list “[wa]s not, on its own, a
material deviation from policy.” Id. at 1112.
Similarly, in Magdirila, officers impounded and
searched a vehicle after the defendant admitted that he did
not have a driver’s license. 962 F.3d at 1154–55. The
relevant department inventory policy required officers to
make an “accurate” inventory of the vehicle’s content on an
inventory form, to list “[a]ll property,” and to “be as
thorough and accurate as practical in preparing an itemized
inventory.” Id. at 1155 (alteration in original). In the
“REMARKS” section of the inventory form, the officer
UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON 27
listed “IPHONE/APPLE WATCH” and cross-referenced a
police report. Id. On the referenced police report, the officer
listed several more items, “including, but not limited to, a
black backpack, air pistol, ink cartridges, USB flash drive,
and an American Express credit card.” Id. Although the
officers did not provide a complete inventory on the
inventory report itself, we held that they “complied
substantially” with department policy by incorporating the
police report into the inventory report. Id. at 1158.
Taken together, these decisions establish that an
incomplete inventory report can nevertheless be valid where
other documents identify the defendant’s property such that
the purposes of preparing an inventory are served. But these
decisions do not displace the requirement that officers must
comply with their departments’ administrative policies
governing inventory searches, which the Fourth Amendment
requires. See United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135,
1141 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Once a vehicle has been legally
impounded, the police may conduct an inventory search, as
long as it conforms to the standard procedures of the local
police department.”).
Here Deputy Schuler did not, as the court suggests,
provide “most of the information required by” the San
Bernadino County Sheriff’s Department (SBCSD)
inventory-search policy. Maj. Op. at 7. The only property
found in Anderson’s truck that Deputy Schuler listed on the
inventory report was the firearm used to convict Anderson.
That would have been fine if it was the only property found
in the truck, but it was not. The court asserts that the deputies
substantially complied with SBCSD policy because they
photographed the property found inside Anderson’s truck
and prepared a police report documenting some of the
28 UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON
property. 1 Maj. Op. at 20. But there is no authority
supporting the proposition that photographs and a police
report can satisfy a department’s inventory-report
requirement where use of these records is not contemplated
by the policy, and they are not referenced or attached to the
form of report that is required. See Magdirila, 962 F.3d at
1158 (officers substantially complied with the department’s
inventory policy by incorporating the police report into the
inventory report). Here, the inventory report did not
reference any of Anderson’s property other than the one item
used as evidence against him, nor does the record show that
any documents were attached to or filed with the inventory
report.
Contrary to the court’s suggestion, this was not merely
“minor” or “slipshod” noncompliance with SBCSD’s policy.
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 369; Magdirila, 962 F.3d at 1157. The
policy requires deputies to inventory “any personal property
contained within the vehicle.” Deputies do not have
discretion to pick and choose which items to list. The
inventory report form itself instructs deputies to list
“property, tools . . . .” Under our precedent, the inventory
report prepared here cannot be characterized as substantially
complying with SBCSD’s policy where the deputies
described the vehicle being impounded and listed only one
of many items found inside the vehicle, which was also the
only item used as evidence against Anderson. Among the
items omitted from the deputies’ inventory were a speaker,
a bag of tools, two pairs of valuable sunglasses, a watch,
cologne, and other miscellaneous items.
1
Not surprisingly, the property identified in the police report also was
limited to items with apparent evidentiary value—a holster, a firearm,
and ammunition.
UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON 29
The court notes that the inventory report identified two
radios. Maj. Op. at 19. True enough, but this was in the
section of the report detailing the features of the truck,
including that it had an automatic transmission, a battery,
and front and rear seats. There is no indication that the radios
were separate items of personal property like the items that
were omitted from the inventory report.
Important to the outcome in Garay was that the location
where the defendant crashed his vehicle was “in effect a
crime scene” and the property in the vehicle was booked into
evidence. 938 F.3d at 1111–12. Neither is true in this
instance. Moreover, the deputies here did not make even a
generic notation on their inventory report that “items of
potential value” were found in Anderson’s truck, as the
officers did in Garay. Id. at 1112. And while the deputies
took photos depicting some of Anderson’s property, unlike
the police report in Magdirila, the photos were not
referenced in the inventory report nor does the record
indicate that they were otherwise made part of the inventory
report or filed with the report, as previously noted. 2 962 F.3d
at 1158.
The Government argues that the deputies could have
decided not to list all of Anderson’s property because they
reasonably believed that the items did not have significant
value. This is unpersuasive for multiple reasons. First,
SBCSD’s procedure makes no reference to the value of
property in directing deputies to record “any personal
property contained within the vehicle.” See Bertine, 479 U.S.
at 375 (explaining the Supreme Court precedent does not
“prohibit[] the exercise of police discretion so long as that
2
The photos were an incomplete record of Anderson’s property; they did
not depict the sunglasses and watch, and other items found in the truck.
30 UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON
discretion is exercised according to standard criteria”).
