IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 49302
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: March 8, 2023
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
)
ROBERT KENNETH WILDE, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge.
Order for restitution, affirmed.
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kimberly A. Coster, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Andrew V. Wake, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
LORELLO, Chief Judge
Robert Kenneth Wilde appeals from an order requiring him to pay restitution. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Wilde pled guilty to trafficking in heroin. According to his
plea agreement, he “agree[d] to pay restitution for all charged, uncharged, and dismissed conduct
in this case or in any case dismissed by the terms of this offer in an amount to be determined or in
the amount of $ TBD.” At the sentencing hearing, the State sought $5,900.26 in restitution for its
investigation efforts. Wilde represented that he had no objection to the costs of the “lab fees,”
which amounted to $291, but asked that the remaining amount of restitution be determined later.
Accordingly, the district court ordered $291 in restitution and set a hearing to determine the
1
remaining portion of the State’s restitution request. The district court imposed a unified thirty-
year sentence, with a minimum period of confinement for ten years, and a fine of $15,000.
At the restitution hearing, the State presented testimony from an officer who testified
regarding the value of his time spent on the case. The State also presented evidence of time spent
by three other officers. The district court found that the costs associated with the testifying
officer’s efforts amounted to $2,806.40 but that the State had not presented substantial evidence
supporting the costs associated with the three other officers. The district court entered an amended
order for restitution totaling $3,097.40. Wilde appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Restitution for costs incurred by law enforcement agencies in cases involving a conviction
for a drug offense is discretionary. I.C. § 37-2732(k); State v. Nelson, 161 Idaho 692, 695, 390
P.3d 418, 421 (2017). When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion;
(3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and
(4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d
149, 158 (2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
Wilde asserts the district court erred in awarding the $2,806.40 in restitution associated
with the testifying officer’s work related to Wilde’s case. Specifically, Wilde asserts it was error
to award this amount of restitution “in light of the substantial fine and lengthy prison sentence
already imposed, and his lack of assets and earning potential for the foreseeable future.” The State
responds that the district court did not err because it considered the relevant factors and that the
record indicates Wilde is employable. We hold that Wilde waived the argument he asserts on
appeal and that, even if considered, he has failed to show error.
Idaho Code Section 37-2732(k) authorizes restitution for costs incurred by law
enforcement agencies in cases involving a conviction for a drug offense. We defer to a trial court’s
determination of the amount of expenses actually incurred by a law enforcement agency if
2
supported by substantial evidence. Nelson, 161 Idaho at 695, 390 P.3d at 421. When deciding
whether restitution is proper, a trial court examines a variety of factors. Id. at 697, 390 P.3d at
423. Thus, there are two components to a trial court’s restitution decision under I.C. § 37-2732(k):
(1) what amount was actually incurred, and (2) whether it is proper to award any of that amount.
See Nelson, 161 Idaho at 697, 390 P.3d at 423.
As part of Wilde’s plea agreement, he agreed to pay restitution “in an amount to be
determined or in the amount of $ TBD.” On appeal, however, Wilde “does not challenge the
district court’s determination that [the law enforcement agency] actually incurred investigation
costs of $2,806.40.” Instead, his argument on appeal concerns the propriety of the district court
awarding this amount. Nonetheless, Wilde asserts that his plea agreement “did not operate to
waive his right to appeal whether the district court adequately considered the relevant statutory
factors.” Whether Wilde waived this argument depends on the scope of his plea agreement.
Because plea agreements are contractual in nature, they generally are examined by courts in
accordance with contract law standards. State v. Taylor, 157 Idaho 369, 372, 336 P.3d 302, 305
(Ct. App. 2014). As with other types of contracts, the interpretation of unambiguous terms and
the legal effect of the plea agreement are questions of law to be decided by the appellate court. Id.
In support of Wilde’s assertion that he did not waive the argument he now raises on appeal,
he relies on State v. Foeller, 168 Idaho 884, 489 P.3d 795 (2021). In Foeller, the plea agreement
provided that the defendant would “pay restitution/reimbursement: If applicable per statute: for
all charges, even those dismissed.” Id. at 888, 489 P.3d at 799 (brackets omitted). The Idaho
Supreme Court held that, by including the words “per statute,” the plea agreement incorporated
“the statutory factors for assessing restitution.” Id. Consequently, the defendant did not waive
consideration of the factors listed in I.C. § 19-5304(2), which allows restitution for a victim of a
crime. Foeller, 168 Idaho at 888, 489 P.3d at 799. The restitution clause in Wilde’s plea
agreement does not refer to a statute or otherwise require restitution to be awarded in compliance
with a restitution statute. We hold that the restitution clause of Wilde’s plea agreement is
unambiguous and that, based on the plain language, the only unresolved aspect of restitution was
the amount--a determination that Wilde does not challenge on appeal. In short, Wilde cannot agree
to pay the amount of restitution determined by the court and then assert it was improper to order
him to pay that amount. Consequently, Wilde waived consideration of whether the district court
3
erred in determining that it was proper to award $2,806.40 in restitution for the investigating
officer’s work on Wilde’s case.
