Z.A. v. F.T. CA3

Filed 3/9/23 Z.A. v. F.T. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yolo)
----

Z.A., C095538

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. FL2021-79)

v.

F.T.,

Defendant and Respondent.

This is an unusual case. Z.A. (wife) requested a domestic violence restraining
order (restraining order) against F.T. (husband).1 She alleged multiple instances of abuse
in her request.
The trial court granted a temporary restraining order and set the matter for hearing.
The terms of the temporary restraining order included that husband would move out of
the family home; wife would have exclusive use, control, and possession of the home;

1 We granted wife’s request to use only initials in the opinion.

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and husband would pay the $2,500 mortgage for the duration of the temporary restraining
order.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court made detailed findings and
granted wife a restraining order after hearing (hearing order) for a three-year term. The
trial court explained it considered “the totality of all the information” but “the reason why
[it was] going to grant a restraining order” was because (1) after the parties agreed to live
in their home peacefully and civilly while pursuing a divorce, each with equal access to
their young daughter, husband deprived wife of seeing the couple’s daughter until wife
agreed to a child custody arrangement; and (2) husband transferred the title to the
couple’s home to his father and “out from under [wife] without any explanation.” The
trial court further explained it was granting a three-year term because of the abusive
comments husband made to wife. The trial court did not discuss, nor did either party
raise, any specific terms to be included in the hearing order.
Wife’s counsel offered to prepare the proposed hearing order, and the trial court
thanked her for doing so. Although it was never orally pronounced by the trial court, the
minute order provided the hearing order would be on the same terms and conditions as
the temporary restraining order.2 Wife’s counsel prepared the proposed hearing order
and, without providing a copy of the proposed order to husband’s counsel, submitted it to
the trial court for signature.
The trial court signed the proposed hearing order but, eleven days later, notified
the parties it was reconsidering the three-year term of the hearing order on its own
motion. During the two hearings that followed, the trial court explained it was concerned
about the three-year term given the facts of the case and that it had not given husband’s
counsel sufficient time to argue for a lower term. The trial court was also surprised and

2 We have found no mention of such an oral pronouncement in the reporter’s
transcript; wife cites solely to the minute order.

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concerned to find a mortgage payment provision in the hearing order, which required
husband to pay the $2,500 mortgage for the duration of the order—a term the trial court
found “somewhat unusual,” particularly because it “was not discussed by anybody.” The
trial court ultimately reduced the term of the hearing order from three years to two years
and struck the mortgage payment provision.
Wife appeals and seeks to reinstate the original terms of the hearing order. Wife
asserts (1) the trial court’s decision to strike the mortgage payment provision was “legal
error and an abuse of discretion” because the trial court’s ruling was “premised on a
faulty legal conclusion that the [Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Act) (Fam. Code,3
§ 6200 et seq.)] does not authorize mortgage or other debt payment terms in [restraining
orders]”; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it reduced the duration of the
hearing order from three years to two years because the trial court’s ruling was premised
on “its belief that there was no physical violence,” a finding not supported by substantial
evidence and contradicted by the trial court’s prior finding that husband “had committed
acts of physical abuse.” Husband did not file a respondent’s brief.
We affirm. Wife’s opening brief is passionate and her arguments, at first glance,
appear to have merit. A fair reading of the record, however, reveals there is no basis for
reversing the trial court’s modification of the hearing order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 19, 2021, wife filed a request for a restraining order against husband,
seeking protection for herself and the couple’s daughter. Wife alleged the parties were
married on December 15, 2017, and separated on January 5, 2021. The couple’s daughter
was approximately 18 months old when wife filed the restraining order request. Wife
sought, among other things, personal conduct orders, a stay-away order, and a move-out

3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

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order. She further requested temporary use, possession, and control of the couple’s
residence and a directive for husband to pay the mortgage of $2,500 per month while the
restraining order remained in effect.
The following five paragraphs generally recite wife’s allegations in the restraining
order request. Husband once, prior to marriage, slapped wife on the side of her head
while they were driving; and, in May 2020, husband threw mail in wife’s face because he
was upset that wife had retrieved the mail. Husband threatened wife that “worse things
would happen” if she looked at his mail again and he thereafter restricted her access to
the mail key. Husband was “very controlling of [wife] and [the couple’s] finances,”
would not give wife access to the community property funds or bank account, and would
“yell at [wife] and belittle [her] for being poor.” As to the couple’s daughter, wife
alleged husband “plays aggressively with [her], pulling her hair, biting her cheeks, and
squeezing her until she cries” because “he was trying to ‘toughen her up.’ ”
On January 3, 2021, after wife had a disagreement with her father-in-law about
“the ‘place of women’ and how women should do as they are told,” she left the couple’s
residence and went to Fresno to see her family “while things cooled off.” Husband
would not allow wife to take their car. On January 5, 2021, the couple discussed
separation. When wife returned to the couple’s residence on January 9, 2021, she was
unable to gain access. Wife called the police and a locksmith for assistance. Husband
approached the house when the locksmith arrived, argued with wife “over what personal
items [she] could take,” aggressively snatched personal belongings from wife’s hands,
and belittled wife. Husband told wife she could only return to their home if she agreed
that husband’s brother would stay with them, wife would not drive the couple’s car, and
security cameras would remain installed at the home.
Wife sought the assistance of counsel, and the couple agreed to live in the home
together civilly and peacefully, neither of the couple’s family members would be allowed
at the home without the express consent of both parties, the couple would have equal

