Williams v. Medialinks Tv, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ROY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 22-cv-2427 (DLF)

MEDIALINKS TV, LLC,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Roy Williams brings this employment action against MediaLinks TV, LLC.

Before the Court is the defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Dkt. 14. For the reasons

that follow, the Court will deny the motion.

I. BACKGROUND 1

Roy Williams, an African-American male who is now sixty-four years old, worked for

MediaLinks TV, LLC, as a lighting technician and video engineer from January 2014 to January

2019. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 14. He “previously had forty-plus years of network [and] major market

television production experience,” id. ¶ 9, and had obtained “at least five secret service clearances

for presidential and other high-level events,” id. ¶ 13.

In January 2014, Williams was first hired by MediaLinks on a “part-time” basis. Id. ¶ 14.

He “later learned” that “three of his White co-workers . . . who performed the same job . . . were

paid a higher salar[y].” Id. ¶ 15. Williams continued to “consistently receive[] very good

1
In resolving the defendant’s motion, the Court has assumed the truth of the material factual
allegations in the complaint, see Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011),
and any documents attached to the complaint or incorporated by reference, see EEOC v. St. Francis
Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
employee evaluations and annual performance-based pay raises for his work,” and he became a

full-time employee in December 2016. Id. ¶ 16.

On March 18, 2018, Williams was “working to resolve [a] lighting malfunction during a

show” when he heard his younger, white female co-worker, Lora Ersbo, comment over her

headset: “What the f*** is Roy doing on the ladder? Roy is going to f*** the lights up. He’s not

qualified to adjust the lights. Paul should correct the problem.” Id. ¶¶ 18–25. “Paul” referred to

Paul Lenihan, a white male co-worker. Id. ¶ 26. After hearing Ersbo’s comments, Williams asked

another co-worker, Valente Miranda, “why he was being treated as such,” to which Miranda

responded: “We were just ragging on you!” Id. ¶¶ 27–28.

On April 20, 2018, Williams requested to meet with his new supervisor, Manuel

Samaniego, to express his concerns about Ersbo’s “hostile, disparaging, and unprofessional

conduct towards him.” Id. ¶ 32. He reported similar concerns to Samaniego “three or more times”

after this meeting, but Ersbo was not investigated or disciplined. Id. ¶¶ 35, 39–40.

From November 20, 2018 through November 26, 2018, Williams was suspended from

work. Id. ¶ 41. At a November 28, 2018 meeting following his return from work, Williams’s

superiors, Samaniego and Ursula Perales-Muretta, gave him a Corrective Action Notice explaining

the reasons for his suspension. Compl. ¶¶ 55–56; see Ex. B (Notice), Dkt. 14-4. The Notice stated

that Williams had violated Samaniego’s newly implemented policy against use of a phone 10

minutes before a live or taped broadcast, Notice at 1; Compl. ¶ 37, and that Williams had engaged

in “inappropriate comments and aggressive behavior” to another member of the studio team,

Ersbo, Notice at 1; Compl. ¶ 56. Ersbo “was not reprimanded or punished for her involvement”

in the incidents described in the Notice. Compl. ¶ 57.

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 At the same November 28 meeting, Williams presented his supervisors with a memo listing

his complaints about Ersbo, as well as his perception that Ersbo was given “preferential

treatment . . . for workplace violations in which she was not suspended or given time off.” Compl.

¶¶ 46–47; Ex. A (Memo), Dkt. 14-3. In the memo, he complained about the March 18 incident;

that on another occasion Ersbo “was willing to let the operation suffer in order to try to get [him]

in trouble,” Memo at 3; and that on a third occasion Ersbo asked him to turn off a game he was

watching during a broadcast, id. at 4. He also admitted that, during the last incident, he “rais[ed]

his voice and us[ed] a slang term ‘Scuzz Bucket,’” used to refer to “unsavorable” behavior, to

describe Ersbo. Id. Williams also informed his supervisors that he had completed an initial intake

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) because he believed “he had a

claim for hostile work environment.” Compl. ¶ 49. In response, Samaniego “informed [Williams]

that because of his age and experience, he should be able to absorb the comments of Ersbo.” Id.

