Estrada v. Superior Court CA1/1

Filed 2/28/23 Estrada v. Superior Court CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

MIGUEL ANGEL ESTRADA,
Petitioner,
A166474
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE (San Francisco City &
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN County
FRANCISCO, Super. Ct. No.
21008360)
Respondent;
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA,
Real Party in Interest.
ANDREW KUHAIKI,
Petitioner,
A166508
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE (San Francisco City &
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN County
FRANCISCO, Super. Ct. No.
22004424)
Respondent;
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA,
Real Party in Interest.

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 In these consolidated writ proceedings,1 petitioners Miguel Angel
Estrada and Andrew Kuhaiki (Petitioners) each seek a writ of mandate or
prohibition requiring respondent Superior Court of the City and County of
San Francisco to dismiss their cases for violating their speedy trial rights
under Penal Code section 1382.2 Petitioners contend there was no good cause
to continue their cases past the statutory deadline, maintaining the superior
court can no longer rely on the “exceptional circumstances” resulting from the
COVID-19 pandemic. We conclude the superior court did not abuse its
discretion in finding good cause to continue their trial dates past the
statutory deadlines or by subsequently denying their motions to dismiss, and
therefore deny the petitions.
BACKGROUND
The COVID-19 Pandemic
Less than a year ago, a different division of this court, in Hernandez-
Valenzuela (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1108, 1117 (Hernandez-Valenzuela),
considered whether the COVID-19 pandemic constituted “exceptional
circumstances” justifying the superior court’s finding of good cause to
continue criminal cases past the statutory deadlines. The court thoroughly
set forth the background of the COVID-19 pandemic and the public health
and judicial response in California, which we recount here.
“On March 4, 2020, Governor Gavin Newsom declared a state of
emergency in response to the global outbreak of COVID-19, a ‘new disease,
caused by a novel (or new) coronavirus that has not previously been seen in
humans.’

1 We ordered the two proceedings consolidated in the November 29,
2022, order to show cause.
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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 “On March 16, 2020, the San Francisco Health Officer issued a shelter-
in-place order requiring residents of the county to remain in their homes
except when engaging in essential activities, and to stay at least six feet
apart from other persons when leaving their homes. A few days later, in an
attempt to limit the spread of the virus, the Governor issued an executive
order requiring all Californians to stay at home except for limited activities.
“On March 23, 2020, Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye, in her capacity
as Chairperson of the Judicial Council, issued an emergency statewide order
suspending all jury trials and continuing them for a period of 60 days. The
Chief Justice also extended by 60 days the time period provided for in section
1382 for holding a criminal trial. In so ordering, the Chief Justice explained:
‘The [Center for Disease Control], the California Department of Public
Health, and local county health departments have recommended increasingly
stringent social distancing measures of at least six feet between people, and
encouraged vulnerable individuals to avoid public spaces. [¶] Courts cannot
comply with these health restrictions and continue to operate as they have in
the past. Court proceedings require gatherings of court staff, litigants,
attorneys, witnesses, and juries, well in excess of the numbers allowed for
gathering under current executive and health orders. Many court facilities in
California are ill-equipped to effectively allow the social distancing and other
public health requirements required to protect people involved in court
proceedings and prevent the further spread of COVID-19. Even if court
facilities could allow for sufficient social distancing, the closure of schools
means that many court employees, litigants, witnesses, and potential jurors
cannot leave their homes to attend court proceedings because they must stay
home to supervise their children. These restrictions have also made it nearly
impossible for courts to assemble juries.’

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 “On March 30, 2020, the Chief Justice issued a second statewide
emergency order, authorizing superior courts to issue implementation orders
that ‘[e]xtend the time period provided in section 1382 of the Penal Code for
the holding of a criminal trial by no more than 60 days from the last date on
which the statutory deadline otherwise would have expired.’
“On April 29, 2020, the Chief Justice issued a third statewide
emergency order, stating: ‘The 60-day continuance of criminal jury trials and
the 60-day extension of time in which to conduct a criminal trial under Penal
Code section 1382, both of which I first authorized in my order of March 23,
2020, are to be extended an additional 30 days. The total extension of 90
days shall be calculated from the last date on which the trial initially could
have been conducted under Penal Code section 1382.’ The Chief Justice
explained the extension applied to those matters for which the last date on
which trial could be conducted under section 1382 occurred or would occur
between March 16, 2020, and June 15, 2020.
“On June 1, 2020, the San Francisco health officer updated the shelter-
in-place order to allow outside gatherings but still required that essential
government functions comply with social distancing requirements to the
greatest extent possible.
“On December 3, 2020, the state public health officer issued a new
regional stay-at-home order restoring many of the earlier restrictions in an
effort to slow the spread of COVID-19 and avoid overwhelming the state’s
hospitals in response to an unprecedented surge in the level of community
spread of COVID-19. The next day, in response to the surge in COVID-19
cases, the San Francisco health officer issued another stay-at-home order
requiring residents of the county to once again remain in their homes except
when engaging in essential activities. The order was extended on December

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30, 2020. The state’s regional stay-at-home order was lifted on January 25,
2021, and the San Francisco health officer allowed for certain businesses and
other activities to reopen starting on January 28, 2021.
“On June 15, 2021, the San Francisco health officer’s ‘Safer Return
Together’ order came into effect. The order rescinded the previous stay-at-
home order and lifted indoor capacity limits and social distancing
requirements.” (Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1114–
1116, fns. omitted.)
The San Francisco Superior Court reopened all courtrooms on June 18,
2021.
However, numerous emergency rules and orders regarding the court
remained in effect. The Chief Justice’s orders regarding extension of time to
hold preliminary examinations, waiver of certain requirements to adopt local
rules related to the pandemic, and suspension of any California Rule of Court
to the extent it prevented a court from using technology to conduct remote
proceedings were not rescinded until April 30, 2022. The last of these,
including emergency rule 3 regarding remote technology in criminal
proceedings and emergency rule 5 regarding criminal appearance waivers
were not rescinded until June 30, 2022.
San Francisco Department of Public Health requirements for
employers and employees regarding COVID-19 remained in effect.
(https://sf.gov/step-by-step/what-do-if-someone-work-has-covid-19 [as of
February 22, 2023], https://sf.gov/youve-had-close-contact-or-positive-test [as
of Feb. 28, 2023].) Likewise, CalOSHA regulations regarding COVID-19
infections and outbreaks in the workplace continued in effect during the
relevant time period. (Cal. Code Regs, tit. 8, § 3205.1.) And at the federal