4
access to the home’s security cameras, and the couple’s daughter would not be left in the
care of wife’s or husband’s parents for an overnight period.
On January 16, 2021, wife returned to the couple’s home. Shortly thereafter,
husband absconded with the couple’s daughter, took or destroyed some of wife’s
belongings, and declined to give wife the log-in information for the security cameras.
Husband gave the couple’s daughter to his father and told wife he “intend[ed] to withhold
[their] daughter” until wife signed a child custody agreement.
Wife alleged she had no income and, because she “could not stay in [the] marital
home because of [husband’s] hostility toward [her]” and husband provided no child
support, she “had been living off credit cards” and had to stay with family.
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on January 20, 2021, and set
the matter for hearing. The terms of the temporary restraining order included that
husband would move out of the couple’s home; wife would have exclusive use, control,
and possession of the home; and husband would pay the $2,500 mortgage for the duration
of the temporary restraining order.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding the restraining order
request over several days. We do not recite the testimony presented at the evidentiary
hearing because the trial court discussed the testimony in great detail in its June 17, 2021
ruling, as set forth post, and wife takes no issue with the factual findings in that ruling.
The trial court said it considered “the totality of all the information that was
presented in evaluating whether a restraining order should issue in this case” and was
mindful that “there is a huge cultural and religious overlay to this case,” particularly “in
terms of expectations of women and their role in the household.” Before delving into the
evidence, the trial court made several credibility findings.
The trial court found husband lacked credibility regarding his finances; the
evidence showed husband was purchasing homes and participating in “an active car sales
operation.” The trial court found wife “is a strong woman . . . moving against culture” in

5
that she did not agree with the expectations placed upon her “by the community she was
raised in,” her family, “and, perhaps, religion.” In the trial court’s view, wife’s
statements and “the text messages and the expressions exchanged between [husband] and
his wife” indicated wife was not “a shrinking wall flower,” “had learned to fight back,”
and “was able to stand her ground.”
Husband’s father “appeared to the Court as the quintessential patriarch” with
strong views and “his own sense of what was appropriate.” Husband’s father was “also a
generous man financially.” He helped “to finance his daughter-in-law’s education for the
better part of two years” and made generous gifts to wife’s family, including a $15,000
loan to pay off a debt. Husband’s father also paid for trips to the Middle East and
Florida.
Finally, the trial court addressed the credibility of wife’s sister and wife’s brother-
in-law (who was married to wife’s sister). The trial court found them to be “believable,
as having credibility” but explained “the problem for the Court” was that “both sides had
an ax to grind” and had “an interest.” Thus, the trial court expressed, it would consider
the testimony with the recognition “that there was an interest.”
Turning to the merits of wife’s restraining order request, the trial court first
addressed physical abuse allegations: “[Wife] herself told us about an incident that
happened prior to the marriage in December of 2017, where when they were driving in
the car, [husband] behind the wheel, she, with her hand on an ice[d] coffee, or something
to that effect, she went to touch her husband on the neck and he backhanded her on the
head, I think, words to that effect. [¶] It had such an influence on her that she
contemplated not going forward with the marriage. The families got together and found a
way through this and the marriage went forward anyway.”
The trial court further detailed wife’s brother-in-law’s testimony that husband
would sometimes push, shove, and strike wife (e.g., “punching her upper arm”), which
wife’s brother-in-law “found . . . funny.” The trial court noted, however, it was

6
“interesting in going through the transcript [wife] never mentions anything about that”;
“there was no mention of, that the Court could find[,] of physical abuse.” Wife’s
testimony that she “was a punching bag” pertained only to her recitation of “various
verbal and emotional assaults.” Wife’s sister also did not mention any physical abuse.
In considering whether the physical abuse allegations could “be a basis” for
issuing the restraining order, the trial court questioned, “[W]hy, if that were going on,
[wife] would want to move back into the house, taking her child back into the home
where this type of physical abuse would have been going on.” The trial court continued,
although it was “not unusual to see victims of crime or abuse going back into the
household,” it gave the court “pause in terms of concluding that a basis for the issuance
of a restraining order in this case should be granted on physical abuse.” The trial court
found the restraining order “cannot be based on that theory alone” but said it would
weigh the physical abuse evidence “in determining whether or not in the totality of the
circumstances a restraining order should issue.”
The trial court next considered wife’s allegations of child abuse. The trial court
noted the testimony of wife’s sister and wife’s brother-in-law, who “both accounted for
or both explained that in their experience they would see [husband] often squeezing the
baby really tightly until the baby would begin to cry.” The trial court further noted
testimony that husband would shake and yell at his daughter until she cried and, when
someone would tell husband that he was hurting the child or ask him to stop, husband
would reply “she’s my daughter,” “I’m teaching her to be strong,” “I can do with her
what I want,” and “[i]t’s to make her tough or to toughen her up.” The trial court,
however, explained that wife “ma[de] no mention of these episodes with regard to the
child” and queried why wife would subject her daughter to such abuse, if it in fact
occurred, rather than staying in Fresno with her mother and sister. The trial court further
noted that husband’s friend testified he never saw husband “roughing up” or “physically
abusing” his daughter. The trial court found the restraining order could not issue based