¶ 52. Ersbo had not been and was not later reprimanded or disciplined for her involvement in any

of the incidents listed in Williams’s memo. Id. ¶ 57.

Finally, on January 14, 2019, Williams’s employment was terminated “due to write ups for

two unapproved late arrivals.” Id. ¶ 59. According to Williams, one late arrival occurred

following a surgery and had been approved by Samaniego; as to the second late arrival, he had

informed Samaniego that he would arrive late when his vehicle was stuck in a snowstorm. Id.

¶ 60. Another basis for Williams’s termination was his participation in a “conversation [at work]

about the possibility of purchasing a firearm” to protect his home in the aftermath of two break-

ins. Id. ¶¶ 63–65. None of the four or five other co-workers who participated in the conversation

were disciplined for it. Id. ¶ 71.

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 On June 5, 2019, Williams filed a complaint against MediaLinks with the D.C. Office of

Human Rights, cross-filed with the EEOC. Id. ¶ 77. His Request to Withdraw was granted on

January 18, 2022, and the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue on May 31, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 78, 80.

Williams filed a complaint against MediaLinks in D.C. Superior Court containing claims for

retaliation, age discrimination, and race discrimination. Id. ¶¶ 81–101. On August 15, 2022,

MediaLinks removed the complaint, Dkt. 1, and filed an answer to the complaint, Dkt. 10. It then

moved for judgment on the pleadings, Dkt. 14.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Because MediaLinks already filed an answer, Dkt. 10, to Williams’s complaint, the

pleadings are closed, and it has properly moved for judgment on the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(c). It has attached two exhibits to its motion, Dkt. 14-3; Dkt. 14-4, that the Court may

consider without converting the motion into a motion for summary judgment because each exhibit

is “referred to in the complaint and is central to [Williams’s] claim.” Vanover v. Hantman, 77 F.

Supp. 2d 91, 98 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d 38 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Compl. ¶¶ 45–48 (discussing

contents of the November 28 memo), 55–56 (discussing contents of Corrective Action Notice);

see also Lopez v. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., 301 F. Supp. 3d 78, 85 (D.D.C. 2018).

A movant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) if it “demonstrates that

no material fact is in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Schuler v.

PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 514 F.3d 1365, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). Here, the

Court reviews the motion for judgment on the pleadings under the same standard that governs a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See McNamara v.

Picken, 866 F. Supp. 2d 10, 14 (D.D.C. 2012); Schuchart v. La Taberna Del Alabardero, Inc., 365

F.3d 33, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Under this standard, to survive the Rule 12(c) motion, a complaint

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must contain factual matter sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facially plausible claim is one that “allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This standard does not amount to a specific

probability requirement, but it does require “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (“Factual allegations must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”). A complaint need not contain “detailed

factual allegations,” but alleging facts that are “merely consistent with a defendant's liability . . .

stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Well-pleaded factual allegations are “entitled to [an] assumption of truth,” id. at 679, and

the court construes the complaint “in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all

inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471,

476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The assumption of truth does not apply,

however, to a “legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation

marks omitted). An “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is not credited;

likewise, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Age Discrimination (Count II)

In count two, Williams has plausibly alleged a claim for age discrimination under the D.C.

Human Rights Act. See D.C. Code § 2-1401.01. A prima facie claim for age discrimination

requires that the plaintiff show that he “(1) was at least forty years of age, (2) suffered an adverse

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employment action, and (3) that there was some reason to believe that the adverse employment

action was based on the employee’s age.” Badwal v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Dist. of Columbia, 139

F. Supp. 3d 295, 315 (D.D.C. 2015). But “a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination is not

required to plead every element of the prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss . . .

as long as the complaint meets the plausibility standard.” Id. (citing Jones v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n

Int’l, 642 F.3d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).

