Jones v. Association of American Medical Colleges

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MICHAEL D. JONES,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 22-1680 (EGS)

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICAL COLLEGES,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Michael D. Jones (“Mr. Jones”) brings this action

against Defendant Association of American Medical Colleges

(“AAMC”) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title

VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., arising out of the

termination of his employment. Mr. Jones, a Caucasian male,

alleges that AAMC discriminated against him because of his race

and retaliated against him for taking opposing views to AAMC’s

official diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DE&I”) policies. See

Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1 ¶ 2. 1 Pending before the Court is AAMC’s

Motion to Dismiss. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 4. Upon careful

consideration of Mr. Jones’ complaint, the pending motion, the

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Memorandum
Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the
original page number of the filed document.
1
opposition, the reply thereto, and the applicable law, the Court

GRANTS AAMC’s Motion to Dismiss.

II. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts reflect the allegations in the

Complaint and the documents incorporated by reference therein, 2

which the Court assumes are true for the purposes of deciding

this motion and construes in Mr. Jones’ favor. See Baird v.

Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 169 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

2 AAMC includes, as Exhibit A to its motion, Mr. Jones’ Charge of
Discrimination that he filed with the D.C. Office of Human
Rights and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). See Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2-4. “Although a
court generally cannot consider matters beyond the pleadings at
the motion-to-dismiss stage, it may consider ‘documents attached
as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, or
documents upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily
relies even if the document is produced not by the plaintiff in
the complaint but by the defendant in a motion to dismiss[.]’”
Patrick v. Dist. of Columbia, 126 F. Supp. 3d 132, 135-36
(D.D.C. 2015) (citation omitted). The Court can thus review Mr.
Jones’ charge “without converting the motion to dismiss into one
for summary judgment[,] as it is necessarily incorporated into
the complaint.” Holston v. Yellen, No. 20-3533 (EGS), 2022 WL
4355289, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2022) (citing EEOC v. St.
Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir.
1997)); see also Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 5 (incorporating by
reference Mr. Jones’ charge). To the extent Mr. Jones seeks to
argue that the present motion should be converted into a motion
for summary judgment, see Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 5-6; the
Court rejects that argument, see Klotzbach-Piper v. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 373 F. Supp. 3d 174, 182 (D.D.C. 2019)
(“Because administrative complaints are public document[s] of
which a court may take judicial notice, courts accordingly may
consider an EEOC complaint and Notice of Charge without
converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
2
 From July 29, 2002 until June 1, 2021 when he was

terminated, Mr. Jones—a Caucasian male identifying as Christian

and Republican—worked for AAMC as Manager of the Service

Management Information Technology Team. Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3

¶¶ 9-10, 7 ¶ 34. With approximately 800 employees and an office

based in Washington, D.C., id. at 3 ¶ 8; AAMC is a non-profit

organization “dedicated to transforming health care through

medical education, health care, medical research, and community

collaborations[,]” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 4 at 4. Mr. Jones worked

for AAMC for almost twenty years as an Information Technology

(“IT”) subject matter expert in AAMC’s organization process

areas, where he was responsible for reporting on process area

performance, making area performance improvements, and leading

and developing a team within AAMC’s IT Department. Compl., ECF

No. 1 at 2 ¶ 7, 3 ¶¶ 9, 11. Mr. Jones maintained a satisfactory

employment record during his time with AAMC. Id. at 3 ¶ 11.

AAMC maintains DE&I policies that commit it to “speaking

out against all forms of racism and discrimination; employing

antiracism and unconscious bias training; and moving from

rhetoric to action.” Id. at 4 ¶ 15. AAMC’s values include

“accepting responsibility for the oppression of minorities and

eradicating racism from society.” Id. at 7 ¶ 35. As a manager

with leadership responsibilities, Mr. Jones was required by AAMC

to complete various training programs regarding problem solving,

3
diversity, and Title VII. Id. at 3 ¶ 12. Between 2018 and 2019,

Mr. Jones completed one such training program titled “Crucial

Conversations,” and as was expected of him as a team manager, he

disseminated the knowledge and tools from the training back to

his team members. Id. at 3-4 ¶ 13.

On June 1, 2020, AAMC published a press release on its

website titled “AAMC’s Statement on Police Brutality and Racism

in America and Their Impact on Health.” Id. at 4 ¶ 14. The press

release indicated AAMC’s “determination to end racism.” Id. at 4

¶ 15. Following media reports of police brutality, AAMC held two

townhall meetings where staff “were encouraged to express their

feelings regarding the brutality and deaths.” Id. at 4 ¶ 16.

According to Mr. Jones, these meetings were “raw” and “emotions

ran high.” Id. At one of these meetings, an employee “made a

comment which compared anyone not out in the streets rioting to

Nazis.” Id. at 4 ¶ 17. This comment made Mr. Jones “extremely

uncomfortable,” causing him to leave the meeting. Id. at 4-5 ¶

17. Following these townhalls, Mr. Jones alleges that “the

workplace had become politicized” and that he continued to do

his job but was “reticent to share his point of view” because he

did not want his co-workers “thinking that he is a Nazi because

he was not out in the streets rioting.” Id. at 5 ¶¶ 19, 21. In

October 2020, AAMC publicly released on its website its “AAMC

Framework for Addressing and Eliminating Racism at the AAMC, in

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Academic Medicine, and Beyond.” Id. at 5 ¶ 22. This framework

outlined AAMC’s goal of becoming an “anti-racist, diverse,

equitable, and inclusive organization.” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 4

at 4 (citing to AAMC’s website). Mr. Jones alleges that AAMC did

not provide training sessions for managers on this new

framework. Compl., ECF No. 1 at 5 ¶ 23.