7
on the child abuse allegations, but said it could “certainly take that [into] account” in
considering whether the restraining order should issue based on the totality of the
circumstances.
The trial court next collectively considered the allegations of financial abuse and
coercion and control because some of the evidence was intertwined—such as husband’s
refusal to allow wife to drive their car to Fresno when “she needed space to clear her
head” on or around January 3, 2021. The trial court found plausible husband’s argument
that he did not want wife and their daughter to take the electric vehicle to Fresno because
husband was concerned about the “safety risk” if wife had to recharge the car on the way.
The trial court noted, however, that wife testified she had previously driven to Fresno
without needing to recharge the car. Although husband’s father testified he offered a
truck to wife as an alternative vehicle, no one corroborated his testimony. The trial court
explained the allegation regarding husband’s control of the car “is more in the field of
coercion and control, but it at least fits in the argument, perhaps, of the financial type of
abuse, denying her access to some [asset] that she normally would have access to.”
The trial court found wife did not have access to part of husband’s earnings
because it was placed in husband’s business accounts and said, “[T]he argument was
made that it was a constant refrain of having to ask for money and being denied access to
some of the other community assets income [sic] that her husband had acquired through
his business.” The trial court explained, “[I]t is part of the theory of the financial abuse,
depriving her of access to community funds.”
Also, as to the financial abuse allegations, the trial court found, as “[a]n important
feature,” “the financial benefits that were provided to [wife] during the course of the
marriage.” For example, husband and husband’s father “literally paid for [wife’s]
education for the last two years” and “there were trips that were subsidized by [husband’s
father] and, perhaps, [husband], for which she was the beneficiary.” Wife “also lived in a
nice home that was bought by the father-in-law” and paid monthly by husband. Wife

8
earned income “when she was not going to school,” but the money she earned went to her
mother for babysitting services her mother provided from October to December 2020.
The trial court ultimately found it could not issue the restraining order based on
the financial abuse allegations, explaining: “There was a lot of financial benefit and there
were some shortcomings in terms of, perhaps, the demeaning need to ask for funds
readily and regularly from . . . husband, whose financial dealings were pretty hard to
figure out, to say the least.”
Turning to the emotional and verbal abuse allegations, the trial court noted wife’s
and her sister’s testimony regarding husband’s statements that wife “would not amount to
anything, that she came from nothing, and she should be happy that she’s with a spouse
like him, who is basically more successful.” Wife testified the verbal abuse happened
frequently and she was “his punching bag” in that he was always reminding her that she
“came from nothing.” When wife received good news about her grade point average,
husband told her the school she was attending was “for dropouts, ghetto people go there.”
Wife also “report[ed]” that husband “body shamed” her, made comments that she
“look[ed] like an elephant” and was fat, and said “no one would want her as a single
mom, if she chose to leave the marriage.” The trial court noted wife’s sister and wife’s
brother-in-law echoed wife’s testimony that husband told wife she was fat.
Wife testified husband’s father constantly told wife “she had no rights as a
woman” and her “job as a housewife [was] to respect her father-in-law’s rules and her
husband’s rules.” With regard to a verbal exchange between wife and husband’s father
during a car ride home from San Francisco, wife testified she “wasn’t going to accept his,
meaning [husband’s father’s,] apology” because it “wasn’t the first time that he had
verbally abused [her], and this time [she] wasn’t going to take it.” Wife “reported to her
husband” that his father “did something very disrespectful” and she thus “had to leave.”
When wife was asked what would happen “if she didn’t follow the rules being laid down,
she said [husband] would threaten [her] by taking away [her] personal belongings.” The

9
trial court explained, “That was the tone of the comments and throughout her testimony
that was her report as to the type of verbal and emotional abuse that was tossed her way
during the course of the [marriage]. Of course, that would get very tiring very fast if you
are on the receiving end of it.” The trial court found the “comments constituting verbal
and emotional abuse” were “significant events.”
The trial court, however, also recounted husband’s friend’s testimony that wife
had “made some derogatory comments about her husband’s appearance, saying that he
was an embarrassment to her, he was not very good looking, and that she and her former
boyfriend” were described as a “handsome couple.” The court noted husband’s father
testified he had also heard wife’s derogatory statements about husband. The trial court
said, “[A]t least in this instance[,] you saw somebody who was fighting back and had her
own things to say, which were cutting and cruel in their own way.” “[T]here are no
absolute heroes in this story in the Court’s view.”
Returning to the coercion and control allegations, the trial court mentioned wife
testified her father-in-law made negative comments about her and her sister and told wife
that she “had no right to have her family over to the house,” her place as a woman was to
stay silent and to respect her in-laws, and the marital home was “not her house” but
instead husband’s house. The court also mentioned wife’s testimony that husband said
“his father is in control and that [she] need[ed] to abide by his and his father’s rules”;
“she was not allowed to take the Tesla and to leave the keys behind”; and she needed to
“think about her decision wisely before deciding to come back” to the house.
The trial court recounted that when wife returned from Fresno, she was locked out
of the house, needed a locksmith to gain entry, and could not find personal items she
wanted to collect, including materials for an upcoming exam. The trial court said that, by
pushing her way into the house when she was denied access, including calling the police
twice, wife showed she “is a strong woman . . . , and not completely a wall flower here.”

10
 The trial court discussed the allegation that wife “was denied access to her family
in the family home,” finding “the house was dominated by [wife’s] family for the better
part of the year” and the court “ha[d] to take into account the fact that there was a great
deal of access for a good period of time in the year 2020.”
On January 16, 2021, wife and daughter returned to the family home. Prior to
returning, the couple’s attorneys helped them reach an agreement. The agreement was
that husband and wife would live in the house “peacefully and civilly” while they
pursued their divorce, wife “was to be shown the cameras and they were to be shut
down,” no family members were to live in the house, and husband and wife were to have
equal access to their child. The trial court said the cameras were “a coercive type of
activity” and “probably a little disconcerting.” The trial court acknowledged, “The
concern was, perhaps, that property was being taken out of the house,” but said it did not
believe husband’s allegation that wife had taken $30,000 out of a wall safe because
husband would not have given wife access to that amount of money. Wife did, however,
remove “gold that had been given to her in this arranged marriage as part of the dowry,”
and the trial court inferred she did so because either she was planning to leave husband or
she was concerned husband would take it.
Shortly after wife returned to the house on January 16, 2021, husband asked to
take their daughter to the park and then denied wife access to their child “for a number of
days.” The trial court found this to be “the most critical feature of this case, and it [wa]s
the reason why” the trial court granted the restraining order, explaining: “It was coercive
in that under [section 6230, subdivision (d)] the child was taken and there was an attempt
to bargain for a custody split 50/50. [¶] I will say some of that comment came from
[husband’s father], who called [wife] and said you won’t get the child back unless there is
an equal split in time, and we have a good lawyer, we have the money and resources to
retain someone and you don’t have the resources, and you’ll be in trouble in that regard.

