2023 IL App (2d) 210690
No. 2-21-0690
Opinion filed January 23, 2023
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of McHenry County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 19-CF-578
)
KOREM M. JOHANSON, ) Honorable
) Michael E. Coppedge,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice McLaren and Justice Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Following a bench trial, defendant, Korem M. Johanson, was convicted of predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child, a Class X felony (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1), (b)(1) (West 2018)).
Before sentencing, he moved the court to sentence him for aggravated criminal sexual abuse (id.
§ 11-1.60), a Class 2 felony (id. § 11-1.60(g)), instead of predatory criminal sexual assault of a
child. Defendant argued that sentencing him as a Class X offender for predatory criminal sexual
assault of a child violated the proportionate-penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, § 11) because predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal
sexual abuse have identical elements but the punishment for predatory criminal sexual assault of
a child is more severe. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced defendant to 16 years’
2023 IL App (2d) 210690
imprisonment for the Class X felony of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. Defendant
timely appeals. We affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 The State charged defendant with five offenses related to the sexual abuse and assault of
his two children. Defendant was found guilty of only one count, concerning his daughter, A.J. That
count provided:
“That between the dates of July 1, 2019 and July 22, 2019, *** defendant
committed the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault, in that the said defendant, who
was seventeen years of age or older, knowingly committed an act of contact with A.J. ***
who was under thirteen years of age when the act was committed, in that defendant caused
[his] sex organ (penis) to make contact with the hand of A.J. for the purpose of the
defendant’s sexual gratification or arousal.”
¶4 After the trial court found defendant guilty, he moved the court to sentence him for
aggravated criminal sexual abuse, 1 a Class 2 felony, instead of predatory criminal sexual assault
1
Section 11-1.60 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.60 (West 2018))
sets out several forms of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. In his motion to be sentenced for
aggravated criminal sexual abuse, defendant cited section 11-1.60(b) of the Code (id. § 11-
1.60(b)), which prohibits an act of “sexual conduct” with a victim who is under 18 years of age
and is a member of the defendant’s family. However, defendant’s proportionate-penalties
argument on appeal relies on section 11-1.60(c)(1)(i) of the Code (id. § 11-1.60(c)(1)(i)), which
prohibits a person 17 years old or older from engaging in “sexual conduct” with a person under 13
years of age. Notably, the State takes no issue with this disparity.
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of a child, a Class X felony. Defendant argued that “the proportionate penalties clause is violated
as the conduct [he] was found guilty of having committed forms the basis for the violation of two
different offenses with identical elements yet vastly different sentences.” The State replied,
arguing only that all dispositions imposed by a court in a criminal case must be authorized by law.
¶5 Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding that predatory criminal
sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse “do not have identical elements.”
The court elaborated:
“Predatory criminal sexual assault requires an act of contact, however slight. For
example, an accused could rub his penis on the back of the victim, and if he did so for
sexual gratification or arousal, he could be found guilty of predatory criminal sexual
assault. The contact must, however, involve the sex organ or anus. Aggravated criminal
sexual abuse requires an act of sexual conduct, not any contact. There must be a knowing
touching or fondling.
Regarding a child under 13, the touching or fondling does not have to involve the
sex organ, anus or breast. For example, massaging a naked child under the age of 13 for
sexual gratification can be aggravated criminal sexual abuse.
The two offenses, while similar, are not identical and evidence the intent of the
legislature to punish more severely contact that involves the sex organ or anus of the victim
or the accused. As noted, this is an identical elements test. It is not driven by the
consideration of the facts specific to a given case, and it is not sufficient that there is
substantial similarity. There must be identical elements.”
¶6 Subsequently, the court sentenced defendant to 16 years’ imprisonment for predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child. This timely appeal followed.
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¶7 II. ANALYSIS
¶8 Defendant argues that his 16-year sentence for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child
violates the proportionate-penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. We review de novo that
issue. See People v. Charleston, 2018 IL App (1st) 161323, ¶ 33.
¶9 “The proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution provides that ‘[a]ll penalties
shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of
restoring the offender to useful citizenship.’ ” People v. Brooks, 2022 IL App (3d) 190761, ¶ 11
(quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11).
“Criminal sentences may be found unconstitutionally disproportionate where: (1) the
punishment is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the
moral sense of the community; (2) similar offenses are compared and the conduct that
results in a less serious threat to the public health and safety is punished more severely;
and (3) identical offenses are given different sentences.” Id.
