2023 IL App (1st) 211564-U
No. 1-21-1564
Order filed March 13, 2023
First Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
OVEZMYRAT YUSUPOV and SURAY MELIKOVA, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 21 M3 4089
)
SUNIL JAIN, ) Honorable
) Martin C. Kelley,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hyman and Coghlan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s judgment in favor of plaintiffs is affirmed where defendant failed
to provide a sufficiently complete record on appeal.
¶2 Defendant Sunil Jain appeals pro se from an order of the trial court granting judgment for
plaintiffs Ovezmyrat Yusupov and Suray Melikova totaling $3749 in their suit for their renter’s
security deposit that defendant, their landlord, retained following the expiration of their lease. On
appeal, defendant argues that the trial court’s order should be vacated because he provided
No. 1-21-1564
evidence that plaintiffs damaged the premises and left it unclean, and further, he is not subject to
the Security Deposit Return Act (Act) (765 ILCS 710/1 et seq. (West 2020)). We affirm.
¶3 The record on appeal comprises a single volume of common law record from which we
have gleaned the following facts and procedural history.
¶4 Pursuant to a residential lease agreement, plaintiffs leased premises on Cove Drive in
Prospect Heights from defendant from June 1, 2020, to May 30, 2021. Plaintiffs agreed to pay a
$1950 security deposit. The release of the security deposit was subject to the following terms:
“A. The full term of the Agreement has been completed.
B. No damage to the premises, buildings, and grounds is evident.
C. The entire dwelling, appliances, closets, and cupboards are clean and free from insects,
the refrigerator is defrosted and clean. The range is to be clean including the racks and
broiler pan, all windows are to be clean inside and outside, all debris and rubbish have been
removed from the property, carpets have been commercially cleaned and left clean and
odorless.
D. All unpaid charges have been paid including late charges, visitor charges, pet charges,
delinquent rent, etc.
***
F. A forwarding address for Tenant has been left with the Landlord. Within thirty (30) days
after termination of the occupancy, the Landlord will mail the balance of the deposit to the
address provided by Tenant in the names of all signatories hereto; or at the Option of the
Landlord will impose a claim on the deposit and so notify the Tenant.”
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¶5 The lease further stated that plaintiffs would return the premises in “moving-in clean”
condition or pay a $185 cleaning fee. The lease also prohibited pets except for a maximum of 10
parakeets with a non-refundable pet deposit of $350.
¶6 On or about May 31, 2021, defendant sent a security deposit deduction form to plaintiffs,
which informed them that various fees were being deducted from the security deposit, including a
cleaning fee, pet violation fee, and fees for damages to flooring and a shelf. The fees totaled
$2087.51, which exceeded the security deposit. Defendant therefore requested $127.76 from
plaintiffs, representing the difference between the fees and the security deposit less $9.75 interest.
On or about June 3, 2021, plaintiffs, through counsel, notified defendant that they disputed the
alleged damages and charges and requested the return of their security deposit.
¶7 On July 29, 2021, plaintiffs filed a verified complaint against defendant seeking the return
of their security deposit. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant failed to provide notice of any pet
violations or damages during their rental period. Plaintiffs reported damages to the floor and the
unclean condition of the premises to defendant within days of moving in. In February or March
2021, the floors “popped out” due to humidity and poor workmanship or installation, and
defendant or his agent attempted to replace or repair the defective flooring during the lease term.
Plaintiffs vacated the premises in or about April 2021. Plaintiffs requested judgment in their favor
for twice their security deposit plus reasonable attorney fees and court costs pursuant to the Act.
See 765 ILCS 710/1(c) (West 2020).
¶8 On August 31, 2021, defendant filed a pro se answer. 1 Defendant denied not providing
plaintiffs written notice of the pet violation and that the floors popped out due to humidity and
1
Defendant appeared and filed all pleadings pro se in the trial court.
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poor workmanship or installation. Defendant also denied that plaintiffs reported any damages or
defects after taking possession of the premises and that the premises were unclean. Defendant
stated that plaintiffs maintained possession of the property until April 30, 2021, and emphasized
that plaintiffs failed to provide a forwarding address after multiple requests.
