Martinez v. Caraballo CA2/1

Filed 3/28/23 Martinez v. Caraballo CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

EFREN MARTINEZ, B319400

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21NWCV00566)
v.

LINDA CARABALLO,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Olivia Rosales, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Albert Robles and Albert Robles for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Law Offices of Thomas Scully and Thomas H. Scully for
Defendant and Respondent.
____________________________
 Plaintiff Efren Martinez is a businessperson, the chair of
the economic development committee at the City of Huntington
Park, and an executive board member of the California
Democratic party. Defendant Linda Caraballo, a former member
of the city council of Huntington Park, controls a website titled
“The Metro Watch,” along with its associated Facebook and
Instagram accounts. Caraballo has posted on those web
platforms allegations of corruption against Martinez. For
example, one of her posts asserted that Martinez has a “plan . . .
to milk the . . . coffers” of the City of Huntington Park. (Some
capitalization omitted.) In connection with each of the nine
postings at issue, Caraballo “tagged” a law enforcement agency,
meaning that the agency was notified of the posting and received
a copy of it.
Martinez filed a verified complaint against Caraballo under
the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976 (Ralph Civil Rights Act, Civ.
Code, § 51.7). Martinez alleged Caraballo’s postings violated the
Ralph Civil Rights Act because she made, or threatened to make,
false claims or reports to law enforcement with reckless disregard
for the truth or falsity of such claims or reports. Caraballo filed a
special motion to strike Martinez’s verified complaint under
Code of Civil Procedure1 section 425.16, the Strategic Lawsuit
Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP) statute. The trial
court granted the motion and struck Martinez’s verified
complaint. Martinez appeals that order.
On appeal, Martinez argues that the trial court erred in
concluding the anti-SLAPP statute applies to his Ralph Civil

1Undesignated statutory citations are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

2
Rights Act claim.2 He further maintains that even if the anti-
SLAPP statute is applicable, the court should have denied the
motion because Martinez established a probability of prevailing
on the merits of his claim.
We reject both contentions. First, we conclude the anti-
SLAPP statute governs because Martinez’s claim arises from
written statements made in public fora in connection with issues
of public interest for the purposes of section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(3). Second, Martinez has failed adequately to
plead and offer evidence supporting an essential element of his
claim, to wit, that Caraballo made the postings because of her
belief that Martinez possesses a characteristic protected by the
Ralph Civil Rights Act (e.g., she was motivated by his actual or
perceived race, sex, or political affiliation). Finding no error, we
affirm.

2 To avoid confusion, our high court has “refer[red] to the
proper subject of a special motion to strike [under the anti-
SLAPP statute] as a ‘claim,’ ” rather than as a “ ‘cause of action.’ ”
(See Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 382 (Baral).) We do
the same here.

3
 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition
of this appeal.

1. The verified complaint 4
On September 1, 2021, Martinez filed a verified complaint
against Caraballo, alleging a single claim under the Ralph Civil
Rights Act.
Martinez is a Los Angeles County resident, “an Executive
Board member of the California Democratic Party,” and “a well-
respected businessman known for his community involvement,
including serving on the boards of several non-profit
organizations . . . .” Conversely, Caraballo is a former member of
the Huntington Park city council who “was forced to vacate her
elected City Council position” upon being “found guilty by a jury
of her peers on four felony counts, including two felony counts of
perjury . . . .”
Caraballo “owns and/or operates the website for ‘The Metro
Watch,’ and the parallel Facebook and Instagram accounts,”
platforms on which Caraballo has made “scurrilous postings” that
infringe on Martinez’s right “to be free from any threats of a

3 Our factual and procedural background is derived in part
from admissions made by the parties in their filings. (See Artal
v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 (Artal) [“ ‘[B]riefs
and argument . . . are reliable indications of a party’s position on
the facts as well as the law, and a reviewing court may make use
of statements therein as admissions against the party.’ ”].)
4 Factual and Procedural Background, part 1 summarizes
certain allegations from the verified complaint. We express no
opinion as to the veracity of these averments.

4
claim or report to a law enforcement agency made with reckless
disregard for the truth or falsity of the claim or report.” In
particular, the verified complaint identifies nine postings
Caraballo made between January 18, 2021 and August 2, 2021
that give rise to Martinez’s Ralph Civil Rights Act claim.5
For example, “[o]n February 5, 2021, [Caraballo] stated ‘HP
RESIDENTS! You are all victims of a large scale pay to play. It
is time to put an end to this public corruption. I urge all of you to
call the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office at 213-257-2475
and the Federal Bureau of Investigations 855-5bribes and urge
them to look at the abuse of Public Funds, contract fraud,
campaign donations given to the Council Members, [Martinez],
and the Weed Dispensaries [ . . . ] We at Metro have been very
active in pushing for a STATE AUDIT, AND INVESTIGATION.
Have all your friends and family call DA Gascon. Enough is
Enough. The residents of Huntington Park, . . . should not be
victims of the corruption.’ ”
Another example is Caraballo’s May 14, 2021 posting:
“ ‘WARNING!!! City of VERNON will be the next City to be
destroyed by corruption. [Martinez] is spending thousands to get
his people in. Message to VERNON PD your [sic] Next!!!’ ”
For each of the nine postings identified in the verified
complaint, Caraballo “tagged” a law enforcement agency. “When

5 Assembly Bill No. 1775 (AB 1775) added a new provision
to Civil Code section 51.7, which became effective on
January 1, 2021. (Stats. 2020, ch. 327, § 3 [adding Civ. Code,
§ 51.7, subd. (b)(2); filed with the Sec’y of State on
Sept. 30, 2020]; Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)(1) [providing
the effective date for AB 1775].) We provide the text of this new
provision in Discussion, part B.1, post.