5
level, the Secretary of Health and Human Services Declaration of Public
Health Emergency with respect to Covid-19 remained in effect.3
Trial Court Proceedings Against Petitioner Estrada
In May 2022, the San Francisco District Attorney charged defendant
Estrada by information with attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a));
assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); battery with serious bodily
injury (§ 243, subd. (d)); mayhem (§ 203); and possession of a switchblade
knife in a motor vehicle (§ 21510, subd. (a)), along with various enhancing
allegations.
Estrada was arraigned on May 27, 2022, on those charges, entered not
guilty pleas, and requested a jury trial on a no-time-waiver basis.
On July 26, 2022, the statutory last day for trial under section 1382,
both sides announced they were ready for trial. The court asked the clerk if a
courtroom was available, to which the clerk replied: “No, Your Honor. Please
find good cause to continue the trial to September 28th.” The court granted
the continuance, and issued a 16-page written order in which it made
extensive findings about the pandemic and the court’s response, concluding
“due to shelter-in-place orders, social distancing requirements, insufficient
courtroom staff and security, and the unavailability of adequate alternative
locations to conduct defendant’s trial, there is good cause to continue
defendant’s jury trial past the statutory last day. These circumstances were
not caused by chronic court congestion nor the neglect or failure of the Court
or the People to adequately provide court services, but solely based on a

3

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global pandemic constituting exceptional and extraordinary circumstances
warranting a good cause finding. Based on the totality of the circumstances,
the Court finds good cause to continue the jury trial in this case and that the
length of the continuance is reasonable under the circumstances, the delay is
minimal, and the defendant has failed to present evidence of prejudice by the
delay. (People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1162-1163 [(Engram)]. . . .)
As such, the Court finds good cause to continue the jury trial until a
courtroom becomes available.”
Two months later, Estrada filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
their4 speedy trial right under section 1382 had been violated. The court
denied the motion. In its order, it reincorporated its prior good cause
findings, and added: “The Court further notes that on July 26, 2022, there
were two cases on calendar in Department 22 for trial call. And as of July 26,
2022, there were 300 no-time-waiver felony jury trial cases with a statutory
last day earlier than the last day for Defendant’s trial. And as of October 11,
2022, there are about 405 pending no-time-waiver felony jury trials. With
regard to the number of no-time-waiver felony cases pending trial, the Court
further notes that of the 1013 arraignments that have occurred in
Department 22 since reopening, there have been 904 cases that have
proceeded on a no-time-waiver basis. Additionally, on July 26, 2022, court
personnel were unavailable to staff courtrooms because of COVID-19.”5

4 Estrada prefers use of the they/them pronouns.
5 Estrada’s counsel, in other cases, had objected to this finding, noting
“The People did not offer evidence of this fact, and the daily court status
reports do not show that courtrooms were dark because of COVID-19-related
staff absences.” The superior court rejected the claim but granted a
continuing objection to the finding, stating “I still believe the sentence is
appropriate at this time. I will continue to keep it in the orders. You need

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 At the hearing, the court expressed frustration with the number of no-
time waivers, noting “From January of 2022 to August of 2022, the backlog
reduced from approximately 490 felony cases to approximately 350 cases and
was continuing to decline. However, these efforts were met with a headwind
of no time waivers from the Public Defender’s Office in the preliminary
hearing departments . . . for both in and out of custody misdemeanor and
felony cases at unprecedented levels for the county and the state, reaching
approximately 90 percent or higher. [¶] The trial backlog can only be
eliminated where the justice partners act to eliminate it. We do not have
justice partners at this time; we have civil litigants.”
Estrada’s trial was continued until November 28, 2022.

Trial Court Proceedings Against Petitioner Kuhaiki
Petitioner Kuhaiki was charged by information with assault with a
deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); making criminal threats (§ 422); two
counts of dissuading a witness by force or threat (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)); first
degree residential burglary (§ 211); two counts of false imprisonment (§ 236);
and inflicting injury on an elder or dependent adult likely to cause great
bodily injury (§ 368, subd. (b)(1)). On June 6, 2022, he was arraigned,
entered pleas of not guilty, and requested a jury trial on a no-time-waiver
basis.
The trial court called Kuhaiki’s case on August 5, 2022, the statutory
last day for trial. It found good cause to continue the trial “based on the
exceptional and extraordinary circumstances caused by the global pandemic.
The Court finds those continue to exist through today and will . . . file a

not object to it each time. I note your objection to it for all the similar
proposed orders.”

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written order in support of the good cause finding.” The court issued a 16-
page written order with the same findings made in Estrada’s case.
Kuhaiki objected to the continuance and orally moved to dismiss his
case. The court denied the motion without prejudice to filing a written
motion, which Kuhaiki did on September 28, 2022.
The court denied his written motion, using the same language as in the
order denying Estrada’s motion. It reincorporated its prior good cause
findings and added “Additionally, on August 5, 2022, court personnel were
unavailable to staff courtrooms because of COVID-19.” As it had in Estrada’s
case, the court rejected Kuhaiki’s objection that the prosecutor offered no
evidence of this fact.
Petitioners’ Writ Proceedings
On November 2, 2022, Estrada filed a petition for writ of mandate or
prohibition seeking dismissal of their case based on violation of their speedy
trial rights and a stay of the trial. One week later, on November 8th,
Kuhaiki filed a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition seeking dismissal
of his case, but not seeking a stay.
We issued an order to show cause and stay of trial in Estrada’s case on
November 23rd. On November 29th, we ordered Estrada’s writ proceedings
consolidated with those of Kuhaiki, stayed trial in Kuhaiki’s case, and
ordered the People to file a consolidated return to the petitions within 30
days of the order.6

6 Respondent superior court sought leave to file an informal response
and an extension of time in which to do so. We granted respondent leave to
file an amicus brief but declined to extend the time in which to file it beyond
November 14th. Respondent declined to file an amicus brief by the ordered
deadline, stating it could not “file a meaningful and informative brief under
the time parameters.” In our November 29th order consolidating the two

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 DISCUSSION
Petitioners contend the trial court abused its discretion in finding good
cause existed to continue their trials past the statutory deadlines. They
acknowledge that the court in Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th
1108 addressed the same arguments advanced by petitioners—that the
inability to get cases to trial is the result of chronic court mismanagement,
including unused courtrooms, excessive judicial vacations, and failure to hold
trials at the civic center courthouse, and not the result of extraordinary
circumstances arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. Hernandez-Valenzuela
rejected these arguments, holding the “backlog which has delayed petitioners’
trials was the result of exceptional circumstances arising from the COVID-19
pandemic.” (Id. at p. 1134.)
Hernandez-Valenzuela cautioned, however, that “respondent court
cannot turn to the pandemic and ‘perpetually cite “exceptional
circumstances” to avoid dismissal under section 1382.’ At some future point,
should respondent court’s backlog persist while courtrooms remain dark and
unused for long stretches of time, a backlog that originated with the
pandemic could transform into one that persists or grows due to court
administration, or the nonuse of available judicial resources. Here, we only
decide that on August 16, September 2, and September 24[,] [2021], that
point was not reached, and we decline to adopt any outside time limitation or
metric that establishes such a point.” (Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1135.)

writ proceedings, we granted respondent further time to file an amicus curiae
brief, on or before the deadline set for the People’s return, but the court never
filed a brief.