¶ 10 Defendant bases his argument on the third scenario—when identical offenses result in
different sentences. He contends that predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, a Class X felony,
and aggravated criminal sexual abuse, a Class 2 felony, have identical elements but different
sentences. “ ‘[A]n identical elements proportionality violation arises out of the relationship
between two statutes—the challenged statute, and the comparison statute with which the
challenged statute is out of proportion.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122, ¶ 32). “If
the two compared statutes exhibit identical elements, but result in different penalties, then one of
these penalties has not been set in accordance with the seriousness of the offense and is
unconstitutionally disproportionate.” Id.
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¶ 11 With these principles in mind, we turn to the two statutes defendant compares in this
appeal. The statute he challenges is section 11-1.40(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code)
(720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2018) (predatory-criminal-sexual-assault statute). The statute he
uses for comparison is section 11-1.60(c)(1)(i) of the Code (id. § 11-1.60(c)(1)(i)) (aggravated
criminal sexual abuse statute).
¶ 12 Defendants convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child are sentenced, as Class
X offenders, to prison sentences between 6 and 60 years. Id. § 11-1.40(b)(1). Defendants convicted
of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, a Class 2 felony, face prison sentences between three and
seven years. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2018). Clearly, the sentences imposed for these two
offenses are disparate, with defendants convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child
facing more severe punishments. Accordingly, if the elements of these two offenses are identical,
sentencing defendant for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child instead of aggravated criminal
sexual abuse violated the proportionate-penalties clause.
¶ 13 To make our comparison, we must set forth the elements of each statute. The predatory-
criminal-sexual-assault-of -a-child statute provides:
“(a) A person commits predatory criminal sexual assault of a child if that person is
17 years of age or older, and commits an act of contact, however slight, between the sex
organ or anus of one person and the part of the body of another for the purpose of sexual
gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused *** and:
(1) the victim is under 13 years of age[.]” 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West
2018).
“Contact,” as used in the predatory-criminal-sexual-assault-of-a-child statute, means any touching.
People v. Kitch, 2019 IL App (3d) 170522, ¶ 51.
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¶ 14 The aggravated-criminal-sexual-abuse statute provides:
“(c) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if:
(1) that person is 17 years of age or over and: (i) commits an act of sexual
conduct with a victim who is under 13 years of age[.]” 720 ILCS contain.60(c)(1)(i)
(West 2018).
“Sexual conduct,” as used in the aggravated-criminal-sexual-abuse statute, is:
“[A]ny knowing touching or fondling by the victim or the accused, either directly or
through clothing, of the sex organs, anus, or breast of the victim or the accused, or any part
of the body of a child under 13 years of age, or any transfer or transmission of semen by
the accused upon any part of the clothed or unclothed body of the victim, for the purpose
of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 11-
0.1.
¶ 15 Deciding whether predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal
sexual abuse share the same elements mandates that we construe the definition of “sexual
conduct.” In doing so, we are guided by the well-settled rules of statutory construction. Dawkins
v. Fitness International, LLC, 2022 IL 127561, ¶ 26. “Our primary and overriding concern is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Id. ¶ 27. “Legislative intent is best
determined from the language of the statute itself, which if unambiguous should be enforced as
written.” Id. “In giving effect to the statutory intent, the court should consider, in addition to the
statutory language, the reason for the law, the problems to be remedied, and the objects and
purposes sought.” Id. “It is also true that statutes must be construed to avoid absurd results.” Id.
“When a proffered reading of a statute leads to absurd results or results that the legislature could
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2023 IL App (2d) 210690
not have intended, courts are not bound to that construction, and the reading leading to absurdity
should be rejected.” Id.
¶ 16 The only word in section 11-0.1. that needs interpretation to resolve this appeal is “or.”
“Or” is a disjunctive conjunction indicating an alternative between two or more options. Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/or (last visited Jan. 3,
2023) [https://perma.cc/WU6D-VXBF]. “ ‘Generally, use of the disjunctive *** requires separate
treatment of those alternatives, hence a clause following a disjunctive is considered inapplicable
to the subject matter of the preceding clause.’ ” (Emphases in original.) In re E.B., 231 Ill. 2d 459,
468 (2008) (quoting Tietema v. State, 926 P.2d 952, 954 (Wyo. 1996)).
