NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
21-P-1002
C.F.
vs.
J.F.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
J.F. (mother) appeals from an amended judgment of divorce
nisi. On appeal she contends that the judge erred in awarding
C.F., the father and former husband, legal custody and primary
physical custody of their daughter, and erred in dividing the
marital estate. We affirm.
1. Custody. On appeal, the mother, who appeared pro se at
trial and in this court,1 maintains that she was a victim of
domestic violence in the marriage, that the father's conduct had
an adverse impact on the child, and that she should be awarded
sole legal and physical custody of the child. The father
testified that an ex parte abuse prevention order had issued
1 At the outset of the litigation the mother was represented by
counsel. That attorney, and two others, withdrew with the
permission of the judge.
previously, and was extended once by agreement, but that he had
not hit or assaulted the mother. The mother testified that she
had been hit and punched, and that she was in fear of the
father. The trial judge, who also was the judge who issued the
ex parte and extension orders, did not explicitly resolve the
credibility issue presented by the diverging testimony regarding
abuse. In the judgment, the judge noted that there was no
extant abuse prevention order at the time of trial and stated
that the mother had not established grounds for divorce on the
basis of cruel and abusive treatment.
The judge awarded sole legal and primary physical custody
to the father for the reason, among others, that the mother had
moved and enrolled the child in a different school system
without informing the father or the court, and that the mother
interposed this and other obstacles to effective communication
between the parents. The judge found that shared legal custody
was not in the child's best interests, and that her best
interests were served by remaining in the community to which she
was accustomed with the father as her primary caregiver. See
generally Macri v. Macri, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 362, 370 (2019)
(discussing breakdown in communications as obstacle to shared
parenting).
After oral argument we remanded the case for findings
regarding domestic violence in accordance with Malachi M. v.
2
Quintina Q., 483 Mass. 725, 738-740 (2019), and Custody of
Vaughn, 422 Mass. 590, 599-600 (1996), and retained jurisdiction
over the appeal. On remand, the judge entered additional
findings, which we now have before us. We review the judge's
findings for clear error, and his determination of custody for
an abuse of discretion. See Schechter v. Schechter, 88 Mass.
App. Ct. 239, 245 (2015). "The determination of which parent
will promote a child's best interests rests within the
discretion of the judge . . . [whose] findings . . . must stand
unless they are plainly wrong" (quotation omitted). Hunter v.
Rose, 463 Mass. 488, 494 (2012). The touchstone of our inquiry
is the best interest of the child. Id. See G. L. c. 208, § 31.
In his supplemental findings the judge found that the
mother's allegations of violence were not credible, and that the
father was not physically abusive during the marriage. The
judge further credited the father's account of the mother's
"erratic and volatile behavior." The judge's credibility
determinations are entitled to deference, and we will not
disturb them. Malachi M., 483 Mass. at 741. See J.S. v. C.C.,
454 Mass. 652, 657 (2009), quoting Mason v. Coleman, 447 Mass.
177, 186 (2006) ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses"). See also Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 52 (a). We cannot
3
say that the judge abused his discretion in awarding sole legal
custody and primary physical custody to the father.
The mother also appears to make a general argument
regarding her fitness as a parent by reference to a report of a
guardian ad litem. The report was not admitted in evidence at
the trial and is not part of the record before us. See Chokel
v. Genzyme Corp., 449 Mass. 272, 279 (2007). The mother also
argues that we should apply the real advantage test articulated
in Yannas v. Frondistou–Yannas, 395 Mass. 704 (1985). The real
advantage test is used when the custodial parent with the
majority of custodial responsibility wants to move with the
child outside of the Commonwealth, and is inapplicable here.
Read more broadly, we understand the mother's argument to
be that she is the better parent. In view of the trial judge's
factual finding that the mother moved with the child to another
town and enrolled her in a different school system without
informing the father or the court, we see no error in the
judge's factual finding that the child's best interests are
better served by remaining with the father in her home community
of many years and granting legal custody to the father.
2. Division of marital property. a. Timeshares. The
mother claims that the trial judge did not properly consider and
divide timeshares that were part of the marital estate and erred
in the distribution of the proceeds of the marital home.
4
Typically, "[o]ur review of a judgment pursuant to the equitable
distribution statute, G. L. c. 208, § 34, proceeds under a two-
step analysis. First, we examine the judge's findings to
determine whether all relevant factors in § 34 were
considered. . . . The second tier of our review requires us to
determine whether the reasons for the judge's conclusions are
apparent in his findings and rulings. . . . A judge's
determinations as to equitable distribution will not be reversed
unless plainly wrong and excessive" (quotations omitted).
Calvin C. v. Amelia A., 99 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 722–723 (2021).
The record here is inadequate to permit us to make this inquiry
in full. However, we are able to review the mother's argument
by reference to the judge's findings, which summarized the
parties' assets, liabilities, financial statements, and
contributions to the marriage.2
The judge considered the § 34 factors. At the time of the
filing of the complaint the parties had been married for five
years and eleven months. The father worked as a truck driver
and stagehand. At the time of the divorce, the mother was
2 The parties, both of whom make arguments based on the financial
statements, provided us with the judge's decision but no
financial statements. The judge took judicial notice of the
financial statements, which were not introduced in evidence by
either party, and summarized them in his decision. Neither
party suggests that the judge's factual findings regarding the
parties' assets and liabilities were erroneous.
5
working as a hairdresser, and had worked for some period of time
during the marriage. The judge divided the husband's pensions
equally and allocated one car to each party. He ordered that
each party remain responsible for any debt held in his or her
name, individually. The judge found that the timeshares, which
were unvalued, were held in the father's name alone and were
acquired before the marriage, and that the mother no longer had
any real property acquired before the marriage. The judge
awarded the assets held in each party's name to that party,
including the timeshares held in the father's name.
The judge correctly treated the property acquired before
the marriage as part of the marital estate, see Williams v.
Massa, 431 Mass. 619, 626 n.4 (2000), but ultimately made the
decision that each person in this relatively short-term marriage
should take from the marriage the liabilities and assets (except
the pensions) that each brought to the marriage. We discern no
abuse of discretion in this division of the timeshares. See
Richman v. Richman, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 655, 659-660 (1990)
(describing marriage of seven years as short-term); Bacon v.
Bacon, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 119-121 (1988) (affirming on
equitable grounds trial judge's decision to permit wife to
retain premarital property).
b. Marital home. The judge had previously ordered the
sale of the marital home, but the home had not been sold at the
6
time of trial. The judge found that the father paid the
mortgage on the marital home without living there for one year
and nine months, and that while he did not pay child support
during this time, the amount of the mortgage payment exceeded
any child support he might have paid. Based on his finding that
the father contributed more to the preservation of the marital
estate, the judge ordered that the first $20,000 of the proceeds
of the sale of the marital home be paid to the father and that
the sale proceeds be split equally thereafter. The mother
objects to the $20,000 carve out, but we have nothing in the
record (or the briefs) to suggest that this figure was either
erroneous or inequitable. On the record before us, the judge
did not abuse his discretion.
Conclusion. For these reasons, the amended judgment of
divorce nisi is affirmed. The father's request for an award of
his appellate attorney's fees is denied.
So ordered.
By the Court (Sullivan,
Shin & Hodgens, JJ.3),
Clerk
Entered: February 28, 2023.
3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
7