In December 2020, Mr. Jones participated in a meeting with

several co-workers, including a colleague named Angelique

Johnson (“Ms. Johnson”), and a subordinate member of his IT team

named Dami Sotande (“Mr. Sotande”). Id. at 5 ¶ 24. The purpose

of the meeting was to discuss an IT change request, which used

the words “master and slave” as “industry terms.” 3 Id. After the

meeting, Ms. Johnson emailed Mr. Jones and Mr. Sotande to

explain that she was “shocked” by the use of these terms and

asked Mr. Jones to “help [her] understand the naming

convention[,]” which she viewed as “non-inclusive and off-

putting.” Id. at 6 ¶ 25. Although Mr. Jones did not partake in

the naming convention or have authority to change it, he

responded “by stating his understanding of the term[s] outside

of the racial connotations as he had used and understood the

term[s] in the context of IT and his religion.” Id. at 6 ¶¶ 26-

3 Mr. Jones explained in his Charge of Discrimination that the
terms “master” and “slave” are “known term[s] used to describe a
relationship between two servers in the IT industry.” Def.’s Ex.
A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2.
5
27; see Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2 (“I explained that the

term has been widely used not only in the IT world but in

religion and sex.”). Ms. Johnson complained to AAMC’s Human

Resources (“HR”) Department about Mr. Jones’ response. Def.’s

Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2.

Following Ms. Johnson’s HR complaint, AAMC, specifically

John Coleman—the Senior Director of IT Operations—issued Mr.

Jones a counseling memorandum regarding his response, which

stated:

Your response to this business partner and
your employee was insensitive, unprofessional
and tone deaf. In your communication, you went
on several tangents to support your opinion
while not recognizing the fact that this
business partner had shared that she was
disturbed by the language and felt it was non-
inclusive. Additionally, you shared other
inappropriate comparisons of master/slave
relationships that should have never been
included in a professional email to a
colleague.

Id.; Compl., ECF No. 1 at 6 ¶ 28. Mr. Jones was required to

write an apology email to Ms. Johnson and was given the verbiage

to be included in the email. Compl., ECF No. 1 at 6 ¶ 29. AAMC

also told Mr. Jones not to contact Mr. Sotande. Id. at 6-7 ¶ 29.

Soon thereafter, in January 2021, AAMC’s Chief Information

Officer emailed the entire IT Department requesting that

“outdated and disrespectful” industry terms like “master, slave,

blacklist, whitelist, and man-hour” be replaced with “more

6
agreeable, inclusive, and respectable terms[,]” a directive with

which Mr. Jones complied. Id. at 7 ¶ 30.

In the spring of 2021, Mr. Sotande transferred from Mr.

Jones’ team, and Mr. Jones recruited from within AAMC to replace

him. Id. at 7 ¶¶ 31-32. On May 4, 2021, Mr. Jones introduced the

new employee during a team meeting and stated that “he had

stolen the employee from another team.” Id. at 7 ¶ 33; see

Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2 (“I made a joke about getting one

of my team members stolen from my department and stealing

another to join my team.”). This comment led an employee to file

a complaint with HR, stating that “they were offended by [Mr.

Jones’] joke because the phrase stealing employees . . . implied

[he] was talking about slavery.” Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2.

As a result of this second HR complaint, AAMC immediately placed

Mr. Jones on paid leave. Id.

On June 1, 2021, Jaynee Jones, an HR representative, and

Steve Harris, the Director of IT Service Management, held a

conference call with Mr. Jones, during which they informed him

that AAMC had terminated his employment. Id. On that call, they

read Mr. Jones his termination letter, which stated that he had

violated AAMC’s Ethical Principles and Conduct Policy, requiring

“[a]n ethical workplace culture” where “management lead[s] by

example and exemplif[ies] AAMC’s values.” Id.; Compl., ECF No. 1

7
at 7 ¶ 34. He requested to appeal this decision but was informed

that the decision was final. Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2.

Based on these facts, Mr. Jones claims AAMC “discriminated

against him because of his race (Caucasian/White),” and

retaliated against him “for taking opposing views to

management[’]s official [DE&I] policies by counseling him for

the use of industry terms and firing him.” Compl., ECF No. 1 at

1 ¶ 2. Specifically, Mr. Jones alleges that because of AAMC’s

policies “that promote discrimination against non-minorities,”

“the interpretation of those policies, the condonation of

comparing someone to a Nazi, and the condemnation of using

industry terms [that may be disrespectful to minorities],” he

was “vilified for the color of his skin” and “subjected to the

adverse employment action of being terminated.” Id. at 5 ¶ 19, 8

¶¶ 39-43. Following his termination, on February 8, 2022, Mr.

Jones filed a Charge of Discrimination with the D.C. Office of

Human Rights (“DCOHR”), which was cross-filed with the U.S.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See Def.’s Ex.

A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2. On June 1, 2022, the EEOC elected not to

proceed with an investigation and issued Mr. Jones a notice of

right to file suit. Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 5.

B. Procedural Background

On June 11, 2022, Mr. Jones filed this action, asserting

Title VII claims against AAMC. See id. at 1 ¶¶ 1-2. On August

8
16, 2022, AAMC filed the present Motion to Dismiss. See Def.’s

Mot., ECF No. 4 at 1. Mr. Jones filed his opposition brief on

August 30, 2022, see Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 1; and AAMC filed

its reply on September 6, 2022, see Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 7 at

1. AAMC’s motion is ripe and ready for the Court’s adjudication.

III. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a

complaint.” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir.

2002). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in

order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

Despite this liberal pleading standard, to survive a motion

to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.

1937 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is

facially plausible when the facts pled in the complaint allow

the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The standard does not

9
amount to a “probability requirement,” but requires “more than a

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

“[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss [pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6)], a judge must accept as true all of the

factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Atherton v.

Dist. of Columbia Off. of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C.

Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “In determining whether a

complaint fails to state a claim, [the Court] may consider only

the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either

attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of

which [the Court] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis

Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In

addition, the Court must give the plaintiff the “benefit of all

inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v.

MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

However, the Court may not accept as true “the plaintiff’s legal

conclusions or inferences that are not supported by the facts

alleged.” Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758

F.3d 296, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

IV. Analysis

AAMC advances three arguments for dismissal under Rule

12(b)(6). See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 4 at 7-11. First, AAMC argues

that Mr. Jones’ retaliation claim should be dismissed for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as Mr. Jones never

10
alleged that AAMC retaliated against him in his Charge of

Discrimination. Id. at 7-8. Second, AAMC argues that even if Mr.

Jones has exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to

his retaliation claim, alternatively this claim should be

dismissed for failure to allege that Mr. Jones engaged in any

statutorily protected activity. Id. at 9. Finally, AAMC contends

that Mr. Jones has not stated a discrimination claim because his

complaint only pleads conclusory allegations, rather than

sufficient facts from which it can be inferred that race was a

motivating factor in AAMC’s decision to terminate him. Id. at 9-

11. The Court addresses each claim in turn.

A. Mr. Jones’ Retaliation Claim Cannot Withstand AAMC’s
Motion to Dismiss

Title VII “both prohibits employers from engaging in

employment practices that discriminate on the basis of

race, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a), and bars them from retaliating

against an employee ‘because he has opposed any [such]

practice,’ id. § 2000e–3(a).” Harris v. Dist. of Columbia Water

& Sewer Auth., 791 F.3d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation

omitted). “In order to establish a prima facie case of

retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) he engaged in a

statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse

employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between

the two.” Jackson v. Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P., No. 18-1978,

11
2019 WL 3502389, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2019). “[A] plaintiff

need not plead each element of his prima facie retaliation case

to survive a motion to dismiss.” Id. However, for the reasons

explained below, Mr. Jones has failed to state a claim for

retaliation that can withstand AAMC’s Motion to Dismiss.

1. Mr. Jones’ Retaliation Claim Was Not
Administratively Exhausted

Title VII requires that an aggrieved employee timely

exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit in a

district court. See Headen v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.,

741 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294 (D.D.C. 2010); Harris v. Gonzales, 488

F.3d 442, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The Act “provides detailed

procedures for bringing administrative charges, and . . .

‘specifies with precision’ the prerequisites that a plaintiff

must satisfy before filing suit.” Dudley v. Wash. Metro. Area

Transit Auth., 924 F. Supp. 2d 141, 154 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109, 122 S.

Ct. 2061 (2002)). Specifically, Title VII requires an aggrieved

employee to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days “after

the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred,” but extends

this period to 300 days if the individual “initially instituted

proceedings with a State or local agency.” Dieng v. Am. Insts.

for Rsch. in the Behav. Scis., 412 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C.

2019) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)).

12
 The employee’s administrative complaint must allege that

the employer engaged in unlawful conduct within the applicable

time period, see Ndondji v. InterPark Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 263,

276 (D.D.C. 2011); as the “charge requirement serves the

important purposes of giving the charged party notice of the

claim and ‘narrow[ing] the issues for prompt adjudication and

decision[,]’” Park v. How. Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir.

1995) (quoting Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 472

n.325 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). While not “a heavy technical burden,”

“it is also true that the requirement of some specificity in a

charge is not a mere technicality.” Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). In meeting this requirement, “[a]

claimant is not necessarily limited to the boxes selected in the

administrative complaint as the basis for the claim if his

written explanation can provide a basis for identifying the

nature of his claims.” Ndondji, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 276 (citing

Robinson-Reeder v. Am. Council on Educ., 532 F. Supp. 2d 6, 13

(D.D.C. 2008), aff’d, 417 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2011)); see also

Maryland v. Sodexho, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 160, 162 (D.D.C.

2007) (explaining that an employee “can merely check” the

applicable “boxes” on the charge form, but if he is “uncertain

of the cause of discrimination . . . , he need only describe it

in the text” of the form); Johnson-Parks v. D.C. Chartered

Health Plan, 806 F. Supp. 2d 267, 270 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting that

13
employees are not required to use “magic words” to make out a

proper charge but instead must “alert the EEOC and the charged

employer with the nature of the alleged wrongdoing”).

Additionally, the employee may amend the administrative

charge “at any time prior to the conclusion of the agency’s

investigation,” but is required to sue in federal court within

ninety days following notice of the agency’s final action. Mount

v. Johnson, 36 F. Supp. 3d 74, 83 (D.D.C. 2014). The theories

advanced in the employee’s lawsuit are thereafter “limited to

the theories contained in the EEOC Charge he filed[,]” and

“[a]ny other theories are barred unless the claim is ‘like or

reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing

out of such allegations.’” Marcelus v. Corr. Corp. of Am./Corr.

Treatment Facility, 540 F. Supp. 2d 231, 236 (D.D.C. 2008)

(citation omitted); Park, 71 F.3d at 907 (“At a minimum, the

Title VII claims must arise from the administrative

investigation that can reasonably be expected to follow the

charge of discrimination.” (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted)). Moreover, “as a general rule, a Title VII

plaintiff must timely exhaust administrative remedies for each

discrete act [of discrimination or retaliation] alleged[,] even

if the acts are related.” Mount, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 83-84

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Morgan, 536

U.S. at 113. Courts are prohibited from “allow[ing] liberal

14
interpretation of an administrative charge to permit a litigant

to bypass the Title VII administrative process[,]” and

“[d]ismissal is required when a plaintiff fails to exhaust his

administrative remedies with respect to particular claims.”

Ndondji, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 276-77.