11
 “She had a right to the child. She was drawn back into the house on an agreement
that the parties would live civilly. Outside family members would not be involved. She
agreed to that and immediately that agreement was broken. Coupled with that is the
transfer of the house out from under the married couple.” The trial court explained
husband had purchased the home as a single, unmarried person, even though he was
married to wife, and then transferred the house “to his father, who was the one who had
put up the $70,000 or so . . . as a down payment on the house.” The trial court noted
husband transferred the home “out from under [wife] without any explanation, and later
on there was an attempt to, or some mention of possibly evicting her from the marital
home.”
The trial court found husband’s conduct constituted a “[b]ig breach of the
agreement” to live “civilly and peacefully” and ruled: “In looking at the totality of
everything that we learned, the Court learned in this case, physical abuse, the child abuse,
to emotional and verbal abuse, to financial abuse, to coercion and control, the Court is
satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that a restraining order should issue, and the
Court will so rule.”
Wife requested that the trial court impose the restraining order for a three-year
term; husband briefly argued three years was excessive. The trial court granted wife’s
request, explaining, “This wasn’t particularly an easy case for the Court.” The trial court
imposed the three-year term because of “the history with [husband] making the
comments that he has . . . taking into account what [wife’s brother-in-law] and [wife’s
sister] had to say.” Wife’s counsel said she would prepare the proposed hearing order
and the trial court thanked her.
The trial court signed the hearing order on June 18, 2021. Eleven days later, the
trial court advised the parties that it was “entertain[ing] the reconsideration of the length
of the restraining order” on its own motion and invited “briefing on this question.”

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 At the July 27, 2021 hearing, the trial court explained it “didn’t really give anyone
an opportunity” to address the term of the hearing order and wanted to provide the parties
with an opportunity to voice any concerns in that regard. The trial court further wanted
to discuss “a second issue that kind of came up when the Court reviewed the order after
hearing,” i.e., the provision requiring husband to pay the mortgage for the duration of the
hearing order despite wife having exclusive possession of the house. The trial court
viewed the provision as “somewhat unusual.”
Husband’s counsel argued the three-year term was “totally outside the realm of
reality” considering the court found “name calling” and “issues that the Court believed
. . . were financial,” but “the Court found no violence.” Counsel explained, “Restraining
orders with no violence should just get [the couple] to the place where these people can
start working together,” which husband and wife were doing. In husband’s counsel’s
view, the restraining order had already achieved its purpose to calm the parties and “keep
them separated,” and thus the three-year term was excessive. Turning to the mortgage
payment provision, husband’s counsel said he just recently received a copy of the hearing
order and he “never heard” the court impose that requirement, or he would have objected
to it.
Wife’s counsel challenged the trial court’s authority to reconsider the hearing
order on its own motion. After some back and forth regarding the trial court’s authority,
the trial court asked for argument regarding the duration of the restraining order and “the
term that was injected into the order that [wife’s counsel] prepared that indicated that
[husband] would be on the hook for three years of the domestic violence restraining order
for payment of the rent at a certain amount.” The trial court said the mortgage payment
provision “kind of startled [it] when [it] saw it,” it had not “seen anything quite like that
in a domestic violence restraining order ruling ever,” and it found the provision unusual.
Wife’s counsel looked at the hearing order and said: “So it doesn’t say anywhere
in -- oh, I see what you’re saying about the payment using the bank mortgage, $2,500

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continues paying the mortgage.” She argued, despite the provision in the hearing order,
the trial court still “ha[d] jurisdiction over property” and “the expectation was that once
the restraining order was in place,” the couple would resolve the property issues and the
house would be sold or confirmed to one of the parties. Wife’s counsel said wife “d[id]
not have the intention of remaining in the family residence long term, but only for a
period of time that it takes for [wife] to secure cooperation from [husband] and to reach a
resolution in this case.” Wife’s counsel explained it was important for wife to remain in
the home because husband was not cooperating in the divorce proceedings; was
“continu[ing] to offset assets, [and] misappropriate assets and funds”; was refusing to pay
child support to wife, “who [wa]s working full time and supporting [their] child on her
own”; and was not cooperating with discovery.
The trial court expressed it did not “have a problem with [wife] being in the home
while [everyone was] working through these things,” but it did “have a problem with”
requiring husband to pay the mortgage for “a three-year period, the duration of the
domestic violence restraining order.” Wife’s counsel responded that she disagreed “the
expectation of this restraining order is that [wife is] going to remain in the house for the
next three years” and husband would be required to pay the mortgage for that term,
because, in her view, “the parties [were] in the middle of the dissolution proceeding [and]
the Court ha[d] the authority to . . . make orders regarding the assets at any time.”
After giving husband’s counsel an opportunity to respond, the trial court said it
believed it had the authority to reconsider the terms of the hearing order. The trial court
continued: “It surprises me that one would take the position that I don’t have to serve the
other side with something as fundamental as a final order, if that is what we’re calling it
at this point, particularly the argument that the Court cannot change a final order.” The
trial court said wife’s counsel’s argument that she did not have to serve the proposed
order on husband’s counsel because he attended the hearing did not “make any sense
whatsoever.”

