GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. A & C MEDICAL CENTER, INC., A/A/O RADHAMES DE JESUS

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida

Opinion filed February 15, 2023.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D22-0145
Lower Tribunal No. 18-10044 SP
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GEICO General Insurance Company,
Appellant,

vs.

A & C Medical Center, Inc., a/a/o Radhames De Jesus,
Appellee.

An appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Gloria
Gonzalez-Meyer, Judge.

Smith, Gambrell & Russell LLP, Kristen L. Wenger, John P. Marino,
and Drew Krieger (Jacksonville), for appellant.

Law Offices of Jose R. Iglesia, LLC, and Mari Sampedro-Iglesia, for
appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ.

MILLER, J.
 Appellant, GEICO General Insurance Company, challenges a final

judgment awarding no-fault personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits to

appellee, A & C Medical Center, a medical provider, following a summary

judgment hearing. On appeal, GEICO contends the denial of its motion for

leave to amend its answer and assert the affirmative defenses of res judicata

and collateral estoppel after it obtained a favorable declaratory judgment in

federal court constituted an abuse of discretion. Finding that A & C failed to

demonstrate “a clear danger of prejudice, abuse, or futility,” we reverse. RV-

7 Prop., Inc. v. Stefani De La O, Inc., 187 So. 3d 915, 916–17 (Fla. 3d DCA

2016).

BACKGROUND

Following an automobile accident, A & C filed suit under an assignment

of benefits seeking reimbursement for medical services purportedly

rendered to Radhames De Jesus, a GEICO insured. GEICO answered and

raised two affirmative defenses: (1) the failure to satisfy the elected

deductible; and (2) payment rendered at the permissible reimbursement

rates. After the pleadings closed, A & C noticed the case for jury trial.

Shortly thereafter, GEICO filed a federal declaratory action against A

& C and fourteen other medical providers. In the federal complaint, GEICO

alleged A & C engaged in unlawful billing practices. The complaint contained

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counts for violations of section 501.201 et seq., Florida Statutes (2018), the

“Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act,” common law fraud, and

unjust enrichment and GEICO specifically sought a declaration that A & C

had “no right to receive payment for any pending bills.” A & C failed to

respond to the complaint, and GEICO obtained a default final judgment.

In the interim, the state court suit remained stagnant, and A & C filed

a succession of further jury trial notices. No trial date was forthcoming, and

A & C eventually moved for summary judgment on the basis that the medical

expenses incurred were reasonable, related, and medically necessary.

While the summary judgment motion was pending, GEICO sought to

amend its answer to add res judicata and collateral estoppel as affirmative

defenses. The trial court convened a hearing on the summary judgment

motion, at the conclusion of which it denied leave to amend and granted

summary judgment. The instant appeal ensued.

ANALYSIS

We review an order denying a motion for leave to amend for an abuse

of discretion. Santos v. Flores, 116 So. 3d 518, 520 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

Under such a standard, ordinarily, “if reasonable men [or women] could differ

as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then the action is not

unreasonable and there can be no finding of an abuse of discretion.”

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Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980). Amendments

to the pleadings are viewed through a different lens. In this regard, our

review is guided by bedrock principles articulated in our precedent.

Under Florida law, leave to amend “shall be given freely when justice

so requires,” and all doubts are generally resolved in favor of granting such

a motion. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a); DiGiacomo v. Mosquera, 322 So. 3d 734,

738 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021). Resultantly, the “refusal to allow amendment of a

pleading constitutes an abuse of discretion unless allowing the amendment

‘would prejudice the opposing party, the privilege to amend has been

abused, or amendment would be futile.’” Pangea Produce Distribs., Inc. v.

Franco’s Produce, Inc., 275 So. 3d 240, 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (quoting

JVN Holdings, Inc. v. Am. Const. & Repairs, LLC, 185 So. 3d 599, 601 (Fla.

3d DCA 2016)).

This rule of liberality, however, diminishes as the case progresses to

trial. See Noble v. Martin Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 710 So. 2d 567, 568–69 (Fla.

4th DCA 1997) (holding trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying

motion for leave to amend when “four years and four complaints passed with

no request for injunctive relief”); Jain v. Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC,

322 So. 3d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (denying motion for leave to

amend when sought after trial court orally granted summary judgment);

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Toscano Condo. Ass’n v. DDA Eng’rs, 274 So. 3d 487, 491 (Fla. 3d DCA

2019) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend when leave

granted three times prior and new claim was not asserted “until more than

two years after the filing of the complaint and more than six months after the

trial court conducted its case management conference”).

Here, GEICO moved to amend the answer for the first time before the

summary judgment hearing. The defenses, as penned, were facially viable.

There was no showing the parties engaged in protracted discovery, and the

case was not set for trial. Consequently, the record is devoid of any

indication of “danger of prejudice, abuse, or futility.” See RV-7 Prop., 187

So. 3d at 917.

A & C argues that a fourteen-month-delay between the time GEICO

obtained the federal default judgment and filed the motion for leave to amend

supports the ruling below. Absent bad faith or dilatory tactics, this court and

others have declined to impute prejudice on a time delay alone. See Carib

Ocean Shipping, Inc. v. Armas, 854 So. 2d 234, 235–36 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003);

see also Heyl & Patterson Int’l, Inc. v. F. D. Rich Hous. of V. I., Inc., 663 F.2d

419, 426–27 (3d Cir. 1981); Lux v. Cox, 32 F. Supp. 2d 92, 97–98 (W.D.N.Y.

1998); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sargent & Lundy, 916 F.2d 1119, 1131 (6th Cir.

1990); State Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Lubbock v. Campbell, 848 F.2d 1186,

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1188–89 (11th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment and

remand with instructions to allow the proposed amendment.

Reversed and remanded.

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