COURT OF CHANCERY
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
BONNIE W. DAVID COURT OF CHANCERY COURTHOUSE
MASTER IN CHANCERY 34 THE CIRCLE
GEORGETOWN, DE 19947
Date Submitted: February 16, 2023
Final Report: March 21, 2023
Stephen A. Spence, Esquire Daniel C. Herr, Esquire
Meluney Alleman & Spence, LLC Law Office of Daniel C. Herr LLC
1143 Savannah Rd., Suite 3-A 1225 N. King St., Suite 1000
Lewes, DE 19958 Wilmington, DE 19801
RE: Schell Brothers, LLC v. Pickard,
C.A. No. 2022-0642-BWD
Dear Counsel:
This final report addresses Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Petitioners’
Amended Petition Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (the “Motion to Dismiss”).
Through this action, Petitioners Schell Brothers, LLC (“Schell Brothers”) and
Reddenwood II, LLC (“Reddenwood”) seek to enforce an addendum to a purchase
agreement through which Respondents Shawn and Lori Pickard agreed to purchase,
and Petitioners agreed to sell, a new construction home. The addendum entitled
Pickard, as a Schell Brothers employee, to an employee discount, which enabled
Respondents to purchase the new home “at cost,” representing a substantial discount
to the home’s market value. But it also required Respondents to repay the employee
discount if Pickard did not remain employed by Schell Brothers for three years
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C.A. No. 2022-0642-BWD
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following the issuance of the home’s certificate of occupancy. According to the
petition, twenty months after the certificate of occupancy was issued, Schell
Brothers terminated Pickard for using the company credit card to make unauthorized
personal expenditures. Respondents refused to repay the employee discount, and
this litigation ensued. Respondents now seek dismissal on the grounds that the
addendum governing the employee discount is “illusory” and not supported by valid
consideration.
For the reasons set forth below, I find that the purchase agreement and the
addendum are part of the same integrated agreement, are not illusory and are
supported by consideration. I also conclude that the addendum, standing alone, is
not illusory and is supported by consideration. I therefore recommend that the
Motion to Dismiss be denied.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
A. Schell Brothers Offers the Pickards an Employee Discount on a
New Construction Home.
Petitioner Schell Brothers, a Delaware limited liability company, is a
homebuilding company based in Rehoboth Beach, Delaware. Am. Pet. ¶ 1.
1
The following facts are taken from the Amended Verified Petition and the agreements
incorporated by reference therein. See Am. Verified Pet., Dkt. No. 12 [hereinafter, “Am.
Pet.”].
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Petitioner Reddenwood, a Delaware limited liability company and wholly-owned
subsidiary of Schell Brothers, is the developer, declarant, and owner of the Estates
at Reddenwood Community, a residential community in Milton, Delaware.
As a tool to recruit and retain employees, Schell Brothers offers employees an
“Employee Discount” towards the purchase of a new construction home. After the
Employee Discount is applied, Schell Brothers employees pay only “the costs
incurred by Schell in ‘the construction of a home, including all materials, labor,
overhead, carry costs, fees, permits, closing costs, anticipated warranty costs, or any
other costs specific to the [construction of the residential improvement located on
the Property],’” representing a substantial discount to the home’s market value. Am.
Pet. ¶ 8.
In July 2019, Schell Brothers hired Respondent Shawn D. Pickard as a pilot
for its corporate aircraft. Schell Brothers offered Pickard, as a new employee, the
opportunity to apply the Employee Discount toward the purchase of a new
construction home.
B. The Purchase Agreement
On July 1, 2019, Pickard and his wife, Respondent Lori D. Pickard (together,
the “Pickards”), entered into a Delaware Purchase Agreement (the “Purchase
Agreement”) with Reddenwood, pursuant to which the Pickards agreed to purchase,
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and Reddenwood agreed to sell, a new construction home in the Estates at
Reddenwood Community (the “Property”). The Purchase Agreement identifies a
“Base Price” of $454,900, a “Home Site Premium” of $25,000, and a “Selections
Estimate” of $200,567, offset by a “Base/Option Discount” of $180,170, for a total
purchase price of $500,297. See Am. Verified Pet., Ex. A at ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 12
[hereinafter, “Purchase Agreement”].
The Purchase Agreement contains a choice of law provision selecting
Delaware as the governing law. Id. ¶ 21. The Purchase Agreement further states
that “[i]f any part of this Agreement is deemed illegal or unenforceable, the rest of
the Agreement will, at Seller’s option, remain in full force and effect, or in the
alternative, Seller may cancel this Agreement and refund all monies paid to Seller
by Buyer and both Seller and Buyer will have no further rights, obligations, or
liabilities to each other at law or equity.” Id.