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a law enforcement agency is mentioned on a website, Facebook or
Instagram account and ‘tagged[,]’ that entity is automatically
notified and receives the posting, without the individual ever
calling or walking into a law enforcement agenc[y’s] office.”
Thus, Caraballo caused each of her false postings to be sent to
law enforcement agencies with reckless disregard for the
posting’s truth or falsity.

2. Caraballo’s anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court’s
ruling thereon, and Martinez’s notice of appeal
On October 19, 2021, Caraballo filed a special motion to
strike the verified complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute,
arguing, inter alia, that the statute applies pursuant to
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) because Caraballo made
publications in a public forum in connection with an issue of
public interest. Martinez opposed the motion, and Caraballo filed
a reply to Martinez’s opposition. The trial court heard the motion
on December 16, 2021.
On January 14, 2022, the trial court issued an order
granting Caraballo’s motion and striking the verified complaint.
The court found that Martinez’s “claim arises from protected
activity” for the purposes of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4),
“which applies . . . to claims arising out of any conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of free
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest.” The trial court reasoned that the “claim stems from
speech made in an online news publication ran by [Caraballo],
wherein [Caraballo] publishes news blasts whenever [Martinez]
and other political figures are engaging in or are about to engage
in unlawful activity,” and that “[t]he public has an interest in

6
whether [Martinez]/other political or public figures are engaging
in or are about to engage in unlawful or corrupt behavior.”
The trial court further concluded that Martinez had not
“establish[ed] a probability of prevailing on the merits of his
theory against [Caraballo].” First, the trial court found Martinez
“fail[ed] to substantiate that [Caraballo] threatened or committed
violent acts against [Martinez]” because, according to the court,
“[t]he threat to contact law enforcement if [Martinez] is engaged
in illegal activity does not suffice” under the Ralph Civil Rights
Act. Second, the court found Martinez had not proven “he [was]
the subject of discrimination based upon his affiliation with a
protected class,” given that he “fail[ed] to allege or otherwise
declare that the alleged threats against him were made with any
discriminatory intent based on his sex, race, color, religion,
ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic
information, marital status, or sexual orientation.”
On March 9, 2022, Martinez appealed the trial court’s order
striking his verified complaint.6

APPLICABLE LAW
The anti-SLAPP statute provides that “[a] cause of action
against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under

6 The grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is an
appealable order. (See § 425.16, subd. (i) [“An order granting or
denying a special motion to strike shall be appealable under
Section 904.1.”]; § 904.1, subd. (a)(13) [“An appeal . . . may be
taken from any of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] From an order
granting or denying a special motion to strike under
Section 425.16.”].)

7
the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion
to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
For the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute, the phrase
“ ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech
under the United States or California Constitution in connection
with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or
writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,
(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection
with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative,
executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing
made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection
with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition
or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a
public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-
pronged procedure. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park).) “First, the
defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from
activity protected by section 425.16.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 384.) “To determine whether a claim arises from protected
activity, courts must ‘consider the elements of the challenged
claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements
and consequently form the basis for liability.’ [Citation.] Courts
then must evaluate whether the defendant has shown any of

8
these actions fall within one or more of the four categories of
‘ “act[s]” ’ protected by the anti-SLAPP statute” that are
identified in section 425.16, subdivision (e). (See Wilson v. Cable
News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884.) “In deciding
whether the initial ‘arising from’ requirement is met, a court
considers ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits
stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’
[Citation.]” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89, quoting
§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)
If the defendant discharges his or her burden vis-à-vis the
first prong, then “the ‘burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected
activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated.’
[Citation.] Without resolving evidentiary conflicts, the court
determines ‘whether the plaintiff’s showing, if accepted by the
trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.’
[Citation.] . . . The court ‘considers the pleadings and evidentiary
submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant [citation] . . . .
[T]he second step of the anti-SLAPP process ‘establishes a
procedure where the trial court evaluates the merits of the
lawsuit using a summary-judgment-like procedure at an early
stage of the litigation.’ [Citation.]” (Litinsky v. Kaplan (2019)
40 Cal.App.5th 970, 979–980 (Litinsky).)
“We exercise independent judgment in determining
whether, based on our own review of the record, the challenged
claims arise from protected activity.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 1067.) Likewise, “we independently review . . . whether the
plaintiff has a probability of prevailing on the merits.”
(Summerfield v. Randolph (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 127, 135.)

9
 “ ‘A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be
correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are
indulged in favor of its correctness.’ [Citation.]” (Thompson v.
Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) Thus, “ ‘ “it is the
appellant’s responsibility to affirmatively demonstrate error” ’ ”
by “ ‘ “supply[ing] the reviewing court with some cogent argument
supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.” ’
[Citation.]” (See Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Torres
Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 492, 497;
Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277
(Hernandez).) The appellant bears this burden of rebutting the
presumption of correctness accorded to the trial court’s decision,
regardless of the applicable standard of review. (See Los Angeles
Unified School Dist., at p. 492 [noting that these principles apply
to “ ‘ “an appeal from any judgment” ’ ”]; see also Orange County
Water Dist. v. Sabic Innovative Plastics US, LLC (2017)
14 Cal.App.5th 343, 368, 399 [indicating that an appellant
must affirmatively show the trial court erred even if the de novo
standard of review applies].)

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Martinez asserts the trial court erred in finding
that his claim against Caraballo is “encompassed by the Anti-
SLAPP statute.” He further argues that even if Caraballo’s
motion met “the threshold showing required under the First-Step
[of the] Anti-SLAPP analysis,” his “Verified Complaint survives
under the Second-Step [of the] Anti-SLAPP analysis,” that is,
Martinez established his claim has the requisite “ ‘minimal merit
to defeat [the] anti-SLAPP motion.’ ” We address each argument
in turn.

