Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC22-72
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FRANK A. WALLS,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
February 16, 2023
PER CURIAM.
Frank A. Walls, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals
an order denying his latest successive postconviction motion, which
sought relief under Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014).1 For the
reasons given below, we affirm.
Background
Early one morning in 1987, Walls broke into a mobile home
then occupied by Edward Alger and Ann Peterson. Using curtain
cords, Walls tied them up. Alger managed to get loose, and a
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
struggle ensued. Ultimately, Walls tackled Alger, slashed his
throat, and then shot him in the head several times—killing him.
Walls then turned his attention to Peterson, who was at that
time helpless and in tears. Though Peterson posed no threat to
him, Walls shot her in the head from close range. Peterson began
screaming. In response, Walls forced Peterson’s face into a pillow
and again shot her in the head from close range. She died as a
result of these gunshot wounds.
Based on these events, the State charged Walls with two
counts of first-degree murder and other crimes. A jury found Walls
guilty as charged on both murder counts and recommended a
sentence of death for the murder of Peterson. Following the
sentencing hearing, the circuit court sentenced Walls to death. On
appeal, we reversed his convictions and death sentence, holding
that a correctional officer committed a Massiah 2 violation during
Walls’s pretrial detention. Walls v. State, 580 So. 2d 131, 132-35
(Fla. 1991) (plurality opinion); id. at 135 (Grimes, J., concurring).
2. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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On remand, a jury found Walls guilty of both first-degree
murder counts and again recommended a death sentence for the
murder of Peterson. Accepting that recommendation, the circuit
count imposed the death sentence. This time, we affirmed in all
respects. Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381, 391 (Fla. 1994). Walls
then filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, which was
denied. Walls v. Florida, 513 U.S. 1130 (1995).
Since then, Walls has challenged his death sentence
numerous times, including on the basis that he is intellectually
disabled. He first raised an intellectual-disability claim shortly after
the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, which held that the
Eighth Amendment forbids execution of the intellectually disabled.
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). Following a lengthy evidentiary hearing,
the circuit court denied Walls’s Atkins claim. We affirmed, noting
that Walls had never scored 70 or below on an IQ test. Walls v.
State, 3 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2008) (table decision) (citing Cherry v.
State, 959 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2007)).
Seven years later, Walls raised his second intellectual-
disability claim—this time relying on Hall v. Florida. That decision
held that Cherry’s bright-line test created “an unacceptable risk
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that persons with intellectual disability will be executed.” Hall, 572
U.S. at 704. Reasoning in part that Hall did not apply to cases on
collateral review, the circuit court summarily denied Walls’s claim.
We disagreed, determining that Hall was retroactive under our state
law. Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340, 346 (Fla. 2016) (applying
retroactivity test set forth in Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla.
1980)). In light of that determination, we reversed the summary
denial and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 341, 347.
Over four years later, the evidentiary hearing took place.
Ultimately, the circuit court denied Walls’s motion, giving two
reasons for its ruling. First, relying on intervening case law from
this Court, see Phillips v. State, 299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2020); Nixon
v. State, 327 So. 3d 780 (Fla. 2021), the circuit court concluded
that Hall was not retroactive and, thus, Hall could not provide a
basis for relief. Second, on the merits, the court found that Walls
failed to prove that he was intellectually disabled under section
921.137, Florida Statutes (2021). Walls now appeals.
Analysis
Walls argues that the circuit court erred in multiple respects
in denying his intellectual-disability claim. We decline to reach his
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merits-based argument and instead affirm on the basis that Hall is
not retroactive. 3
Walls’s death sentence became final in 1995. Thus, to benefit
from Hall—a decision that issued almost 20 years later—Walls must
show that Hall is retroactive. Our decision in Phillips, however,
forecloses that argument. In that decision, we held that Hall is not
retroactive under federal or state law, receding from prior case law
to the contrary. Phillips, 299 So. 3d at 1018-24.
Recognizing the hurdle Phillips poses, Walls contends that
Phillips was wrongly decided. And in the alternative, he argues that
our decision in State v. Okafor, 306 So. 3d 930, 933-35 (Fla. 2020)
(applying finality-of-judgment principles in concluding that we
lacked authority to simply reinstate death sentence when time
period for recalling our mandate vacating death sentence had
expired), and the law-of-the-case doctrine preclude application of
Phillips in this particular case. But we have already rejected
arguments to recede from Phillips and have instead consistently
applied its holding in the postconviction context, see, e.g.,
3. Our review in this case is de novo. See Rogers v. State, 327
So. 3d 784, 787 n.5 (Fla. 2021).