The Purchase Agreement also contains an integration clause providing that
“[t]his Agreement, together with any addenda checked as ‘yes’ below, collectively
supersede any and all prior understandings and agreements between Buyer and
Seller and constitutes the entire agreement between them and no representations,
warranties, conditions, or statements (oral or written), not contained herein shall be
considered a part hereof.” Id. ¶ 19. The same paragraph lists fifteen separate
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addenda, ten of which are checked as applicable and five of which are left
unchecked. The applicable addenda include a “Selections Estimate,” an
“Acknowledgement of Community Documents,” an “Acknowledgement of
Investment Analysis,” a “Radon Disclosure,” “Signed Site Plans,” a “Seller’s
Disclosure,” a “Setting Expectations Addendum,” a “Tree Clearing Addendum,” a
“Miscellaneous Addendum,” and a “Deposit Requirement.” Id.
C. The Employee Addendum
Contemporaneous with,2 and as “an integral part of,”3 the Purchase
Agreement, Reddenwood and the Pickards executed an Addendum to Purchase
Agreement (the “Employee Addendum”). See Am. Verified Pet., Ex. B, Dkt. No.
12 [hereinafter, “Employee Addendum”]. The Employee Addendum sets forth
eligibility requirements for receiving the Employee Discount, which is defined as
“any discounts reflected in the Purchase Agreement, any addendums to the Purchase
Agreement, and any Change Orders.” Id. ¶ 5.
2
The Pickards signed both the Purchase Agreement and the Employee Addendum on June
27, 2019. Reddenwood signed both the Purchase Agreement and the Employee Addendum
on July 1, 2019.
3
Employee Addendum at 1.
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Specifically, the Employee Addendum states that “[t]o be eligible for the
‘Employee Discount’ . . . Employee/Buyer must use the Home as his/her primary
residence and the Employee/Buyer should meet all the requirements outlined in the
Schell Brothers Team Member Handbook, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit A.” Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, the Employee Addendum explains
that “[a] major purpose of the Employee Discount being offered to Employee/Buyer
in this Addendum and the Purchase Agreement is the retention of Employee/Buyer,”
and therefore offers the Employee Discount “[i]n consideration of
(i) Employee/Buyer continuously owning the Home for 3 years from the date a
certificate of occupancy is granted for the Home, and (ii) Employee/Buyer
remaining employed by Schell Brothers for 3 years from the date a certificate of
occupancy is granted for the Home . . . .” Id. ¶ 6 (emphasis added).
The Employee Addendum states that, “[s]hould Employee/Buyer voluntarily
cease employment with Schell Brothers or be terminated within 3 years of the date
of a certificate of occupancy is issued for the Home,” Schell Brothers is entitled to
reimbursement of the Employee Discount. Id. ¶ 7. The Employee Addendum
further provides:
In the event that Employee/Buyer does not reimburse Schell Brothers
the full amount of the Employee Discount within 30 days,
Employee/Buyer agrees to put the Home on the market for sale within
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60 days of the date Employee/Buyer ceases to be employed with Schell
Brothers. Employee/Buyer shall notify Schell Brothers 15 days prior
to listing or otherwise offering the Home for Sale. Schell Brothers has
the first option to purchase the Home from the Employee/Buyer at the
original cost calculated as the total “Sales Price” of the Home and/or
lot as shown on the HUD1/ALTA documents. Should Schell Brothers
choose not to exercise its right, Employee/Buyer shall notify Schell
Brothers of the date on which the Home is listed or otherwise offered
for sale. Employee/Buyer shall provide Schell Brothers with the
ratified agreement of sale and use the proceeds of the sale to reimburse
Schell Brothers the full amount of the Employee Discount within 30
days of the date of the sale. If the proceeds from the sale of the Home
are insufficient to fully reimburse Schell Brothers for the Employee
Discount, Employee/Buyer shall still be obligated to reimburse Schell
Brothers for the difference between the full amount of the Employee
Discount and the amount provided to Schell Brothers from the sale of
the Home.
Id. (emphasis added).
D. The Change Orders
In the months following execution of the Purchase Agreement and the
Employee Addendum, on December 9, 2019, January 2, 2020, March 20, 2020, and
March 31, 2020, the Pickards and Reddenwood entered into four change orders,
which resulted in a final purchase price of $515,444, reflecting a total Employee
Discount of $237,812. See Am. Verified Pet., Ex. J, Dkt. No. 12.