10
A. Martinez’s Claim Against Caraballo Arises from
Protected Activity

1. Martinez’s claim arises from written statements
Caraballo made in public fora in connection with
issues of public interest
Martinez’s verified complaint demonstrates his Ralph Civil
Rights Act claim is based on Caraballo’s postings on The Metro
Watch website and its associated Facebook and Instagram
accounts, which Caraballo sent to law enforcement agencies
using the “tagging” feature. This alleged wrongful conduct
satisfies section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3)’s definition of protected
activity.7
Our high court has “articulated the two-part test” to
determine whether a statement is made in connection with an
issue of public interest: “[W]e first ‘ask what “public issue or . . .
issue of public interest” ’ is implicated by the challenged activity.
[Citation.] Second, we look to the ‘functional relationship’
between the challenged activity and the ‘public conversation’
about that issue, and ask whether the activity ‘ “contribute[s]” ’ to
public discussion of the issue.” (See Geiser v. Kuhns (2022)

7 Although the trial court concluded that Martinez’s “claim
falls squarely within” subdivision (e)(4) of section 425.16, we may
affirm the court’s order on the ground that subdivision (e)(3)
covers Martinez’s claim. (See Chen v. BMW of North America,
LLC (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 957, 963 [“We review the trial court’s
ruling, not its reasoning. A ruling that is correct must be upheld
on appeal regardless of the reasoning articulated by the trial
court.”].)

11
13 Cal.5th 1238, 1249 (Geiser).)8 The “first step is satisfied so
long as the challenged speech or conduct, considered in light of its
context, may reasonably be understood to implicate a public
issue, even if it also implicates a private dispute.” (See Geiser, at
p. 1253.) At the second step, we assess the “context from which
the conduct underlying the lawsuit arises” to determine whether
the activity “furthered public discussion of the public issues it
implicated.” (See id. at pp. 1255–1256.) In undertaking this two-
step analysis, a court “should take the position of a reasonable,
objective observer.” (Id. at p. 1254.)
Regarding the first step of the test discussed in Geiser,
Caraballo’s online postings implicate issues of public interest
because they are allegations of corruption on the part of an
individual in the public eye. Martinez claims Caraballo
“publish[ed] salacious claims of corruption and/or misconduct
by . . . Martinez,” and, similarly, Caraballo admits her online
statements “focus[ ] on [Martinez’s alleged] business

8 Although Geiser construed section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(4) (see Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1248–
1250), the high court’s analysis is instructive on
subdivision (e)(3), given that both provisions concern acts
undertaken “in connection with” “an issue of public interest.”
(See § 425.16, subds. (e)(3)–(e)(4); Trejo v. County of Los Angeles
(2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 129, 143 [“[W]e presume a word or phrase
has the same meaning throughout a statute.”]; see also Jackson
v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1253 (Jackson)
[suggesting that “issue of public interest” has the same meaning
in § 425.16, subds. (e)(3) & (e)(4)]; Burke, Cal. Practice Guide:
Anti-SLAPP Litigation (The Rutter Group 2021) § 3:94, p. 3–60
[“[I]n practice, statements protected by subdivision (e)(3) are now
also within and subsumed by the much broader
subdivision (e)(4).”].)

12
entanglements and corruption in local politics.”9 For instance,
Caraballo suggested in a posting dated January 18, 2021 that
Martinez and the City Attorney for Huntington Park had a
“plan . . . to milk the City’s coffers.” (Some capitalization
omitted.) Furthermore, Martinez alleges in his verified
complaint that he is “a well-respected businessman known for his
community involvement” and “an Executive Board member of the
California Democratic Party . . . .”10 In support of her motion,
Caraballo declared that “Martinez currently holds a seat on the
Economic Development Committee as the Chair, an official
position” at the City of Huntington Park, and that “[t]he other
two seats are held by people elected to city government with his
help . . . .”11 Given Martinez’s prominent position in the
community, Caraballo’s allegations of misconduct against him
“may reasonably be understood” by an “objective observer” “to
implicate a public issue . . . .”12

9As we mentioned in footnote 3, ante, we may consider
statements made in briefing as admissions against the party
making them. (See Artal, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 275, fn. 2.)
10 Indeed, Martinez labels himself a “ ‘public figure’ ” in his
opening brief.
11 The trial court sustained nine of the 13 evidentiary
objections Martinez leveled against Caraballo’s declaration. On
appeal, neither party challenges the trial court’s rulings on
Martinez’s objections. We do not rely on any of the inadmissible
portions of Caraballo’s declaration.
12 (See Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1253–1254; see also
id. at p. 1248 [observing that “statements found to implicate a
public issue generally ‘concern[ ] a person or entity in the public
eye[,] . . . conduct that could directly affect a large number of

13
 The instant case also satisfies the second step of the Geiser
test. Caraballo made the postings on The Metro Watch site and
its corresponding Facebook and Instagram accounts, which are
publicly-accessible websites.13 Any objective observer would
conclude that Caraballo sought to disseminate her allegations
against Martinez widely. Indeed, in his verified complaint,
Martinez acknowledges each of The Metro Watch’s online
platforms states that: (1) “ ‘The Metro Watch was created for the
purpose of . . . holding government officials accountable for their
actions’ ”; and (2) these “page[s] . . . serve as an eyes and ears for
the public.” (Boldface omitted.) The context of Caraballo’s
postings thus demonstrates they “furthered public discussion of

people beyond the direct participants[,] . . . or a topic of
widespread, public interest’ ”]; cf. Vogel v. Felice (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1015 (Vogel) [“The character and
qualifications of a candidate for public office constitute[ ] a ‘public
issue or an issue of public interest’ [for the purposes of the anti-
SLAPP statute].”]; id. at p. 1016 [“ ‘ “Public discussion about the
qualifications of those who hold or who wish to hold positions of
public trust presents the strongest possible case for applications
of the safeguards afforded by the First Amendment[.]” ’ ”].)
13 Martinez does not dispute—and thus tacitly agrees
with—Caraballo’s representation that “ ‘The Metro Watch’ site
and related social media” are “ ‘[w]eb sites accessible to the
public . . . .’ ” (See Rudick v. State Bd. of Optometry (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 77, 89–90 [concluding that the appellants made
an implicit concession by “failing to respond in their reply brief to
the [respondent’s] argument on th[at] point”].)

