Garcia, D. v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.

J-A18007-22

                             2023 PA SUPER 40


 DANIEL GARCIA, INDIVIDUALLY AND  :           IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS          :                PENNSYLVANIA
 SIMILARLY SITUATED               :
                                  :
                                  :
          v.                      :
                                  :
                                  :
 FOOT LOCKER RETAIL, INC., FOOT   :           No. 1453 WDA 2021
 LOCKER SPECIALTY, INC., AND FOOT :
 LOCKER STORES, INC.              :
                                  :
                Appellants        :

             Appeal from the Order Entered September 2, 2021
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
                          No(s): GD-21-002107


BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

CONCURRING OPINION BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                FILED: MARCH 14, 2023

     In Feeney v. Dell Inc., 908 N.E.2d 753 (Mass. 2009), the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered a similar issue regarding

Massachusetts’ consumer protection statute. There, retailers argued that the

erroneous collection of sales tax “falls outside ‘the conduct of trade or

commerce’ as those terms are used in” the statute. Id. at 769. The

Massachusetts   statute   uses   terms   identical   in   all   material   ways   to

Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”)

and prohibits “unfair or deceptive practices in the conduct of any trade or

commerce.” Id. at 770 (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 2).

     Like the majority here, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in

Feeney concluded that the allegations there did not fall within the scope of
J-A18007-22



the statute. It did, however, identify a fact pattern that it concluded would

compel a different result:

      Of course, if a retailer deceptively collects a charge that the
      retailer terms a “sales tax” and keeps the proceeds of the “tax”
      for the retailer's own enrichment rather than remit them to the
      Commonwealth, a different result would obtain. In such a
      circumstance, the collection of the “tax” would be motivated by
      business reasons, not by a legislative mandate, and would
      constitute a “deceptive practice” under G.L. c. 93A. There is no
      such allegation here.

Id. at 771 n.37.

      I join the majority on the understanding that it addresses the allegations

of the complaint in our case and expresses no opinion on whether a case such

as the Massachusetts court identified would be actionable under the UTPCPL.

      Judge Stabile and Judge Murray join the concurring opinion.




                                     -2-