Filed 3/1/23 In re C.H. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re C.H., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B320051
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Super. Ct. No. PJ53380)
(Los Angeles County)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786,1 a minor
who satisfactorily completes probation is entitled to dismissal of a
section 602 wardship petition and the automatic sealing of all
records pertaining to the petition. C.H. appeals the juvenile
All statutory references are to the Welfare and
1
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
court’s order finding his performance on probation unsatisfactory
and declining to dismiss his two section 602 petitions and seal his
records. The court based its decision on C.H.’s use of marijuana
while on probation and his failure to enter a drug treatment
program as directed by the court and probation. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
In February 2020, a section 602 wardship petition was filed
against C.H., alleging the felonious possession of metal knuckles
(Pen. Code, § 21810), misdemeanor trespass (id., § 602, subd.
(m)), and misdemeanor public intoxication (id., § 647, subd. (f)).
Three months later, a second section 602 petition was filed,
alleging the felonious taking or driving of a vehicle without
consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor hit-
and-run driving resulting in property damage (id., § 20002, subd.
(a)).
The juvenile court sustained the two felony allegations, i.e.,
possession of metal knuckles and the taking or driving a vehicle
without consent. Initially, C.H. was placed at home on probation.
At probation’s recommendation, C.H. was placed out of home for
a period due to his drug and alcohol use and overall reckless
behavior. In April 2021, C.H. was placed back home on
probation.
At a hearing on April 26, 2022, the juvenile court
terminated its jurisdiction over C.H., who was no longer a minor,
but denied C.H.’s request under section 786 to dismiss the
petitions and seal his records. As detailed below, the court found
C.H. had failed to satisfactorily complete probation, noting he
2 We omit the facts underlying C.H.’s offenses because they
are irrelevant to the issues on appeal.
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“was given a lot of chances, and that would include he was told to
stop using drugs, and he used drugs.”
In addition, when C.H. turned 18 years old, he withdrew
from his participation in drug court. The juvenile court noted
that if C.H. had “stayed in drug court, . . . we would have
withdrawn the petition and sealed it.”
DISCUSSION
Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 786, subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part: “If
a person who has been alleged or found to be a ward of the
juvenile court satisfactorily completes . . . a term of probation for
any offense, the court shall order the petition dismissed. The
court shall order sealed all records pertaining to the dismissed
petition in the custody of the juvenile court, and in the custody of
law enforcement agencies, the probation department, or the
Department of Justice.”
“For purposes of [section 786], satisfactory completion of [a]
. . . term of probation described in subdivision (a) shall be deemed
to have occurred if the person has no new findings of wardship or
conviction for a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude during the period of supervision or probation and if the
person has not failed to substantially comply with the reasonable
orders of supervision or probation that are within their capacity to
perform.” (§ 786, subd. (c)(1), italics added.)
A juvenile court must determine, in its “discretionary
estimation,” whether a minor has “‘substantially complied’ with
the essential requirements of his probation, such that he ha[s]
demonstrably achieved the rehabilitative goals of probation.” (In
re A.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 697, 701, 711.) A court does not
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abuse its discretion if its finding is “supported by substantial
evidence” and is “not irrational or capricious.” (Id. at p. 711.)
The Juvenile Court Acted Within Its Discretion in
Declining to Dismiss C.H.’s Petitions and Seal His Records
Between February 2022 and the April 26, 2022 termination
hearing, C.H. failed two of five drug tests. At the outset of the
hearing, the juvenile court stated its tentative was to “follow
[probation’s] recommendation and terminate [jurisdiction], but
that would be without sealing since his last tests were positive
for marijuana.”
Prior to that hearing, the juvenile court advised C.H. it
would terminate jurisdiction if he attended substance abuse
classes and had negative drug tests. Neither requirement was
met. In addition to the two positive drug tests, C.H. failed to
enroll in substance abuse classes. When C.H. had difficulty
finding an available substance abuse program, his “probation
officer instructed [him] to enroll himself into a Narcotics
Anonymous program or an acceptable adult program.” (All caps.
omitted.) He did not do so.
C.H. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it
found he had failed to substantially comply with the probation
requirements. He maintains his use of “very low dosage
marijuana” near the end of his probationary period cannot be
considered noncompliance because “[i]t might be that ceasing all
use of marijuana under all circumstances, such as those involving
the loss of a family member [i.e., C.H.’s grandmother], might
have been beyond [his] capacity to perform.” (See § 786, subd.
(c)(1).)
Neither this argument nor the supporting “authoritative”
internet sources were presented in the juvenile court. We decline
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to consider them for the first time on appeal. (In re M.S. (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1251, fn. 4 [information not presented in
the juvenile court may not be considered on appeal]; People v.
Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1183 [“[O]ur review on a direct
appeal is limited to the appellate record”].)
In C.H.’s estimation, his performance on probation was
more than adequate. He had taken steps to obtain his high
school diploma, was gainfully employed and generally stayed out
of trouble. But “[t]he existence of evidence supporting [C.H.’s]
position does not demonstrate that the juvenile court abused its
discretion. Our role is not to substitute our judgment for that of
the juvenile court or reweigh the evidence.” (In re J.P. (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 1111, 1123.) “‘“The appropriate test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced
from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute
its decision for that of the trial court.”’ [Citation.]” (In re
Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319; In re Emmanuel R.
(2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 452, 465.)
As the juvenile court concisely stated, C.H. “was told to
stop using drugs, and he used drugs.” C.H. does not dispute that
substantial evidence supports this finding. Whether the juvenile
court could have focused on other factors and reached a different
conclusion is immaterial. (See In re Emmanuel R., supra, 94
Cal.App.4th at p. 465.) C.H.’s continued drug use alone supports
the court’s decision to decline to dismiss the petitions and seal his
records.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order denying C.H. relief under section
786 is affirmed.
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P.J.
YEGAN, J.
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Fred J. Fujioka, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis, Peggy Z. Huang
and Gabriel Bradley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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