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 The trial court ruled “on [its] own motion” to “reduce the time period of the
restraining order from three years to two years.” The trial court explained: “I do this
because of the fact there -- I would disagree with [husband’s counsel] in the sense that
there -- what the Court was trying to say in its ruling is that there was not physical
violence, but there was certainly emotional control and coercion and the comments and
the steady drumbeat of the comments that were derogatory in nature from [husband] to
[wife] certainly were significant in the Court’s mind.” The trial court noted it took into
account that wife benefited from “the financial position of her husband and his family,”
such as “[t]he payment of her entire college degree and other opportunities,” when it
evaluated “all of the evidence and credibility of the parties.” The trial court then clarified
that it did not find physical violence had occurred, “except for the physical violence that
occurred prior to the marriage,” but it did find emotional abuse had occurred. “So I will
shorten the period from three years to two years for that reason.”
Turning to the mortgage payment provision, the trial court said: “I don’t have a
problem making a temporary order that [wife] is to remain in the house pending other
details to be worked out regarding the divorce and the division of property. I think that’s
a fair thing, but the idea that a certain amount of money was incorporated in the domestic
violence restraining order and for the period of time that she was to be living in the house
and her rent being paid, I think that is the term that should not be there. [¶] But I would
direct that temporarily [wife] is to have control of the house pending further orders of the
Court and the Court would reserve further jurisdiction to make rulings of division of
property.”
After wife’s counsel continued to argue that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
reconsider the hearing order, the trial court ordered the parties to brief the issue. The trial
court ruled the hearing order would not be a final order until after the November 10, 2021
hearing for purposes of triggering the deadline to appeal the order.

15
 During the November 10, 2021 hearing, the trial court reiterated it was unaware
the mortgage payment provision was in the hearing order presented to it for signature and
again expressed concern that the proposed hearing order was not provided to husband’s
counsel for review before it was submitted to the trial court. The trial court said it had
forgotten the mortgage payment provision was part of wife’s original restraining order
request, it did not “see [a debt payment term] often” in restraining order cases, and it was
concerned that the mortgage payment requirement could “continu[e] on somewhat
indefinitely if there were to be a request for an extension of the restraining order” in the
future. In the trial court’s experience, “it is a very dicey issue” whether to affix a debt
payment provision to a temporary restraining order without a hearing or to “keep those
issues separate,” especially in circumstances “as we have here,” where there is ongoing
litigation and continued “discovery of certain information.” Considering the mortgage
payment “certainly will be a [feature] of their divorce and their dissolution in terms of
who owes what, who is allowed to be in the house, what’s to happen to the house and
whose [sic] to pay for what,” the trial court said it seemed inappropriate and unfair to
have the mortgage payment provision “affixed to a restraining order.” The trial court
expressed its belief that “a debt feature should not be affixed or part of the restraining
order itself” and “should not be included for the time period or any extended time
period.”
Wife’s counsel argued husband could file a motion and ask the court “to make
another order” regarding the mortgage because “the Court has jurisdiction over the
divorce proceedings for the entire duration.” The trial court agreed husband could file a
motion but said “the better thing is to not have it as a barnacle on the restraining order”
because “of the consequences of the domestic violence restraining order having a
financial hook in the middle of it.” The trial court explained the mortgage payment
provision may not be “something that is visible” to a judge when the restraining order is
later renewed or extended.

16
 Wife’s counsel asserted there were, however, “very unusual issues still pending in
this case” that “obviously caused prejudice to [her] client.” She explained husband had
transferred the home to his father, had placed other assets “out of reach,” and was
refusing to cooperate with discovery or pay child support. The trial court posited, “I
guess the only question is, is whether or not all of that being said and I completely
understand where you’re coming from on that,” whether the mortgage payment provision
should “be a part of the restraining order.” The trial court explained it was “having
trouble with that.”
Wife’s counsel said her usual practice was to resolve issues like debt payments
with opposing counsel and she understood “why the Court would be concerned about that
issue.” Wife’s counsel, however, asserted she was unable to secure cooperation from
husband’s counsel in resolving “that issue.” Wife’s counsel further explained wife owed
her “a lot of money” and was “just stuck in a place where there [wa]s no financial
security for her.”
Husband’s counsel argued a three-year restraining order would mean wife could
“live rent free for longer than the time she was married” and, because “[t]his was a
property distribution dispute,” it was better handled in family court through a “full blown
hearing.” Husband’s counsel further argued husband was unemployed, wife was
“making approximately $3,000 a month,” and husband was caring for the child several
hours a week. The duration of the hearing order was excessive in husband’s counsel’s
view because the parties were “working fine together” and the trial court found “there
was no physical violence.”
The trial court asked: “Was there ever mention of -- by either side that among the
terms of the restraining order would be one where father would be indebted to mom [for]
$2,500 a month?” Husband’s counsel responded, “No.” The trial court said it seemed
that the provision “was not discussed by anybody,” “[n]o one argued that, either side, that
debt payment should be part of the restraining order, and it was [an] omission on [the