The complaint plausibly alleges the elements of a prima facie case. Williams has alleged

that, at the time of his employment, he was over 40 years old. See Compl. ¶ 3. He suffered an

adverse employment action when he was terminated in January 2019. 2 Id. ¶ 88; see D.C. Code

§ 2-1402.11(a)(1)(A). As to the causation element, even though “the standard at the motion to

dismiss stage is not high,” Badwal, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 315, it is not enough for a plaintiff to simply

allege that he was “treated unfairly” and that he was over 40, see Arnold v. Speer, 251 F. Supp. 3d

269, 273 (D.D.C. 2017). Rather, a plaintiff must make “sufficient allegations demonstrating that

such treatment stemmed from discrimination on the basis of age.” Id. Williams has done so. He

has alleged that his supervisor, Samaniego, responded to his concerns about Ersbo by stating that

“because of [Wiliams’s] age and experience, he should be able to absorb [Ersbo’s] comments.”

Compl. ¶ 52. Stray, “discriminatory remarks by uninvolved co-workers or remarks that have no

bearing on the employment decision in question” are not sufficient to establish an inference of age

discrimination. Pederson v. Mills, 636 F. Supp. 2d 78, 85 (D.D.C. 2009). But here, the

2
It is unclear from Williams’s complaint and his opposition brief whether he is alleging that
MediaLinks’s failure to investigate his complaints about Ersbo also constitutes an actionable
adverse action for purposes of his age discrimination claim, or simply is additional evidence of a
hostile work environment. See Compl. ¶¶ 89–90; Pl.’s Opp. at 8–10, Dkt. 16. The Court need not
address this issue, however, because Williams’s alleged January 2019 termination unquestionably
is an actionable adverse action.

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discriminatory comment was made by Williams’s supervisor—who reported incidents for which

Williams was disciplined, see Compl. ¶¶ 51–52, and that led to Williams’s termination, see id.

¶¶ 37, 60—less than two months before his termination. Because Samaniego’s allegedly

discriminatory remark “ha[d] some nexus to the eventual employment decision,” at this stage it is

sufficient to support Williams’s allegation that his termination was causally connected to his age.

Pederson, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 85; see also Lucas v. Paige, 435 F. Supp. 2d 165, 170–171 (D.D.C.

2006) (finding a workplace remark to be evidence of discrimination where the statement “was

made by an individual with the power to influence Plaintiff’s termination, and the remark was

temporally close in time to the termination”). 3

B. Retaliation (Count I)

In count one, Williams has plausibly pleaded a retaliation claim. To adequately plead a

retaliation claim, a plaintiff “must [allege] (1) that [he] engaged in statutorily protected activity;

(2) that [he] suffered a materially adverse action by [his] . . . employer; and (3) that a causal link

connects the two.” Howard R.L. Cook & Tommy Shaw Found. for Black Emps. of Library of

Cong., Inc. v. Billington, 737 F.3d 767, 772 (D.C. Cir. 2013). To allege that he suffered a

materially adverse action, a plaintiff must allege that the action “well might . . . dissuade[] a

3
Williams’s claims of age discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, see Compl. ¶ 91,
are not viable, however, because age is not a protected status under either Title VII or § 1981, see
Greer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Dist. of Columbia, 113 F. Supp. 3d 297, 305 (D.D.C. 2015); 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a)–(c).

As alleged, Williams also fails to plead a viable hostile work environment theory to support his
age discrimination claim. By Williams’s own admission, “he enjoyed his job, except for the
workplace actions of Ersbo.” Compl. ¶ 50. Even taken together, Ersbo’s small number of verbal
insults, see Compl. ¶ 25; see also Bell v. Gonzales, 398 F. Supp. 2d 78, 92 (D.D.C. 2005), coupled
with MediaLinks’s failure to investigate Williams’s complaints about Ersbo’s conduct, are not
sufficiently severe or pervasive to rise to the level of a hostile work environment. See Bell, 398 F.
Supp. 2d at 92 (D.D.C. 2005); Casey v. Mabus, 878 F. Supp. 2d 175, 189–90 (D.D.C. 2012);
Bergbauer v. Mabus, 934 F. Supp. 2d 55, 78 (D.D.C. 2013).