E. Pickard is Terminated from Schell Brothers.
A certificate of occupancy was issued for the Pickards’ new home on May 28,
2020. Less than three years later, on January 24, 2022, Schell Brothers terminated
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Pickard’s employment after it “discovered that Pickard had grossly misused the
company credit card for his personal expenses and failed in the performance of his
employee responsibilities.” Am. Pet. ¶ 21. Specifically, the Amended Petition
alleges that Pickard was terminated after he failed to provide proper documentation
to account for tens of thousands of dollars in charges made with his company credit
card, which was intended to be used only for authorized business purposes, but was
instead used to purchase personal items such as speakers, a truck bed tent, tires for
Pickard’s personal vehicle, subscriptions for streaming entertainment services and
other items without an authorized business purpose. Pickard confessed to Schell
Brothers that he “really messed up,” “got caught up in a moment and bought [certain
items] for [his] own use,” and “really did plan on going back and marking [the
expenses] personal but [he] didn’t” because he “was over extended that month and
then it just got pushed to the way side [sic] and [he] never went back and fixed it.”
Id. ¶ 25.
Following Pickard’s termination, Schell Brothers notified Respondents that,
pursuant to the Employee Addendum, the Pickards were required to reimburse
Schell Brothers for the full amount of the Employee Discount within thirty days of
termination or put the Property on the market within sixty days of termination. When
the Pickards refused to do so, Petitioners initiated this litigation, seeking, among
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other things, a declaration that Respondents breached the Employee Addendum;
specific performance of the Employee Addendum by requiring Respondents to list
the Property for sale and remit the sale proceeds; and an equitable lien on the
Property in the amount of the Employee Discount.
II. ANALYSIS
Respondents have moved to dismiss the Amended Petition under Court of
Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) to failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6),
Delaware courts “(1) accept all well pleaded factual allegations as true, (2) accept
even vague allegations as ‘well pleaded’ if they give the opposing party notice of the
claim, [and] (3) draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.”
Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Hldgs. LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535
(Del. 2011). “[T]he governing pleading standard in Delaware to survive a motion
to dismiss is reasonable ‘conceivability.’” Id. at 537. “[T]he threshold for the
showing a plaintiff must make to survive a motion to dismiss is low.” Doe v. Cahill,
884 A.2d 451, 458 (Del. 2005).
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The Amended Petition asserts a single cause of action for breach of the
Employee Addendum.4 Respondents offer one theory in support of dismissal—that
the Purchase Agreement and the Employee Addendum must be viewed as separate
agreements, and the Employee Addendum, standing alone, is an “illusory” contract
unsupported by consideration. According to Respondents, the Employee Addendum
lacks “mutuality of obligation” because it permits Schell Brothers to unilaterally
revoke the Employee Discount by terminating Pickard’s employment.
For the reasons set forth below, I conclude that the Purchase Agreement and
the Employee Addendum are part of the same integrated agreement, are not illusory
and are supported by consideration. Moreover, even standing on its own, the
Employee Addendum is not illusory and is supported by consideration.
Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
1. The Purchase Agreement and Employee Addendum Are Part of
the Same Integrated Agreement, Are Not Illusory And Are
Supported by Consideration.
“[A] valid contract exists when (1) the parties intended that the contract would
bind them, (2) the terms of the contract are sufficiently definite, and (3) the parties
4
The Amended Petition contains two counts: Count I, seeking specific performance as a
remedy for breach of the Employee Addendum, and Count II, separately alleging breach
of the Employee Addendum.
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exchange legal consideration.” Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 991 A.2d 1153,
1158 (Del. 2010). When analyzing the sufficiency of the consideration exchanged
in a contract, Delaware courts “limit our inquiry into consideration to its existence
and not whether it is fair or adequate.” Newell Rubbermaid Inc. v. Storm, 2014 WL
1266827, at *9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2014).
Respondents’ challenge to the Employee Addendum as “illusory” rests on the
premise that the addendum must be analyzed in a vacuum. According to
Respondents, “the Purchase Agreement and the [Employee] Addendum are two
separate documents,” so the consideration exchanged under the Purchase Agreement
cannot support the Employee Addendum. Opening Br. in Supp. of Resp’ts’ Mot. to
Dismiss Pet’rs’ Am. Pet. Pursuant to R. 12(b)(6) at 6, Dkt. No. 16 [hereinafter,
“OB”]. Respondents’ argument fails because “[a]s a matter of black letter law, all
writings that are part of the same transaction are interpreted together.” Fla. Chem.