Even if the merits of Wilde’s argument are considered, he has failed to show error. In
determining whether restitution is proper, factors to consider include other fines imposed, victim
restitution, assets, and previous and prospective earning abilities. Nelson, 161 Idaho at 697, 390
P.3d at 423. Where relevant, the factors set forth under the general restitution statute,
I.C. § 19-5304, may also be considered. Nelson, 161 Idaho at 697, 390 P.3d at 423. One of the
factors to consider under I.C. § 19-5304 is the financial resources, needs, and earning ability of the
defendant. I.C. § 19-5304(7). However, the defendant’s immediate inability to pay restitution
shall not be, in and of itself, a reason to not order restitution. I.C. § 19-5304(7). Under I.C.
§ 19-5304(7), inability to pay neither precludes nor limits a restitution award; rather, ability to pay
is only one factor for a trial court’s consideration when it makes a discretionary restitution
determination. State v. Olphin, 140 Idaho 377, 379, 93 P.3d 708, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).
Restitution in contemplation of future ability to pay is appropriate. Id. at 380, 93 P.3d at 711.
Wilde asserts the district court abused its discretion in ordering $2,806.40 in restitution “in
light of the substantial fine and lengthy prison sentence already imposed, and his lack of assets[1]
and earning potential for the foreseeable future.” Wilde notes that he was thirty-eight-years old at
the time of the restitution hearing and that, given his sentence, “his earning potential will have
vastly decreased by the time he is released, even if he is paroled in ten years.” Wilde further argues
that, if not paroled, “he will likely have to use his social security to pay the restitution.” As the
1
In support of Wilde’s assertion that he lacked assets, he provides three citations to the
record. The first citation is to an assertion by Wilde’s counsel while arguing at the restitution
hearing that Wilde “has no assets anymore.” This unsworn assertion during argument is not
evidence. See Nelson, 161 Idaho at 697, 390 P.3d at 423. Next, Wilde cites to his affidavit in
support of his request for counsel in connection with this appeal, in which Wilde averred that he
was indigent and lacked various assets. This affidavit, however, postdates the restitution hearing
and, consequently, was not available to the district court. Because it was not available to the
district court at the time it made its decision, we do not consider it on appeal. See State v. Fox,
170 Idaho 846, 862, 517 P.3d 107, 123 (2022) (declining on appeal to consider testimony presented
after a trial court’s decision when the “information was not included in the State's offer of proof
made during the argument on the motion”). This leaves Wilde’s third citation, which is to two
pages of his PSI. These two pages do not identify a lack of assets but hint at it by noting that Wilde
had not had “legitimate income since 2019.”
4
State notes, however, the district court considered Wilde’s sentence, fine, and lack of employment
“immediately before the arrest.” The district court also stated that it reviewed Wilde’s presentence
investigation report (PSI), which contained information that he had not had “legitimate income
since 2019,” indicating a lack of assets. On the other hand, the PSI report also referenced Wilde’s
past employment in carpentry and construction, with wages of up to $28 per hour. The district
court found that Wilde has “some employability [sic] skills” and that, during his incarceration, he
could potentially “qualify for work release or other work programs.” In essence, Wilde’s argument
is nothing more than a request for this Court to reweigh the evidence considered by the district
court. Based on these facts, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in ordering
$2,806.40 in restitution for investigatory work as authorized by I.C. § 37-2732(k). Cf. State v.
Garcia, 170 Idaho 708, 714-15, 516 P.3d 578, 584-85 (2022) (holding trial court did not err in
awarding $162,285.27 in restitution under I.C. § 19-5304(7) when defendant had paid $2,267.90
via garnishments of his inmate account, had worked for five years in the “trailer manufacturing
industry,” and would be incarcerated for at least twenty-five years).
IV.
CONCLUSION
Wilde waived the argument he asserts on appeal and, even if not waived, Wilde has failed
to show the district court erred in awarding restitution. Accordingly, the order for restitution is
affirmed.
Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.
5