10
 Petitioners maintain “Respondent [Superior] Court is now long past
that point.”
The Hernandez-Valenzuela Decision
In order to provide context to petitioners’ claims, we set forth the facts
and analysis in Hernandez-Valenzuela in detail.
The Right to Speedy Trial
Hernandez-Valenzuela provided a detailed summary of the applicable
law. “ ‘The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed by both
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section
15 of the California Constitution. [Citation.] The purpose of the speedy trial
right is “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize
anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the
defense will be impaired.” [Citation.] “To implement an accused’s
constitutional right to a speedy trial, the Legislature enacted section 1382.” ’
(Burgos v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 817, 825 . . . ; see also
People v. Sutton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 533, 545. . . . (Sutton) [‘[S]ection 1382 is
one of the principal provisions implementing a criminal defendant’s statutory
right to a speedy trial.’].)
“Section 1382 prescribes certain time periods within which an accused
must be brought to trial. (§ 1382, subd. (a).) The statute provides that, in a
felony case, ‘the court shall dismiss the action when a defendant is not
brought to trial within 60 days of his or her arraignment on an indictment or
information, unless (1) the defendant enters a general waiver of the 60-day
trial requirement, (2) the defendant requests or consents (expressly or
impliedly) to the setting of a trial date beyond the 60-day period (in which
case the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within

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10 days thereafter), or (3) “good cause” is shown.’ (Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th
at p. 545; see also § 1382, subd. (a).)
“ ‘No affirmative showing of prejudice is necessary to obtain a dismissal
for violation of the state constitutional speedy trial right as construed and
implemented by statute. [Citation.] Instead, “an unexcused delay beyond the
time fixed in section 1382 . . . without defendant’s consent entitles the
defendant to a dismissal.” ’ (People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750,
766. . . .)
“The prosecution has the burden of establishing good cause to avoid
dismissal. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 569, fn. 12, . . . (Johnson);
Rhinehart v. Municipal Court (1984) 35 Cal.3d 772, 781, . . . (Rhinehart) [‘The
burden of showing good cause is on the prosecution.’].) ‘ “[I]n making its
good-cause determination, a trial court must consider all of the relevant
circumstances of the particular case, ‘applying principles of common sense to
the totality of the circumstance . . . .’ ” ’ ” (Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1122–1123, italics omitted.)
“ ‘ “The cases recognize that, as a general matter, a trial court ‘has
broad discretion to determine whether good cause exists to grant a
continuance of the trial’ [citation], and that, in reviewing a trial court’s good-
cause determination, an appellate court applies an ‘abuse of discretion
standard.” ’ ([Engram, supra,] 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1163. . . .)” (Hernandez-
Valenzuela, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1122–1123.)
Meaning of Good Cause
“ ‘ “[S]ection 1382 does not define ‘good cause’ as that term is used in
the provision, but numerous California appellate decisions that have
reviewed good-cause determinations under this statute demonstrate that, in
general, a number of factors are relevant to a determination of good cause: (1)

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the nature and strength of the justification for the delay, (2) the duration of
the delay, and (3) the prejudice to either the defendant or the prosecution
that is likely to result from the delay.” ’ (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at
pp. 1162–1163.)” (Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1124.)
“In reviewing a trial court’s exercise of its discretion in determining
what constitutes good cause, ‘the appellate courts have evolved certain
general principles. The courts agree, for example, that delay caused by the
conduct of the defendant constitutes good cause to deny his motion to dismiss.
Delay for defendant’s benefit also constitutes good cause. Finally, delay
arising from unforeseen circumstances, such as the unexpected illness or
unavailability of counsel or witnesses constitutes good cause to avoid
dismissal.’ (Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 570. . . .)” (Hernandez-
Valenzuela, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1124.)
“ ‘[A] broad variety of unforeseen events may establish good cause
under section 1382.’ (People v. Hajjaj (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1184, 1198 . . .
(Hajjaj).) For instance, in In re Venable (1927) 86 Cal.App. 585 . . . , an
epidemic of infantile paralysis was prevalent in the town where court
sessions were held and prohibited calling juries. (Id. at p. 587.) The court
concluded the quarantine imposed to prevent the spread of the infectious
disease was good cause for the delay of trial and found there was no
unreasonable delay in bringing the case to trial after the cessation of the
epidemic. (Id. at p. 587.) In People v. Tucker (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1313
. . . , the defendant could not appear for trial as he was under quarantine
because another inmate had contracted the H1N1 flu virus. (Id. at p. 1315.)
The court concluded that medical necessity of the defendant’s quarantine
constituted good cause for the continuance of his trial. (Id. at pp. 1317–1318.)
More recently, in Stanley v. Superior Court (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 164 . . . ,

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Division Four of this court concluded the COVID-19 pandemic and impact it
has had within the state supported the trial court’s finding of good cause to
continue the defendant’s trial. (Id. at p. 166.) The court observed that the
COVID-19 pandemic was ‘of such severity’ as to justify a 90-day continuance
and observed that courts were places of high risk during the pandemic given
they involved gatherings of judges, court staff, litigants, attorneys, witnesses,
defendants, law enforcement, and juries in excess of the numbers allowed for
gatherings under the then applicable executive and health orders. (Id. at
pp. 169–170 [‘Health quarantines to prevent the spread of infectious diseases
have long been recognized as good cause for continuing a trial date.’].)”
(Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1124–1125.)
Good Cause to Continue in Summer 2021
Hernandez-Valenzuela considered whether good cause had been shown
for continuances of trials approximately two months after reopening of the
San Francisco Superior Court, in the late summer/early fall of 2021.7
(Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1117.)
The court first addressed the backlog of no-time-waiver cases and
whether it was “attributable to exceptional circumstances connected to the
COVID-19 pandemic [or] chronic conditions in [the superior] court.”
(Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1127.) It noted there was
no dispute the “ ‘backlog was originally caused by public health restrictions to
combat the COVID-19 pandemic.’ Thus, the backlog petitioners’ cases were a

7 Hernandez-Valenzuela was also a consolidated writ proceeding
involving two defendants. (Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1113.) Defendant Valdivia Torres maintained his speedy trial rights were
violated by the continuances of his trial granted on August 16 and September
2, 2021, while defendant Hernandez-Valenzuela contended his speedy trial
rights were violated by a continuance granted on September 24th. (Id. at p.
1121.)