Co., LLC v. Flotek Indus., Inc., 2021 WL 3630298, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 17, 2021);
see also Comerica Bank v. Glob. Payments Direct, Inc., 2014 WL 3567610, at *7
(Del. Ch. July 21, 2014) (holding that an LLC agreement and a service agreement
should be read as one contract where “the integration clause in the LLC Agreement
acknowledge[d] the inter-relatedness of these two agreements (and other
agreements) the parties entered simultaneously,” explaining that “contemporaneous
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contracts between the same parties concerning the same subject matter should be
read together as one contract”).5
The Purchase Agreement and the Employee Addendum were signed
contemporaneously. The Purchase Agreement’s integration clause provides that the
Purchase Agreement and applicable addenda—including the Employee
Addendum6—together “constitute[] the entire agreement between” the parties.
Purchase Agreement ¶ 19. And the Employee Addendum further confirms that it is
“an integral part of the Purchase Agreement.” Employee Addendum at 1.
To avoid this result, Respondents contend that the Employee Addendum
“modif[ies] and amend[s]” the Purchase Agreement. OB at 6. This too fails.
5
Respondents argue that the Purchase Agreement and the Employee Addendum should
not be read together because the Employee Addendum “is not a valid contract in the first
instance.” Reply Br. in Further Supp. of Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss Pet’rs’ Am. Pet. Pursuant
to R. 12(b)(6) at 4, Dkt. No. 21 [hereinafter, “RB”]. Respondents’ reasoning is circular
and undermined by many cases holding that not only “contracts,” but “all writings that are
part of the same transaction,” must be interpreted together. Fla. Chem. Co., LLC, 2021
WL 3630298, at *9 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. N.V. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Co. LLC, 166 A.3d 912, 927 n.61 (Del. 2017), as revised (June 28,
2017) (citing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 for the proposition that “all
writings that are part of the same transaction are interpreted together”) (emphasis added);
Trexler v. Billingsley, 166 A.3d 101, 101 n.21 (Del. 2017) (same); Narayanan v.
Sutherland Glob. Hldgs. Inc., 2016 WL 3682617, at *10 n.77 (Del. Ch. July 5, 2016)
(same).
6
The applicable addenda listed in Paragraph 19 include, among others, a “Miscellaneous
Addendum.” At this stage, it is at least reasonably conceivable that “Miscellaneous
Addendum” refers to the Employee Addendum.
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Although “‘an amendment to a contract requires consideration,’”7 the Employee
Addendum is not an “amendment”—it is “an integral part” of “the entire agreement
between” the parties, executed at the same time the Purchase Agreement was signed.
Unsurprisingly, both cases on which Respondents rely for this argument address
amendments that, unlike the Employee Addendum here, were executed months or
years after the initial agreement was signed.8 Here, the Purchase Agreement and the
Employee Addendum were executed together and must be analyzed together.
Because Respondents seek to retain the benefits received under the Purchase
Agreement,9 they concede that the Purchase Agreement is not illusory and is
supported by valid consideration. Considered together with the Employee
Addendum, the entire contract is plainly supported by consideration. A contract is
supported by consideration, even where a promisor reserves a choice of alternative
7
OB at 6 (quoting Continental Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., 750 A.2d 1219 (Del. Ch. 2000)).
8
See Continental Ins. Co., 750 A.2d at 1232-33 (finding parties did not orally modify an
LLC agreement approximately a decade after the LLC agreement was executed, and even
if they had, the alleged amendment was not supported by consideration); 13 N. Enters.,
Inc. v. Bruner, 1992 WL 187630, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 8, 1992) (finding lease amendment
executed several months after initial lease was signed was supported by consideration).
9
As noted above, Schell Brothers may cancel the Purchase Agreement if any part of that
agreement is deemed illegal or unenforceable. Purchase Agreement ¶ 21 (“If any part of
this Agreement is deemed illegal or unenforceable . . . Seller may cancel this
Agreement . . . .”).
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performance, if “each of the alternative performances would have been
consideration if it alone had been bargained for.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 77 (1981). Comment (b) to the Restatement explains that “[a] promise in the
alternative may be made because each of the alternative performances is the object
of desire to the promisee. . . . [T]he promise is consideration if it cannot be kept
without some action or forbearance which would be consideration if it alone were
bargained for.” Id. cmt. b.