Here, AAMC argues that Mr. Jones failed to administratively

exhaust his retaliation claim because his charge only checked

the boxes for discrimination based on race and age and did not

allege that AAMC retaliated against him, or that he had engaged

in any protected conduct, “such as complaining to the [HR]

Department or filing reports against his supervisors.” Def.’s

Mot., ECF No. 4 at 6-8. Mr. Jones claims he has exhausted his

administrative remedies because his retaliation claim “arises

from two incidents which are described in the particulars

[section] of his EEOC complaint form[:]” (1) his response in

“opposition to” Ms. Johnson’s email about the “non-inclusive”

“master/slave” industry terminology; and (2) “the resulting

corrective action by AAMC’s [HR Department] requiring [him] to

issue a formal apology for his response[.]” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No.

6 at 9-10. Mr. Jones claims that these “particulars” should

support “a finding of retaliation at [ ] least to defeat a

motion to dismiss” since they are “factually similar” to his

discrimination claims and “would be discovered during the

agency’s investigation[,]” even though the box for retaliation

15
“was unchecked.” Id. at 10 (citing Mount, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 85-

88). In considering these arguments, the Court notes that

“[w]here, as here, the defendant alleges a failure to exhaust

administrative remedies under Title VII[,]” it may consider, “in

addition to the pleadings, . . . [the] [p]laintiff’s EEOC

Complaint and Notice of Charge . . . without converting the

motion[] to dismiss” into one for summary judgment because these

are “public document[s] of which [the C]ourt may take judicial

notice[.]” Latson v. Holder, 82 F. Supp. 3d 377, 386 (D.D.C.

2015) (citation omitted); see also Holston v. Yellen, No. 20-

3533 (EGS), 2022 WL 4355289, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2022).

“Presuming the truth of the allegations in [Mr. Jones’]

complaint and drawing all inferences in his favor,” the Court

concludes that he has failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies as to his retaliation claim. See Rattigan v. Gonzales,

503 F. Supp. 2d 56, 68 (D.D.C. 2007). While Mr. Jones could have

properly exhausted his retaliation claim by “either checking the

box on the charge for retaliation or describing conduct

constituting retaliation[,]” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 4 at 7 (citing

Robinson-Reeder, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 13-14); his charge does not

check the retaliation box and only indicates that he “was

discriminated against on the basis of [his] race (White) in

violation of Title VII” and “on the basis of [his] age (53 years

old)[,]” Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 3. Nowhere in the factual

16
allegations of his charge does Mr. Jones “express or event hint

at” a retaliation claim, as he merely summarizes the series of

events that led to his termination, noting that: (1) AAMC’s HR

Department “met with [him] to discuss [Ms. Johnson’s complaint]”

and asked him to send a written apology, “which [he] did[;]” and

(2) he was placed “on paid leave” and later “terminated”

following a coworker’s complaint to HR regarding his joke about

stealing a new team member from another department. Park, 71

F.3d at 907; Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2. Not only does Mr.

Jones’ charge “lack[] the words” “retaliation” or “retaliatory,”

but this summary of the “particulars” does not “provide the

slightest hint” that Mr. Jones viewed any of these incidents as

retaliatory acts, as opposed to discriminatory acts, which he

does specify in his charge. See Park, 71 F.3d at 908; Robinson-

Reeder, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 13. Thus, “[a] fair characterization

of [Mr. Jones’] EEOC Charge does not incorporate a charge of

retaliation.” Robinson-Reeder, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 14; see also

Brown v. Dist. of Columbia, 251 F. Supp. 2d 152, 162 (D.D.C.

2003) (dismissing retaliation claim for failed exhaustion when

the plaintiff “checked only the boxes” for discrimination based

on race and disability, and there was “absolutely no indication”

of retaliation allegations in her charge); Hunt v. Dist. of

Columbia Dep’t of Corr., 41 F. Supp. 2d 31, 36 (D.D.C. 1999)

(finding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative

17
remedies when she “specifically checked the boxes for age

discrimination and retaliation,” but not gender discrimination,

and did not otherwise indicate that “she was alleging gender

discrimination”); Latson, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 387 (dismissing age

discrimination claim for failure to exhaust when the plaintiff

neither checked that box on the charge, “nor provided any

factual details in her written explanation to suggest that she

intended to assert” that claim); Sisay v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,

34 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding failed exhaustion

when there was no “indication of a claim of national origin

discrimination either in the form of express words or factual

allegations that would support such a claim”); Park, 71 F.3d at

908 (same conclusion for a hostile work environment claim).

Moreover, as AAMC argues, “[d]iscrimination claims are

distinct from retaliation claims under Title VII,” Def.’s Mot.,

ECF No. 4 at 8; as that Act requires plaintiffs to timely

exhaust their administrative remedies for “each discrete act” of

discrimination and retaliation alleged, Mount, 36 F. Supp. 3d at

83-84; see also Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114 (holding that “[e]ach

incident” of discrimination and retaliation “constitutes a

separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice’” for which an

administrative charge must be filed). “[R]aising discrimination

claims before the EEOC is [therefore] not sufficient to warrant”

exhaustion of a retaliation claim because these two discrete

18
claims “must be raised independently if the retaliation occurred

prior to the filing of the administrative charge.” Ndondji, 768

F. Supp. 2d at 278-79 (dismissing the plaintiff’s retaliation

claim when he “never expressed or described any belief” in his

charge that his employer had engaged in retaliatory behavior and

prohibiting the addition of retaliation claims for the first

time in a Title VII suit); see also Ponce v. Billington, 652 F.

Supp. 2d 71, 73-74 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding the plaintiff failed

to exhaust his retaliation claim when he did not allege that

claim in his charge, and retaliation is not “like or reasonably

related to” a discrimination claim); Marcelus, 540 F. Supp. 2d

at 236 (noting that the “only theories mentioned in [the

plaintiff’s] EEOC charge . . . were age and national origin[,]”

and absent any indication of a retaliation theory, such as

“making past complaints about discrimination, or filing prior

incident reports against co-workers and supervisors[,]” his

retaliation claim was “not ‘like or reasonably related to’ the

allegations in his EEOC Charge”); Rattigan, 503 F. Supp. 2d at

69 (concluding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies for his retaliation claim, which was not

“within the scope of ‘the administrative investigation that

[could] reasonably be expected to follow’” his charge); Payne v.

