Case: 22-20037 Document: 00516653918 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/23/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 22-20037 February 23, 2023
Summary Calendar
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
John Anthony Buchanan,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
A. Barnes, III, Detention Officer; Detention Officer
Villanueva; Detention Officer Arsno; Detention
Officer Zwerspenski; Detention Officer Gurrero, et
al
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No.4:20-CV-241
Before Jolly, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
E. Grady Jolly, Circuit Judge:*
John Anthony Buchanan, a pretrial detainee in the Harris County Jail,
appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. He asserted a
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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multitude of constitutional violations as well as several violations of state law.
For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.
Buchanan filed a 52-page complaint naming 28 defendants. The
district court found that the complaint, although detailed, did not clearly
identify how each defendant was involved in the claims and ordered
Buchanan to provide a more definite statement. Buchanan responded by
listing each defendant and citing page numbers to his earlier complaint. The
court found his response did not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or its order. The court then struck both his complaint and
response. Nevertheless, it granted Buchanan another opportunity to file a
complaint. It instructed Buchanan to use an approved complaint form for
§ 1983 actions and warned that failure to comply with its order would result
in dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
Eventually, Buchanan filed his amended complaint and a response to
the court’s order for a more definite statement. He also filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court’s order striking his earlier response.
Furthermore, he sent a letter to the district court, calling the judge a racist
and liar and refusing to use the § 1983 form as instructed.
In response, the district court issued an order reiterating its earlier
instructions and warning Buchanan that failure to comply would warrant
sanctions. Despite Buchanan’s noncompliance with its orders, the court
provided one last opportunity for him to submit an amended complaint as
directed. It again warned him that noncompliance would result in dismissal
pursuant to Rule 41(b). When Buchanan submitted no response, the district
court dismissed his suit.
I.
Buchanan appeals. He argues that the district court abused its
discretion: by dismissing his action pursuant to Rule 41(b); by requiring a
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more definite statement without identifying the problems in his original
complaint as provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e); and finally,
by dismissing his action in its entirety rather than simply dropping any
misjoined defendants or claims. 1 We address his arguments as necessary to
resolve this appeal.
A.
Rule 41(b) allows a district court to dismiss an action on its own
motion if the plaintiff fails to comply with a court order. See Coleman v.
Sweetin, 745 F.3d 756, 766 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); FED. R. CIV. P.
41(b). This court generally reviews such decisions for abuse of discretion.
Coleman, 745 F.3d at 766. Nevertheless, a heightened standard of review
applies even if the dismissal is without prejudice when future litigation likely
would be barred by the statute of limitations. Id. In such cases, this court will
affirm where (1) the record is clear that the plaintiff has either delayed the
proceedings or engaged in “contumacious conduct” and (2) “the district
court has expressly determined that lesser sanctions would not prompt
diligent prosecution, or the record shows that the district court employed
lesser sanctions that proved to be futile.” Berry v. CIGNA/RSI–CIGNA, 975
F.2d 1188, 1191 (5th Cir. 1992). Further, this court generally affirms only
when one of the following aggravating factors is present: where the plaintiff,
not the plaintiff’s counsel, caused the delay; where intentional conduct
caused the delay; or where the defendant suffered actual prejudice. Id.
1
Rule 41(b) provides: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these
rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
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B.
The district court did not specify whether its dismissal was with or
without prejudice. Nevertheless, the heightened standard of review applies
because Buchanan’s claims, which arose in 2019, likely would be barred by
the applicable two-year limitations period. See Coleman, 745 F.3d at 766; see
also Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989) (holding that the general
personal injury statute of limitations for the forum state applies to § 1983
actions); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a) (setting a
two-year limitations period in Texas personal injury suits).
So to determine whether the court’s dismissal was an abuse of
discretion, we look first to whether Buchanan engaged in contumacious
conduct. Here, contumacious conduct “is the stubborn resistance to
authority which justifies a dismissal with prejudice.” McNeal v. Papasan, 842
F.2d 787, 792 (5th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The district court issued three orders requiring further pleading concerning
Buchanan’s claims. And yet, Buchanan expressly declined to submit a
complaint complying with the district court’s orders. Instead, he sent a letter
disparaging the district court and its orders. His defiant refusal to comply
with the district court’s orders satisfies the first perquisite for dismissal
under Rule 41(b)—that is, his conduct was contumacious. Id.
Next, we review whether the district court considered alternative
sanctions and determined that they would be futile. Callip v. Harris Cnty.
Child Welfare Dep’t, 757 F.2d 1513, 1521 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam);
Hornbuckle v. Arco Oil & Gas Co., 732 F.2d 1233, 1237 (5th Cir. 1984). Here,
the district court on multiple occasions explicitly warned Buchanan that his
failure to provide an amended complaint would result in dismissal. The
district court’s warnings can constitute lesser sanctions. See Rogers v. Kroger
Co., 669 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that lesser sanctions include
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explicit warnings). The record thus shows that the district court applied
lesser sanctions, which proved futile.
To conclude our abuse of discretion analysis, we consider the
presence of factors that “aggravated” the judicial process. See Berry, 975
F.2d at 1191. Here, the relevant aggravating factor is the senseless delay
caused by the plaintiff himself. Id. Buchanan caused willful delays in the
judicial process by contemptuously declining to follow the court’s reasonable
instructions. In short, Buchanan’s conduct satisfied the “aggravating factor”
referred to in our cases. See Larson v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir.
1998).
II.
Buchanan’s additional arguments also lack merit. First, he argues that
the district court violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) by not
identifying the defects of his complaint with sufficient particularity. Under
Rule 12(e), a party may file a motion for a more definite statement of a
pleading if it “is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably
prepare a response.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). Thus, Rule 12(e) is not
specifically applicable, as no party moved for a more definite statement from
Buchanan. Instead, the district court noted the confusion of the complaint in
associating the various claims with the respective parties and sua sponte
ordered a more definite statement.
Buchanan further argues that the district court should have severed
any misjoined claims and parties instead of striking his complaint in its
entirety. It is true that improper joinder of parties is not usually a basis for
complete dismissal of a case. See Tuft v. Texas, 397 F. App’x 59, 61–62 (5th
Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. But that is not exactly what
happened here. Here, the district court noted the confusing allegations
concerning the various claims and parties and remedied the defective
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complaint by dismissing it and ordering Buchanan to file an amended
complaint that clearly identified how each party was involved with each
claim. This remedy was not an abuse of discretion because the district court
allowed Buchanan to refile a proper complaint. Branum v. Johnson, 265 F.
App’x 349, 350 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
Finally, Buchanan argues that the Rule 41(b) dismissal for failure to
prosecute and comply with court orders was improper. He alleges that his
extensive handwritten complaint was sufficient and that the district court had
no basis to require him to use the court-provided form. We find no error in
this requirement by the district court. Based on Buchanan’s status as a
pretrial detainee, he is a “prisoner” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). His
complaint, although extensive, was largely an incomprehensible pleading.
Thus, it was within the discretion of the district court to order him to simplify
and clarify his claims by using the proper form for prisoner civil rights
complaints. See also Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 890, 893-94 (5th Cir. 1976)
(addressing the difficult task that district courts face in reviewing pro se
litigation and attaching a model form for prisoner civil right complaints).
III.
We sum up: we hold that dismissal of the complaint was not legal
error. The district court acted within its discretion in concluding that
Buchanan’s repeated and contumacious refusals to follow its reasonable
instructions warranted dismissal. The judgment of the district court is
therefore
AFFIRMED.
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