Filed 2/15/23 P. v. Daniels CA2/2
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B308995
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA347305)
v.
BRANDON DANIELS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Craig J. Mitchell, Judge. Reversed.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Peggy Z. Huang, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
We affirmed the denial of defendant and appellant Brandon
Daniels’s (defendant) petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal
Code former section 1170.95 in People v. Daniels (Dec. 16, 2021,
B308995) (nonpub. opn.).1 By order dated November 30, 2022, the
California Supreme Court returned this case to this court with
directions to vacate our previous decision and to reconsider the
cause in light of People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong).
BACKGROUND
A jury convicted defendant in 2013 of first degree murder and
found true the felony-murder special circumstance alleged pursuant
to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). Defendant was sentenced to
prison for life without the possibility of parole, which we affirmed in
People v. Daniels (Sept. 29, 2014, B249088) (nonpub. opn.).
In 2019, defendant filed a petition for vacatur and
resentencing under section 1172.6. After appointing counsel for
defendant and considering briefing and counsel’s arguments, the
trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage without an
evidentiary hearing. In affirming the denial, we found the trial
court could deny a section 1172.6 petition at the initial prima facie
review on the ground that the murder conviction with a special
circumstance finding pursuant to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)
made defendant ineligible as a matter of law for resentencing under
section 1172.6. (See People v. Daniels, supra, B308995.) We further
1 Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch.
58, § 10.) We will refer to the section by its new numbering only.
All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.
2
held that the jury’s special circumstance finding could not be
challenged in a section 1172.6 proceeding based upon factors
clarified after his conviction in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th
788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark). We
also conducted a substantial evidence review of the evidence
relevant to Banks and Clark as summarized in our opinion
affirming the judgment and concluded that any error in denying the
petition was harmless.
We now reconsider that decision in light of Strong, supra, 13
Cal.5th 698.
DISCUSSION
In Strong, our high court held that a true finding on a felony-
murder special-circumstance allegation that predates Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th 788 and Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522 does not preclude
section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at pp. 717-720.) Such a finding is premised on outdated legal
standards, making Banks and Clark comparable to the kind of
significant change in law traditionally found to warrant a
reexamination of earlier litigated decisions, thus rendering the rule
of collateral estoppel inapplicable. (Strong, supra, at pp. 719-720.)2
The court also held that an erroneously denied petition on that
ground is not subject to a substantial evidence review for harmless
error, as this would deny the defendant a determination beyond a
reasonable doubt that the correct standards were met; and it would
2 The court made clear that while its decision did not foreclose
reexamination of all special circumstance findings, it also did not
mean that all such findings should be open to relitigation. (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 714.)
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entail factfinding, which is prohibited at the prima facie stage.
(Strong, at p. 720, citing People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972.)
The parties have filed supplemental briefs addressing these
issues, and the People acknowledge that their previous arguments
in People v. Daniels, supra, B308995 were the same arguments
presented to and rejected by the high court in Strong, supra, 13
Cal.5th 698. We agree with the People who concede that the matter
should be remanded to the trial court for issuance of an order to
show cause and an evidentiary hearing. Then the petition must be
granted unless the prosecution proves “beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Upon
reconsideration of the cause in light of Strong, we conclude that the
superior court erred in denying defendant’s petition. We therefore
remand the matter for the issuance of an order to show cause and
further proceedings in accordance with section 1172.6, subdivision
(d).
DISPOSITION
The opinion and decision filed in this case on December 16,
2021, is vacated and the denial of the section 1172.6 petition is
reversed. The matter is remanded for reappointment of counsel and
further proceedings in accordance with section 1172.6, subdivision
(d).
___________________________
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
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______________________________ ___________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J. HOFFSTADT, J.