¶9 On November 5, 2021, after a videoconference hearing where both parties appeared, the
trial court entered judgment against defendant and in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of $3749. In
a written order, the court explained that the award was calculated by awarding plaintiffs $5336
and deducting $1587 for defendant’s claim for damages and the cleaning fee.
¶ 10 On November 30, 2021, defendant filed a notice of appeal asking this court to vacate the
November 5, 2021, order and remand for a new hearing. On December 6, 2021, defendant filed
another notice of appeal asking this court to reverse the trial court’s November 5, 2021, judgment
and remand for a new hearing, increase defendant’s award from $1587 to $2087 plus court costs,
and order the trial court to review defendant’s answer and the security deposit deduction form. 2
¶ 11 On December 28, 2021, defendant moved the trial court for review and approval of an
attached bystander’s report, stating that the trial court clerk advised him that there was no audio
recording or transcript of the hearing held on November 5, 2021. On January 14, 2022, the trial
court denied the motion. 3
2
The November 30, 2021, notice of appeal was not forwarded to this court and did not receive an
appeal number. The December 6, 2021, notice of appeal, which was assigned appeal number 1-21-1564,
was timely filed in relation to the November 5, 2021, judgment, as December 5, 2021, the thirtieth day after
the judgment, was a Sunday. See 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2020); Ill. S. Ct. R 606(b) (eff. Mar. 12, 2021).
3
The trial court’s denial of the motion to review and approve the bystander’s report is not at issue
on appeal.
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¶ 12 On November 15, 2022, this court entered an order taking this case for consideration on
the record and defendant’s pro se brief only. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis
Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976) (reviewing court may decide a case on appellant’s
brief alone “if the record is simple and the claimed errors are such that the court can easily decide
them without the aid of an appellee’s brief”).
¶ 13 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in (1) awarding plaintiffs two times
the security deposit for his failure to return the security deposit within the time prescribed by the
Act, and (2) not awarding him court costs and the pet violation fee. Defendant further maintains
that the Act does not apply to him because he does not “own/rent” enough units to qualify.
¶ 14 As an initial matter, defendant’s failure to fully comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule
341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which “governs the form and content of appellate briefs,” hinders our
review of his appeal. McCann v. Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 12. Defendant’s pro se status
does not relieve him from complying with the appellate procedures required by our supreme court
rules. Wing v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶ 7.
¶ 15 Rule 341(h)(6) provides that an appellant’s brief should contain a statement of “facts
necessary to an understanding of the case, stated accurately and fairly without argument or
comment, and with appropriate reference to the pages of the record on appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R.
341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). The supreme court rules also provide that “[i]f no verbatim transcript
of the evidence of proceedings is obtainable the appellant may prepare a proposed report of
proceedings from the best available sources, including recollection.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(c) (eff. July
1, 2017). This proposed bystander’s report must be submitted to the trial court for “settlement and
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approval,” but absent stipulation, only a report certified by the trial court may be included in the
record on appeal. Id.
¶ 16 Defendant’s brief contains a “statement of facts,” but to the extent it purports to describe
the proceedings on November 5, 2021, or to relate information adduced at that hearing, it is
unsupported by the record on appeal. The trial court did not certify defendant’s proposed
bystander’s report and this court may not consider the uncertified copy that was attached to the
motion of December 28, 2021. Id.; see also Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Rongren,
127 Ill. App. 3d 85, 92 (1984) (without adequate support in the record on appeal, a “statement of
facts” contained in an appellate brief cannot be considered on appeal).
¶ 17 As the appellant, defendant bears the burden of providing this court with a sufficiently
complete record of the trial proceedings to support a claim of error. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d
389, 391 (1984). Absent a sufficiently complete record on appeal, the reviewing court must
presume that the trial court entered its judgment in conformity with the law and had a sufficient
factual basis. In re Marriage of Gulla & Kanaval, 234 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2009).
¶ 18 Without a report of the proceedings, approved bystander’s report, or agreed statement of
facts, this court is unaware of the testimony, evidence, or arguments, if any, presented at the
November 5, 2021, hearing and the basis for the trial court’s order. Accordingly, defendant’s
claims are not subject to review (Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 432 (2001)), and we must
presume that the trial court heard adequate evidence to support its judgment (Corral v. Mervis
Industries, Inc., 217 Ill. 2d 144, 157 (2005)).
¶ 19 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
¶ 20 Affirmed.
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