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reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Baird v. Gotbaum, 662

F.3d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The action need not “affect

the terms and conditions of employment,” id. (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,

548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006)), but it must “result in tangible job consequences like a change in pay,

position, or promotional opportunities,” Heavans v. Dodaro, No. 22-cv-836, 2022 WL 17904237,

at *9 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2022).

Williams has alleged that he engaged in statutorily protected activity by informing his

supervisors on November 28, 2018, that he “felt compelled to seek help from the EEOC,” including

by completing an initial intake form. Compl. ¶¶ 48–49. He has also alleged that he suffered a

materially adverse action when he was terminated on January 2019. See Davis v. Gables

Residential/H.G. Smithy, 525 F. Supp. 2d 87, 100 (D.D.C. 2007). Finally, the relative proximity

of his protected activity on November 28, 2018 to his January 14, 2019 termination is, at least at

this stage, sufficient to support an inference of a causal connection between the two events. See

Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (recognizing a presumption of causation

where “the employer had knowledge of the employee’s protected activity, and . . . the adverse []

action took place shortly after the activity”); Rattigan v. Gonzales, 503 F. Supp. 2d 56, 77 (D.D.C.

2007) (“This Court has often followed a three-month rule to establish causation on the basis of

temporal proximity alone.”). Williams has thus plausibly pleaded a retaliation claim based on the

theory that he suffered an adverse action when he was terminated. 4

4
In contrast, MediaLinks’s failure to investigate Williams’s complaints about Ersbo’s behavior,
see Compl. ¶¶ 84–85, is not an adverse action sufficient to support a retaliation claim. “A
retaliatory failure-to-remediate claim is not actionable unless the underlying incident would itself
be actionable.” Baird v. Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 171 (D.C. Cir. 2015). As discussed above, supra
section III.A, “the incidents [MediaLinks] failed to remediate[, namely, Williams’s handful of
negative interactions with Ersbo,] would not themselves constitute a retaliatory hostile work
environment,” id.; see also Brooks v. Grundmann, 748 F.3d 1273, 1277–78 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

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 Because Williams has pleaded facts that are “sufficient to cross the federal court’s

threshold” for a retaliation claim, the Court need not consider whether he has alleged sufficient

additional facts to rebut MediaLinks’s proffered non-retaliatory motivation for his termination, see

Def.’s Mot. at 18. Ryan-White v. Blank, 922 F. Supp. 2d 19, 24 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation omitted).

“[A]t the motion-to-dismiss stage, a . . . plaintiff is not generally required to plead facts that

specifically rebut a defendant’s legitimate non[retaliatory] reasons or establish [pretext].” Id. at

23; cf. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511–14 (2002) (holding that employment

discrimination plaintiff’s complaint need not allege each element of a prima facie discrimination

case, only “give[] . . . fair notice of the basis for [his] claims”). This is because MediaLinks’s

assertion that Williams was terminated for a variety of legitimate reasons is a “factual question,

not a deficiency in [Williams’s] pleading, and therefore . . . cannot be a basis for dismissing

the . . . [c]omplaint at this stage.” Ryan-White, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 29; see also Jimenez v.

McAleenan, 395 F. Supp. 3d 22, 40–41 (D.D.C. 2019) (refusing to consider, in context of motion

for judgment on pleadings, whether plaintiff had rebutted legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for

adverse action). Evaluating the legitimacy of MediaLinks’s proffered justifications would be

especially inappropriate here because Williams has alleged facts that, if proven, would call

MediaLinks’s explanations into question. See Compl. ¶¶ 60 (late arrivals were actually approved),

71 (other employees in conversation about firearm purchase were not disciplined). The Court will

(“[T]he ordinary tribulations of the workplace, [such as] a series of petty insults, vindictive
behavior, and angry recriminations[,] . . . are not actionable under Title VII.” (cleaned up)). The
relatively trivial nature of these underlying incidents distinguishes this case from one like Rochon
v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2006), in which a failure to investigate was actionable
because the employer failed to investigate a death threat against the complaining employee, see id.
at 1219–20; Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (drawing the same
distinction).