Second, the Government’s assertion that deputies can
selectively determine what is worth inventorying based on
an item’s assessed value conflicts with the purposes of
protecting the defendant’s property and protecting deputies
from allegations that they “lost, stole[], or vandalized” the
defendant’s property. United States v. Johnson, 889 F.3d
1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Wells, 495 U.S. at 4).
Even if the deputies could reasonably assess the value of
property found in impounded vehicles, an item lacking
obvious monetary value may nonetheless have value to its
owner such that the owner would want it protected and
would seek recourse if it were lost or damaged.
Moreover, the record belies the Government’s
suggestion that the deputies did not create an inventory
because they deemed Anderson’s property without value. On
other occasions, Deputy Schuler did list tools and other items
similar to what he found in Anderson’s truck on inventory
reports. Thus, the assertion that Deputy Schuler simply acted
consistently with his routine practice does not account for
his failure to inventory Anderson’s property.
The bottom line is simple: failing to prepare any
inventory beyond the one item that was used as evidence
against the defendant when there was other property that
came within the scope of the department’s policy of what
should be inventoried contradicts the “essence of an
inventory search” and does not serve the administrative
purpose of such a search. Garay, 938 F.3d at 1111. We have
clearly stated that the “purpose of [an inventory] search is to
produce an inventory of the items in the car, in order to
protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the
police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized
property, and to guard the police from danger.” Johnson, 889
UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON 31
F.3d at 1125 (quoting Wells, 495 U.S. at 4). Where officers
fail to prepare an inventory that will accomplish these
administrative purposes, it suggests that something else
drove the search. See id. at 1127–28 (noting the officers had
“evidentiary motives” where “the items taken from [the
defendant’s] car were seized and treated specifically as
evidence of a crime—not as property held for
safekeeping.”).
The court contends that the deputies’ compliance with
some aspects of SBCSD’s policy, including documenting
the condition and features of Anderson’s truck and when the
tow truck driver arrived, evidence that the deputies were
acting in good faith for administrative purposes. Maj. Op. at
20. I cannot agree. These actions relate to seizing
Anderson’s truck, not searching the property inside the
truck. See Johnson, 889 F.3d at 1126–27 (separately
analyzing the constitutionality of a vehicle impoundment
and the resulting inventory search). As just stated, “[t]he
policy or practice governing inventory searches should be
designed to produce an inventory.” Wells, 495 U.S. at 4
(emphasis added). SBCSD’s policy meets this objective and
expressly requires officers to prepare a complete inventory.
The deputies’ failure to comply with this policy in a
meaningful way indicates that they did not search
Anderson’s truck to ensure that the property located inside
was protected or that SBCSD was protected against
allegations of property damage or theft. See Opperman, 428
U.S. at 369; Cervantes, 703 F.3d at 1141. Rather, the
circumstances indicate that they were motivated to search
the truck for investigatory reasons. Law enforcement
officers should not be given the benefit of the inventory-
search exception to the warrant requirement in these
32 UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON
circumstances. Any other result undermines the
administrative character of inventory searches.
In my view, this also is a rule of law problem. Law
should be understandable to the citizenry, not just lawyers.
A reasonable citizen informed about the inventory-search
exception and its purposes would expect it to apply,
consistent with its purpose, when an inventory is prepared.
That does not mean law enforcement officers must prepare a
hyper-technical inventory that records every gum wrapper
and piece of junk mail found in an impounded vehicle.
Reasonableness is the guiding principle, of course. But
officers must make some effort to record an individual’s
personal property such that the administrative purposes of
protecting personal property and protecting law enforcement
against allegations of theft or destruction of property are
served. See Cervantes, 703 F.3d at 1141. Otherwise, the law
starts to look like a word game that only lawyers and judges
can play.
I agree with the court that the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness requirement, not an administrative policy,
defines Anderson’s constitutional rights. But governing
precedent concerning the inventory-search exception
establishes that an officer’s reasonableness in this context is
informed by their compliance with standard department
policy governing inventory searches. See Opperman, 428
U.S. at 376 (“[I]n following standard police procedures, . . .
the conduct of the police was not ‘unreasonable’ under the
Fourth Amendment.”); Garay, 938 F.3d at 1111 (“If [an
inventory search is] done according to standardized criteria
and not in ‘bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation,’
police inventory procedures satisfy the Fourth Amendment.”
(quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372)). That the deputies in this
case had a proper community-caretaking purpose for
UNITED STATES V. ANDERSON 33
impounding Anderson’s truck is not itself determinative of
whether the search of the truck was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. See Johnson, 889 F.3d at 1126–27;
Cervantes, 703 F.3d at 1141 (“[A]n inventory search must
not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover
incriminating evidence.” (quoting Wells, 495 U.S. at 4)).
And in my view, the Fourth Amendment is violated where
officers are required to prepare a full inventory of the
property found during a search of an impounded vehicle and
they inventory only that property found that has evidentiary
value such that the administrative purposes animating the
inventory-search exception are subverted, and there
otherwise is no indication that administrative purposes
motivated the “inventory” search.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent in part.