DLD-084 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 22-1860
___________
RICKY MILLER,
Appellant
v.
MONROE COUNTY; KEN MORRIS, Sheriff; GEORGE LITTLES, Secretary of
PADOC; ROBERT CHETIRKIN, Administrator of EJSP
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-22-cv-00759)
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect,
Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 2, 2023
Before: JORDAN, SHWARTZ, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 28, 2023)
_________
OPINION *
_________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant, Ricky Miller, is a Pennsylvania prisoner who was previously
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
incarcerated in New Jersey. In February 2022, he filed a civil rights complaint in the
District Court claiming that his due process rights were violated when Pennsylvania took
custody of him pursuant to a detainer. According to Miller, Pennsylvania was not
permitted to take him into custody because he had not yet served the supervised release
portion of his New Jersey sentence. By way of relief, Miller sought a preliminary
injunction directing the defendants to return him to New Jersey custody; a judgment
declaring that his constitutional rights had been violated; and money damages. The
District Court screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and dismissed it
without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Miller appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Borelli v. City of Reading, 532
F.2d 950, 951–52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (explaining that an order that dismisses a
complaint without prejudice is final and appealable if the plaintiff declares his intention
to stand on his complaint). We review the District Court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
Upon review, we agree with the District Court that Miller failed to state a due
process claim. Contrary to Miller’s contention, a prisoner does not have a constitutional
right to be released upon expiration of a custodial sentence in one jurisdiction if he is
subject to a detainer in another jurisdiction. Cf. Lindsay v. United States, 453 F.2d 867,
868 (3d Cir. 1972) (“The exercise of jurisdiction over a prisoner who has violated the law
of more than one sovereignty and the priority of prosecution of the prisoner is solely a
question of comity between the sovereignties which is not subject to attack by the
prisoner.” (quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, Miller did not identify any
2
Pennsylvania or New Jersey law that would preclude him from vindicating his federal
rights, nor did he allege that the Pennsylvania or New Jersey courts did not afford him the
full protections of the law. See Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).
Finally, as the District Court noted, to the extent that Miller sought release from
Pennsylvania custody, the proper vehicle to do so was via a petition for writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm.
3