TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-22-00766-CV
C. R., Appellant
v.
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE 146TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY
NO. 21DFAM328579, THE HONORABLE DALLAS SIMS, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mother appeals the trial court’s final order terminating her parental rights to her
child. 1 See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001. After a bench trial, the trial court found by clear and
convincing evidence that statutory grounds for terminating her parental rights existed and that
termination of those rights was in the child's best interest. Mother’s rights were terminated as to
Jason, based on the (D) (Endangering Conduct Provision), (E) (Endangering Conditions
Provision), (N) (Abandonment Provision), (O) (Ordered Services Provision) grounds and best
interest grounds. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O) and (b)(2).
Appellant’s court-appointed attorney has filed a motion to withdraw supported by
an Anders brief, concluding that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders
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For the child’s privacy, we will refer to him by the alias “Jason,” and to his family
members by their relationships to him. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8. The biological father of Jason is
deceased. The case began with Jason’s two siblings included in the case, but they were each
placed with their respective fathers and their cases were severed from Jason’s case.
v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 & n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per
curiam) (approving use of Anders procedure in appeals from terminations of parental rights).
The brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record
demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. See 386 U.S. at
744; Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646–47 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2005, pet. denied). Appellant’s counsel has certified to this Court that he has provided
Mother with a copy of the Anders brief and motion to withdraw and advised her of her rights to
examine the appellate record and to file a pro se brief. To date, Mother has not filed a pro se
brief. The Department of Family and Protective Services waived filing a response to the
Anders brief.
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of the record
to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988);
Taylor, 160 S.W.3d at 647. We have conducted an independent review of the entire record,
including the Anders brief submitted on Mother’s behalf. We have found nothing in the record
that might arguably support an appeal, and we agree the appeal is frivolous and without merit.
We have specifically reviewed the trial court’s findings as to Mother under subsections (D)
and (E) of Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1), and we have found no nonfrivolous issues that
could be raised on appeal with respect to those findings. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237
(Tex. 2019) (per curiam). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order terminating Mother’s
parental rights.
However, the Supreme Court of Texas has held that the right to counsel in suits
seeking the termination of parental rights extends to “all proceedings in the Supreme Court of
Texas, including the filing of a petition for review.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27. Accordingly,
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counsel’s obligation to Mother has not yet been discharged. See id. If after consulting with
counsel Mother desires to file a petition for review, her counsel should timely file with the
Supreme Court “a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See id. at
27–28. Counsel’s motion to withdraw therefore is denied.
__________________________________________
Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Theofanis
Affirmed
Filed: March 21, 2023
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