14
the public issues [they] implicated.”14 (See Geiser, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 1255.)
Martinez seems to allege that Caraballo made these
postings with knowledge or reckless disregard as to their falsity
for the purpose of “caus[ing] harm” to him. That being said, this
averment does not detract from our conclusion that Caraballo
made these statements in connection with issues of public
interest for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. (See Geiser,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1254 [“[T]he movant’s beliefs, motivations,
or characterizations . . . . are not themselves dispositive . . . . If a
reasonable inference can be drawn that the challenged activity
implicates a public issue, then the analysis proceeds to [the]
second step [of the test for determining whether a statement was
made in connection with an issue of public interest].”]; Geiser, at
p. 1255 [noting that at the second step of the test for ascertaining
whether § 425.16, subd. (e)(4) applies, “ ‘[w]e are not concerned
with the social utility of the speech at issue’ ”].)

14 Martinez does not argue that Caraballo’s “ ‘tagging’ ”
certain law enforcement agencies with these postings should be
treated as an activity separate from her posting these allegations
on her web platforms. Even if we analyzed Caraballo’s tagging
separately from her decision to post these materials, it would
appear that Caraballo’s conduct still would constitute protected
activity. (See § 425.16, subd. (e)(2) [defining protected activity to
include “any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law”]; Siam v. Kizilbash (2005)
130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1569–1570 (Siam) [holding that
“statements . . . designed to prompt action by law enforcement”
satisfy § 425.16, subd. (e)(2)’s definition of protected activity].)

15
 Additionally, we conclude that the remainder of
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3)’s definition of protected
activity—that is, that Carballo made the written statements in
public fora—is satisfied, given that Caraballo posted them on
publicly-accessible websites. (See Jackson, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1245, 1252 [“[The defendant’s] postings on his Facebook
page and Instagram account . . . were all made ‘in a place open to
the public or a public forum’ within the meaning of
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3). ‘Web sites accessible to the
public . . . are “public forums” for purposes of the anti-SLAPP
statute.’ ”].)

2. Whether Caraballo’s statements give rise to liability
has no relevance to prong one of the anti-SLAPP
analysis
Even though Caraballo’s statements constitute protected
activity described in subdivision (e)(3) of section 425.16, Martinez
argues his claim does not arise from protected activity because
(1) Caraballo’s statements violate the Ralph Civil Rights Act, and
(2) Caraballo’s statements are not privileged under Civil Code
section 47.
Yet, “the alleged wrongfulness of a defendant’s conduct is
an issue for the second step of anti-SLAPP analysis, not the
first.” (Symmonds v. Mahoney (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1107–
1108.) Similarly, whether Caraballo’s statements were privileged
is an “issue [that] is irrelevant to the determination of whether
[Caraballo] has satisfied [her] burden under the first prong of the
section 425.16 analysis.” (See Birkner v. Lam (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 275, 284 (Birkner).) To hold otherwise would
“ ‘ “confuse[ ] the threshold question of whether the [anti-]SLAPP
statute [potentially] applies with the question whether [an

16
opposing plaintiff ] has established a probability of success on the
merits.” ’ [Citation.]” (See Symmonds, at p. 1108, first and
second bracketed insertions added.)
We acknowledge there is an “exclusion from anti-SLAPP
coverage for indisputably illegal conduct . . . .” (See Birkner,
supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 285.) This exclusion “applies only if
a ‘defendant concedes, or the evidence conclusively establishes,
that the assertedly protected speech or petition activity was
illegal as a matter of law.’ [Citation.]” (See ibid.) Caraballo
certainly does not concede that her conduct was illegal as a
matter of law. Furthermore, as we explain in our Discussion,
part B.2, post, the evidence does not conclusively establish that
Caraballo violated the Ralph Civil Rights Act. (See Birkner, at
p. 285 [“ ‘[C]onduct that would otherwise come within the scope of
the anti-SLAPP statute does not lose its coverage . . . simply
because it is alleged to have been unlawful or unethical.’ ”].)
Martinez nonetheless insists that “the express words of the
amendments under AB 1775 and its legislative history”
demonstrate that the Legislature “intended that such ‘claims or
reports to a peace officer or law enforcement agency’ not be
subject to dismissal by an Anti-SLAPP motion.” We do not
address this contention because Martinez does not cite any
authority to support it. (See Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric
Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [“ ‘ “When an appellant fails
to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned
argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as
waived.” ’ ”].) We further observe that AB 1775 did not amend

17
the anti-SLAPP statute.15 (See Stats. 2020, ch. 327, §§ 2–4
[AB 1775 amended only Civ. Code, §§ 47 & 51.7 & Pen. Code,
§ 653y].)
Additionally, Martinez relies heavily on Siam, supra, 130
Cal.App.4th 1563, to argue that allegations of threats of violence
under the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976 are per se exempt from
the anti-SLAPP statute. Siam, however, does not support such a
broad principle.
In Siam, the defendant accused the plaintiff “of abusing
defendant’s two young sons,” and “reported the alleged abuse to
school officials and people involved in [a] family law matter”
pending between the defendant and his ex-wife, when his ex-wife
was in a romantic relationship with the plaintiff. (See Siam,
supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1567–1568.) When the ex-wife
“first decided to end the marriage [with the defendant], [the]
defendant allegedly demanded that she agree to an Islamic
divorce, give up custody of the couple’s two young sons, and
relinquish her community property rights.” (See id. at p. 1567.)
According to the ex-wife, the “defendant swore revenge” “when
she refused these demands . . . .” (See ibid.)
The defendant reported the alleged abuse to two police
departments; “[t]he resulting law enforcement investigations

15 At oral argument, counsel for Martinez asserted that on
page 12 of his opening brief, he had directed us to a report from a
Senate Committee indicating that, in enacting AB 1775, the
Legislature intended to exempt conduct violative of the Ralph
Civil Rights Act from the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute.
The excerpt from the report cited in Martinez’s opening brief,
however, shows only that AB 1775 “provide[s] that deliberately
false police reports are not privileged.”

