AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED; and Opinion
Filed March 22, 2023
S In the
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-22-00182-CV
HUNT WOODBINE REALTY CORP., Appellant
V.
DALLAS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellee
On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-17-07266
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Carlyle, Garcia, and Wright1
Opinion by Justice Carlyle
Hunt Woodbine Realty Corp. sued the Dallas County Appraisal District to
remove certain property from its appraisal rolls for tax years 2011 through 2015. On
cross-motions, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of DCAD, and
Hunt appeals. We reverse to the extent the trial court granted DCAD’s motion, affirm
to the extent the trial court denied Hunt’s motion, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
1
The Honorable Carolyn Wright, Justice, Assigned
This dispute involves property-tax assessments for certain parking lots located
near the Reunion Hotel in Dallas. Hunt owned the parking lots and leased them to
nonparty Reunion Hotel, LP, which owned and operated the hotel. As the respective
owners of the properties, Hunt paid the taxes assessed on the parking lots, while
Reunion paid the taxes assessed on the hotel.2
Hunt contends that during the relevant tax years, DCAD erroneously assessed
the parking lots’ value directly to Hunt while simultaneously assessing the parking
lots’ value indirectly to Reunion as part of the hotel’s “economic unit.” According to
Hunt’s experts, an “economic unit” is:
[a] combination of parcels in which land and improvements are used
for mutual economic benefit. An economic unit may comprise
properties that are neither contiguous nor owned by the same owner.
However, they must be managed and operated on a unitary basis and
each parcel must make a positive economic contribution to the
operation of the unit.
Hunt’s experts assert that “[i]t is standard practice in Texas for real estate appraisers
to value economic units as a whole rather than appraise each individual part of the
economic unit independently.” One way to do this is by valuing an economic unit
according to the income it generates. This method, according to Hunt’s experts,
captures the value contributed by each of the unit’s subparts, even if those subparts
do not directly contribute income to the unit.
2
Both Hunt and Reunion are subsidiaries of nonparty parent corporation Hunt Consolidated, Inc. We
note that DCAD has not moved to abate the case on the ground that Reunion is a necessary party to any
judgment determining the parties’ rights with respect to the alleged multiple appraisals. See TEX. R. CIV. P.
39.
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Hunt contends that by assessing the hotel to Reunion based on its income,
DCAD necessarily captured the parking lots’ value, and thus, DCAD erred by
separately assessing the parking lots against Hunt. To address this purported error,
Hunt filed a motion seeking to remove the separate parking-lot assessments from the
appraisal roll on the ground that they were based on “multiple appraisals of a
property” in each tax year. See TEX. TAX CODE § 25.25(c)(2). After the chief
appraiser and the appraisal review board denied Hunt’s motion, Hunt filed this
lawsuit for a trial de novo in the district court. See id. §§ 42.21, 42.23. The parties
ultimately filed cross motions for summary judgment, which the trial court resolved
in DCAD’s favor.
When both sides move for summary judgment, and the trial court grants one
motion and denies the other, we review the evidence, determine all questions
presented, and render the judgment the trial court should have rendered. FM Props.
Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000). Our consideration
is limited to the issues expressly presented in the motions. See TEX. R. CIV. P.
166a(c); McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341–42 (Tex.
1993).
We begin with DCAD’s motion. DCAD argued that Hunt could not receive
relief because: (1) allowing such relief under section 25.25(c)(2) would upset the
“delicate legislative balance” between taxpayers’ rights and appraisal-roll finality
reflected under Chapter 41’s protest procedures; (2) section 25.25(c)(2) does not
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authorize “going behind the roll to revalue property or to change the appraised value
in the roll”; (3) section 25.25(c)(2) does not authorize relief unless the property in
question is listed twice on the face of the appraisal roll; and (4) Hunt provided no
evidence that DCAD appraised the property multiple times in each relevant tax year.
We reject these arguments.
First, allowing relief would not upset the “delicate legislative balance”
between taxpayers’ rights and appraisal-roll finality reflected under Chapter 41’s
protest procedures. To the contrary, section 25.25(c) is part of that legislative
balance, providing a procedure for correcting certain types of errors notwithstanding
Chapter 41. See TEX. TAX CODE § 25.25(a) (“Except as provided by Chapters 41 and
42 of this code and by this section, the appraisal roll may not be changed.”). We
remind DCAD that our precedent still forecloses its repeated arguments on this issue.
See Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 05-97-01382-CV,
2000 WL 1195684, at *2–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 23, 2000, no pet.) (mem. op.);
GE Capital Corp. v. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist., 971 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1998, no pet.).
With respect to DCAD’s second and third arguments, nothing in section
25.25(c)(2) prevents a court from considering evidence beyond the appraisal roll.