Salazar, 619 F.3d 56, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal

of the plaintiff’s retaliation claim since this claim “could not

19
possibly have ‘arisen from the administrative investigation’

that followed” the filing of her charge).

Because of the absence of allegations in Mr. Jones’ charge

positing a theory of retaliation, or any facts indicating he

complained to HR about retaliation or filed reports against co-

workers or supervisors, the Court concludes that Mr. Jones has

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for his discrete

retaliation claim. 4 See Ndondji, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 279;

Marcelus, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 236; Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113.

Accordingly, Mr. Jones’ retaliation claim under Title VII cannot

withstand AAMC’s Motion to Dismiss and must fail.

4 Mr. Jones attempts to argue that “his retaliation claim arises
from factually similar allegations” in his charge, and so,
“regardless if it was separately alleged[,]” it should satisfy
the administrative exhaustion requirement. Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No.
6 at 2. To support this argument, he cites to language from
Mount v. Johnson, 36 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.D.C. 2014) indicating
that allegations “put before the agency” and “new allegations”
can both proceed if they “are factually similar such that they
would be discovered during the agency’s investigation.” 36 F.
Supp. 3d at 85-86. However, this language is inapposite here, as
Mount was comparing claims “based on events that occur [before
and] after the filing of an administrative charge.” Id. at 85.
In Mr. Jones’ case, none of his claims are based on events that
occurred after the filing of his charge, and thus, “at a
minimum, he must have raised his pre-charge retaliation
allegations with the EEOC to exhaust his administrative
remedies[.]” See Ndondji v. InterPark Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 263,
278 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Retaliation claims that occurred prior to
the filing of a claim must be administratively exhausted.”);
Pyne v. Dist. of Columbia, 298 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2002)
(labeling it a “prerequisite” to bring a retaliation charge
before the EEOC if the retaliation occurred prior to the filing
of the charge).
20
 2. Mr. Jones Has Not Alleged That He Engaged in
Statutorily Protected Activity Under Title VII,
As Is Required to State a Retaliation Claim

AAMC next argues that even if Mr. Jones has exhausted his

administrative remedies as to his retaliation claim, this claim

should still be dismissed “for failure to allege that he engaged

in a statutor[ily] protected activity.” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 4

at 9. In contrast, Mr. Jones argues that he engaged in protected

activity by sending a response email to his colleague, Ms.

Johnson, in which he “express[ed] his opposition to cancel

culture interpretation of industry standard terms as a practice

of his [Republican] political affiliation,” which he claims is a

“protected trait” under the District of Columbia Human Rights

Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code § 2-1401.01, et seq. 5 See Pl.’s Opp’n,

ECF No. 6 at 10-12. He adds that his affiliations as “a

conservative Christian and member of the Republican party” were

“known to his coworkers” and that “his opposition [in his email]

to adopting the subjective view of the [master/slave] term[s] as

non-inclusive was an expression of his concern about the

5 Under the DCHRA, it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice to
coerce, threaten, retaliate against, or interfere with any
person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of having
exercised or enjoyed, or on account of having aided or
encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of any
right granted or protected under this chapter.” D.C. Code. § 2-
1402.61. In addition, the DCHRA makes it unlawful for employers
to discriminate based on an employee’s “political affiliation,”
id. § 2-1402.11(a); defined as “the state of belonging to or
endorsing any political party[,]” id. § 2-1401.02(25).
21
politicized cancel culture within AAMC.” Id. at 9-11. Mr. Jones

claims that this opposition was “protected conduct” under the

DCHRA and that he was “punish[ed]” for not adopting “the dynamic

subjective view” of these terms when AAMC issued him a

“corrective action” counseling memorandum following his email to

Ms. Johnson and required him to formally apologize to her. Id.

at 10-12. AAMC replies by noting that Mr. Jones “devotes the

bulk of his Opposition to explaining how he has a viable claim

for retaliation on the basis of political affiliation under the

[DCHRA]—a claim not alleged in either the Complaint or the EEOC

Charge[,]” and therefore “fails to explain his failure to

exhaust administrative remedies with respect to his retaliation

claim under Title VII.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 7 at 1. Instead,

AAMC claims that Mr. Jones improperly “attempts to convert his

race retaliation claim into a political affiliation claim under

the [DCHRA,]” a claim which is “time-barred.” Id.

As an initial matter, the Court rejects Mr. Jones’ attempt

in his opposition brief to supplement his existing Title VII

claims with “a brand new theory of liability and new facts[,]”

Hawkins v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 311 F. Supp. 3d 94,

109 (D.D.C. 2018); namely a political affiliation retaliation

claim under the DCHRA, see Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 9-12.

First, Mr. Jones failed to plead such a claim, as his complaint

includes just one count for race discrimination and retaliation

22
under Title VII. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1 ¶ 1, 8 ¶¶ 37-44. As

such, the Complaint does not, on its face, state a claim under

the DCHRA, and “[t]hat omission is fatal because a ‘plaintiff

cannot add a new claim through an opposition brief.’” Billups v.

Lab’y Corp. of Am., 233 F. Supp. 3d 20, 25 (D.D.C. 2017)

(quoting Williams v. Spencer, 883 F. Supp. 2d 165, 181 n.8

(D.D.C. 2012) (collecting cases)); see also BEG Invs., LLC v.

Alberti, 85 F. Supp. 3d 13, 26 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Because ‘a

complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a

motion to dismiss,’ Coleman v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 94

F. Supp. 2d 18, 24 n.8 (D.D.C. 2000), the Court was unable to

consider those new facts when ruling on Defendants’ motion to

dismiss.”). Here, Mr. Jones’ opposition brief contains new facts

not appearing in the Complaint about his email response to Ms.

