UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
BETTY WILLIAMS NORWOOD, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, DC-1221-13-0830-W-1
v.
SMALL BUSINESS DATE: February 15, 2023
ADMINISTRATION,
Agency.
THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
James A. Westbrooks, Fort Washington, Maryland, for the appellant.
Nathania Bates, Washington, D.C., for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Member
Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
REMAND ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
denied her request for corrective action under the Whistleblower Protection Act
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
(WPA). 2 For the reasons set forth below, we GRANT the petition for review. We
VACATE the administrative judge’s findings that the appellant exhausted only
one disclosure and that it was not protected or a contributing factor in the
agency’s decision to take a personnel action against her, and the administrative
judge’s alternate finding that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence
that it would have taken that action absent the appellant’s protected disclosure.
We REMAND the case to the regional office for further adjudication in
accordance with this Remand Order.
BACKGROUND
¶2 The appellant was employed as an Audit Manager in the U.S. Small
Business Administration (SBA) Office of Inspector General (OIG). Sometime in
or after October 2010, the appellant developed concerns about a March 2010 audit
report that had been the subject of testimony to Congress and which she believed
contained omissions and several inaccuracies. 3 Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 24
at 28-29. The appellant alleges having disclosed this information to a manager in
the Credit Programs Group (CPG), the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing
(AIGA), and the Deputy Inspector General who responded with “we will reissue
the report.” Id. at 29. However, the manager, after being promoted in early 2011
to Director of the CPG, decided not to reissue the report. Id.
¶3 The appellant subsequently expressed concerns to the CPG Director about
the sufficiency of evidence in a 2012 audit report 4 and her beliefs about the 2010
2
The WPA was amended by the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012,
Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465, which took effect on December 27, 2012.
3
SBA OIG Audit Report No. 10-10, Audit of Premier Certified Lenders in the
Section 504 Loan Program.
4
The 2012 report, referenced by the appellant as the “High-Risk Lenders report,”
appears most likely to have been SBA OIG Audit Report No. 12-20, Addressing
Performance Problems of High-Risk Lenders Remains a Challenge for the Small
Business Administration. See IAF, Tab 24 at 25-26.
3
report. Id. at 7, 25-26. The appellant shared her concerns the next day with the
AIGA and met with the Inspector General on March 27, 2012, to discuss her
concerns and to request reassignment under a different first-line supervisor. Id.
at 25-26. She followed up with a letter to the Inspector General, recounting her
history of disclosures regarding both audit reports, disclosing that the CPG
Director had bragged that the Deputy Inspector General had preselected her as
Director and moved the duty station in the Director vacancy listing from agency
headquarters to a field office location purely for the Director’s benefit, and
alleging that the CPG Director approved a nearly $1 million payment to a
contractor to review loans, only to later have the work entirely redone by her own
staff. Id. at 25-30.
¶4 In July 2012, the appellant met with an Equal Employment Opportunity
(EEO) counselor to allege that the CPG Director had subjected her to harassment
since September 2011 because of her race, sex, and age. IAF, Tab 10 at 67-73.
Following an unsuccessful mediation, id. at 72, the appellant filed a formal EEO
complaint naming the CPG Director, the AIGA, the since-retired Deputy
Inspector General, and the Inspector General. IAF, Tab 11 at 64-82.
¶5 Meanwhile, the appellant sent an email to officials in the U.S. Congress, the
Office of Government Ethics, and the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency (CIGIE), repeating the disclosures that favoritism towards the
CPG Director had resulted in her change of duty station to a field office, the
decision not to retract the deficient March 2010 audit report, and the waste of
nearly $1 million. IAF, Tab 1 at 25-28. She further alleged that because of the
favoritism, the field office where the CPG Director worked had been allowed to
remain open when the agency’s three other field offices were closed in
October 2011. Id. at 26. She raised similar allegations in a separate email to the
President. IAF, Tab 10 at 35-38.
¶6 By letter dated September 25, 2012, the CIGIE Integrity Committee
informed the appellant that it lacked jurisdiction to address the a llegations raised
4
in her email because they did not appear to involve the actions of either the
Inspector General herself, an individual who reported directly to the Inspector
General, or a person whose position had been designated by the Inspector
General. IAF, Tab 1 at 33. The appellant responded by letter in November 2012
asserting that the Inspector General, the Deputy Inspector General, the Counsel to
the Inspector General, and the AIGA were all implicated in the actions she had
described. Id. at 34-35, 40-41. She also alleged, inter alia, that the Inspector
General was responsible for systemic race and age discrim ination, id. at 36-38,
and that both the Inspector General and the AIGA had placed sensitive loan
information at risk, id. at 39.