17
court’s] part.” The trial court expressed the view that if it “abide[d] by [wife’s counsel’s]
argument,” the court “would be doing an injustice.”
Wife’s counsel replied: “Do I think it is fair that [husband] should have to pay a
mortgage on a house for a period of three years, I never said that. What I said was, is that
there is recourse in order to deal with it, which would require him to file a motion.” The
trial court asked whether “the better recourse” was to strike the provision from the
hearing order because it was not the court’s “intent to have a debt part of the restraining
order.” Wife’s counsel responded in the negative, explaining she was concerned “that it
again puts [her] client in a very precarious and prejudiced position” because husband
continued “to violate court orders.” Wife’s counsel explained that, because the hearing
order included the mortgage payment provision, she could file a motion to compel
husband to perform. The trial court responded it would not overlook its concern simply
because wife was “not getting the cooperation” she wanted from husband.
The trial court reiterated, as it explained “about six different ways,” that it did not
know the mortgage payment provision was in the hearing order and the parties “certainly
didn’t get [into] the question of debt” during the hearing. The trial court reduced the
duration of the hearing order from three years to two years, explaining: “As I said last
time, I think under the circumstances of this case, knowing that there was no physical
violence I had trouble with coming to the conclusion I came to in this case. [¶] I granted
it and, I think, I made myself clear at the time I did that this was a close call for the Court,
and I think under the circumstances here, the Court was satisfied that [the] restraining
order should issue, but the length of it of three years was in excess of what the Court
deemed appropriate having heard all the facts in the case there were -- there was
verbiage, there was coercion and control to be sure, but there was also, as I said, there
was also some activities by [wife] that the Court was concerned about and I expressed
that, and I believe a two year period will satisfy our purposes here, and I think it is the

18
right call and I standby it.” The trial court further struck the mortgage payment provision
because “that term in the middle of it” was “not appropriate in [its] view.”
After wife’s counsel asked the trial court to “put on the record the findings of the
order being erroneous,” the trial court invited wife’s counsel to appeal the order, stating it
“would say to [the appellate court], this should not be a part of a restraining order, and it
is a way to circumvent the usual process whereby we’ll decide through other channels of
discovery who is to be paying what in terms of child support, who is to be paying spousal
support, [and] how the property is to be divided.”
Wife appeals.
DISCUSSION
I
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
When It Shortened The Duration Of The Hearing Order
Wife argues “[t]he trial court’s stated justification for shortening the [hearing
order’s duration] was not supported by substantial evidence” because the trial court
“stated that its primary reason for adjusting the [hearing order’s] duration was its belief
that ‘there was no[] physical violence,’ ” which “directly contradicted the trial court’s
original factual finding at the June 2021 hearing of several episodes of physical abuse.”4
In short, wife argues the “original findings were well supported by the record, and there
was no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s later decision to contradict them.”
We find no merit in wife’s argument.
During the June 2021 hearing, the trial court detailed wife’s testimony regarding
the car incident prior to marriage. The trial court then discussed wife’s brother-in-law’s
testimony that husband sometimes pushed, shoved, or struck wife; however, the trial

4 Wife does not on appeal challenge the trial court’s authority for reconsidering the
terms of the hearing order.

19
court noted wife “never mentions anything about that” and “there was no mention of, that
the Court could find[,] of physical abuse” during marriage. The trial court further noted
that wife’s sister also did not mention any physical abuse by husband against wife. The
trial court ultimately said it would not issue the restraining order based on a finding of
physical abuse, but it would weigh the evidence in tandem with the other evidence to
determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the restraining order should
issue. We do not read the trial court’s statement that it was issuing the hearing order
based on “the totality of everything” it “learned in this case, physical abuse, the child
abuse, to emotional and verbal abuse, to financial abuse, to coercion and control” to mean
the trial court found true all of the physical abuse allegations presented in the testimony
during the hearing. That statement, upon which wife relies, does not support wife’s
assertion that the trial court found “several episodes of physical abuse” had occurred.
When the trial court originally imposed the three-year term in the hearing order,
the trial court was explicit that it was imposing the three-year term based on the evidence
of emotional abuse—i.e., the “comments” husband had made to wife, taking into account
the testimony of wife’s sister and wife’s brother-in-law. The trial court reiterated its
position in that regard during the July 2021 hearing, when it indicated its intent to reduce
the hearing order’s duration from three years to two years. The trial court explained it
was “significant in the Court’s mind” that there was “emotional control and coercion”
and a “steady drumbeat” of derogatory comments from husband to wife. The trial court
noted, however, that it also weighed the financial benefits wife had received during the
marriage. The court clarified that, although it did not find physical violence had
occurred, except for the car incident prior to the marriage, it did find emotional abuse had
occurred and it would “shorten the period from three years to two years for that reason.”
During the November 2021 hearing, the trial court referred back to what it “said
last time” in terms of “knowing that there was no physical violence.” Fairly read, the
trial court thus referred back to its statement that it did not find that husband had

20
physically abused wife during the marriage, even though it did find credible wife’s
testimony as to the car incident prior to marriage. (See People v. Barnett (1998)
17 Cal.4th 1044, 1107 [an appellate court conducts a fair reading of the record]; People v.
Bolian (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1422 [same].) The trial court accordingly did not
contradict its June 2021 discussion of and findings regarding the physical abuse
allegations, as wife asserts.
The trial court clearly explained that, when it originally imposed the three-year
duration, it “was a close call” for the court and, although it “was satisfied that [a]
restraining order should issue,” it was reconsidering the duration of the order because the
court believed “three years was in excess of what the Court deemed appropriate having
heard all the facts in this case.” (Italics added.) The court noted “there was coercion and
control to be sure,” but there were “also some activities by [wife] that the Court was
concerned about,” and it thus believed a two-year period would “satisfy our purposes
here.”
Based on the foregoing, we disagree with wife that the trial court’s “primary
reason” for adjusting the hearing order’s duration was based on its finding no physical
violence whatsoever occurred in this case. The trial court reconsidered the hearing
order’s duration in light of the evidence and its prior findings.
Wife makes no argument that the trial court’s June 2021 findings were not
supported by substantial evidence or that the trial court abused its discretion by not
finding significant physical abuse had occurred. Indeed, wife asks us to reinstate the
original hearing order that was based on the June 2021 findings. Because the trial court
relied on its unchallenged prior findings when it reconsidered and reduced the term of the
hearing order during the November 2021 hearing, we find no basis for reversing the trial
court’s ruling.