¶ 17 “Or” is used here with preceding serial commas. “The serial comma [is the comma that]
separates items, including the last from the next to last, in a list of more than two.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Hatcher v. Hatcher, 2020 IL App (3d) 180096, ¶ 18. These commas,
like the statutory terms, must “ ‘be considered and given weight unless from inspection of the
whole act it is apparent [they] must be disregarded in order to arrive at the intention of the
legislature.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) In re D.F., 208 Ill. 2d 223, 234 (2003) (quoting Illinois Bell
Telephone Co. v. Ames, 364 Ill. 362, 368 (1936)).
¶ 18 In defining “sexual conduct,” the legislature used “or” with a preceding serial comma three
times. First, the legislature used the combination to separate items in a list—specifically, “sex
organs, anus, or breast,” i.e., three different body parts. The knowing touching of any of these for
sexual gratification or arousal constitutes “sexual conduct.” Second, “or” and a serial comma
separate two clauses: (1) the clause providing that “sexual conduct” constitutes the knowing
touching of the “sex organs, anus, or breast” for purposes of sexual gratification or arousal from
(2) the clause indicating that “sexual conduct” also occurs when, for sexual gratification or arousal,
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there is a knowing touching of “any part of the body of a child under 13 years of age.” If we were
to conclude that “sex organs, anus, or breast” in the first clause modified “any part of the body of
a child under 13” in the second clause, we would be ignoring “or” and the serial comma separating
the clauses. Moreover, we would render the legislature’s inclusion of “any part of the body”
meaningless and frustrate the legislature’s intent to punish those who touch any part of a child’s
body for sexual gratification or arousal. Under that reading, knowingly touching the “sex organs,
anus, or breast” of anyone, regardless of age, would constitute “sexual conduct” as well as the
knowing touching of any part of the body of a child under 13. This would conflate the two clauses,
with clause one effectively subsuming clause two, and override the legislature’s intent to
criminalize touching any part of the body of a victim under 13. We simply cannot construe the
statute this way. In re Julie M., 2021 IL 125768, ¶ 27 (“No part of a statute should be rendered
meaningless or superfluous.”). The third and final use of “or” and a serial comma is to separate
the first and second clauses from the clause indicating the last circumstance where “sexual
conduct” occurs. Specifically, in addition to the circumstances indicated in the first two clauses,
“sexual conduct” occurs when, for sexual gratification or arousal, there is “any transfer or
transmission of semen by the accused upon any part of the clothed or unclothed body of the
victim.” 720 ILCS 5/11-0.1 (West 2018). Thus, put more simply, “sexual conduct” occurs when,
for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the defendant or the victim, there is (1) knowing
touching or fondling of the victim’s or the defendant’s sex organs, anus, or breast, or (2) knowing
touching or fondling of any part of the body of a child under age 13, or (3) “any transfer or
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transmission of semen by the accused upon any part of the clothed or unclothed body of the
victim[.]” 2 Id.
¶ 19 Aiding our conclusion that “sexual conduct” occurs in these three distinct ways is that
“sexual conduct” applies to some offenses that have nothing to do with the age of the victim or the
defendant. See, e.g., id. § 11-1.50(a)(1) (criminal sexual abuse occurs when the defendant
“commits an act of sexual conduct by the use of force or threat of force”); id. § 11-9.2(a)(1)
(custodial sexual misconduct committed when the defendant “is an employee of a penal system
and engages in sexual conduct or sexual penetration with a person who is in the custody of that
penal system”); id. § 11-9.5(b)(1) (sexual misconduct with a disabled person committed when the
defendant “is an employee and knowingly engages in sexual conduct or sexual penetration with a
person with a disability who is under the care and custody of the Department of Human Services
at a State-operated facility”). With these offenses, in contrast to predatory criminal sexual assault
of a child, “sexual conduct” is committed when, for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal,
there is a knowing (1) touching of the defendant’s or the adult victim’s sex organs, anus, or breast
or (2) transfer of semen by the defendant upon any part of the adult victim’s body. Thus, these
offenses involve two of the ways outlined above in which “sexual conduct” occurs. The offense of
which defendant was convicted, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, concerns “contact,
2
We do not construe whether “either directly or through clothing” applies to both the first
and second clauses describing “sexual conduct.” Construing the application of that term is not
relevant to this appeal and would, thus, constitute dicta. See People v. Kovacs, 135 Ill. App. 3d
448, 450-51 (1985) (refusing to rely on dicta because, at best, it provided only superficial support
to the defendant’s argument).