¶7 Responding by letter to the CIGIE Integrity Committee a month later, the
appellant forwarded a copy of an email exchange between the CPG Director and
the AIGA that had been copied to several other staff members. Id. at 20. The
email conveyed the Director’s message that she was working in a back office in
headquarters that day, and the AIGA responded with a symbol denoting a wink
(“;-)”). Id. at 21. The appellant reported that several staff members had told her
that the AIGA’s message was inappropriate and made them feel uncomfortable.
Id. at 20. After the CIGIE Integrity Committee informed the appellant that the
matter fell outside its jurisdiction, id. at 23, she reported the AIGA’s email to
members of Congress, id. at 24.
¶8 During a December 2012 meeting between the CPG Director and the
appellant to discuss the appellant’s performance during the prior fiscal year, the
CPG Director told the appellant that she had received negative feedback from
other employees about the appellant’s communication and collaboration. On
January 2, 2013, the appellant asked the CPG Director by email to identify the
source of the negative feedback. The CPG Director responded with the names of
two offices within SBA. IAF, Tab 10 at 84-85.
¶9 Five days later the appellant sent an email to several officials in the offices
identified by the CPG Director, with copies to the AIGA and the CPG Director, in
5
which she apologized “for any dialogue (verbal or written) that I exchanged o r
actions that I took during FY 2012 that resulted in your perception of me as
negative or obstructionist.” Id. at 94. She asked for their forgiveness as well as
“any suggestions that will make for a more collaborative working relationship in
FY 2013 and beyond.” Id. Having received no response, the appellant sent
another email a week later in which she also requested “details about the specific
dialogue and actions that I took in FY 2012 that left you feeling like you did not
want to work with me.” Id. at 104-05. The day after the appellant’s second
email, the AIGA informed her that her emails might raise an issue of auditor
independence and/or objectivity. Id. at 107. He stated that he was seeking
clarification from the Auditing Standards Group at the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) regarding those issues, and he directed her not to
send any further emails on the matter. Id. at 107.
¶10 The AIGA presented his concerns regarding the appellant’s independence
and objectivity to GAO. Id. at 113-14. In a telephone conversation that was later
confirmed in writing, an official from the GAO Auditing Standards Gr oup
advised the AIGA that, while the appellant’s emails were inappropriate, they did
not violate the Government Auditing Standard for Independence for either current
or past auditing work. Id. at 125. However, the GAO official advised the AIGA
that the appellant should not be assigned future work with the offices that
received her emails because management in those offices could perceive the
emails as threatening or intimidating. Id. On February 4, 2013, the AIGA
informed the appellant that going forward, she was not to conduct any audit work
involving the Office of Credit Access or its subordinate organizations. IAF,
Tab 1 at 53.
¶11 In the meantime, in January 2013, the appellant had forwarded her
correspondence with CIGIE to the congressional committees with jurisdiction
over the inspector general system. Id. at 24. The appellant also filed a complaint
with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) on February 13, 2013, in which she
6
alleged retaliation for whistleblowing, citing the AIGA’s decision to restrict her
ability to perform certain audit work as an act of retaliation. IAF, Tab 11
at 44-59.
¶12 In April 2013, OSC informed the appellant of its initial determination to
close its file regarding her complaint. IAF, Tab 1 at 89. In a written response to
OSC’s determination that she had not provided enough specific information
regarding her disclosures, the appellant argued that her November 2012 letter to
the CIGIE Integrity Committee and her January 2013 letters to members of
Congress constituted protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9). Id. at 14.
She also alleged that the AIGA’s actions restricting her audit responsibilities
violated 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(12). Id. at 16. By letter dated May 24, 2013, OSC
informed the appellant that her response had not provided a sufficient basis to
alter its initial determination to close its file, and also informed her of her right to
seek corrective action from the Board. IAF, Tab 11 at 60-63.
¶13 The appellant remained in her position and continued performing other
audit work. IAF, Tab 13 at 20. In June 2013, following the departure of another
Audit Manager, the AIGA reassigned the appellant to serve in the same position
in an audit group for which she was not prevented from performing any audit
work within the group’s jurisdiction. Id.; IAF, Tab 11 at 99.
¶14 The appellant filed this individual right of action (IRA) appeal on July 7,
2013. IAF, Tab 1. She initially requested a hearing, id. at 2, but later withdrew
that request, IAF, Tab 26, Initial Decision (ID) at 1. The administrative judge
issued an initial decision based on the written record.