18
did not reveal any abuse.” (See Siam, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1568.) According to the plaintiff, the defendant also “coached
the boys to transmit his threats of violence to [the] plaintiff and
to say ‘bad things’ about [the] plaintiff to other people so that he
would be put in jail.” (See ibid.) The defendant also obtained an
ex parte temporary restraining order against the plaintiff by
allegedly making the false representation that a child abuse
investigation against the plaintiff was still open at that time.
(Ibid.) The temporary restraining order, which prevented the
plaintiff from coming near the children, was later dissolved, and
the court that had issued the order awarded the plaintiff over
$12,000 in attorney fees. (Ibid.)
The plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging (1) libel and libel
per se; (2) slander and slander per se; (3) intentional infliction of
emotional distress; (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress;
(5) making a knowingly false report of child abuse in violation of
Penal Code section 11172, subdivision (a); (6) violation of the
Ralph Civil Rights Act; (7) malicious prosecution; and (8) abuse of
process. (Siam, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1568.) The
defendant moved to strike all eight causes of action under the
anti-SLAPP statute, and the trial court denied the motion in its
entirety. (See id. at pp. 1567–1568.)
On appeal, the reviewing court concluded that all but the
sixth cause of action under the Ralph Civil Rights Act constituted
protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) or
(e)(2).16 (See Siam, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1570–1571.)

16 Recall that section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) covers “any
written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative,
executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding

19
The Court of Appeal reasoned, “The first five causes of action
[were] based upon [the] defendant’s reports of child abuse to
‘people who were legally required to report any child abuse
allegations[,]’ ” meaning they constituted “[c]ommunications that
[were] preparatory to or in anticipation of commencing official
proceedings . . . .” (See ibid.) The Siam court also concluded that
the malicious prosecution cause of action, which was based on the
defendant’s “petition for an injunction prohibiting harassment,”
was “susceptible to an anti-SLAPP motion.” (See id. at pp. 1570–
1571, 1582.) It further held that the abuse of process cause of
action, which was predicated in part on allegations that the
“defendant obtained a [temporary restraining order] by falsely
representing to the court that [the] plaintiff was being
investigated for child abuse,” was likewise “subject to the statute
since it ar[ose] from the exercise of the right of petition.” (See id.
at pp. 1568, 1570, 1579–1580.)
The Court of Appeal concluded that the Ralph Civil Rights
Act claim, “however, d[id] not describe conduct arising from a
protected activity.” (Siam, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1570.)
The court remarked: “This cause of action for violation of Civil
Code section 51.7 is based upon allegations that [the] defendant
committed violence and made threats of violence against [the]
plaintiff based upon his religion. These allegations do not
describe acts in furtherance of [the] defendant’s rights of petition

authorized by law,” whereas subdivision (e)(2) applies to “any
written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an
issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law . . . .” (§ 425.16, subds. (e)(1)–(e)(2).)

20
or free speech and are not encompassed by the anti-SLAPP
statute.” (Siam, at p. 1570, citing § 425.16, subd. (e).)
Siam does not assist Martinez.
First, the language of the Siam opinion does not purport
categorically to exclude all threats of violence under the Ralph
Civil Rights Act from the anti-SLAPP statute’s purview. Rather,
the opinion indicates that the particular Ralph Civil Rights Act
cause of action alleged in that case did not arise from protected
activity. (See Siam, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1569–1570
[“The sixth cause of action . . . does not describe conduct arising
from a protected activity. This cause of action for violation of
Civil Code section 51.7 is based upon allegations that defendant
committed violence and made threats of violence against plaintiff
based upon his religion. These allegations do not describe acts in
furtherance of defendant’s rights of petition or free speech and
are not encompassed by the anti-SLAPP statute,” italics added];
see also In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 721 [“ ‘Language
used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of
the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is
not authority for a proposition not therein considered.’ ”].)
Second, Siam is the sole authority upon which Martinez
relies for his assertion that such Ralph Civil Rights Act claims
are exempt from the statute. As noted earlier in this part,
Martinez failed to support this assertion with any textual
analysis of AB 1775 or legislative history.
Third, the Siam court did not identify the allegations of
threats of violence underlying the plaintiff’s Ralph Civil Rights
Act claim. (See Siam, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1569–1570.)
By process of elimination, however, that claim appears to have
been based on the defendant’s alleged decision to do the following

21
because of the plaintiff’s religion: “coach[ ] the boys to transmit
[the defendant’s] threats of violence to [the] plaintiff” (see id. at
pp. 1568, 1570), given that the court found that all other alleged
acts were protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.17
Specifically, the court had already ruled that the defendant’s
reports of abuse to (a) law enforcement, (b) persons involved in
the family law matter, and (c) the court that had issued the
temporary restraining order were acts within the scope of the
anti-SLAPP statute. (See Siam, at pp. 1568–1570, 1579–1580,
1582; see also Vogel, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016
[indicating that the anti-SLAPP statute applies if, “regardless of
the underlying theories of recovery,” the claim is “ ‘based on an
act in furtherance of the defendant’s right of petition or free
speech’ ”].) Coaching children to transmit threats of violence to
an individual does not fit within any statutory definition of an act
in furtherance of the right to petition or free speech, and
Martinez does not cogently argue otherwise.18 In contrast,