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 II
The Trial Court’s Decision To Strike The Mortgage Payment Provision
Was Not Premised On Prejudicial Legal Error
Wife argues the trial court prejudicially erred when it struck the mortgage payment
provision from the hearing order because the trial court misunderstood the scope of its
discretion under the Act. Specifically, wife asserts the trial court believed it “had no
power to include a mortgage payment term in a [restraining order]” and “expressed the
blanket view that no ‘financial hook’ should appear in any [restraining order], and that
these types of arrangements are instead properly resolved in divorce proceedings.” Wife
further asserts the trial court’s erroneous understanding of the scope of its discretion was
prejudicial because “[t]he only reason the trial court amended the [hearing order] here to
remove the mortgage payment term was its mistaken legal premise that such terms are
not proper in a [restraining order].” We conclude no prejudicial error occurred.
A trial court’s ruling on a request for a restraining order is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 115.) “All
exercises of discretion must be guided by applicable legal principles, . . . which are
derived from the statute under which discretion is conferred.” (Farmers Ins. Exchange v.
Superior Court (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 96, 106.) “We presume that the court properly
applied the law and acted within its discretion unless the appellant affirmatively shows
otherwise.” (Mejia v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 151, 158.)
When we consider whether the trial court was influenced by an erroneous
understanding of applicable law or was unaware of the full scope of its discretion, we
must, as in any normal appellate review process, accept statements that support the trial
court’s ruling as representing the court’s final determinations and interpret favorable to
the ruling those statements which are susceptible to such interpretation. (People v.
Risenhoover (1968) 70 Cal.2d 39, 57.) In other words, if the trial court said things that
indicate it understood its proper role, and said things indicating it did not, the appellate

22
court is to focus on those statements that directly and by inference support the trial
court’s ruling. This notion has otherwise been described as “plac[ing] the most charitable
interpretation possible” on the trial court’s remarks so as to conclude that it used the
proper standard. (People v. Dickerson (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 645, 650; accord People v.
Browning (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 125, 137, overruled on other grounds in People v.
Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 669.) “[U]nless the record makes the assumption
preposterous [citations] we must assume that the [trial court] applied correct legal
principles to [its] rulings.” (Barajas v. Superior Court (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 185, 191,
fn. 6.)
If an appellant makes an affirmative showing that the trial court’s discretionary
order was “ ‘ “influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an
unawareness of the full scope of its discretion,” ’ ” the order may be reversed.
(In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 116.) Even if the trial court
erred in that regard, however, we will not reverse a discretionary order unless the
appellant has demonstrated “ ‘it is reasonably probable that, but for the error, the
appealing party would have obtained a more favorable outcome.’ ” (In re S.G. (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 654, 673.) In other words, the appellant must show prejudice.
At the outset, we agree with wife that the trial court had discretion and was
authorized to impose a debt payment provision, such as a mortgage payment requirement,
in the restraining order after notice and a hearing.5 (§§ 6324, 6340, subd. (a).) The
Judicial Council of California’s mandatory form, Restraining Order After Hearing (Order

5 Section 6342.5, subdivision (a) (effective Jan. 1, 2021, and operative Jan. 1, 2022)
also now expressly provides that, “After notice and a hearing, the court may issue an
order determining the use, possession, and control of real or personal property of the
parties during the period the order is in effect and the payment of any liens or
encumbrances coming due during that period.”

23
of Protection) (DV-130), indeed includes an option for the trial court to require the
restrained party to make identified debt payments “until this order ends.”
That said, wife has not affirmatively shown that the trial court misunderstood the
applicable law or the scope of its discretion. The trial court never said it “had no power”
to include a debt payment provision in the restraining order, nor did the trial court say
“mortgage payments and other debt payment[] terms cannot . . . be part of a [restraining
order],” as wife asserts. (Italics added.) We recognize and understand the trial court
made several broad statements that it would be “inappropriate and unfair” to affix a
mortgage payment provision to “a restraining order,” it did not believe that such a
provision should “be part of a restraining order,” and that the imposition of such a
provision “is a way to circumvent the usual process whereby we’ll decide through other
channels of discovery who is to be paying what in terms of child support, who is to be
paying spousal support, [and] how the property is to be divided.” The trial court’s
statements as a whole, however, reveal the trial court understood it could impose the
mortgage payment provision in a restraining order but declined to do so in this case.
(People v. Cartier (1960) 54 Cal.2d 300, 313 [“where a judge’s statements as a whole
disclose a correct concept of the law and its application, no secondary remarks should be
deemed to have impeached his determination”]; People v. Dickerson, supra,
273 Cal.App.2d at p. 650 [where trial court’s statements could be understood, though
perhaps with some difficulty, not as announcing a general view but as a finding in a
particular case, appellate court focused on the case-specific application].)
The trial court explained it was a “very dicey issue” as to whether a debt payment
provision should be affixed to a restraining order, or whether it was more appropriate “to
keep those issues separate,” especially in circumstances, “as we have here,” where there
is ongoing litigation and continued “discovery of certain information.” The trial court
expressed concern (1) that the hearing order incorporated “a certain amount of money” to
be paid for the duration of the hearing order while discovery was ongoing in the divorce