Through the Purchase Agreement and the Employee Addendum, Petitioners
made two alternative promises: (1) Petitioners agreed to sell the Property to
Respondents for a discounted purchase price ($515,444 after change orders) and not
to seek repayment of the Employee Discount ($237,812) if Pickard remained
employed by Schell Brothers for three years; or (2) if Pickard did not remain
employed by Schell Brothers for three years, Petitioners still agreed to sell the
Property, but reserved a right to repayment of the Employee Discount (reflecting an
effective purchase price of $753,256). Under either alternative, Petitioners were
bound to sell, and Respondents were bound to purchase, the Property at one of two
prices ($515,444 or $753,256).
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Because the Purchase Agreement and the Employee Addendum together are
not illusory and are supported by consideration, the Motion to Dismiss must be
denied.
2. The Employee Addendum Is Not Illusory And Is Supported By
Consideration.
Because the Purchase Agreement and the Employee Addendum together are
not illusory, the Motion to Dismiss must be denied. Alternatively, the Motion to
Dismiss also must be denied because, even standing alone, the Employee Addendum
is not “illusory” and is independently supported by consideration.
Respondents maintain that the Employee Addendum is an “illusory” promise.
Citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Wroten and similar cases,10 Respondents explain that
“[w]here the plaintiff’s promise is a mere illusion, that is, where his promise exists
in form only but not in substance, then it follows necessarily that there is no
consideration to support the defendant’s promise, and thus no enforceable contract.”
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Wroten, 303 A.2d 698, 701 (Del. Ch. 1973). According to
10
Respondents also rely on Carey’s Home Construction, LLC v. Estate of Myers, 2014 WL
1724835, at *5-6 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2014), in which the Superior Court upheld an
escalator clause in a construction contract as not illusory, and SARN Energy LLC v. Tatra
Defense Vehicle a.s., 2018 WL 5733385, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2018), in which
the Superior Court held that an agreement “d[id] not lack consideration” where it was
supported by one party’s promise to use best efforts to accomplish the agreement.
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Respondents, Petitioners were not bound by the contract, but were instead given “a
three-year ‘out’ to claw back” the Employee Discount at their sole discretion. OB
at 8. Petitioners counter that this Court previously rejected a similar “illusory”
argument under factually analogous circumstances, and that, in any event, the
Employee Addendum is not “illusory” because the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing limited Petitioners’ ability to terminate Pickard and demand
repayment of the Employee Discount. Pet’rs’ Answering Br. Opposing Resp’ts’
Mot. to Dismiss at 10-18, Dkt. No. 19 [hereinafter, “AB”]. Petitioners are correct
on both counts.
First, Vice Chancellor Noble’s decision in Newell Rubbermaid Inc. v. Storm,
2014 WL 1266827 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2014), refutes Respondents’ contention that
the Employee Addendum is illusory. There, the Court analyzed restricted stock unit
(“RSU”) award agreements under which performance-based RSUs would vest if an
employee remained employed on future dates. Like Respondents here, the
defendant, a former employee of the plaintiff, argued that “because the [RSU]
[a]greements would cause [defendant] to forfeit her awards if [plaintiff] terminated
her, which it could do at its sole discretion and without cause because she was an at-
will employee,” those agreements were supported “only by illusory consideration
and [we]re therefore unenforceable.” Id. at *8. Vice Chancellor Noble rejected that
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argument, concluding that the RSU agreements were not illusory because the
defendant “was granted a benefit that held actual value,” even if “somewhat
contingent, based on certain factors such as the time period in which the units will
vest and [the defendant’s] likelihood of future employment.” Id. at *9.
Respondents “respectfully disagree with Vice Chancellor Noble’s Storm
analysis,” RB at 11, but fail to offer any compelling distinction that would cast doubt
on its application here. Like the RSU agreements in Newell Rubbermaid, the
Employee Addendum offered Respondents immediate value even though the full
extent of that value depended on future events. For example, even if the Employee
Discount were forfeited, Respondents received an interest-free loan in the amount
of the Employee Discount and lower monthly mortgage payments. “[B]ecause
Delaware courts ‘limit our inquiry into consideration to its existence and not whether
it is fair or adequate,’” I cannot conclude that such consideration was inadequate.
