[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Bell
v. McConahay, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-693.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-693
BELL, APPELLANT, v. MCCONAHAY, WARDEN, APPELLEE.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as Bell v. McConahay, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-693.]
Habeas corpus—Petitioner had adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law—
Motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) was properly granted—Court of
appeals’ judgment dismissing petition affirmed.
(No. 2022-0418—Submitted January 10, 2023—Decided March 9, 2023.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Richland County, No. 2022-CA-005.
_______________________
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Michael D. Bell, appeals the Fifth District Court of
Appeals’ dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus against appellee,
Tim McConahay, warden of the Mansfield Correctional Institution (“MCI”). Bell
has also filed a motion to reverse and vacate the judgment against him based on
McConahay’s alleged failure to timely file a merit brief in this appeal. For the
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
reasons that follow, we deny Bell’s motion and affirm the judgment of the court of
appeals.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} Bell is an inmate at MCI. In 2012, a Hamilton County grand jury
indicted him for murder, with a firearm specification, and for having weapons while
under disability. In October 2013, Bell pleaded guilty to reduced charges of
voluntary manslaughter, with a firearm specification, and to having weapons while
under disability. The trial court sentenced Bell to 11 years in prison for voluntary
manslaughter, 3 years for the firearm specification, and 3 years for having weapons
while under disability. The trial court ordered those sentences to be served
consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of 17 years. Bell did not file a direct
appeal.
{¶ 3} On January 14, 2022, Bell filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in the Fifth District Court of Appeals. He presented several arguments to support
his claim for relief.
{¶ 4} McConahay filed a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), which
Bell opposed. The court of appeals granted McConahay’s motion to dismiss,
finding that Bell’s petition failed to state a valid claim for relief in habeas corpus.
{¶ 5} Bell appeals to this court as of right.
BELL’S MOTION TO REVERSE AND VACATE
{¶ 6} Bell filed a motion to reverse and vacate the judgment and conviction
against him based on McConahay’s alleged failure to timely file a brief in this
appeal. We deny that motion because McConahay timely filed his merit brief on
July 11, 2022.
ANALYSIS
{¶ 7} This court reviews de novo a court of appeals’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6)
dismissal of a habeas corpus petition. State ex rel. Norris v. Wainwright, 158 Ohio
St.3d 20, 2019-Ohio-4138, 139 N.E.3d 867, ¶ 5. Dismissal is appropriate if it
2
January Term, 2023
appears beyond doubt, after taking all factual allegations in the petition as true and
making reasonable inferences in the petitioner’s favor, that the petitioner can prove
no set of facts entitling him to a writ of habeas corpus. Orr v. Schweitzer, 165 Ohio
St.3d 175, 2021-Ohio-1786, 176 N.E.3d 738, ¶ 4.
{¶ 8} Generally, a writ of habeas corpus is available only when a
petitioner’s maximum sentence has expired and he is being held unlawfully,
Leyman v. Bradshaw, 146 Ohio St.3d 522, 2016-Ohio-1093, 59 N.E.3d 1236, ¶ 8,
or when the sentencing court patently and unambiguously lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction, see Stever v. Wainwright, 160 Ohio St.3d 139, 2020-Ohio-1452, 154
N.E.3d 55, ¶ 8. The writ is not available when the petitioner has an adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law unless the trial court’s judgment is void for
lack of jurisdiction. State ex rel. Davis v. Turner, 164 Ohio St.3d 395, 2021-Ohio-
1771, 172 N.E.3d 1026, ¶ 8.
{¶ 9} Bell does not assert that his maximum sentence has expired or that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction. Instead, his arguments can be summarized as
follows: (1) he was not permitted to attend all proceedings in his criminal case in
violation of Crim.R. 43, (2) his guilty plea was unknowing and coerced and the trial
court failed to engage in a Crim.R. 11(C) plea colloquy, (3) the trial court breached
his plea agreement by failing to make certain statutorily mandated findings at his
sentencing hearing, and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because
his attorney failed to object to the trial court’s errors and failed to inform Bell that
the state had no evidence to prove the charges against him. Bell also asserts that as
a result of these alleged defects in his case, his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated.
{¶ 10} Bell raises nonjurisdictional issues that could have rendered his
sentence voidable if they had been properly raised on appeal. Bell had adequate
remedies at law to challenge the trial court’s alleged failure to conduct a proper
Crim.R. 11(C) plea colloquy. See State ex rel. Lusher v. Robinson, 5th Dist.
3
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Richland No. 15CA60, 2016-Ohio-1461, ¶ 6 (recognizing that the petitioner had
the opportunity to contest the propriety of a plea colloquy during the plea hearing,
in a direct appeal, or in a motion to withdraw his guilty plea). And “the issue of
whether [a petitioner] made an intelligent, knowing, and voluntary guilty plea is a
matter to be resolved by motion to withdraw the guilty plea, direct appeal, or
postconviction proceedings, rather than in habeas corpus.” Douglas v. Money, 85
Ohio St.3d 348, 349, 708 N.E.2d 697 (1999).
{¶ 11} Similarly, Bell’s claims that the trial court violated Crim.R. 43 and
failed to make statutorily mandated findings in support of its sentence are not
jurisdictional and thus are not cognizable in habeas corpus. See Wilson v. Hudson,
127 Ohio St.3d 31, 2010-Ohio-4990, 936 N.E.2d 42, ¶ 1 (Crim.R. 43(A) violation
does not support habeas claim); State ex rel. O’Neal v. Bunting, 140 Ohio St.3d
339, 2014-Ohio-4037, 18 N.E.3d 430, ¶ 13-14 (sentencing errors are not
jurisdictional and thus not cognizable in habeas corpus).
{¶ 12} Bell’s claim that he was denied his constitutional rights to due
process and effective assistance of counsel are likewise unavailing in this habeas
action. See Jackson v. Johnson, 135 Ohio St.3d 364, 2013-Ohio-999, 986 N.E.2d
989, ¶ 3 (alleged due-process violation not cognizable in habeas corpus); Bozsik v.
Hudson, 110 Ohio St.3d 245, 2006-Ohio-4356, 852 N.E.2d 1200, ¶ 7 (claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel not cognizable in habeas corpus).
{¶ 13} Bell maintains that he has no adequate remedy at law because no
attorney would represent him or file an appeal on his behalf and his pro se filings
have been unsuccessful. The fact that a remedy may no longer be available to Bell,
however, does not render it inadequate or entitle Bell to the extraordinary writ of
habeas corpus. See Jackson v. Wilson, 100 Ohio St.3d 315, 2003-Ohio-6112, 798
N.E.2d 1086, ¶ 9 (“even if these other remedies are no longer available to [the
habeas petitioner], he is not thereby entitled to an extraordinary writ”); State ex rel.
4
January Term, 2023
Gaydosh v. Twinsburg, 93 Ohio St.3d 576, 579, 757 N.E.2d 357 (2001) (a
petitioner’s “failure to timely pursue [remedies] does not render them inadequate”).
CONCLUSION
{¶ 14} Because Bell cannot establish that he is entitled to habeas relief
under any of these theories, the court of appeals properly dismissed his petition.
Accordingly, we deny Bell’s motion and affirm the judgment of the Fifth District
Court of Appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER,
and DETERS, JJ., concur.
_________________
Michael Bell, pro se.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Stephanie L. Watson, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
_________________
5