Johnson that allegedly included reference to “his opposition to”

“cancel culture[’s] interpretation of industry standard terms”

as part of his political affiliation and beliefs as a

Republican—all new facts which the Court may not now consider.

See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 10-12. Mr. Jones “cannot overcome

a 12(b)(6) motion by adding new information, much less a new

cause of action, in a brief[,]” and should he wish to add a

claim under the DCHRA, the proper course of action is to move

for leave to amend his complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure Rule 15(a). Hawkins, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 109.

23
 Even considering Mr. Jones’ new claims and factual

allegations proffered in his opposition briefing, a DCHRA

political affiliation claim would nonetheless fail. The DCHRA

requires that “[a] private cause of action . . . be filed . . .

within one year of the unlawful discriminatory act, or the

discovery thereof,” but “[t]he timely filing of a complaint with

the [DCOHR] . . . toll[s] the running of the statute of

limitations while the complaint is pending.” D.C. Code § 2–

1403.16(a). Here, Mr. Jones claims that AAMC issued him “a

corrective action memorandum on or about December 23, 2020, in

response to [his] email sent on December 17, 2020.” See Pl.’s

Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 10, 12 (alleging a “clear causal nexus”

between his “opposition” email to Ms. Johnson and AAMC’s

issuance of a counseling memorandum that he argues should

support his retaliation claim). Yet, Mr. Jones did not file his

charge until February 8, 2022—more than a year after the alleged

“unlawful discriminatory act”—and thus any political affiliation

claims relating to these events are time-barred under the DCHRA.

See D.C. Code § 2–1403.16(a); Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 7 at 6.

As such, the Court proceeds with analyzing whether Mr.

Jones engaged in statutorily protected activity as defined by

Title VII, which does not include “political affiliation” as a

protected class. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting

discrimination based solely on “race, color, religion, sex, or

24
national origin”). The Court also agrees with AAMC that the only

relevant documents in this analysis are Mr. Jones’ complaint and

his Charge of Discrimination, see Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 7 at 4;

neither of which include factual allegations about Mr. Jones’

email response expressing “his opposition to the subjective

interpretation of the Master/Slave term[,]” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No.

6 at 11. To the extent Mr. Jones seeks to reference details from

this email exchange and incorporate new factual allegations as

to his political affiliation, the Court is “unable to consider

those new facts” when ruling on AAMC’s Motion to Dismiss. 6

Alberti, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 26; see Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 9,

11 (incorporating specific wording from Mr. Jones’ email to Ms.

Johnson, along with outside data regarding “cancel culture”—both

of which the Court must disregard). Thus, the only remaining

question as to Mr. Jones’ Title VII retaliation claim is

whether, presuming the truth of the allegations in his complaint

6 As AAMC notes, Mr. Jones references his email response to Ms.
Johnson as “Exhibit B (Email Exchange),” although no such
exhibit “was attached to either the Complaint or the
Opposition.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 7 at 4 n.1; Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF
No. 6 at 9-11. Even if Mr. Jones meant to in fact attach this
exhibit, the Court could not consider such a matter “outside the
pleadings” without converting AAMC’s Motion to Dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment, which the Court declines to do. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see also Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 7 at 4
(noting that the proposed exhibit was also not incorporated by
reference in the Complaint or relied upon in the Complaint but
was “absent” from it); Patrick, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 135-36.
25
and charge and drawing all inferences in his favor, he has

alleged that he engaged in statutorily protected activity.

To state a claim for retaliation under Title VII, Mr. Jones

must allege that: (1) he engaged in a statutorily protected

activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse action by AAMC;

and (3) a causal link connects the two. See Carter-Frost v.

Dist. of Columbia, 305 F. Supp. 3d 60, 73 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing

Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). While no

“magic words” are required to allege a statutorily protected

activity, “the complaint must in some way allege unlawful

discrimination, not just frustrated ambition.” Broderick v.

Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Title VII’s

anti-retaliation provision specifically outlines what

constitutes a “protected activity.” Robinson-Reeder, 532 F.

Supp. 2d at 14. The first prong, known as “the opposition

clause,” makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate

against an employee “because he has opposed” an unlawful

employment practice. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). The

second prong, known as “the participation clause,” makes it

unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee for

his “participation in a discrimination charge, investigation, or

proceeding.” Id.; Burton v. Batista, 339 F. Supp. 2d 97, 114

(D.D.C. 2004) (citing § 2000e-3(a)). In sum, “[a]n activity is

protected if it involves opposing alleged discriminatory

26
treatment by the employer or participating in legal efforts

against the alleged treatment[,]” Globus v. Skinner, 721 F.

Supp. 329, 334 (D.D.C. 1989), aff’d, No. 90-5020, 1990 WL 123927

(D.C. Cir. Aug. 13, 1990); and objections or complaints

“unconnected to any asserted violation of the antidiscrimination

laws” do not suffice, Liu v. Geo. Univ., No. 22-157, 2022 WL

2452611, at *8 (D.D.C. July 6, 2022).

Because Mr. Jones does not allege discrimination based on

participation in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under

Title VII, his claims are properly assessed under the opposition

clause. To come within that clause, “one must demonstrate an

objectively reasonable belief that the practice ‘opposed’

actually violated Title VII[.]” Burton, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 114.

However, nowhere in his complaint or charge does Mr. Jones claim

that he opposed an unlawful employment practice. Regarding his

email to Ms. Johnson, Mr. Jones only alleges that he “responded

by stating his understanding of the [master/slave] term[s]

outside of the racial connotations as he had used and understood

[them] in the context of IT and his religion.” Compl., ECF No. 1

at 6 ¶ 27. 7 According to these factual allegations, Mr. Jones

simply stated his beliefs regarding the master/slave terminology

7 The language in Mr. Jones’ charge is similar: “I explained that
the term has been widely used not only in the IT world but in
religion and sex. Ms. Johnson complained to [HR] about my
response.” Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2.
27
and did not allege the existence of unlawful conduct by AAMC.

