UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOHN DOE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Civil Action No. 12-01229 (TFH)
JUDITH ROGERS, M.H.A., et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Pending before the Court is the defendants’ request to remove the pseudonymous
treatment of the plaintiff’s name from this Court’s September 10, 2020 Memorandum Opinion
[ECF No. 139]. The defendants ask that the Court replace references to “Dr. Doe” with the
plaintiff’s real name. Resp. About Proposed Withholdings In Mem. Op. at 5-7 (“Defs.’ Resp.”)
[ECF No. 137]. The plaintiff opposes the request. Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Remove the
Pseudonymous Status of the Case (“Opp’n”) [ECF No. 140]. The plaintiff contends that
removing the pseudonymous status will destroy his chances of ever securing employment as a
cardiac surgeon in the United States. Opp’n at 2 [ECF No. 140]. He also argues that, because
Peconic Bay Medical Center fraudulently submitted his name to the National Practitioner Data
Bank (“NPDB”), removing the pseudonymity of this case would compound that fraud by
exposing it to the public. Id. at 15. Alternatively, the plaintiff requests that the Court stay its
decision on pseudonymity “pending” a decision from the D.C. Circuit on the same issue. Id. For
the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that it is appropriate to remove the pseudonymous
treatment of the plaintiff’s name from this Court’s September 10, 2020 memorandum opinion.
Legal Standard
The “presumption of openness in judicial proceedings is a bedrock principle of our
judicial system” and thus parties who seek to proceed under pseudonym seek a “rare
dispensation” from the Court. In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d 324, 325-26 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(quotation omitted). “The presumption of openness is both ‘customary and constitutionally-
embedded[.]’” Id. at 326 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2019)); see also
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1995). With these principles in
mind, the party seeking pseudonymity “bears the weighty burden of both demonstrating a
concrete need for such secrecy, and identifying the consequences that would likely befall it if
forced to proceed in its own name.” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 326. “Speculative assertions
of harm will not suffice.” Id.
Once the movant fulfills its heavy burden of showing a legitimate need for secrecy, the
court must then “balance the litigant’s legitimate interest in anonymity against countervailing
interests in full disclosure.” In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 96. The following five non-
exhaustive factors serve as “guideposts from which a court ought to begin its analysis”:
(1) whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid the
annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy
in a matter of [a] sensitive and highly personal nature;
(2) whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the
requesting party or[,] even more critically, to innocent non-parties;
(3) the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be protected;
(4) whether the action is against a governmental or private party; and, relatedly,
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(5) the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it
to proceed anonymously.
In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97 (citing James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993)).
The court’s inquiry is “necessarily flexible and fact-driven.” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 326.
Discussion
The plaintiff generally asserts that he would be harmed by “the linkage of [plaintiff’s]
name in a very public manner to the NPDB report.” Opp’n at ¶ 25. The defendants counter that
much of this information is already publicly available in other lawsuits initiated by the plaintiff,
that the public has a heightened interest in lawsuits challenging governmental programs, and that
the plaintiff’s justifications for continued pseudonymity are outweighed by the countervailing
interests favoring full disclosure. The Court agrees.
First, the Court considers whether the justification is to avoid annoyance or to preserve
privacy in a sensitive or highly personal matter. The plaintiff states that public linkage of his
name with the NDPB report would jeopardize his “little remaining chance…of ever securing
employment a cardiac surgeon in the United States.” Opp’n at ¶ 1. However, it is unclear how
maintaining pseudonymity here would “preserve privacy” when the facts underlying this case
have already been publicly disclosed by the plaintiff in other lawsuits initiated by the plaintiff.
See Defs.’ Resp. at 3-4 (discussing New York State case filings). Moreover, even putting aside
the already publicly available information, the plaintiff’s asserted privacy concerns “‘bear no
resemblance to those types of intimate or sensitive personal information’ that are traditionally
recognized under this factor, ‘such as sexual activities, reproductive rights, bodily autonomy,
medical concerns, or the identity of abused minors.’” Doe v. Bogan, 542 F. Supp. 3d 19, 23
(D.D.C. 2021) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 327)). Lastly, the plaintiff’s concerns
about potential career harm are more akin to “annoyance and criticism that may attend any
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litigation.” See Bogan, 542 F. Supp. 3d at 23 (finding that the plaintiff’s concerns about career
harms and embarrassment in the community are “annoyance and criticism that may attend any
litigation”). This factor thus weighs in favor of disclosure.
Second, identification does not pose any risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the
plaintiff or to innocent non-parties. The plaintiff alleges that he will not be able to practice
medicine in the United States if his name is revealed. But economic harm does not suffice under
this factor. See In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 328 (“The asserted injuries are purely economic,
and speculative at that.”). This factor, too, weighs in favor of disclosure.
Third, the plaintiff’s age is not an issue in this matter; he is an adult.
Fourth, this action is against a governmental entity. The plaintiff has sued the
government about its conduct in maintaining and sharing reports submitted by hospitals
regarding the medical practice of physicians, which weighs heavily in favor of removing
pseudonymity. See id. at 329 (noting that “[a]s many courts have recognized, there is a heighted
public interest when an individual . . . files a suit against the government”).
Fifth, there is an ongoing risk of unfairness to the government to allow the plaintiff to
continue to proceed pseudonymously in light of the plaintiff’s allegations. In the plaintiff’s
filings in connection with this dispute alone, the plaintiff disparages government employees
while proceeding pseudonymously. See Opp’n at 2 (claiming that the “bureaucrats” at the
NPDB have asked that pseudonymity be removed “[i]n an act of pure vindictiveness” because
his lawsuit “endangers their cushy sinecure as administrators of the NPDB” and that they are
“paid 6-figure salaries” to “rubberstamp” reports submitted by hospitals). This factor thus
weighs in favor of disclosure.
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In sum, having considered the defendants’ request to replace references to Dr. Doe with
the plaintiff’s name in the Court’s September 10, 2020 Memorandum Opinion [ECF No. 137],
the plaintiff’s opposition thereto [ECF No. 140], and the entire record herein, and for the reasons
set forth above, the Court hereby grants the defendants’ request. A copy of the September 10,
2020 Memorandum Opinion that replaces references to “Dr. Doe” with the plaintiff’s real name
will be filed on the public docket.
SO ORDERED.
February 2, 2023 ________________________________
Thomas F. Hogan
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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