17 The Siam decision indicates that the plaintiff’s Ralph
Civil Rights Act claim was also predicated on the defendant’s
alleged perpetration of certain acts of violence against the
plaintiff that are not further described in the opinion. (See Siam,
supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1570.) That fact is immaterial here
because Martinez does not allege Caraballo committed any acts of
violence against him. Rather, Martinez alleges Caraballo merely
threatened him.
18 The Siam court did not further elaborate on the “threats
of violence” the defendant allegedly “coached the boys to
transmit” to the plaintiff. (See Siam, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1568; see also id. at pp. 1567, 1582 [noting that the defendant’s
ex-wife provided a “description of [the] defendant’s threats and
abusive behavior,” but declining to further expound upon that

22
Caraballo’s online publication of allegations of corruption against
Martinez, who held public office and a prominent position in a
political party, are within the purview of section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(3). (See Discussion, part A.1, ante.)
Lastly, when Siam was decided, the Ralph Civil Rights Act
did not define “intimidation by threat of violence” to include
“making or threatening to make a claim or report to a peace
officer or law enforcement agency that falsely alleges that
another person has engaged in unlawful activity or in an activity
that requires law enforcement intervention, knowing that the
claim or report is false, or with reckless disregard for the truth or
falsity of the claim or report.”19 Yet, Martinez’s Ralph Civil
Rights Act claim is premised on this definition of “intimidation by
threat of violence.” Further, as noted above, the Siam court ruled
that the defendant’s false reports to law enforcement constituted
protected activity, and thus could not have been the basis for the
plaintiff’s Ralph Civil Rights Act claim in that case, a claim that
the court had ruled was not based on protected activity. (See
Siam, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1568–1570, 1579–1580,
1582.) Accordingly, the Siam court had no occasion to rule on

point].) Therefore, we have no reason to believe that the threats
of violence at issue in Siam arguably fell within any of the
definitions set forth in section 425.16, subdivision (e) (e.g.,
written statements made in public fora in connection with issues
of public interest).
19 (See Stats. 2020, ch. 327, § 3 [adding Civ. Code, § 51.7,
subd. (b)(2)]; Stats. 1994, ch. 407, § 1 [version of Civ. Code, § 51.7
in effect when Siam was issued on July 15, 2005, which does not
contain new subd. (b)(2)]; Siam, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1563 [issued on July 15, 2005].)

23
whether a Ralph Civil Rights Act claim based on Martinez’s legal
theory was protected by the anti-SLAPP statute (see Kim v. Reins
International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 85, fn. 4 (Kim)
[“ ‘[C]ases are not authority for propositions that are not
considered.’ ”]), and the Court of Appeal’s decision strongly
suggests the panel would have found that this type of Ralph Civil
Rights Act claim satisfies prong one.
In sum, regardless of whether Caraballo’s conduct is
privileged or violates the Ralph Civil Rights Act, Martinez’s claim
against Caraballo arises from activity protected by the anti-
SLAPP statute.

B. Martinez Fails to Establish a Probability of
Prevailing on His Claim Against Caraballo
We now turn to whether Martinez has discharged his
burden of demonstrating a probability of prevailing on his claim.
(Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384; § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “To
meet that burden, [a] plaintiff ‘ “must ‘ “state[ ] and
substantiate[ ] a legally sufficient claim.” ’ [Citations.] . . .” ’
[Citation.]” (Industrial Waste & Debris Box Service, Inc. v.
Murphy (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1135, 1154.) At this stage, a court
should “consider[ ] . . . the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s
complaint, as well as all available defenses to it” (see Traditional
Cat Assn., Inc. v. Gilbreath (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 392, 398), to
determine whether the claim has “ ‘ “the requisite minimal merit
[to] proceed.” ’ [Citation.]” (see Industrial Waste & Debris Box
Service, Inc., at p. 1147). “If the pleadings are not adequate to
support a cause of action, the plaintiff has failed to carry his [or
her] burden in resisting the motion.” (Gilbert v. Sykes (2007)
147 Cal.App.4th 13, 31 (Gilbert).) In addition, “ ‘[i]t is not
sufficient that [a] plaintiff’s complaint survive a demurrer. . . .’

24
[Citations.] . . . [¶] . . . [A] plaintiff[ must also] . . . show[ ] an
ability to prove [the] case on the merits.’ [Citation.]” (See
Industrial Waste & Debris Box Service, Inc., at p. 1155.)

1. The Ralph Civil Rights Act and related statutes
The Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976 provides in part: “All
persons within the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be
free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence,
committed against their persons or property because of political
affiliation, or on account of any characteristic listed or defined in
subdivision (b) or (e) of Section 51, or position in a labor dispute,
or because another person perceives them to have one or more of
those characteristics. The identification in this subdivision of
particular bases of discrimination is illustrative rather than
restrictive.” (Civ. Code, § 51.7, subd. (b)(1); see also id., subd. (a)
[providing Civ. Code, § 51.7 “shall be known, and may be cited, as
the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976”].)
Civil Code section 51, subdivision (b) in turn provides: “All
persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal,
and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry,
national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information,
marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language,
or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in
all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ.
Code, § 51, subd. (b).) Subdivision (e) of section 51 defines or
describes each of the 14 characteristics listed in subdivision (b) of
that statute. (See id., subds. (e)(1)–(e)(7).)
AB 1775 added the following provision to the Ralph Civil
Rights Act: “For purposes of this subdivision, ‘intimidation by
threat of violence’ includes, but is not limited to, making or