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part of was due at least in part to the pandemic and thus far from a routine
event.” (Id. at p. 1130.)
The court observed: “[t]he COVID-19 pandemic has been a
‘ “unique, nonrecurring event[]” ’ which ‘ “ha[s] produced an inordinate
number of cases for court disposition,” ’ and thus exceptional circumstances
justifying delay of petitioner’s trial. (Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 571.)
From early March 2020 to June 28, 2021—when respondent court fully
reopened—respondent court was unable to operate at its usual capacity for
approximately 15 months due to safety orders imposed by health officers in
response to the pandemic. During three of the 15 months, jury trials were
suspended by the Chief Justice’s statewide emergency orders. The Chief
Justice’s blanket 90-day extension of the last days of all criminal jury trials
with last days between March 16, 2020, and June 15, 2020, reflected the
challenge of conducting jury trials during the pandemic. As the Chief Justice
explained, courts were a ‘high risk’ environment during the pandemic given
they required the assembly of judges, court staff, litigants, attorneys,
witnesses, defendants, law enforcement, and juries in excess of the number
allowed for gathering under governing health orders. Criminal jury trials in
respondent court were suspended again for another month during the surge
of community spread of COVID-19 in December 2020. During the other
months that jury trials were not suspended, respondent court was limited to
using only four of its 10 trial courtrooms for criminal jury trials due to social
distancing requirements imposed by health orders. None of these events
were the fault of the prosecution or respondent court but rather the
unprecedented effects of the pandemic.
“When respondent court reopened on June 28, 2021, after 15 months of
diminished or no capacity to conduct criminal jury trials, it was not

15
surprising that it confronted an ‘ “inordinate number of cases for court
disposition.” ’ (Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 571.) The pandemic had
severely limited its ability to conduct jury trials. Upon reopening, scores of
no-time-waiver felony cases past their statutory day had accumulated during
the 15-month period of limited operations. As of August 29, 2021, respondent
court’s jury trial list indicated there were approximately 220 no-time-waiver
felony cases with original last days sometime in the 15-month period before
reopening. The District Attorney explains that respondent court attempted
to address this backlog by prioritizing older cases first when it reopened.
Respondent court assigned trials out in order of their statutory last days,
prioritizing three courtrooms for in-custody felony trials, and maintaining the
remaining courtrooms for out-of-custody trials with earlier last days.
“It was in this context in which petitioners’ trials were called and
continued on August 16, September 2, and September 24, [2021], since on
those dates other defendants with earlier last days than petitioners—most of
whom with last days falling within the 15-month period before reopening—
were still awaiting trial. After 15 months of constrained operations resulting
in a backlog of numerous no-time-waiver cases, it was not unreasonable for
respondent court to not have addressed its backlog within seven, nine, or
twelve weeks of reopening, that is, by Valdivia Torres’s August 16 and
September 2 last days, or by Hernandez-Valenzuela’s September 24 last day.
Moreover, it was not unreasonable after those 15 months for the court to need
some latitude to determine how best to address[] its backlog, while the
pandemic persisted despite the full reopening. (See Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th
at p. 555, fn. 10 [quoting ABA standards which observe that it is unfeasible to
expect the same prompt disposition of court business when a unique,
nonrecurring event results in many cases for disposition and advocating for

16
‘ “some leeway for additional time” ’ in such circumstances].) The method the
court chose of advancing cases from the backlog by order of their statutory
last days did not reflect court mismanagement. Rather, it was a reasonable
approach in line with priorities set forth in section 10488 and not detrimental
to the good cause finding. Based on the totality of these circumstances, it
was not an abuse of discretion for the respondent court to conclude that the
backlog delaying petitioners’ cases was attributable to exceptional
circumstances constituting good cause and to continue their trials.”
(Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1127–1129.)
The petitioners nevertheless asserted the backlog in the superior court
was due to “ ‘poor administration,’ ” as evidenced by dark courtrooms at the
Hall of Justice due to judicial vacations or absences, and failure to reassign
additional courtrooms to hear jury trials, including at the civic center
courthouse. (Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1130–1133,
1142.)
Hernandez-Valenzuela addressed and rejected these claims. “[E]mpty
or available courtrooms,” both during the period since reopening and on the
dates petitioners’ cases were called, did “not mean respondent court was not
undertaking efforts to reduce its backlog.” (Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1131.) Although the empty courtrooms were “startling

8 “Section 1048 provides in part: ‘(a) The issues on the calendar shall
be disposed of in the following order, unless for good cause the court directs
an action to be tried out of its order:
(1) Prosecutions for felony, when the defendant is in custody.
(2) Prosecutions for misdemeanor, when the defendant is in custody.
(3) Prosecutions for felony, when the defendant is on bail.
(4) Prosecutions for misdemeanor, when the defendant is on bail.’ (§ 1048,
subd. (a)(1)–(4).)”

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and troubling,” the evidence showed the court had advanced “221 no-time
waiver felony trials” in the six months since reopening. (Ibid.)
Hernandez-Valenzuela also rejected the claim that failure to use the
Civic Center Courthouse for criminal trials evidenced court mismanagement
and precluded a good cause finding. (Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1133.) It observed the superior court had “noted that
use of the Civic Center Courthouse was not a viable option . . . because of the
inability to provide adequate security [and because] there were not enough
bailiffs to staff each courtroom.” (Id. at pp. 1133–1134.) The evidence
showed “Civic Center Courthouse lacked security devices designed to prevent
escape, which are features of the Hall of Justice. For additional in-custody
criminal matters at the Civic Center Courthouse, additional holding cells
would need to be constructed, and various locks and cameras, secure
entrances, and additional emergency communication devices would need to
be installed. In addition, thirteen more full-time sheriff staff would be
needed to staff additional criminal matters at the Civic Center Courthouse.
These security and structural concerns related to the Civic Center
Courthouse provide further reason to not fault respondent court from not
assigning additional criminal matters there.” (Id. at p. 1134.)
Petitioners’ Assertions Regarding Lack of Good Cause
Petitioners make the same claim advanced in Hernandez-Valenzuela—
that the shortage of trial capacity on their last no-waiver trial dates was the
result of the superior court’s “chronic, needless underuse of its trial resources
over thirteen months,” due to the “combined result of courtroom closures due
to judicial vacations and a remarkably inefficient trial assignment system.”
They also take issue with the court’s comments about the number of
defendants proceeding on a no-time waiver basis, asserting exercise of their