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Thompson v. State, 341 So. 3d 303, 304 (Fla. 2022) (death sentence
final in 1993); Pittman v. State, 337 So. 3d 776, 777 (Fla. 2022)
(death sentence final in 1995); Nixon, 327 So. 3d at 781 (death
sentence final in 1991); Freeman v. State, 300 So. 3d 591, 593 (Fla.
2020) (death sentence final in 1991); Cave v. State, 299 So. 3d 352,
353 (Fla. 2020) (death sentence final in 1999), even in cases where
we had remanded for additional proceedings in light of Hall,
see, e.g., Thompson, 341 So. 3d at 306; Nixon, 327 So. 3d at 782.
For instance, in Nixon, we affirmed the denial of a Hall-based
intellectual-disability claim. 327 So. 3d at 784. In so doing, we
stated that Phillips was the controlling law that governed on appeal,
concluding: “It would be inconsistent with that controlling law for
us to entertain Nixon’s successive, Hall-based challenge to the trial
court’s order here.” Id. at 783. We further stressed that the law-of-
the-case doctrine did not compel a different analysis. Id. Again,
noting that Phillips had issued after our mandate in Nixon’s prior
appeal, we applied an exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine for
intervening changes in controlling law. Id.
We reached a similar conclusion in Thompson, a case that
involved a remand instruction requiring the circuit court to hold a
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new evidentiary hearing on Thompson’s Hall-based intellectual-
disability claim. Thompson, 341 So. 3d at 305. On remand, the
circuit court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing and summarily
denied the claim on the authority of Phillips. Id. Thompson argued
on appeal that Okafor required the circuit court to hold an
evidentiary hearing in compliance with the remand instruction. Id.
Disagreeing with that argument, we distinguished Okafor based on
the fact that Thompson’s death sentence remained intact. Id. at
305-06. Additionally, consistent with Nixon, we concluded that
Phillips constituted an intervening change in law for purposes of an
exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine. Id. at 306. Accordingly,
we followed Phillips and held that Hall did not apply in Thompson’s
case. Id. Based on this analysis, we affirmed the summary denial
of Thompson’s intellectual-disability claim. Id.
Accordingly, consistent with Nixon and Thompson,4 we
conclude that Walls does not get the benefit of Hall. As a
4. We reject Walls’s argument to recede from Nixon and
Thompson.
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consequence, his Hall-based intellectual-disability claim fails
regardless of the evidence presented at his evidentiary hearing. 5
Conclusion
Based on the above analysis, we affirm the circuit court’s
ruling.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, POLSTON, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
and FRANCIS, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LABARGA, J., dissenting.
Because I continue to adhere to my dissent in Phillips v. State,
299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2020) (receding from Walls v. State, 213 So.
5. Walls also argues that application of Phillips would result
in a due-process violation, claiming that the decision was both
“unexpected and indefensible.” We reject this argument. Of
significance, federal and state courts alike have concluded that Hall
is not retroactive. See State v. Lotter, 976 N.W.2d 721, 741
(Neb. 2022) (relying on Phillips in holding that Hall is not
retroactive); State v. Jackson, 157 N.E.3d 240, 253 (Ohio Ct. App.
2020) (refusing to apply Hall retroactively; listing Phillips as
example of “substantial and growing body of case law” declining “to
apply Hall and Moore [v. Texas, 581 U.S. 1 (2017),] retroactively”); In
re Payne, 722 Fed. Appx. 534, 538 (6th Cir. 2018) (noting body of
federal case law finding Hall not retroactive).
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3d 340 (Fla. 2016), and holding that Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701
(2014), does not apply retroactively), I dissent to the majority’s
decision affirming the denial of Walls’s successive motion for
postconviction relief.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Okaloosa County,
William Francis Stone, Judge
Case No. 461987CF000856XXXAXX
Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Julissa R.
Fontán, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle
Region, Temple Terrace, Florida; and Kara R. Ottervanger, Office of
the Federal Public Defender, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee
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