IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
WILLIAM O. BARKSDALE, §
§ No. 341, 2022
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 1403019776 (N)
§
Appellee. §
Submitted: March 2, 2023
Decided: April 3, 2023
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the brief and motion to withdraw filed by the
appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), the State’s response, and the
record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) In July 2014, the appellant, William O. Barksdale, was indicted on
multiple drug and weapon offenses. On May 5, 2015, Barksdale pleaded guilty to
drug dealing (tier 4) and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited (“PFBPP”).
Barksdale also agreed that he was an habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).
The State agreed to enter a nolle prosequi on the remaining charges, not to pursue
criminal charges against Barksdale in two other matters, and to cap its
recommendation for non-suspended Level V time to twenty years. After granting
the State’s petition for habitual offender sentencing, the Superior Court sentenced
Barksdale as follows: (i) for drug dealing, under Section 4214(a), twenty years of
Level V incarceration; and (ii) for PFBPP, fifteen years of Level V incarceration,
suspended after ten years for decreasing levels of supervision.
(2) This Court affirmed Barksdale’s convictions on direct appeal.1 In 2021,
this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of Barksdale’s motion for
postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.2
(3) In April 2022, Barksdale filed motions for correction of illegal
sentence. He argued that two of the predicate offenses underlying the habitual
offender petition were no longer classified as felonies and that the parties and
Superior Court had miscalculated his minimum mandatory exposure for PFBPP as
ten years of Level V incarceration. Based on this Court’s decision in Ayala v. State,3
the State argued that Barksdale’s habitual offender sentence for drug dealing was
legal. Based on this Court’s decisions in Butcher v. State4 and Jones v. State,5 the
State argued that the Superior Court should resentence Barksdale for PFBPP because
the parties incorrectly believed at the time of the original sentencing that Barksdale
was subject to a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence for PFBPP.
1
Barksdale v. State, 2016 WL 2585892 (Del. Apr. 6, 2016).
2
Barksdale v. State, 2021 WL 1423473 (Del. Apr. 14, 2021).
3
204 A.3d 829 (Del. 2019).
4
171 A.3d 537 (Del. 2017).
5
2021 WL 4098967 (Del. Sept. 8, 2021).
2
(4) On August 24, 2022, the Superior Court resentenced Barksdale, who
was represented by counsel, for PBFPP to fifteen years of Level V incarceration
suspended after ten years for decreasing levels of supervision. The Superior Court
stated that the sentence was imposed as a matter of discretion and was not based on
a belief that there was a minimum sentence. Barksdale filed a pro se motion for
reargument within the thirty-day appeal period. The Superior Court forwarded the
motion to Barksdale’s counsel and advised that it would not consider the motion.
This appeal followed.
(5) On appeal, Barksdale’s counsel (“Counsel”) filed a brief and a motion
to withdraw under Rule 26(c). Counsel asserts that, based upon a complete and
careful examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues. Counsel
informed Barksdale of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him with a copy of
the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief.
(6) Counsel also informed Barksdale of his right to identify any points he
wished this Court to consider on appeal. Barksdale has not provided points for this
Court’s consideration. The State has responded to the Rule 26(c) brief and has
moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.
(7) When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief
under Rule 26(c), this Court must: (i) be satisfied that defense counsel has made a
conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims; and (ii)
3
conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an
adversary presentation.6
(8) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that
Barksdale’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable
issue. We also are satisfied that Counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine
the record and the law and has properly determined that Barksdale could not raise a
meritorious claim on appeal.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Chief Justice
6
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927-28 (Del. 1996).
4