18
statutory rights does not constitute good cause, and the court failed to
consider the “severe psychological harm” to defendants “forced to wait in jail”
“under extreme lockdown conditions that risk grave damage to [their] mental
health.” (Italics omitted.)
Underuse of Trial Resources
Petitioners concede that by the time of reopening in June 2021, there
was “a massive backlog of criminal trials,” (italics omitted) but claim the
backlog should have been cleared by the time of their statutory dates because
the superior court announced that it was returning to “ ‘pre-pandemic’ levels
of service on June 28, 2021,” and “our criminal justice system has gradually
returned to normal.”
In June 2021, the superior court reopened the 11 trial departments in
the Hall of Justice that were open before the pandemic—Departments 10, 13,
16, 19, 21, and 24–29. There were around 562 cases waiting to be tried,
including about 155 felony cases in which the defendant was in custody
Petitioners have submitted hundreds of pages of “Criminal Daily Court
Status Report[s]” (some capitalization omitted) produced by the court
(specifically reports from June 28 through August 8, 2022). Using these
reports, petitioners calculated that “on an average day” in the 11-month
period between July 1, 2021 and May 31, 2022, 56 percent of the 11 trial
departments were holding trials.
These status reports also noted reasons why the dark courtrooms were
dark. The most common reason, responsible for 48 percent of the 182 dark
days from June 1 to August 8, 2022, was a judge’s “ ‘approved absence,’ ”
“ ‘scheduled absence’ ” or “ ‘excused absence.’ ” The second most-common
reason, responsible for 33 percent of dark courtrooms, was “Covering another
department,” while the third most common reason, responsible for eight

19
percent of dark courtrooms, was “Official business.” Of the judicial absences
resulting in a dark courtroom day during that time period, 54 percent were
due to vacations, 14 percent were due to being on, or covering for another
judge on, official business, nine percent were due to medical leave or covering
for another judge on medical leave, and five percent were due to personal
leave.
As petitioners point out, “[i]t is settled that, although a broad variety of
unforeseen events may establish good cause under section 1382, the
unavailability of a number of judges or courtrooms sufficient to handle the
court’s caseload, due to chronic congestion of the court’s docket, does not
establish good cause, absent exceptional circumstances.” (People v. Hajjaj
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 1184, 1198; Rhinehart v. Municipal Court (1984) 35 Cal.3d
772, 783 [judicial vacations alone do not constitute good cause for trial
delay].) Neither does the absence of judges due to their attendance at a
“ ‘mid-career’ training program,” when no good cause appeared why the court
“fail[ed] to recall [them] from the conference to try these cases.” (Lewis v.
Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 494, 498–499 (Lewis).)
However, contrary to petitioners’ claims, and unlike in the cases they
cite, the evidence does not show that judicial vacations, alone, were the cause
of either the backlog of cases or the lack of court room availability at the time
in question.
To begin with, it is unremarkable that during the traditional summer
vacation months of June, July, and August 2022, numerous judges were
taking vacation days. And petitioners’ statistics obfuscate the true number of
judicial vacation days during that time period. Of the 182 dark courtroom
days during that time period, only 88 were due to judicial absences. Of those
88 days, only 71 were judicial vacations, or 39 percent of the total dark

20
courtroom days during that time period. Nor did the backlog develop during
that time period, and forbidding judges to take vacation days, even if that
were possible, would not have alleviated it. In short, unlike in Lewis,
petitioners’ cases could not have proceeded to trial simply by recalling judges
from a nearby training session. (Lewis, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d at pp. 498–
499.)
Petitioners cite no authority for the proposition that allowing judges to
take vacation days or cover for other absent judges is trial court
mismanagement. Indeed, they admit that “when a trial judge covers for an
absent colleague, that judge sometimes conducts his or her own regularly
assigned calendar as well as covering the other department.” And as
Hernandez-Valenzuela concluded, the massive backlog in the summer of 2021
was the result of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the evidence in the instant
writ proceedings shows the pandemic and its attendant disruptions, while
somewhat abated, certainly had not ceased.
Moreover, the superior court had made significant progress in clearing
the backlog of cases awaiting trial since the dates at issue in Hernandez-
Valenzuela. The court had reduced its backlog of felony in-custody no-time-
waiver trials from 280 cases in February 2022 to 192 cases in July 2022, with
the backlog rising slightly to 204 cases in September 2022. The court had
also reduced its backlog of felony out-of-custody no-time-waiver trials, from
202 cases in February, to 182 cases in July, to 170 cases in September of
2022. Although petitioners point to the fact the backlog had increased
between June 2021 and February 2022, that time period ended almost six
months before the good cause determination in these cases and during that
six-month period the court made substantial progress reducing the backlog.
Moreover, it did so while criminal cases continued to be filed and without

21
additional court facilities or judgeships. This reflects responsive
management, rather than mismanagement, of court resources.
Petitioners acknowledge that as of May 2022, the court’s records
indicate 89 percent of the 11 trial courtrooms were in use. But they assert
that beginning in mid-May, the court’s “ ‘HOJ Courts in Trial’ ” statistics
were overstated because they included “out-of-custody trials that had been
assigned to departments for all purposes, but had not actually started.”
Thus, as defendants calculated it, there were an average of eight courtrooms
that were actually in trial each day in May 2022, not the 9.8 average
calculated using the “ ‘HOJ Courts in Trial’ ” statistics. However, even
accepting petitioners’ calculation, this still meant 73 percent of the 11
courtrooms were in use—a dramatic increase from the 33 percent and 28
percent, respectively, for the months of August, and September 2021 at issue
in Hernandez-Valenzuela. And on the last days for trial for Estrada and
Kuhaiki, 73 percent of the 11 courtrooms were again in use.9
Hernandez-Valenzuela addressed whether open courtrooms evidenced
court mismanagement and “disagree[d] that the open courtrooms preclude
respondent court’s good cause finding.” (Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1130.) The court observed that in Hajjaj, supra,
50 Cal.4th 1184, “the Supreme Court recognized that ‘a broad variety of
unforeseen events may establish good cause under section 1382’ and that the
unavailability of judges or courtrooms sufficient to handle a court’s caseload
due to chronic congestion of the court’s docket was not such an event. (Id. at
p. 1198. . . .) In contrast, the backlog pending in respondent court at issue

9 Petitioners’ evidence showed there were three dark courtrooms on
both July 26 (Estrada) and August 5, 2022 (Kuhaiki). A fourth courtroom
was “dark during trial” on August 5th.