25
threatening to make a claim or report to a peace officer or law
enforcement agency that falsely alleges that another person has
engaged in unlawful activity or in an activity that requires law
enforcement intervention, knowing that the claim or report is
false, or with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the
claim or report.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 327, § 3 [adding Civ. Code,
§ 51.7, subd. (b)(2)].)
Additionally, Civil Code section 52, subdivision (b) provides
that any person who “denies the right provided by” the Ralph
Civil Rights Act, “or aids, incites, or conspires in that denial, is
liable for each and every offense for the actual damages suffered
by any person denied that right and, in addition, the following:
[¶] (1) An amount to be determined by a jury, or a court sitting
without a jury, for exemplary damages. [¶] (2) A civil penalty of
twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the
person denied the right provided by [the Ralph Civil Rights Act]
in any action brought by the person denied the right . . . [and] [¶]
(3) Attorney’s fees as may be determined by the court.” (See Civ.
Code, § 52, subd. (b).) Subdivision (c)(3) authorizes a plaintiff to
seek injunctive relief for violations of the Ralph Civil Rights Act.
(See id., subd. (c)(3).)

2. Martinez does not show that Caraballo acted with a
prohibited discriminatory motive
Courts of Appeal have held that “[u]nder the Ralph [Civil
Rights] Act, a plaintiff must establish the defendant threatened
or committed violent acts against the plaintiff or their property,
and a motivating reason for doing so was a prohibited

26
discriminatory motive . . . .”20 (See Gabrielle A. v. County of
Orange (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1268, 1291, italics added;
accord, Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 860, 880–881 (Austin B.) [holding that an
element of a Ralph Civil Rights Act claim is “[t]hat a motivating
reason for [the defendant’s] conduct was [his/her] perception” that
the plaintiff has a characteristic protected by the Act].) Martinez
disagrees, arguing he is not required to demonstrate that a
motivating reason for Caraballo’s alleged wrongful conduct was
her belief that Martinez was “ ‘in one of the specified
classifications set forth in Civil Code section 51.7.’ ” Martinez
further contends that even if he is obligated to make this
showing, he established the “ ‘minimal merit’ ” required at the
second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. We disagree with both
contentions.
Martinez apparently claims that Venegas v. County of
Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820 (Venegas), held that
discriminatory animus is not an essential element of a Ralph
Civil Rights Act claim. (See also Austin B., 149 Cal.App.4th at
p. 881 [referring to this element of a Ralph Civil Rights Act claim

20 We acknowledge that a plaintiff may also bring suit
against any person who “aids, incites, or conspires in th[e] denial”
of that plaintiff’s rights under the Ralph Civil Rights Act (see
Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (b)(1)), and that Martinez alleges in his
verified complaint that Caraballo is liable under these theories as
well. Martinez offers no cogent argument in his briefing on that
point; we thus do not address it further. (See Hernandez, supra,
37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277 [“We may and do ‘disregard conclusory
arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority or
fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the
conclusions he wants us to adopt.’ ”].)

27
as “bias” or “animus against” a particular group].) Martinez
misreads the Venegas decision.
In Venegas, the plaintiffs filed suit against a police officer, a
city, the city’s police department, a county, the county’s sheriff’s
department, the county’s sheriff, and certain sheriff’s deputies,
alleging causes of action under title 42 United States Code
section 1983 “for unreasonable search and seizure, and a similar
cause of action under Civil Code section 52.1,” along with causes
of action for “false detention and arrest.” (See Venegas, supra,
32 Cal.4th at pp. 826–828.) On review of a defense judgment
entered after the trial court had, inter alia, sustained demurrers
to the Civil Code section 52.1 claim, the Supreme Court
addressed whether the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded their
cause of action under that statute, which authorizes an
individual to seek relief “if a person interferes, or attempts to
interfere, by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise
or enjoyment of the constitutional or statutory rights of ‘[that]
individual[ ]’ . . . .” (See Venegas, at pp. 827–828, 841–843.)
In assessing whether the plaintiffs had stated claims under
Civil Code section 52.1, the Supreme Court rejected the defense
argument that the statute “requires a showing . . . that the
defendants acted with ‘discriminatory animus,’ i.e., an intent to
threaten or coerce another in violation of their constitutional
rights, based on the victim’s actual or apparent racial, ethnic,
religious, or sexual orientation or other minority status.”
(Venegas, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 841.) The high court
acknowledged that the Ralph Civil Rights Act “declares that all
persons have the right to be free from violence or intimidation
because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,
political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability, or

28
position in a labor dispute, or because they are perceived by
another to have any of these characteristics.”21 (Venegas, at
pp. 841–842.) The high court went on to explain that Civil Code
section 52.1 expressly provides it is “ ‘independent of any other
action, remedy, or procedure that may be available to an
aggrieved individual under any other provision of law,’ including
[the Ralph Civil Rights Act],” and that “nothing in Civil Code
section 52.1 requires any showing of actual intent to
discriminate.” (See Venegas, at p. 841, quoting former Civ. Code,
§ 52.1, subd. (g) [which has since been redesignated as Civ. Code,
§ 52.1, subd. (h)].) In Venegas’s own words, “[h]ad the Legislature
intended to limit the scope of [Civil Code] section 52.1 to
individuals protected under [the Ralph Civil Rights Act], it could
easily have done so.” (See Venegas, at p. 842.)
Thus, even a cursory review of the Venegas opinion reveals
the high court held only that “plaintiffs need not allege that
defendants acted with discriminatory animus or intent” “under
[Civil Code] section 52.1,” (see Venegas, 32 Cal.4th at p. 843,
italics added), and not that such a showing is unnecessary under
the Ralph Civil Rights Act. Additionally, we note the Venegas
court apparently had no occasion to determine whether
discriminatory animus is an essential element of a Ralph Civil
Rights Act claim, given there is no indication in the opinion that
the plaintiffs had sought relief under that statute. (See Venegas,

21 As we mentioned in Discussion, part B.1, ante, the
current version of the Ralph Civil Rights Act also identifies the
following protected characteristics: medical condition, genetic
information, marital status, citizenship, primary language, and
immigration status. (See Civ. Code, § 51.7, subd. (b)(1); id., § 51,
subd. (b).)

