NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 16 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSHUA LEON WORRELL, No. 22-35268
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:20-cv-00458-CWD
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Candy W. Dale, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 8, 2023**
Portland, Oregon
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and FORREST and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
Claimant Joshua Leon Worrell appeals from the district court’s ruling
affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for
disability benefits. We review the district court’s order de novo and reverse only if
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) decision was not supported by substantial
evidence or was based on legal error. Larson v. Saul, 967 F.3d 914, 922 (9th Cir.
2020). We affirm.
1. Due Process. Worrell makes a conclusory argument that the ALJ denied
him due process in evaluating his claim. This argument fails because there is no
indication that the Commissioner failed to afford Worrell an opportunity to be heard,
failed to consider the relevant evidence, or failed to explain the basis for the denial
of Worrell’s claim in a reasoned decision. See Klemm v. Astrue, 543 F.3d 1139, 1144
(9th Cir. 2008) (“A mere allegation of a due process violation is not a colorable
constitutional claim.”) (internal citation omitted).
2. Claimant’s Subjective Evidence of Pain. Substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s decision to discount Worrell’s subjective evidence of pain because the
ALJ gave clear and convincing reasoning. See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664,
678–79 (9th Cir. 2017). The record evidence establishes that Worrell’s hip pain
improved after surgery, physical therapy, and weight loss. See 20 C.F.R.
404.1529(c)(2); Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 598–600
(9th Cir. 1999). Similarly, Worrell’s mental health improved with medication. See
Morgan, 169 F.3d at 599. Moreover, despite partially discrediting Worrell’s self-
reported symptoms, the ALJ incorporated multiple non-exertional physical and
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mental limitations related to those symptoms into her residual-functional-capacity
determination.
3. Evaluation of Medical Evidence. The Commissioner’s revised regulations
regarding evaluating medical evidence apply to Worrell’s June 14, 2018, disability
claim. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c; Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir.
2022). To the extent Worrell relies on the “displace[d]” standard for evaluating
medical evidence, those arguments are foreclosed by Woods. 32 F.4th at 787.
Worrell also argues that the ALJ substituted her opinion of his mental limitations for
the findings of the consultative examiner.
We conclude the ALJ correctly applied the revised regulations when
evaluating consultative examiner Nels Sather, Ph.D.’s findings. The ALJ explained
why she found Dr. Sather’s opinion persuasive but ultimately incomplete because
Dr. Sather relied on Worrell’s subjective complaints to draw his conclusions. The
ALJ took other administrative findings addressing Worrell’s mental limitations—
the opinions of state agency medical reviewers—into account and linked those
findings, along with Dr. Sather’s opinion, to references in the record and to other
objective sources in making her step-five residual-functional-capacity
determination.
Additionally, contrary to Worrell’s assertion, the ALJ did not erroneously
dismiss orthopedist Stephen Kenji Aoki, M.D.’s medical opinions about Worrell’s
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hip pain. The relevant treatment notes reflect statements that Worrell made to Dr.
Aoki about his hip pain, not Dr. Aoki’s assessment of Worrell’s pain or any
functional limitations associated with it. Accordingly, Dr. Aoki’s notes do not
constitute medical opinions under the Commissioner’s revised regulations. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2).
4. Step-Five Finding. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s step-five
finding. First, as noted above, the ALJ considered the persuasiveness of Dr. Sather’s
opinion, but also properly noted its limitations and relied on the opinions of state
agency medical reviewers to translate Worrell’s mental-health symptoms into
functional limitations. Moreover, the ALJ addressed Worrell’s subjective
complaints to Dr. Sather by limiting him to occasional public, co-worker, and
supervisor interaction. She also addressed Dr. Sather’s findings about Worrell’s
memory by limiting him to simple, routine tasks and low stress work.
Second, the functional restrictions in the residual-functional-capacity
determination sufficiently capture Worrell’s functional limitations related to his
mental-health symptoms. The state agency medical reviewers’ findings are the only
medical evidence in the record that translates those symptoms into functional
limitations. And Worrell does not challenge those opinions. Therefore, substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Worrell is only moderately impaired
and can perform “simple, unskilled jobs.”
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Finally, the ALJ did not err under Maxwell v. Saul, 971 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.
2020), when she concluded that available jobs in two positions—office work and
electronics worker—constituted “significant numbers in the national economy.”
Maxwell interpreted a rule applying only to persons of advanced age—fifty-five
years or older—with limited transferrable skills. See id. at 1131. This rule is not
applicable to Worrell, who was thirty years old at the time of his alleged disability
onset date.
AFFIRMED.
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