¶15 In her initial decision, the administrative judge found that the appellant
established having exhausted her administrative remedies as to only one of her
alleged disclosures, i.e., that OIG allowed an erroneous audit report to be
published on its website, but that she failed to show that she had provided OSC
with sufficiently clear and precise information about her remaining disclosures to
establish exhaustion. ID at 11. The administrative judge further found that the
7
appellant nonfrivolously alleged that her disclosure was protected and that it was
a contributing factor in the AIGA’s decision to restrict the scope of the audit
work the appellant could perform beginning in February 2013, and that therefore
the appellant had established Board jurisdiction over her IRA appeal. ID
at 10-12. However, on the merits of the appeal, the administrative judge found
that the appellant failed to prove by preponderant evidence that her audit report
disclosure was protected or that it was a contributing factor in the personnel
action at issue. ID at 13-15. The administrative judge further found that the
agency established by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the
same action absent the appellant’s disclosure. ID at 15-17. Accordingly, the
administrative judge denied the appellant’s request for corrective action. 5 ID
at 17.
¶16 The appellant filed a timely petition for review of the initial decision, in
which she challenges several of the administrative judge’s factual findings .
Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 5-11. She argues that the administrative
judge failed to properly consider additional disclosures, id. at 11-14, and she
challenges the administrative judge’s findings that she failed to prove that her
disclosure was protected or that it was a contributing factor in the personnel
action, id. at 14-15. Finally, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s
finding that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would
have taken the personnel action absent her disclosure. Id. at 15-17. The agency
has responded in opposition to the petition for review, PFR File, Tab 3, and the
appellant has filed a reply, PFR File, Tab 4.
5
Although the order language at the end of the initial decision indicates that the IRA
appeal was dismissed, ID at 18, it is apparent from the administrative judge’s finding of
jurisdiction that the actual disposition of the appeal was a denial of the appellant’s
request for corrective action on the merits.
8
ANALYSIS 6
¶17 The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant has
exhausted administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous
allegations that: (1) she engaged in whistleblowing activity by making a
protected disclosure; and (2) the disclosure was a contributing factor in the
agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action. Yunus v. Department
of Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In an IRA appeal, the
standard for establishing subject matter jurisdiction and the right to a hearing is
an appellant’s merely asserting a nonfrivolous claim, while the standard for
establishing a prima facie case is that of preponderant evidence. Langer v.
Department of the Treasury, 265 F.3d 1259, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2001). When an
appellant meets her burden to establish a prima facie case of reprisal for
whistleblowing, the burden shifts to the agency to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action(s) absent the
appellant’s whistleblowing. Scoggins v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R.
592, ¶ 26 (2016).
The appellant fully exhausted all her claims before OSC and established the
Board’s jurisdiction over her appeal.
¶18 The Board has recently clarified the substantive requirements of exhaustion.
Chambers v. Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶¶ 10-11. The
requirements are met when an appellant has provided OSC with sufficient basis to
pursue an investigation. The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those issues that
have been previously raised with OSC. However, an appellant may provide a
more detailed account of whistleblowing activities to the Board than she did to
OSC. An appellant may establish exhaustion through her initial OSC complaint,
evidence that she amended the original complaint, including but not limited to
6
We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted since the filing of this appeal and
find that it does not impact the outcome.
9
OSC’s determination letter and other letters from OSC referencing any amended
allegations, and the appellant’s written responses to OSC referencing the
amended allegations. An appellant may also establish exhaustion through other
sufficiently reliable evidence, such as an affidavit or declaration attesting that the
appellant raised with OSC the substance of the facts in the Board appeal. Id.
¶19 Here, while the administrative judge correctly found that the appellant
established exhaustion before OSC regarding her disclosure of the erroneous audit
report, the administrative judge further found that the appellant “failed to show
that she provided OSC with sufficiently clear and precise information about her
remaining disclosures.” ID at 11. The administrative judge recognized that OSC
acknowledged receiving additional information in response to its initial
determination, but she found that the appellant failed to establish what that
additional information comprised. ID at 7. However, it appears that the appellant
included with her initial MSPB appeal copies of her additional disclosures as
attachments to her response to OSC’s initial determination. IAF, Tab 1 at 12,
17-45. We find that the appellant’s submissions were adequate to provide OSC
with a sufficient basis to pursue an investigation. Accordingly, we find that the
appellant fully exhausted all her claims before OSC.
¶20 We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant nonfrivolously
alleged that she made at least one protected disclosure that was a contributing
factor in the challenged personnel action. ID at 11-12. Accordingly, the
administrative judge properly found that the appellant establ ished jurisdiction
over her IRA appeal.
The appellant established that she made protected disclosures.