29
supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 828 [identifying the plaintiffs’ claims,
none of which includes a Ralph Civil Rights Act claim]; Kim,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 85, fn. 4.)
Next, Martinez cites the following passages from his
verified complaint to support his assertion that “Caraballo has
violated . . . Martinez’s civil rights under Civil Code [s]ection 51.7
on the basis of an enumerate[d] protected characteristic”: “Under
the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976, the motive why [Caraballo]
insists [upon] such scurrilous conduct that infringes upon
[Martinez’s] civil rights does not need to be understood nor
explained; but, maybe as protected under subsection (b)(1) of
Civil Code Section 51.7 it is in part due to [Martinez’s] strong
political affiliation, i.e., [Martinez] is an Executive Board member
of the California Democratic Party while [Caraballo] is a
registered member of the political antithetical ultra-conservative
American Independent Party, therefore perhaps this antagonistic
political difference as encouraged by the recent disdainful and ill-
mannered national political environment inspired [Caraballo’s]
delusional self-righteous conduct against [Martinez].” (Some
italics added.)
“Or [Caraballo’s] infringement of [Martinez’s] civil rights
could be on account of [Caraballo] perceiving [Martinez] as
having any of the other applicable characteristic[s] listed or
defined in subdivision (b) or (e) of Civil Code Section 51, e.g.,
(i) that [Martinez] is a locally born and raised respected first-
generation Mexican-American success story and [Caraballo] is a
jealous convicted felon and political has-been who is not from
here and as such wants to cause harm to [Martinez], (ii) that
[Martinez] is Catholic and [Caraballo] is known to be a member
of a[ ] non-Catholic Santeria organization and as such

30
sanctimoniously wishes to undermine [Martinez], (iii) that
[Martinez] fights for immigrant rights while [Caraballo] is anti-
immigrant and publicly bashes immigrants and as such detest[s
Martinez] and wants to cause him disrepute, or (iv) could be as
simple as [Martinez] being male and [Caraballo] being female,
and [Caraballo] believes she was treated unfairly for her
peccadillo by law enforcement during her prosecution for public
corruption and wants to minimize her legal problems by showing
residents the hypocrisy of law enforcement not pursuing the
purportedly graver more serious crimes against [Martinez].”
(Some italics added.)
“Or any combination of these characteristic[s] listed or
defined in subdivision (b) or (e) of Civil Code section 51, or any
other attribute perceived or real may be, individually or
collectively, the motivating reason for [Caraballo’s] conduct
toward [Martinez]. [¶] . . . Regardless, any reasonable person in
[Martinez’s] circumstances could perceive [Caraballo’s] conduct
as discriminator[ily] targeting [Martinez] based on one or more of
these characteristic[s] noted above . . . .” (Italics added.)
These averments fall short of demonstrating that the
element of discriminatory animus “ ‘is legally sufficient and
factually substantiated.’ [Citation.]” (Litinsky, supra,
40 Cal.App.5th at pp. 979–980.)22 As the text italicized in the

22 We assume arguendo that Martinez’s verified complaint
may be treated as a declaration or affidavit, and review
Martinez’s averments at prong two for the purposes of
determining (1) whether he alleged sufficient facts to state a
Ralph Civil Rights Act claim and (2) whether he offered sufficient
evidence to support that claim. (See ViaView, Inc. v. Retzlaff
(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 198, 217 [“Generally, a properly verified

31
above quotations shows, Martinez merely speculates that
Caraballo “could be” or “may be” motivated by her supposed belief
he has a particular characteristic or combination of
characteristics. Martinez does not direct us to any other
allegation or evidence from which we could infer that Caraballo
possessed the discriminatory animus proscribed by the Ralph
Civil Rights Act.23 It follows that Martinez fails to (1) plead
adequately this element of his claim, and (2) make the requisite
prima facie evidentiary showing regarding this element.24 We
thus do not address the parties’ arguments concerning whether

complaint . . . may be treated as a declaration or affidavit.”];
§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2) [providing that “the court shall consider the
pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the
facts upon which the liability or defense is based” in ruling on an
anti-SLAPP motion].)
23 (See also Austin B., supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 880–
881 [indicating the Ralph Civil Rights Act requires “evidence
creating . . . an inference that [the defendant’s] motivation” for
his or her conduct was the plaintiff’s protected characteristic].)
24 (See Folgelstrom v. Lamps Plus, Inc. (2011)
195 Cal.App.4th 986, 993 [“[A] speculative conclusion of fact . . .
may [be] disregard[ed] on review of a demurrer.”]; Gilbert,
supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 31 [noting that anti-SLAPP motions
“ ‘ “operate ‘like a demurrer[,]’ ” ’ ” meaning that “[i]f the
pleadings are not adequate to support a cause of action, the
plaintiff has failed to carry his [or her] burden in resisting the
motion”]; Dwight R. v. Christy B. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 697, 714
[“In determining whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie
evidentiary showing on the second prong of the anti-SLAPP
inquiry, . . . . we disregard declarations lacking in foundation or
personal knowledge, or that are argumentative, speculative,
impermissible opinion, hearsay, or conclusory.”].)

32
Martinez established the requisite minimal merit as to other
essential elements of his Ralph Civil Rights Act claim. (See, e.g.,
Civ. Code, § 51.7, subd. (b)(1) [barring “violence[ ] or intimidation
by threat of violence”].)
In sum, Martinez fails to discharge his burden to
demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his Ralph Civil Rights
Act claim against Caraballo.

DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order striking appellant
Efren Martinez’s verified complaint. Respondent
Linda Caraballo is awarded her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.

33