For example, Mr. Jones does not claim that he “voiced any

concerns about any discriminatory actions” by AAMC based on his

race, either in his response to Ms. Johnson, or afterwards by

filing a complaint of discrimination with AAMC’s HR Department.

Robinson-Reeder, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 14; see also Ndondji, 768 F.

Supp. 2d at 279 (dismissing a retaliation claim when the

plaintiff did not allege that he complained to management or

HR); Marcelus, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (same for an employee who

did not make a past complaint about discrimination).

Nor does Mr. Jones contend that AAMC acted in a retaliatory

manner following the email incident, Robinson-Reeder, 532 F.

Supp. 2d at 14; as he merely indicates that he “was counseled

for his response[,]” which involved an “insensitive,

unprofessional” tone and “inappropriate comparisons of

master/slave relationships that should never have been included

in a professional email to a colleague[,]” Compl., ECF No. 1 at

6 ¶ 28. At most, Mr. Jones appears to be complaining about being

forced to write an apology to Ms. Johnson, id. at 6 ¶ 29; or

expressing “frustrated ambition” with AAMC’s cultural values and

policies, but “without mentioning discrimination or otherwise

indicating that [race, or another Title VII protected ground,]

was an issue, [this] does not constitute protected activity,”

Broderick, 437 F.3d at 1232; see also Liu, 2022 WL 2452611, at

28
*8 (dismissing retaliation claim where the plaintiff made email

comments to his employer that equated “to little more than

‘frustrated ambition’” rather than opposition to “any type of

unlawful discrimination”); Robinson-Reeder, 532 F. Supp. 2d at

14 (same for a plaintiff who seemed to be only “complaining

about the effects of nepotism” at her company); King v. Jackson,

468 F. Supp. 2d 33, 38 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d, 487 F.3d 970 (D.C.

Cir. 2007) (same where the plaintiff did “not allege that his

opposition was directed at any act of employment discrimination

allegedly taken by the defendant”); Logan v. Dep’t of Veteran

Affs., 404 F. Supp. 2d 72, 77 (D.D.C. 2005) (same for a

plaintiff who wrote a letter about her employer’s management

practices and filed a grievance regarding her medical care but

did not “include a claim of discrimination based upon” a

protected ground under Title VII).

Therefore, Mr. Jones’ retaliation claim, in addition to

being dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies,

is also subject to dismissal because Mr. Jones “has not alleged

a sufficient protected activity to provide the foundation for a

retaliation claim.” 8 Robinson-Reeder, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 14.

8 In its reply brief, AAMC argues that Mr. Jones’ retaliation
claim should also fail because he “does not allege [that] he
suffered an adverse action due to emailing Ms. Johnson.” Def.’s
Reply, ECF No. 7 at 5. Because the Court has already concluded
that Mr. Jones’ retaliation claim must be dismissed, it need not
discuss this additional argument. Moreover, the Court does not
29
 B. Mr. Jones’ Discrimination Claim Cannot Withstand
AAMC’s Motion to Dismiss

To bring an actionable discrimination claim under Title

VII, Mr. Jones must allege that: “(1) [he] is a member of a

protected class; (2) [he] suffered an adverse employment action;

and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of

discrimination.” Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C. Cir.

2002) (citation omitted). “Although it is well-established that

an employment discrimination plaintiff is not required to plead

every fact necessary to establish a prima facie case to survive

a motion to dismiss, [he] must nevertheless plead sufficient

facts to show a plausible entitlement to relief.” Jones v.

Ottenberg’s Bakers, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 2d 185, 191 (D.D.C. 2013)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Even at the

motion-to-dismiss stage, conclusory allegations . . . ‘are not

entitled to the presumption of truth.’” See Johnson v. Dist. of

Columbia, 49 F. Supp. 3d 115, 121 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679) (dismissing a plaintiff’s Title VII claim when

the court was left with “wholly conclusory” allegations after

“presuming [the] (limited) factual allegations to be true”).

It is undisputed that Mr. Jones’ complaint alleges the

first two elements of a prima facie discrimination case by

consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.
Carter v. Geo. Wash. Univ., 387 F.3d 872, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
30
asserting that he is “Caucasian/White” and that he “received a

termination letter” and was “fired.” Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1 ¶ 2,

7 ¶ 34, 8 ¶ 36; see Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C.

Cir. 2009) (“An adverse employment action is a significant

change in employment status, such as hiring[ or] firing[.]”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). However, AAMC

contends that Mr. Jones’ discrimination claim must be dismissed

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

because he has not alleged facts that give rise to an inference

of discrimination and has instead only stated “conclusory

statements and legal conclusions.” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 4 at 9-

11. Mr. Jones argues that the Complaint sets forth enough facts

establishing that he was terminated “because of his race as a

Caucasian” by alleging that “[o]ne can infer that had a non-

Caucasian employee of the same position” joked about stealing a

team member from another department like he did, “their words

would not be interpreted as ‘talking about slavery’ and a

demonstration of a lack [of] self-awareness in violation of

AAMC’s policy.” See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 12-13 (noting that

his termination letter accused him of violating the AAMC Ethical

Principles and Conduct Policy). The Court disagrees with Mr.

Jones that he has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly suggest

that AAMC’s actions “taken against [him] were motivated by

31
racial animus.” See Harris v. Mayorkas, No. 21-cv-1083, 2022 WL

3452316, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2022).