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however slight, between the sex organ or anus of one person and the part of the body of another,”
where the victim is under 13 years of age. Id. § 11-1.40(a)(1). While the aggravated-criminal-
sexual-abuse statute likewise provides that the victim is under 13, “sexual conduct” is much
broader than the conduct prohibited in the predatory-criminal-sexual-assault statute. For instance,
when the victim is under 13, “sexual conduct” need not involve the sex organs, anus, or breast but,
rather, includes the touching (for sexual gratification or arousal) of any part of the victim’s body.
The fact that “sexual conduct” occurs in three distinct ways necessarily means that predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse do not have identical
elements.
¶ 20 Defendant suggests that, because the conduct at issue here “constitute[d] both predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse,” a proportionate-penalties
violation arose. We disagree. As the court in Brooks observed, a person convicted of striking a
police officer with his hand (aggravated battery) could also have been convicted of simple battery.
Brooks, 2022 IL App (3d) 190761, ¶ 20. However, a defendant who strikes his friend with his hand
(simple battery) cannot automatically be convicted of aggravated battery in the absence of an
aggravating factor. Id. Likewise, the touching of a defendant’s penis by a child under 13 for the
purpose of the defendant’s sexual gratification or arousal—as happened here—constitutes both
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and the lesser included offense of aggravated criminal
sexual abuse. However, not all conduct that constitutes aggravated criminal sexual abuse also
constitutes predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. For example, a defendant who massages
the back of a naked six-year-old for purposes of sexual gratification can be convicted of aggravated
criminal sexual abuse, but, without an allegation that the touching concerned a sex organ or anus,
the defendant cannot also be convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child.
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¶ 21 Supporting our position is People v. Williams, 2015 IL 117470. There, our supreme court
assessed whether (1) aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, a Class 4 felony (720 ILCS 5/24-
1.6(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)(C) (West 2012)) 3, and (2) a violation of section 2(a)(1) of the Firearm
Owner’s Identification Card Act (FOID Card Act), a Class A misdemeanor (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1)
(West 2012)), shared the same elements but different sentences, in violation of the proportionate-
penalties clause. Williams, 2015 IL 117470, ¶¶ 12-14. The court determined that there was no
proportionate-penalties clause violation, because aggravated unlawful use of a weapon required
proof that the defendant possessed a firearm outside of his home, while section 2(a)(1) of the FOID
Card Act did not have a location requirement. Id. ¶ 14. In reaching that conclusion, the court
observed that an individual could violate the two statutes simultaneously under certain
circumstances but that “this [was] not always true.” Id. ¶ 18. For example, “a person [could] violate
the FOID Card Act by possessing a firearm in his home without also having in his possession a
FOID card, whereas such conduct would not violate the [aggravated-unlawful-use-of-a-weapon]
statute.” Id.
¶ 22 The same is true of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal
sexual abuse. Like the location requirement in the aggravated-unlawful-use-of-a-weapon statute
in Williams, the predatory-criminal-sexual-assault-of-a-child statute requires more than the
aggravated-criminal-sexual-abuse statute. Predatory criminal sexual assault of a child requires
proof of a knowing touching of a sex organ or anus for sexual gratification or arousal when the
3
This version of the aggravated-unlawful-use-of-a-weapon statute was found
unconstitutional in People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶¶ 21-22, and amended by Public Act 98-
63 (eff. Jul 9, 2013) (amending 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6).
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victim is under 13, whereas aggravated criminal sexual abuse does not require knowing touching
of such specific areas when the victim is under 13. Rather, touching any part of the body of a
victim under 13 for sexual gratification or arousal constitutes aggravated criminal sexual abuse.
¶ 23 This difference makes clear that the legislature created the offenses of predatory criminal
sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse for similar, albeit different, reasons.
Presumably because of an increase in sexual assaults against children where the sex organs or anus
are involved, the legislature found a need to punish more severely defendants who commit
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child than defendants who touch more innocuous parts of a
child’s body for sexual gratification or arousal. Nothing about this was improper. People v. Coty,
2020 IL 123972, ¶ 24 (noting that the legislature may enact more severe penalties for certain
crimes to halt the increase of certain crimes).
¶ 24 Defendant argues that, as applied to him, the predatory-criminal-sexual-assault-of a-child
statute and the aggravated-criminal-sexual-abuse statute violate the proportionate-penalties clause.