24
proceedings and (2) particularly because the mortgage payment issue was not litigated
during the hearing that resulted in the issuance of the hearing order. The trial court thus
expressed its view that if it “abide[d] by [wife’s counsel’s] argument” to retain the
mortgage payment provision in the hearing order, the court “would be doing an
injustice.”
Wife’s counsel said she “never said” she believed it was fair for husband to pay
the mortgage for three years; she also said she did not expect wife to remain in the home
“long term.” Wife’s counsel argued the reason wife needed the mortgage payment
provision in the restraining order was to secure cooperation from husband in the divorce
proceedings, because husband continued “to violate court orders,” and the provision gave
wife’s counsel an opportunity to seek a motion to compel. The trial court in turn
responded it would not overlook its concern simply because wife was “not getting the
cooperation” she wanted from husband. In the trial court’s view, the “better recourse”
was to strike the mortgage payment provision from the hearing order and to consider any
future motion wife may file on the merits with regard to the mortgage payment, given the
trial court had continuing jurisdiction in the divorce proceedings. The trial court
explained the mortgage payment “certainly will be a [feature] of their divorce and their
dissolution in terms of who owes what, who is allowed to be in the house, what’s to
happen to the house and whose [sic] to pay for what . . . .” The trial court was thus
willing to issue a “temporary order” for wife “to remain in the house pending other
details to be worked out regarding the divorce and the division of property.”
Read as a whole, the record shows the trial court struck the mortgage payment
provision because (1) it was uncomfortable imposing the requirement for the duration of
the restraining order given the parties’ ongoing discovery and divorce disputes; (2) the
mortgage payment provision was not litigated during the restraining order hearing; and
(3) wife had other recourse (i.e., seeking a separate court order) to deal with the mortgage
payment. The trial court’s concern in that regard and its preference to deal with disputes

25
regarding the parties’ home and associated mortgage payment outside the restraining
order context do not affirmatively show that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its
discretion or misapplied legal principles.
The trial court also did not misunderstand that it could modify or strike the
mortgage payment provision in the hearing order in the future, as wife asserts. Indeed,
the trial court acknowledged husband could file a motion to do so, but stated it believed
the more appropriate course of action was to not have the mortgage payment provision in
the hearing order in the first instance.
We further disagree with wife’s assertion that she was prejudiced because “[t]he
only reason the trial court amended the [hearing order] here to remove the mortgage
payment term was its mistaken legal premise that such terms are not proper in a
[restraining order].” In addition to the trial court’s reasoning discussed ante, the trial
court explained it did not exercise informed discretion when it imposed the mortgage
payment provision in the June 2021 hearing order because it was unaware the provision
was included in the proposed order submitted by wife. The trial court appropriately took
issue with wife’s position that she did not need to serve the proposed hearing order on
husband following the June 2021 hearing. As in the trial court, wife’s appellate counsel
argues wife’s trial counsel did not need to serve the hearing order on husband’s counsel
following the June 2021 hearing, citing sections 6380, subdivision (c) and 6384,
subdivision (a). Not so.
Section 6380, subdivision (c), which pertains to the issuance of a restraining order,
provides: “The information conveyed to the Department of Justice shall also indicate
whether the respondent was present in court to be informed of the contents of the court
order. The respondent’s presence in court shall provide proof of service of notice of the
terms of the protective order. The respondent’s failure to appear shall also be included in
the information provided to the Department of Justice.” First, nothing in this code
section provides that wife’s counsel could submit a proposed order to the trial court for

26
signature without providing a copy to opposing counsel. Second, the statute applies only
to the issuance of a protective order when the restrained party was “present in court to be
informed of the contents of the court order.” (§ 6380, subd. (c), italics added.) Here, the
trial court did not issue the hearing order during the hearing, nor did it describe the
contents of the hearing order, except for the three-year term. We note, although the
minute order stated the hearing order would be “on the same terms and conditions as the
Temporary Restraining Order,” the trial court never made such an oral pronunciation
during the June 2021 hearing.
Section 6384, subdivision (a) also does not assist wife. That statute provides: “If
a respondent named in an order issued under this part after a hearing has not been served
personally with the order but has received actual notice of the existence and substance of
the order through personal appearance in court to hear the terms of the order from the
court, no additional proof of service is required for enforcement of the order.” (§ 6384,
subd. (a), italics added.) The statute pertains only to enforcement of the order; it does not
address whether wife’s counsel could submit a proposed order to the court without
providing a copy to opposing counsel.
Wife’s counsel’s transmission of the proposed hearing order to the trial court
without providing a copy to husband’s counsel constituted an ex parte communication.
(See Nguyen v. Superior Court (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1013, fn. 2.) The
prohibition against ex parte communication is “ ‘in essence, a rule of fairness meant to
insure that all interested sides will be heard on an issue.’ ” (Mathew Zaheri Corp. v. New
Motor Vehicle Bd. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1317.) Moreover, California Rules of
Court, rule 5.125(b) provides that, in cases under the Family Code (such as this), the
party preparing a proposed order must, if the other party appeared at the hearing, serve
the proposed order on the other party for approval before submitting it to the trial court.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.2(a), (c) [Family Rules apply “to every action and
proceeding to which the Family Code applies”].) Wife did not do so here.

27
 The parties never, during the June 2021 hearing, mentioned, discussed, or argued
the merits of imposing the mortgage payment provision in the hearing order. Nor was
there any mention of such a provision in the parties’ written briefs. And, as the trial court
explained repeatedly, it did not know the provision was in the proposed hearing order. If
we were to reinstate the mortgage payment provision in the original June 2021 hearing
order, as wife requests, we would be reinstating an order not supported by the trial
court’s exercise of discretion, as expressly explained by the trial court “about six different
ways.” That we will not do.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no reversible error in the court’s modification
of the hearing order to strike the mortgage payment provision.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.

/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
MAURO, J.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

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