22
here has not been due to chronic congestion, but rather the result of a global
pandemic—a ‘unique, nonrecurring event[ ] [that has] produced an inordinate
number of cases for disposition’ and which may properly [be] regarded as an
exceptional circumstance that would support a court’s good cause
determination. (See id. at p. 1204; Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 571; see
also Arreola v. Municipal Court (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 108, 114 . . . [‘While
chronic congestion will not constitute good cause, court backlogs caused by
exceptional circumstances will excuse delay in bringing a defendant to
trial.’].)” (Hernandez-Valenzuela, at p. 1130, italics omitted.)
We also observe that while petitioners, in the trial court, complained
about lack of use of the Civic Center Courthouse, they have not pursued this
complaint in the instant writ proceeding. Hernandez-Valenzuela concluded
that the “security and structural concerns related to the Civic Center
Courthouse [were] reason to not fault respondent court from not assigning
additional criminal matters there.” (Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1134.) Here, the superior court, after detailing the
circumstances surrounding use of that courthouse, found “the Civic Center
Courthouse has not been a viable option for either in-custody or violent out of
custody criminal trials. However, with the lifting of shelter-in-place orders
and the relaxing of social distancing requirements, in addition to the return
of additional judicial officers, staff, and bailiffs, the Court has begun to send
more non-violent out-of-custody trials to the Civic Center Courthouse.
Judges at the Civic Center Courthouse have been instructed by the Presiding
Judge of the Superior Court that no time waiver jury trials will be given
highest priority at that courthouse.” Thus, the court has also made

23
significant efforts to utilize its Civic Center facility to assist in working
through the backlog of no time waiver cases.10
While petitioners insist the persisting, but steadily diminishing,
backlog of no time waiver cases in the San Francisco Superior Court can no
longer be attributed to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the evidence
simply does not support this claim. The backlog that resulted from the court
closures and the later disruptions from surges and new variants is not a
problem that can reasonably be expected to have dissipated within only
months or even a year or two, particularly given the continued filing of new
criminal cases.
Superior Court’s Findings
The superior court took judicial notice of its “records, policies,
procedures, courtroom facilities, and operations during the relevant periods
of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Emergency Orders and Rules issued by
the Governor, the Chief Justice, the Judicial Council, the Presiding Judge of
the San Francisco Superior Court, San Francisco County Health Officer, the
State of California Department of Public Health, and any other local or
statewide governmental agency . . . issued in response to the COVID-19
pandemic,” as well as its own records, practices, and official acts taken during
the pandemic. And based thereon, it made extensive findings in support of
its 16-page orders finding good cause to continue petitioners’ the trials.

10 Petitioners also claim there must be mismanagement at the San
Francisco Superior Court because other superior courts have eliminated their
COVID-19 related backlogs. Suffice it to say that without an examination of
the circumstances, including the number of no-time-waiver cases, facilities,
and personnel at those courts, and an analysis of the similarities and
differences—evidence petitioners did not present—this assertion is
meaningless.

24
 The court found: “even with the reopening of the courtrooms, isolation
and quarantine requirements persisted in San Francisco, surrounding
counties, the State, and under CDC guidelines. These requirements caused
significant delays during the trials that were in session as well as hampered
the Court in sending out trials at a similar pace prior to the pandemic. [¶]
Since the recent emergence of the delta and omicron variants of the
coronavirus, the Court has again had to balance the safety of the public, the
staff, the defendants, and the attorneys with the right to a speedy and public
trial. The increase in infections due to these new variants has caused
concerns with potential jurors, affected the readiness of witnesses, and
decreased the appearances of defendants. The delta and omicron variants
have impacted both the unvaccinated and the vaccinated. On December 13,
2021, the State reinstituted the indoor mask mandate in all public settings
regardless of vaccination status. San Francisco has not been immune from
the spread, and as of January 3, 2022, it had the third highest transmission
rate in the state. Governor Newsom extended the state of emergency to
March 21, 2022.”
As to the issues regarding the Sheriff’s Department, the court found
“the Sheriff’s Department is already stretched for staffing at the county jails
and the Hall of Justice due to retirements, resignations, and staffing
shortages caused by the global pandemic.” “The massive spread of these new
variants has had a substantial impact on court staff and sheriff’s deputies.
In early January of 2022, numerous sheriff’s deputies were unavailable due
to the new variants. Trial judges were forced to make good cause findings to
continue active trials [until] adequate deputies became available. For
example, on one particular day, the Sheriff’s Department was short 13
deputies at the Hall of Justice. Some trials were forced to have dark days

25
during the trial because there were not enough bailiffs to staff the
courtrooms. This, of course, lengthened the time of each trial, contributing to
the backlog. This also hampered sending new cases out to trial because there
were not enough deputies to secure open courtrooms. The Court was
informed by the Sheriff’s command staff that the bailiff shortage is
anticipated to continue through March of 2022. The number of sheriff
deputies has diminished by over 200 members since the onset of the
pandemic. This bailiff shortage, which has been a problem since the
beginning of the pandemic, has substantially increased since the emergence
of the delta and omicron variants. The shortage has also impacted the ability
of the courts to conduct anything more than one or two misdemeanor non-
violent criminal cases at a time at the Hall of Justice.”
“The recent spread of the variants also impacted court staff and judicial
officers. In January of 2022, there was a mistrial declared after two jurors
and a deputy public defend[er], who was 32-weeks pregnant tested positive
for the virus. In addition, the judicial officer and the entire courtroom staff
assigned to the case were forced to stay home due to potential exposure,
eliminating the use of the courtroom for other trials. In a separate case, a
judge tested positive during a trial and had to isolate for close to two weeks
causing a delay in the proceedings. Other judges who have either tested
positive, been exposed to someone who has tested positive, or live with
vulnerable individuals have been forced to remain home requiring the Court
to shift judicial resources to cover those judges in their absence, or to
designate a courtroom dark. These circumstances have substantially
impacted the Court’s functioning and operating ability.”
The court further found that “in May of 2022, the Bay Area again
began experiencing a massive spike in positive cases impacting the courts.

26
There were numerous judges, staff, attorneys, jury trial witnesses, and jurors
unable to appear in court from May of 2022 until the present. During this
same time period, the Court’s Human Resource Department declared all
three floors of the Hall of Justice in ‘outbreak’ status in accordance with
applicable law and CalOSHA guidelines. The virus continues to disrupt our
everyday lives, the judicial process is no exception.”
While petitioners acknowledge that the court made these and other
factual findings about the continuing effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on its
operations, they complain the orders were “boilerplate” and the findings
unsupported by any evidence.
With respect to petitioners’ complaint that the court issued
“boilerplate” orders, it is well settled that a trial court has “inherent power to
exercise reasonable control over litigation pending before it ‘ “in order to
ensure the orderly administration of justice.” ’ (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 . . . ; see §§ 128, subd. (a)(3), 187.) These
inherent powers primarily encompass ‘procedural matters, typically to control
the court’s own process, proceedings and orders,’ or to create ‘workable
means’ to enforce statutory rights.” (Carlsbad Police Officers Assn. v. City of
Carlsbad (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 135, 150–151, italics omitted.) Given the
hundreds of cases in which defendants had not waived time, a boilerplate
order setting forth the background of the COVID-19 pandemic and the court’s
response was not only within the trial court’s discretion, but a time-efficient
way of addressing motions to dismiss.
With respect to the evidence supporting the court’s findings, petitioners
assert “the court’s own records” show that from April 1 through August 8,
2022, “only six dark days . . . were caused by COVID-19 protocols, courtroom
capacity limits, or ‘staffing’ issues.” Thus, they maintain “[t]hese statistics

