22-500-cv
Bradshaw v. Welch
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 1st day of March, two thousand twenty-three.
PRESENT:
ROBERT D. SACK,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
Jay Bradshaw,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 22-500-cv
Matthew Welch, Correctional Officer, Upstate
Correctional Facility; Gabriel Orbegozo,
Correctional Officer, Upstate Correctional
Facility; Nathan Locke, Correctional Officer,
Upstate Correctional Facility; Russell,
Correctional Officer, Upstate Correctional
Facility; Gravlin, Captain, Upstate
Correctional Facility; John Doe #1-2,
Correctional Officers, Upstate Correctional
Facility; Eric E. Marshall, Sergeant, Upstate
Correctional Facility,
Defendants-Appellees,
Soucia, Sergeant, Upstate Correctional
Facility; Donald Uhler, Veneske, Corrections
Sergeant, Brunson, Corrections Officer, C.O.
Lamica, Mallette, Corrections Officer,
Gadway, Corrections Officer, Gibson, C.O.,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Jay Bradshaw, pro se, Malone, NY.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Frederick A. Brodie, Assistant Solicitor
General, Andrea Oser, Deputy Solicitor
General, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor
General, for Letitia James, Attorney
General of the State of New York, Albany,
NY.
Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York (D’Agostino, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-appellant Jay Bradshaw, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order,
entered on March 4, 2022, denying his motion for a preliminary injunction. As the district court
noted, this lawsuit is one of at least twenty-two civil actions brought by Bradshaw since 2008.
See Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 13, at 3 (listing cases). In this lawsuit, Bradshaw brought claims for,
among other things, excessive force and failure-to-intervene under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in
connection with an alleged series of incidents on July 12, 2021, during which Bradshaw asserts
he was assaulted by certain defendants while incarcerated at Upstate Correctional Facility
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(“Upstate”).
Over several months following the filing of the complaint on July 21, 2021, Bradshaw
moved numerous times for a preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to (1) desist from
harming him and (2) transfer him from Upstate to another prison. The district court denied these
motions. Bradshaw did not appeal those decisions.
On January 18, 2022, Bradshaw filed another request for injunctive relief based on an
allegedly improper cell search conducted by correctional officers and threats allegedly made by
defendant Sergeant Eric Marshall on January 6, 2022 (the “January 2022 Allegations”). While
that motion was being briefed, Bradshaw commenced a separate federal lawsuit based on the
January 2022 Allegations and moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction, relief identical to that sought in the motion denied and appealed in this case. See
Bradshaw v. Uhler, No. 22-cv-94, Dkt. Nos. 1–2 (N.D.N.Y.).
In the instant action, on March 4, 2022, the district court denied Bradshaw’s motion for
injunctive relief based on the January 2022 Allegations. See Bradshaw v. Marshal, No. 21-cv-
0826, 2022 WL 630890, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2022). The district court determined, among
other things, that the motion should be denied because Bradshaw’s pending separate lawsuit
relating to the January 2022 Allegations sought identical injunctive relief, and “[i]t [was] entirely
inappropriate to pursue the same injunctive relief in two separate actions, based on the same
underlying conduct.” Id. at *2.
Bradshaw filed this appeal. While the appeal was pending, Bradshaw was transferred
to another New York State facility to participate in a treatment program but was subsequently
transferred back to Upstate, where he remains incarcerated today. We assume the parties’
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familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal, to which
we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether Bradshaw’s appeal is moot because
we lack jurisdiction to review a moot appeal. Nat’l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh, 714 F.3d
682, 692 (2d Cir. 2013). An appeal becomes moot “if an event occurs while a case is pending
on appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief [whatsoever] to a
prevailing party.” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, “[a] prisoner’s transfer to a different
correctional facility generally moots his request for injunctive relief against employees of the
transferor facility.” Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 2002).
Defendants argue that, because Bradshaw was transferred to Lakeview Correctional
Facility to participate in a treatment program in September 2022, his motion for injunctive relief
related to his conditions of confinement at Upstate became moot, and his appeal must be
dismissed even though he has now been transferred back to Upstate. We disagree.
Here, Bradshaw seeks an order vacating the district court’s denial of his motion for a
preliminary injunction that would provide emergency relief because of his conditions of
confinement at Upstate. Because he is currently at Upstate, regardless of whether he was
temporarily housed at another facility during the appeal, there is nothing about the present
situation that would render it impossible for the district court to grant his requested relief,
including his requested transfer from Upstate to another facility. See, e.g., Davis v. New York,
316 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a transfer of incarcerated plaintiff to a different
housing block did not moot claim for injunctive relief where plaintiff alleged that the unlawful
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conduct persisted in current location); see also Smith v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., No. 8-
cv-7909, 2010 WL 1191957, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010) (declining to adopt Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation that inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim was moot because he had been
transferred out of the facility at issue where inmate alleged that he had been transferred back),
aff’d in part and vacated in part, 500 F. App’x 59 (2d Cir. 2012), as amended (Oct. 24, 2012)
(summary order) (addressing merits of Eighth Amendment claim). Put simply, “a live
controversy” continues to exist between Bradshaw and the defendants regarding his continued
incarceration at Upstate. Thompson, 284 F.3d at 415. Accordingly, this appeal is not moot. 1
“A party seeking a preliminary injunction must ordinarily establish (1) irreparable harm;
(2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits, or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to
the merits of its claims to make them fair ground for litigation, plus a balance of the hardships
tipping decidedly in favor of the moving party; and (3) that a preliminary injunction is in the
public interest.” New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 650 (2d Cir.
2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
We review the denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, examining
factual conclusions for clear error and the legal conclusions de novo. Green Haven Prison
Preparative Meeting of Religious Soc’y of Friends v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty.
Supervision, 16 F.4th 67, 78 (2d Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Green Haven Preparative
Meeting v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 142 S. Ct. 2676 (2022). We also
1
In holding that the requested injunctive relief (including a transfer from Upstate) has not been rendered
impossible by any subsequent events for purposes of the mootness analysis, we make no legal
determination on the merits as to whether the relief sought may be granted in this case.
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review for abuse of discretion a district court’s handling of duplicative claims or motions in
separate lawsuits. Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000).
The district court determined in this case (which relates to alleged unconstitutional
conduct by the defendants at Upstate on July 12, 2021) that it should not consider Bradshaw’s
motion for injunctive relief related to separate events at Upstate months later in January 2022
allegedly involving different defendants (with the exception of Sergeant Marshall), especially
where Bradshaw filed a separate lawsuit regarding the January 2022 Allegations and has a
pending motion in that case seeking identical injunctive relief. Marshal, 2022 WL 630890, at
*2–3 & n.8. We find no abuse of discretion in that determination. See Curtis, 226 F.3d at 138
(“The complex problems that can arise from multiple federal filings do not lend themselves to a
rigid test, but require instead that the district court consider the equities of the situation when
exercising its discretion.”). 2
We have considered Bradshaw’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
2
The district court also concluded that Bradshaw failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success regarding
his claims arising from the January 2022 Allegations because, “having filed his motion only one week
after the alleged wrongdoing that gives rise to his request for injunctive relief, plaintiff unquestionably
failed to fully exhaust his administrative remedies, yet he offers no explanation as to why he did not do
so.” Marshal, 2022 WL 630890, at *3. We express no view on the issue here. Defendants are free to
raise an exhaustion defense, if they wish, in the separate lawsuit related to the January 2022 Allegations.
We similarly do not reach the other grounds articulated by the district court for denial of the preliminary
injunction.
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