Newell Rubbermaid Inc., 2014 WL 1266827, at *9.11
11
Vice Chancellor Noble also concluded that the RSU agreements were not illusory
because the defendant’s “likelihood of future employment, although perhaps not precisely
knowable, [wa]s likely high in this circumstance” given the plaintiff’s desire to retain her
as an employee. Newell Rubbermaid Inc., 2014 WL 1266827, at *9. Similarly, here, the
Employee Addendum provides that “[a] major purpose of the Employee Discount being
offered to Employee/Buyer in this Addendum and the Purchase Agreement is the retention
of Employee/Buyer.” Employee Addendum ¶ 6.
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Second, to the extent Petitioners’ obligations under the Employee Addendum
might otherwise be illusory, it is reasonably conceivable that the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing limits Petitioners’ discretion and binds them to the
contract. The parties debate whether a “for cause” requirement can be read into the
Employee Addendum that would prohibit Petitioners from terminating Pickard
without cause and thereby improperly depriving him of the full benefit of the
Employee Discount. One might expect Respondents to argue that the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing prohibited Petitioners from terminating
Pickard except for cause—but in this unusual posture, Respondents instead insist
that nothing in the agreement restricted Petitioners from terminating Pickard at any
time, for any reason. OB at 8-9.
I disagree. As comment (d) to the Restatement explains, “[a] limitation on the
promisor’s freedom of choice need not be stated in words. It may be an implicit
term of the promise, or it may be supplied by law.” Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 77 cmt. d (1981); see also Mobil Oil Corp., 303 A.2d at 701 (finding
agreement was not illusory because plaintiff was bound “to a good faith effort” to
obtain required permits and “would be held as a matter of law to a standard of
reasonableness” in determining whether permits were acceptable).
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As Petitioners explain, “[t]he implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
inheres in every contract governed by Delaware law and ‘requires a party in a
contractual relationship to refrain from arbitrary or unreasonable conduct which has
the effect of preventing the other party to the contract from receiving the fruits of
the bargain.’” AB at 17 (citing Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP, 984 A.2d
126, 145-46 (Del. Ch. 2009)). Accepting the allegations of the Amended Petition as
true, as I must, it is at least reasonably conceivable that the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing prohibited Petitioners from terminating Pickard without cause
in order to intentionally deprive Respondents of the benefit of their bargain under
the Employee Addendum. It is also reasonably conceivable, based on the facts pled,
that Petitioners terminated Pickard for cause for misappropriating the company
credit card for his personal use.
Finally, Respondents argue that even if a “termination for cause” term is
implied, “what is and what is not ‘cause’ remains undefined.” RB at 14. With a
back-of-the-hand to the employee handbook attached to the addendum,12
Respondents implausibly assert that “[t]he [Employee] Addendum does not provide
12
Employee Addendum ¶ 5 (“Employee/Buyer should meet all the requirements outlined
in the Schell Brothers Team Member Handbook, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit A.”).
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any guidance for determining whether a breach occurred” and must therefore be
“invalid.” RB at 14. That argument is specious. “At the pleading stage, a plaintiff
need only plead facts from which a court can infer the existence of definite terms.”
Endowment Rsch. Grp., LLC v. Wildcat Venture Partners, LLC, 2021 WL 841049,
at *10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 2021). Respondents’ suggestion that it is impossible to
determine if alleged theft from the company provides cause for termination strains
credulity.
Because the Employment Agreement is not illusory, and instead is supported
by consideration, the Motion to Dismiss must be denied.13
13
Respondents also cite Vice Chancellor Zurn’s recent decision in Ainslie v. Cantor
Fitzgerald, L.P., 2023 WL 106924 (Del. Ch. Jan. 4, 2023), which addressed a “forfeiture-
for-competition” provision in a limited partnership agreement providing that upon
departure from the partnership, a partner would receive payments unless he or she breached
the LP agreement’s restrictive covenants or engaged in competitive activity. The
“competing policy interests” at play in that case—“enforcing private agreements on one
hand, and disfavoring restraints of trade and allowing individuals to freely pursue their
profession of choice, on the other”—are not present here. Nothing in the Employee
Addendum prevents Pickard from competing with Schell Brothers or otherwise pursuing
his profession as a pilot, and Respondents have not argued otherwise.
Schell Brothers, LLC v. Pickard,
C.A. No. 2022-0642-BWD
March 21, 2023
Page 21 of 21
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, I recommend that the Motion to Dismiss be
denied. This is a final report pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 144.
Sincerely,
/s/ Bonnie W. David
Bonnie W. David
Master in Chancery
cc: All counsel of record (by File & ServeXpress)