27
hardly support the notion that COVID-19-related staffing problems were to
blame for the continuance[s],” specifically disputing the court’s findings that
on the petitioners’ last days for trial “court personnel were unavailable to
staff courtrooms because of COVID-19.”
Petitioners acknowledge the finding that a new outbreak of COVID-19
occurred at the Hall of Justice in May 2022, but suggest the outbreak had
little effect on court administration. They assert an outbreak “simply means
that the worksite must report the matter to the local health department and
that employees must wear masks and test regularly for infection. It does not
require the closure of any courtroom, and so cannot justify delaying trials for
months.” (Fn. omitted.)
Petitioners are mistaken. A workplace “outbreak” in San Francisco is
defined as “when three or more employees have COVID-19 in a two-week
period.” (https://sf.gov/step-by-step/what-do-if-someone-work-has-covid-19 [as
of Feb. 28, 2023].) Although the outbreak must be reported to the San
Francisco Department of Public Health, that is not the only requirement.
(Ibid.) The employer must “[t]alk with the employee who tested positive,”
determine when they tested positive or their symptoms began, make a list of
“close contacts,” (which includes anyone the individual has been indoors with
for more than 15 minutes, even if wearing a mask), and inform those contacts
they have been exposed. (Ibid.) Individuals who test positive, with or
without symptoms, must “stay home and away from others for [five] days.”
(https://sf.gov/youve-had-close-contact-or-positive-test [as of Feb. 28, 2023].)
An individual who still tests positive after five days must stay home until a
negative COVID-19 test or 10 days have passed since the first positive test,
whichever comes first. (Ibid.)

28
 Thus, an “outbreak” results in significant disruption to the superior
court, as the court must contact individuals with positive tests, identify their
“close contacts,” and inform them of possible exposure. At the same time, the
individuals who have tested positive must isolate at home for between 5-10
days. While it is true, as petitioners claim, that the San Francisco Public
Health Department does not require a courtroom closure during an outbreak,
trial delays are the natural result as judges, court staff, litigants, attorneys,
witnesses, defendants, law enforcement, and jurors are required to test and
isolate.
Petitioners also take issue with the superior court’s finding that, on
petitioners’ last statutory days for trial, “court personnel were unavailable to
staff courtrooms because of COVID-19,” claiming “this assertion is wholly
unsupported by the evidence.”11 The court, however, took judicial notice of its
own “findings, records, policies, procedures, courtroom facilities, and
operations during the relevant periods of the COVID-19 pandemic.”
Petitioners do not challenge the propriety of the court taking judicial notice of
these matters, and consequently have failed to show this finding was
unsupported by the evidence.
Practices of Public Defender’s Office
In addition to the foregoing findings, the superior court found two
practices of the San Francisco Public Defender’s Office had contributed to the
no time waiver backlog.
The first was the unprecedented increase in no time waiver felony
cases. The court found that before the pandemic, “about 58.9% of the

11 We note this finding does not necessarily mean the judge had
COVID-19, but rather, due to the overall effects of the COVID-19 pandemic
on the court, personnel were unavailable to staff courtrooms that day.

29
defendants arraigned on a Felony Information set their cases for trial on a no
time waiver basis. . . . From January 1, 2021 to July 13, 2021, during the
height of the pandemic, the number of felony defendants who asserted their
right to a speedy trial increased to 81.1%. Since the reopening, the number of
felony defendants who asserted their right to a speedy trial has grown to
approximately 96%.”
Petitioners maintain that asserting their rights to a speedy trial and
declining to waive time cannot be considered good cause, citing Arreola v.
Municipal Court (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 108 (Arreola). In that case, due to
certain policies of the court and district attorney’s office, the public defender
counseled clients to plead not guilty and request a trial rather than seek a
plea bargain. (Id. at p. 112.) A backlog of 100 cases awaiting trial developed,
but the court denied motions to dismiss for failure to timely bring the cases to
trial. (Ibid.) The defendants sought writ relief, which the Court of Appeal
granted.
The appellate court first observed that “delay caused by chronic court
congestion and overcrowding is not good cause. [Citation.] If the contrary
were true, ‘[a] defendant’s right to a speedy trial may be denied simply by the
failure of the state to provide enough courtrooms or judges to enable
defendant to come to trial within the statutory period.’ [Citation.]
Insufficient allocations of admittedly limited public funds should not justify
the deprivation of the right to speedy trial.” (Arreola, supra,139 Cal.App.3d
at pp. 113–114, fns. omitted.) It went on to conclude that the exercise of
speedy trial rights could not, “even in unprecedented numbers,” be called “an
exceptional circumstance. The state must stand ready to provide a jury trial
to every defendant. The state may not demand as a price in exchange
therefor that a defendant give up the right to a speedy disposition of the

30
cause. As a matter of policy the ‘courts should not participate in, or
encourage, a procedure which obliges the accused to forfeit one constitutional
right in order to retain the protection of another.’ ” (Id. at p. 115.)
The circumstances in Arreola differ markedly from those at hand. In
Arreola, the defendants exercised their speedy trial rights in response to
perceived stricter policies adopted by the master calendar judge and the
district attorney. In other words, the sole reason for the backlog were policies
the court and district attorney had unilaterally enacted. The circumstances
here are entirely different. At bottom, the principal reason for the backlog
and the court’s facility and personnel difficulties in the instant proceeding
was continuing fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic.
We are not questioning petitioners’ right to assert their speedy trial
rights. Rather, their doing so is simply another consequence of the pandemic
that has magnified the pandemic’s impact on court facilities and personnel.
The second practice the court commented on was “assigning deputy
public defenders to ‘second chair’ cases . . . diminish[ing] the number of cases
that can be sent out to trial due to the ‘second chair’ attorney’s
unavailability.” The court further found since “[t]here are six individual
public defenders responsible for approximately 35% of the entire trial
backlog, their unavailability contributes significantly to the delay in getting
trials out and reducing the backlog.”12 Petitioners do not contest those

12 Real party maintains other defense practices have also contributed
to the backlog, including waiting until after a case has been assigned to a
trial courtroom to enter into a plea agreement, move to continue, or declare a
doubt as to competency, citing to exhibits lodged with its return. Although
these documents were not submitted to the trial court, real party asserts that
the court’s taking judicial notice of its operating procedures meant “this
information was before Respondent Court.”