¶21 On the merits of the appellant’s reprisal claims, the administrative judge
found that the appellant failed to establish either that her disclosures about the
erroneous 2010 audit report were protected or that they were a contributing factor
in the AIGA’s decision to restrict the scope of the appellant’s audit work
beginning in February 2013. ID at 12-15. Having found that the appellant failed
10
to exhaust her administrative remedies as to her other disclosure s, the
administrative judge did not address those disclosures on the merits.
¶22 In considering whether the disclosures about the deficient 2010 audit report
were protected, the administrative judge found that the appellant did not establish
by preponderant evidence that she reasonably believed that her disclosures
evidenced any violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or gross mismanagement,
a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger
to public health or safety. ID at 13-14; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). In part, the
administrative judge relied on the Department of Transportation (DOT) OIG
employees’ finding that the 2010 report at issue in this appeal did not need to be
recalled and reissued. ID at 13. However, any such finding by the DOT OIG is
not dispositive of whether the appellant’s initial belief—that posting an erroneous
report constituted a rule violation—was reasonable. IAF, Tab 24 at 7. As SBA’s
OIG itself noted in its pleadings, its audits must “comply with standards
established by [GAO’s] Comptroller General.” Id. at 10. We find that the GAO
audit standards constitute “rules” for the purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). A
central pillar of the GAO auditing standards is reducing “the risk that auditors
will not detect a mistake, inconsistency, significant error, or fraud in the evidence
supporting the audit,” and “[a]uditors should determine the overall sufficiency
and appropriateness of evidence to provide a reasonable basis for the findings and
conclusions[.]” GAO, Government Auditing Standards, GAO-12-331G, ch. 6,
¶¶ 6.05, 6.69 (Dec. 2011), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-12-331g.pdf.
Additionally, SBA’s OIG has its own audit policies, which we find also constitute
“rules” for the purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). IAF, Tab 1 at 77.
¶23 Moreover, that SBA OIG engaged DOT OIG for a “special quality
assessment review” through the lens of its 2010 auditing policies and procedures
indicates that the appellant’s concerns were not unreasonable. IAF, Tab 24 at 7,
20-21, 31-32. That the appellant’s disclosures regarding the report resulted in
remedial revisions to the SBA OIG’s audit process further highlights the
11
significance of the issues she raised. Id. at 20-21, 32. Furthermore, the appellant
alleged that the SBA OIG had provided misleading testimony to Congress based
on the report. Id. at 28-29. The same criminal statute prohibiting “materially
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement[s] or representation[s]” to OIG
employees, or “falsif[ying], conceal[ing], or cover[ing] up by any trick, scheme,
or device a material fact,” applies to OIG employees themselves—both in their
reports and their appearing before Congress. 7 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a). We therefore
find that the appellant established by preponderant evidence that a reasonable
person could believe—particularly prior to receiving the results of the DOT OIG
review—that her disclosures about the audit reports evidenced a violation of law,
rule, or regulation, and that those disclosures were thereby protected. 8
Remand is necessary to determine if the appellant has established that her
protected disclosures were a contributing factor in the agency’s taking a covered
personnel action against her.
¶24 The term “contributing factor” means any disclosure that influences an
agency’s decision to threaten, propose, take, or not take a personnel action
regarding the individual making the disclosure. Usharauli v. Department of
Health and Human Services, 116 M.S.P.R. 383, ¶ 31 (2011); 5 C.F.R.
§ 1209.4(d). The most common way of proving the contributing factor element is
the “knowledge/timing test.” Chavez v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 27 (2013). Under that test, an appellant can prove that a
disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action through evidence that
the official taking the personnel action knew of the whistleblowing disclosure and
took the personnel action within a period of time such that a reasonable person
7
Significantly, whether the 2010 report needed to be recalled appears to have hinged on
whether the omissions and inaccuracies were “material” to the report’s findings and
recommendations. IAF, Tab 24 at 20, 31-32.
8
With this finding, we need not decide whether the appellant’s subsequent disclosures
to CIGIE and to Congress, which took place after the DOT OIG review found it
unnecessary to reissue the 2010 report, were protected.
12
could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel
action. Id. Satisfying the knowledge/timing test demonstrates that a protected
disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action. Gonzalez v.
Department of Transportation, 109 M.S.P.R. 250, ¶ 20 (2008).
¶25 The appellant indicated in her OSC complaint that the AIGA knew about
her disclosures to CIGIE and Congress through the Inspector General. IAF,
Tab 11 at 57-58. The Inspector General declared under penalty of perjury that
she learned of allegations to the CIGIE Integrity Committee based on a letter
from the committee, but that it did not identify the individual who made the
allegations. IAF, Tab 24 at 33. The AIGA declared under penalty of perjury that
he was not aware of the appellant’s disclosures until she appealed to the Board.
