NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 1 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 21-30271
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
4:19-cr-00181-BLW-1
v.
CODY MILLER WILLIAMS, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 9, 2023
Portland, Oregon
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and FORREST and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
Cody Williams appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress a
gun that law-enforcement officers found in his coat pocket. Williams was charged
and convicted with one count of Possession of a Firearm by a Prohibited Person in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court denied Williams’ motion to
suppress, concluding that: (a) the officers had reasonable suspicion that Williams
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
was armed and dangerous and were therefore entitled to conduct a pat down
search; (b) Williams violated Idaho Code § 18-705 by resisting and obstructing the
officers when they asked Williams to drop a crowbar and approach, and the
officers were therefore entitled to search him incident to arrest; and (c) in the
alternative, the inevitable discovery doctrine applied because the officers would
have found the gun while conducting a pat down search. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm on all three grounds.
“We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress de novo and
the underlying factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Zapien, 861 F.3d
971, 974 (9th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
1. The district court correctly determined the officers had reasonable
suspicion that Williams may have been armed and were therefore entitled to
conduct a Terry search. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). “In connection with
an otherwise lawful investigative detention under Terry, an officer may conduct a
brief pat-down (or frisk) of an individual when the officer reasonably believes that
the ‘persons with whom [they are] dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous.’” United States v. Brown, 996 F.3d 998, 1007 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned
up). “The test . . . is an objective one: ‘whether a reasonably prudent officer in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that [their] safety or that of others
was in danger.’” Id. (cleaned up).
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At the suppression hearing, the officers testified that they believed Williams
“could possibly have another weapon.” When they showed up to the scene during
midday, Williams matched the description of a reported burglary suspect, had a
crowbar, was wearing a trench coat, was near the backyard of the person that
called the officers, and it appeared he may attempt to flee. The situation as a
whole justified a Terry pat down. See Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864, 878 (9th
Cir. 2016), as amended (May 5, 2016) (“In Terry, the officer’s suspicion that Terry
was armed was premised largely on his substantiated suspicion that Terry was
planning a daytime store robbery and that such robberies are ‘likely to involve the
use of weapons.’”) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 28)).1
2. The district court also correctly determined that the officers had probable
cause to arrest Williams and search him incident to that arrest. An officer has
probable cause to arrest someone “if the facts and circumstances known to the
officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed.”
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959). Under Idaho law, an officer may
make a warrantless arrest when a person has committed a “public offense . . . in
[the officer’s] presence.” Idaho Code § 19-603(1). “The search-incident-to-arrest
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At the motion to suppress hearing, the district court expressed concerns about
whether the officers exceeded the limits of a Terry stop by forcing Williams on the
ground within seconds of arriving on the scene. Williams abandoned this
argument on appeal.
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exception permits law enforcement officers to conduct a warrantless search of a
person who is arrested, and of his surrounding area, when the search is incident to
the arrest.” United States v. Smith, 389 F.3d 944, 950–51 (9th Cir. 2004).
It was reasonable for the officers to conclude that they had probable cause to
arrest Williams for violating Idaho Code § 18-705, which provides:
Every person who willfully resists, delays[,] or obstructs any public
officer, in the discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his
office . . . is punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars
($1,000), and imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year.
The Supreme Court of Idaho has interpreted this statute broadly. For
example, if a search would be lawful, mere refusal to allow the search can justify
an arrest. See State v. Bishop, 203 P.3d 1203, 1216 (Idaho 2009) (“Because the
officer’s entry was constitutional, [the defendant’s] refusal to let [the officer] in
constituted a violation of section 18-705.”). Additionally, Idaho courts have noted
“[t]he plain language of the statute criminalizes resisting, delaying or obstructing
an officer in the discharge of his duties,” and “does not plainly require resistance
beyond refusal to comply with lawful orders.” State v. Orr, 335 P.3d 51, 55 (Idaho
App. 2014) (cleaned up).
Here, Williams concedes that the Terry stop was lawful. While conducting
the lawful Terry stop, the officers asked Williams to drop the crowbar three times.
They also ordered Williams to approach them four times. Williams dropped the
crowbar only after the officers’ third request, and he never approached. Then,
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when the officers approached Williams and attempted to place his arms behind his
back, he tried to pull away.
Williams does not argue that any of the officers’ orders were unlawful.
Instead, Williams notes that he partially complied with the officers’ orders by
dropping the crowbar and argues that his partial compliance means he did not
violate Idaho Code § 18-705. However, because Williams failed to comply with
several lawful orders during a lawful Terry stop, the officers had probable cause to
arrest him for violating Idaho Code § 18-705 and search him incident to that arrest.
See Smith, 389 F.3d at 950–51.
3. Finally, the district court correctly held that even if the officers did not
have probable cause to arrest Williams and conduct the search incident to arrest,
the officers would have inevitably discovered the gun while conducting a pat down
search of Williams. “The inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the
exclusionary rule.” United States v. Andrade, 784 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1986).
“For the exception to apply, the prosecution must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the contraband or other material seized would have been discovered
inevitably by lawful means.” Id.
As explained above, the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat
down search. The officer who found the gun testified that he “fe[lt] a hard object
in [Williams’] right front pocket . . . .” We conclude it is more likely than not that
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the officers inevitably would have discovered Williams’ gun.
***
AFFIRMED.
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