31
findings. Accordingly, we accept them as true for the purposes of this
proceeding. (See People v. Superior Court (J.C. Penney Corp., Inc.) (2019)
34 Cal.App.5th 376, 406, fn. 18.) And as we have observed, “ ‘[d]elay for
defendant’s benefit,’ ” such as the presence of second chair counsel,
constitutes good cause to deny a motion to dismiss. (Hernandez-Valenzuela,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1124, quoting Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at
p. 570.)
Summary
In sum, considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the
continued, but abating, backlog at the time in question was primarily the
result of exceptional circumstances arising from a “ ‘unique, nonrecurring
event’ ”—the continuing consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.
(Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1130, 1135, italics
omitted.) Accordingly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that good cause existed to continue petitioners’ trials, and thus did
not err in denying their motions to dismiss under section 1382.

Petitioners, on the other hand, have sought to strike exhibits 1, 2, 7, 8,
9, and 10, as well as exhibits 1–3 submitted by real party with its the
preliminary opposition. These exhibits consist of over 2000 pages of
documents, including the declaration of a deputy district attorney, a
spreadsheet of all cases assigned to a courtroom from June 18, 2021, through
December 16, 2022, and a Case Management System printout and minute
orders for each case in the spreadsheet.
We do not agree the court’s judicial notice encompassed the truth of the
contents of thousands of pages of court records and grant the motion to strike
to the extent the documents comprising these exhibits were not before the
superior court at the time it ruled on these motions. (See Lockley v. Law
Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875,
882.)

32
Consideration of Prejudice to Petitioners
Petitioners additionally assert the superior court failed to consider the
prejudice to them resulting from continuance of their cases. They claim they
have been “waiting in county jail past [their] last day, under extreme
lockdown conditions that risk grave damage to [their] mental health.”13
However, as petitioners point out, no showing of prejudice is necessary to
prevail on a section 1382 motion to dismiss.14 Thus, it is unsurprising that
the trial court did not expressly mention it in its order.
That does not mean, however, that the court did not consider
petitioners’ submitted evidence of prejudice. Indeed, the court indicated at
the hearing it had reviewed all the “paperwork” submitted, and we presume
the court “regularly performed its official duties.” (People v. Sparks (1968)
262 Cal.App.2d 597, 600.)
In any event, prejudice is not necessarily shown by “lengthy
incarceration during pendency of . . . unresolved criminal charges.” (Elias v.
Superior Court (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 926, 943 (Elias).) Elias, considering
whether the defendant’s continued pretrial incarceration was prejudicial
applying the balancing test for the federal Constitution’s speedy trial right,
concluded the defendant “is in the same position as hundreds of other in-
custody defendants awaiting trial due to COVID-19 pandemic delays.” (Id. at
pp. 938, 943.) Moreover, the People submitted evidence in the trial court that

13 In a letter to this court, Estrada corrected their earlier allegation,
stating they have been housed in a “special, dormitory-style pod” in county
jail, and have not been subject to “the lockdown conditions faced by other
inmates” as asserted in the petition, undercutting their prejudice claim.
14 Petitioners concede they are not asserting a Sixth Amendment
claim.

33
the allegedly harsher conditions in the county jails during the COVID-19
lockdown have been improved, with programs and visitation reinstated.
Changes Suggested by Hernandez-Valenzuela
Petitioners also claim the San Francisco Superior Court has failed to
implement the changes suggested in Hernandez-Valenzuela.
Hernandez-Valenzuela “urge[d] respondent court to consider even more
measures to adopt, which could include but are not limited to expanding the
number of trial courtrooms in the Hall of Justice beyond the number that was
standard pre-pandemic, reassigning additional judicial officers from other
departments in the Civic Center Courthouse or Hall of Justice, or using
visiting or retired judges to cover courtroom vacancies. Respondent court’s
backlog which was borne of exceptional circumstances must be met with an
equally exceptional response to ensure that our recognition of a defendant’s
speedy trial rights as a critical constitutional protection is not merely lip
service.” (Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1136.)
Well aware of Hernandez-Valenzuela, the superior court detailed the
changes that had been made in the ensuing year. The court had “added an
additional trial courtroom at the Hall of Justice, utilized judicial officers and
additional clerical staff from the Civic Center Courthouse and the visiting
and retired judges’ programs to assist with trial, and sought the assistance of
a retired judge for additional settlement conferences. In addition, based on
extensive discussion with the Sheriff’s Department, the Court will begin to
send three to four misdemeanor cases to the Civi[c] Center Courthouse by
then end of July of 2022. The Court is still working on trying to get the
Sheriff’s Department to a staffing level to handle out of custody felony
matters. It does not appear they will be able to handle in-custody felony
matters at any time in the foreseeable future.” Indeed, petitioners concede

34
“Respondent court often calls on visiting judges to handle gaps in its staffing
or to hold pretrial conferences.”
“ ‘It is not our function to interfere with the trial court in its
administration of the calendar or assignment of judges.’ ” (Hernandez-
Valenzuela, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1133.) As the court in Elias observed,
“ ‘It is well established, in California and elsewhere, that a court has both the
inherent authority and responsibility to fairly and efficiently administer all of
the judicial proceedings that are pending before it, and that one important
element of a court’s inherent judicial authority in this regard is “the power
. . . to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time
and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done
calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and
maintain an even balance.” ’ ” (Elias, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 941.)
In sum, as of the time in question here, the San Francisco Superior
Court had made reasonable progress under continued challenging
circumstances. This is not to suggest continued improvements need not be
made. The superior court must protect defendants’ speedy trial rights and
should be continually considering ways to expedite these cases. But as the
court in Elias explained, the superior court is in the best position to exercise
its judgment, weigh competing interests, and maintain an even balance.
(Elias, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 941.)
Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic and its adverse impacts on the superior court
did not end when the court reopened. After reopening, the court had to
address not only the backlog that had developed during the closure of the
courts, but also the new cases that continued to be filed. And even though
the court reopened, the COVID-19 pandemic continued to wreak havoc, with

35
judicial officers, court staff, sheriff’s deputies, attorneys, defendants, and
jurors contracting COVID-19, being required to quarantine due to exposure,
or having to care for family members. Thus, the persistence of a backlog
during the time period at issue here was principally the result of continuing
sequelae of the COVID-19 pandemic. Not only the pandemic, itself, but its
length, seriousness, and continuing effects were unexpected and
unanticipated, and certainly resulted in exceptional and extraordinary
circumstances. Accordingly, the superior court did not, in the instant cases,
abuse its discretion in concluding that exceptional circumstances justified
continuance of petitioners’ trials past their statutory last days. Nor did it err
in denying petitioners’ motions for dismissal.
DISPOSITION
The petitions for writs of mandate or prohibition are denied, and the
order to show cause is discharged. The previously imposed stays of the trial
in both matters are lifted.

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 _________________________
Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Margulies, Acting P.J.

_________________________
Swope, J.*

**Judge of the San Mateo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

A166474, Estrada v. Superior Court

37