Although cited by neither party, there is support for defendant’s position. In People v. Deckard,
2020 IL App (4th) 170781-U, ¶ 72, the defendant argued that his two convictions of predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child violated the proportionate-penalties clause because those
offenses, as charged, had the same elements as aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The appellate
court agreed, observing that the counts charging the defendant with predatory criminal sexual
assault of a child alleged that the defendant “ ‘patted the sex organ of [his girlfriend’s six- or seven-
year-old granddaughter] with his hand for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the
defendant.’ ” Id. ¶¶ 2, 38, 75. The court determined that “this conduct, as alleged, also [met] the
elements of aggravated criminal sexual abuse.” Id. ¶ 75. That is, predatory criminal sexual assault
of a child, as charged, required—as would a charge of aggravated criminal sexual abuse based on
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the same allegations—that the touching of the granddaughter’s sex organ was for the defendant’s
sexual gratification or arousal. See id.
¶ 25 We believe that Deckard was wrongly decided. How and where the granddaughter was
touched was irrelevant in deciding whether the proportionate-penalties clause was violated under
the identical-elements test. Instead, comparing the elements of both statutes, irrespective of how
the defendant committed predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, was all that mattered.
¶ 26 Williams is again instructive. There, the defendant argued that the aggravated-unlawful
use-of-a-weapon statute violated the proportionate-penalties clause as applied to him, because
(1) his being armed with a firearm on a public street while lacking a valid FOID card violated both
the aggravated-unlawful-use-of-a-weapon statute and the FOID Card Act and (2) the statutes
prescribed disparate penalties. Williams, 2015 IL 117470, ¶¶ 3, 19. Our supreme court disagreed,
noting that “a proportionate penalty analysis under the identical elements test is not a subjective
determination.” Id. ¶ 19. Rather, “[i]t is an objective and logic-based test” that “compares the
elements of two offenses to determine if the offenses are the same.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. “This objective test does not consider the offenses as applied to an individual
defendant.” Id.
¶ 27 Here, admittedly, what the State alleged in the count of which defendant was found guilty
satisfied the elements of both predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal
sexual abuse. However, as in Williams and unlike in Deckard, it is irrelevant what was alleged in
that count. Under the identical-elements test, all that matters is whether, when comparing the
elements of the offenses as the legislature enacted them, the two statutes are revealed to contain
the same elements but provide for disparate sentences. The elements of predatory criminal sexual
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assault of a child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse are not the same. Thus, the disparate
sentences for the two offenses are proper.
¶ 28 In reaching our conclusion, we find misplaced defendant’s reliance on People v.
Hernandez, 2016 IL 118672, and People v. Ligon, 2016 IL 118023. Citing these cases, defendant
argues that “courts must necessarily consider the facts alleged in a case.” Although both cases
discussed the specific weapons with which the defendants were armed, our supreme court did not
do so in determining whether the charges of armed robbery with a dangerous weapon (Hernandez)
and aggravated vehicular hijacking while armed with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm
(Ligon) violated the proportionate-penalties clause in that these offenses had the same elements as
armed violence with a Category III weapon but different sentences. See Hernandez, 2016 IL
118672, ¶ 16; Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 25. Rather, our supreme court objectively compared the
elements of the applicable statutes to assess whether a proportionate-penalties violation occurred
under the identical-elements test. See Hernandez, 2016 IL 118672, ¶ 16 (“[T]he elements of armed
robbery, which require, inter alia, proof that [the] defendant was ‘armed with a dangerous weapon’
*** [citation] are not identical to the elements of armed violence, which require, inter alia, proof
that [the] defendant committed a qualifying felony while armed with a Category III weapon ***
[citation].” (Emphasis omitted.)); Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 25 (“[T]he elements of [aggravated
vehicular hijacking while armed with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm], which require,
inter alia, proof that [the] defendant was ‘armed with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm’
*** [citation] are not identical to the elements of armed violence, which require, inter alia, proof
that [the] defendant committed a qualifying felony while armed with a category III weapon ***
[citations].” (Emphasis omitted.)).
¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION
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¶ 30 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 31 Affirmed.
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People v. Johanson, 2023 IL App (2d) 210690
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of McHenry County, No. 19-CF-
578; the Hon. Michael E. Coppedge, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Lilien, and Vicki P. Kouros, of State
for Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.
Appellant:
Attorneys Patrick D. Kenneally, State’s Attorney, of Woodstock (Patrick
for Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, Victoria E. Jozef, of State’s
Appellee: Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the
People.
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People v. Johanson
Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
Date filed: 2023-01-23
Citations: 2023 IL App (2d) 210690
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