IAF, Tab 13 at 20. The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to
prove that anyone who was involved in the personnel action was aware of her
disclosures before that action was taken. ID at 14-15. On review, the appellant
argues that both the Inspector General and the AIGA must have known about her
disclosures earlier, in part because they were both heavily involved in CIGIE
activities. PFR File, Tab 1 at 15. She also argues that the Inspector General must
have known about her disclosures to Congress because the Inspector General was
“confirmed by Congress.” Id. However, there is no evidence that either official
was involved in the CIGIE Integrity Committee to which the appellant made her
disclosures, nor is there evidence that anyone who was involved in CIGIE
activities necessarily would have been aware of those disclosures. Similarly,
there is no evidence that Congress would have shared the appellant’s disclosures
with the Inspector General simply because she had been confirmed.
¶26 Nevertheless, the aforementioned communications outside of the appellant’s
agency were not her first disclosures about the deficiencies in the 2010 audit
report. Specifically, the appellant’s interactions with the CPG Director on the
issue began in 2011. IAF, Tab 24 at 29. As recounted by the administrative
judge, the appellant alleged having shared her concerns with the CPG Director
13
and the AIGA at least as early as February 2012. ID at 4; IAF, Tab 24 at 25-26.
Subsequently, the appellant met with the Inspector General to discuss the
allegedly deficient audits and other concerns, and she followed up with a letter.
IAF, Tab 24 at 25; ID at 4. Overall, as the SBA OIG acknowledges in its
pleadings, the agency “was well aware of Appellant’s concerns prior to her
disclosure of the same concerns to the CIGIE Integrity Committee.” IAF, Tab 24
at 20. Accordingly, we find that the appellant did in fact put her supervisors on
notice of her disclosures about deficient audits. We further find that the
personnel action that the agency took on February 4, 2013—that is, the AIGA’s
decision informing the appellant that she was no longer to conduct any audit work
involving the Office of Credit Access or its subordinate organizations —occurred
within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the
appellant’s protected disclosures were a contributing factor in that personnel
action. Thus, we find that, under the knowledge/timing test, the appellant
established that her disclosures regarding the erroneous audit report were a
contributing factor in the personnel action taken against her. Mastrullo v.
Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶¶ 18, 21 (2015).
¶27 The final hurdle to the appellant’s establishing a prima facie showing of
retaliation for whistleblowing is to prove that the agency’s action is a covered
personnel action. As is relevant here, a “personnel action” is defined under the
WPA as a significant change in duties, responsibilities , or working conditions.
5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). As noted, the personnel action at issue is the
agency’s decision that the appellant was not to conduct any further audit work
involving the Office of Credit Access or its subordinate organizations.
¶28 To meet the burden of proof in this regard, the appellant must provide
sufficient information and evidence for the Board to determine whether the
agency’s alleged action or actions were “significant.” See Shivaee v. Department
of the Navy, 74 M.S.P.R. 383, 388-89 (1997). The Board has recently clarified
this requirement, stating that only agency actions that, individually or
14
collectively, have practical and significant effects on the overall nature and
quality of an employee’s working conditions, duties, or responsibilities will be
found to constitute a covered personnel action under section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii).
Skarada v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 16.
¶29 The administrative judge failed to make a finding on this issue . Given the
Board’s recently-issued guidance and the findings we have made above, we deem
it appropriate to remand this case to allow the administrative judge to determine
if the appellant has established that she suffered a significant change in duties,
responsibilities, or working conditions when, beginning on February 4, 2013, the
agency restricted her ability to perform certain audit work. 9 If, on remand, the
administrative judge finds that the appellant has failed to establish that she
suffered a covered personnel action under section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii), the
administrative judge shall issue a new initial decision denying corrective action.
If, however, the administrative judge finds that the appellant does make such a
showing, thereby establishing a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation, the
administrative judge must then determine if the agency has established by clear
and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action
absent the appellant’s protected disclosures. 10 Scoggins, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 28.
9
The administrative judge may, in her discretion, allow the parties to present further
documentary evidence on this issue.
10
If necessary, the administrative judge shall consider whether the additional
disclosures we have found were exhausted with OSC, including inappropriate behavior
by the AIGA, were protected and a contributing factor to the covered personnel action.
15
ORDER
¶30 The appeal is remanded for further adjudication in accordance with this
Order.
FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
Betty Norwood v. Small Business Administration
Combined Opinion