“[A]n inference of discrimination can be established

through allegations that the plaintiff was ‘treated differently

from similarly situated employees who are not part of the

protected class.’” Id. (quoting George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405,

412 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). In cases, like here, “[w]here a plaintiff

seeks an inference of discrimination based on ‘disparate

treatment,’” Budik v. How. Univ. Hosp., 986 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7

(D.D.C. 2013); he “must plead sufficient facts to raise a

plausible inference that all of the relevant aspects of [his]

employment situation were nearly identical to those of the other

employees who did not suffer similar adverse employment

actions[,]” Harris, 2022 WL 3452316, at *5 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted); see also Neuren v. Adduci,

Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

(concluding that the plaintiff “offered no evidence to

demonstrate” similarity of situations between her and a male

employee and “thus failed to demonstrate disparate treatment”).

Here, Mr. Jones’ claim fails to meet these standards, as

his complaint is “devoid of any [ ] factual material” supporting

“a plausible inference of race discrimination.” Harris, 2022 WL

3452316, at *6. Nowhere in his complaint does he proffer factual

allegations describing “any comparator employees [outside of his

32
race], how they were similarly situated, or how they were

treated differently than [him].” Id. Only in his opposition

brief does he seek to make comparisons to “a non-Caucasian

employee of the same position,” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 13;

but he does not actually identify any such employees and

certainly does not allege specifics about their job titles,

experiences, levels of seniority, or even their exact races, see

Budik, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 7 (“Because the plaintiff[, an African

American,] has alleged no facts other than the ambiguous job

title of ‘co-worker’” to compare her employment situation to

that of her former Caucasian co-worker, “she has failed to state

a claim for disparate treatment discrimination, and the Court

must therefore dismiss that claim.”). Instead, Mr. Jones

generally states that “[o]ne can infer that had a non-Caucasian

employee of the same position” used his exact phrasing about

stealing a team member from another department, they would have

been treated differently than him, and “their words would not

[have been] interpreted as ‘talking about slavery[.]’” Pl.’s

Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 13. He then writes: “For that reason, there

is an inference that AAMC has taken adverse action against Mr.

Jones on the basis of his race.” Id. However, by offering no

facts to support these statements and simply concluding that

“[o]ne can infer” racial discrimination from comparing him to an

unspecified “non-Caucasian employee of the same position[,]”

33
id.; Mr. Jones has rendered his discriminatory allegations “just

[ ] legal conclusion[s]—and a legal conclusion is never

enough[,]” Harris, 2022 WL 3452316, at *6 (citation omitted);

see also SS & T, LLC v. Am. U., No. 19-721, 2020 WL 1170288, at

*5 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2020) (calling the plaintiff’s race-based

discrimination claim “too threadbare to state a claim” when it

failed “to identify any of the other businesses . . . or the

race of the other business owners,” and did not “explain how

those businesses were similarly situated yet treated

differently”); Bekkem v. Wilkie, 915 F.3d 1258, 1275 (10th Cir.

2019) (noting that a plaintiff’s bare assertion of “differential

treatment of similarly situated employees” is “too conclusory to

permit a reasonable inference of” discrimination). Such

conclusory allegations, along with inferences not supported by

the factual allegations, “are not entitled to the assumption of

truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; cf. Williams v. Dist. of

Columbia, 317 F. Supp. 3d 195, 200 (D.D.C. 2018) (concluding

that the plaintiff’s discrimination claim could survive a motion

to dismiss when he “provide[d] considerable detail” in his

complaint, “pointing to specific dates on which purportedly

discriminatory interactions occurred and naming specific

individuals involved”).

Most of Mr. Jones’ allegations are “wholly conclusory.”

Johnson, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 121. For example, he states in the

34
Complaint and Opposition that “AAMC’s leadership used phrases

and ideology that required nonminority employees to accept their

role in racism, including the privilege that comes with being a

nonminority.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 13 (citing Compl., ECF

No. 1 at 5 ¶ 18). He also alleges that AAMC “has developed” and

“interpreted policies to promote discrimination against non-

minorities.” Compl., ECF No. 1 at 8 ¶¶ 39-40. Yet, Mr. Jones

“does not specify what those allegedly discriminatory policies

are, or how [they] related to his termination[,]” nor does he

offer factual allegations regarding how any such policies,

including AAMC’s Ethical Principles and Conduct Policy, were

applied differently to employees of differing races. Def.’s

Mot., ECF No. 4 at 10. Instead, he merely alleges that one can

“interpret[]” that his termination resulted from “a lack of

self-awareness of his race as a Caucasian” because AAMC’s

policies held him, as a “non-minorit[y,] to impossible standards

and foster[ed] a culture of overwhelming White Guilt.” Pl.’s

Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 13; see also Compl., ECF No. 1 at 8 ¶¶ 41-43

(claiming Mr. Jones was terminated because of AAMC’s “support of

minorities” that “created a work environment that condoned . . .

comparing someone to a Nazi” and “condemned the use of industry

terms that may be disrespectful to minorities”). These are all

conclusory allegations that Mr. Jones fails to causally tie to

his termination and thus do not support an inference of racial

35
discrimination. As AAMC notes, that Mr. Jones may have “personal

disagreement” with AAMC’s policies and his co-workers’ comments

in townhalls is insufficient to establish a race discrimination

claim under Title VII. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 4 at 4, 10-11; see

Harris, 2022 WL 3452316, at *7-8 (noting that “courts have

recognized that [ ] generalized statements of racial friction

are insufficient to sufficiently allege discriminatory intent”

and concluding that “a generalized opinion” about “racial and

social tension” in the plaintiff’s office did not create an

inference of discrimination). Thus, “stripping away [Mr. Jones’]

conclusory allegations,” and presuming the remaining “(limited)

factual allegations to be true,” the Court concludes that Mr.

Jones has failed to state a racial discrimination claim under

Title VII. Johnson, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 121. Accordingly, Mr.

Jones’ discrimination claim under Title VII cannot withstand

AAMC’s Motion to Dismiss and must fail.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, AAMC’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF

No. 4, is GRANTED. An appropriate Order accompanies this

Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
March 2, 2023

36