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therefore deny the defendant’s motion as to Williams’s theory that he was unlawfully retaliated

against when he was terminated.

C. Race Discrimination (Count III)

Finally, in count three, Williams has plausibly alleged that he was unlawfully discriminated

against on the basis of his race when MediaLinks suspended him without pay and terminated him.

Compl. ¶¶ 97, 99. These acts constitute actionable employment actions, see Weng v. Solis, 960 F.

Supp. 2d 239, 248–49 (D.D.C. 2013), and Williams has alleged that MediaLinks’s justifications

for both actions were not attributable to legitimate reasons, including to those offered by

MediaLinks in its briefing, see Def.’s Mot. at 18, Dkt. 14-1. He has alleged, for example, that he

was suspended in part due to incidents involving Ersbo, yet Ersbo, who is white, “was not

reprimanded or punished for her involvement in either.” Compl. ¶¶ 56–57. He was also allegedly

suspended for using his phone 10 minutes before a broadcast, but he was first informed of this rule

against phone use when he was suspended—even though his co-workers were given advance

notice of the rule or mere warnings for their first violation of the rule. Id. ¶¶ 37–38. What is more,

Williams has alleged that the two “unapproved late arrivals” cited as reasons for his termination

were actually approved or excusable, id. ¶ 60, and that other co-workers involved in his

conversation about firearms were not disciplined, id. ¶ 71. Further, he has alleged that he was

otherwise qualified for his position, id. ¶ 66, and that he “consistently received very good

employee evaluations and annual performance-based pay raises for his work,” id. ¶ 16.

“If true, these facts would show that [Williams’s] termination was not attributable to either

of the two most common legitimate reasons for termination: performance below the employer’s

legitimate expectations or the elimination of [his] position altogether.” Harris v. Dist. of Columbia

Water & Sewer Auth., 791 F.3d 65, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). “Such a showing

10
is . . . certainly enough to survive a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Nurriddin v. Bolden, 674 F.

Supp. 2d 64, 90–91 (stating the same where plaintiff alleged only that “defendants’ proffered

reasons for the actions taken are false”); Chien v. Sullivan, 313 F. Supp. 3d 1, 17–18 (D.D.C.

2018). It may well be that Williams will not be able to develop evidence to support his factual

allegations, or that any evidence developed will support only his age discrimination and retaliation

claims. But, at least at this stage, the Court cannot dismiss Williams’s suspension- and

termination-based race discrimination claims because, under this Circuit’s caselaw, the allegations

are sufficient to support an inference of racial discrimination. 5

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies MediaLinks’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings. A separate order consistent with this decision accompanies this memorandum opinion.

________________________
DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH
United States District Judge
March 13, 2023

5
The Court notes, however, that as to Williams’s first two alleged theories of liability—that
Williams’s pay and MediaLinks’s failure to investigate Williams’s claims were motivated by race
discrimination, see Compl. ¶¶ 96, 98—Williams has not pleaded sufficient facts to support such a
causal inference. See Beaulieu v. Barr, No. 15-cv-896, 2019 WL 5579968, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 29,
2019) (dismissing claim lacking allegations that comparator employees were treated differently or
that supervisors made discriminatory statements); Tolton v. Day, No. 19-cv-945, 2020 WL
2542129, at *29 (D.D.C. May 19, 2020) (dismissing claim with only “threadbare recitals” of why
pay comparators were similarly situated). The Court therefore need not address whether these
claims were timely raised, see Def.’s Mot. at 19–21, or constitute actionable adverse actions, see
supra section III.B.

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