DCAD relies on a line of cases in which courts, including ours, have held it is
inappropriate to “look behind the appraisal roll” when addressing challenges under
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section 25.25(c)(3).3 But that section, unlike section 25.25(c)(2), specifically refers
to the manner in which property is “described in the appraisal roll.” See TEX. TAX
CODE § 25.25(c)(3); see also Handy Hardware Wholesale, Inc. Inc., v. Harris Cnty.
Appraisal Dist., 985 S.W.2d 618, 620–21 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no
pet.) (distinguishing cases decided under section 25.25(c)(3) and holding that going
“behind the appraisal roll” is permissible to determine challenges under different
subsections).
We also reject DCAD’s argument that there is “no evidence” showing it
appraised the parking lots multiple times in each relevant tax year. Hunt’s summary
judgment evidence included expert testimony that: (1) the parking lots are part of an
economic unit; (2) the typical process for appraising economic units involves
assessing the entire unit based on its income; (3) DCAD assessed value for the
parking lots to Reunion in each relevant tax year by appraising the hotel complex
based on its income; (4) DCAD assessed value for the parking lots separately to Hunt
during each relevant tax year using a different appraisal method; and (5) although
DCAD uses software to avoid this sort of error, it did not properly utilize that
software in this case. This evidence sufficiently raises a fact issue as to whether
3
See, e.g., Bauer-Pileco, Inc. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 443 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied); Titanium Metals Corp. v. Dallas Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 3 S.W.3d
63, 67 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.); Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. G.T.E. Directories Corp., 905
S.W.2d 318, 322 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, writ denied).
–5–
DCAD included the value of the parking lots in multiple appraisals during the
relevant tax years.
And there is no evidence to support the assertion in DCAD’s motion that if it
did “appraise the hotel as an economic unit and determined that the parking lots were
part of that economic unit,” then the economic unit’s “total value would be
subdivided and allocated to the 10 specifically described property accounts and
placed on the Tax Roll with a value on each of the 10 parcels that would add up to
the total value of the economic unit.” In fact, DCAD failed to attach any evidence to
support its motion. Thus, we conclude the trial court erred to the extent it granted
DCAD’s motion.
That said, Hunt also failed to establish entitlement to summary judgment.
Although Hunt’s experts opined that there were multiple appraisals, their testimony
was not conclusive on that issue. Hunt’s evidence does not establish what value, if
any, DCAD attributed to the parking lots in its assessments against Reunion.
Moreover, Hunt’s evidence does not conclusively refute DCAD’s assertion that,
even if it had considered the parking lots as part of the hotel complex’s economic
unit, it would have divided the total value of the unit and allocated it among the
unit’s various parcels. Consequently, the value it assessed to Hunt would represent
the value it assessed for the parking lots, regardless of how it appraised Reunion’s
property. Although DCAD failed to attach any evidence to support that assertion, it
does not mean Hunt’s affidavits are conclusive. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168
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S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005) (“Undisputed evidence and conclusive evidence are
not the same—undisputed evidence may or may not be conclusive, and conclusive
evidence may or may not be undisputed.”).
And even had Hunt conclusively established multiple appraisals, the record
would not have established Hunt’s entitlement to the section 25.25(c)(2) remedy it
seeks—removing its own assessments from the appraisal roll. The fact that nonparty
Reunion may have also paid taxes based on the same property does not conclusively
establish that Hunt is entitled to have its own assessments removed from the
appraisal roll. Moreover, if a party may obtain section 25.25(c)(2) relief based on an
assessment issued to a third party,4 Hunt has not demonstrated that it—rather than
Reunion—is the proper party for relief in this case. Hunt owned the parking lots, and
it contractually agreed with Reunion that it would pay any taxes due on the property.
Hunt does not conclusively establish how Reunion would be responsible for paying
any taxes attributable to the parking lots as a matter of law, requiring DCAD to
remove Hunt’s assessments from the appraisal roll. The trial court did not err by
denying Hunt’s motion for summary judgment.
4
DCAD’s motion does not expressly raise this issue. Thus, even if we concluded that section
25.25(c)(2) applies only if the party seeking relief received more than one appraisal for the relevant tax
year, we could not affirm the trial court’s judgment on that basis. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); McConnell,
858 S.W.2d at 341–42.
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We reverse to the extent the trial court granted DCAD’s motion, affirm to the
extent the trial court denied Hunt’s motion, and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
/Cory L. Carlyle/
CORY L. CARLYLE
JUSTICE
220182F.P05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
HUNT WOODBINE REALTY On Appeal from the 160th Judicial
CORP., Appellant District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-17-07266.
No. 05-22-00182-CV V. Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle.
Justices Garcia and Wright
DALLAS CENTRAL APPRAISAL participating.
DISTRICT, Appellee
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. We REVERSE to the
extent the trial court granted the Dallas Central Appraisal District’s motion for
summary judgment, AFFIRM to the extent the trial court denied Hunt Woodbine
Realty Corp.’s motion for summary judgment, and REMAND this cause to the
trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment entered March 22, 2023.
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Hunt Woodbine Realty Corp. v. Dallas Central Appraisal District
Combined Opinion