Fritz, T. v. Bruce-Fritz, K.

J-A02004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

TODD A. FRITZ : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
KELLEY BRUCE-FRITZ : No. 867 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered July 21, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at
No(s): FD 19-007010-007

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: APRIL 3, 2023

Todd A. Fritz (“Father”) appeals from the order entered on July 21,

2022, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, granting the petition

for modification of the existing custody order filed by Kelley Bruce-Fritz

(“Mother”) with respect to the parties’ sons, B.B.-F., born in April of 2008, and

D.B.-F., born in July of 2011. After careful review, we affirm in part, vacate

in part, and remand to the trial court.

The record reveals that Mother initiated a divorce and child custody

action against Father on January 3, 2019, after he had relocated from the

marital home in Glenshaw, Pennsylvania, to Gainesville, Florida. There is no

dispute that Father moved to Florida prior to the parties’ separation “to secure

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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new employment at the University of Florida 6th BDE Army ROTC and housing

for the family. Mother and the children remained in Pittsburgh where there is

a large extended family.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/8/22, at 2 n.1. On

January 14, 2019, Father filed a notice of proposed relocation requesting

primary physical custody of B.B.-F. and D.B.-F. during the school year,

commencing with the 2019-2020 school year. Mother filed a counter-affidavit,

objecting to the relocation. By order dated September 23, 2019,1 the court

awarded Father primary physical custody during the school year and granted

Mother partial physical custody every spring break, on alternating

Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays, and up to seven days per month in

Florida during the school year. Mother exercised primary physical custody

during summer vacation. The parties shared legal custody.

Approximately one year later, Mother filed a petition to modify the

existing custody order, wherein she requested primary physical custody of the

children during the school year. Prior to filing the petition, Mother moved from

the marital home in the Shaler Area School District to a residence in the

Hampton Township School District in Pittsburgh. During the ensuing hearing,

Mother testified and presented her father, Robert Bruce, who shares a close

____________________________________________

1 The Honorable Susan Evashavik DiLucente issued the existing custody
order. The Honorable Nicola Henry-Taylor presided over the subject
proceedings and issued the order on appeal.

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bond with B.B.-F. and D.B.-F. N.T., 6/24/22, at 7, 189. B.B.-F. and D.B.-F.

refer to the maternal grandfather as “Pip.” Id. at 195.

Father testified that he was then working as a “supply technician with

the University of Florida Army ROTC and [as] a military reservist.” N.T.,

6/24/22, at 6. In addition, Father presented Eric Bernstein, Ph.D., the

licensed psychologist who performed a child custody evaluation and submitted

to the court a report dated December 11, 2021. Dr. Bernstein testified that

Mother believes B.B.-F. and D.B.-F. “are emotionally suffering . . . separated

from her. . . .” N.T., 6/27/22, at 258. In contrast, Father believes that B.B.-

F. and D.B.-F. “are adjusted, healthy, and stable, [and] he is meeting their

needs.” Id. Dr. Bernstein stated that Mother “fulfills a more nurturing role,

supporting the children’s emotional health.” Id. at 280. However, he did not

recommend returning B.B.-F. and D.B.-F. to Pittsburgh because “they ha[ve]

developed a life in Florida, even if they still to an extent have preference to

be with their mother or, in [B.B.-F.’s] case, spend time with his grandfather

and pursue a career in baseball.” Id. at 274.

Father also presented the remote testimony of two family members who

reside in Clarion County, Pennsylvania, and several witnesses from Florida,

including Sarah Bundrick and Nayia Diaz, D.B.-F.’s fifth grade teacher and

tutor, respectively.

The court conducted in camera interviews of B.B.-F. and D.B.-F. in the

presence of the parties’ counsel. As of the date of the hearing, both boys had

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completed three academic years in Florida. In the fall of 2022, B.B.-F. would

be in ninth grade and starting high school, and D.B.-F. would be in sixth grade

and starting middle school. D.B.-F. was diagnosed with Attention Deficit

Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”) in 2021, for which he is prescribed

medication. N.T., 6/27/22, at 430. D.B.-F. also has an Individualized

Education Program (“IEP”) involving occupational and speech therapy. N.T.,

6/24/22, at 63. During D.B.-F.’s fifth grade year, he received tutoring twice

per week. N.T., 6/27/22, at 428.

B.B.-F., then fourteen years old, testified that he “would prefer to come

back to Pittsburgh” for the school year. N.T., 6/9/22, at 11, 20. He stated

that he misses Mother and his maternal grandparents. Id. at 21. B.B.-F.

testified that, approximately one year earlier, “I was doing something, and

[Father] didn’t like it, and he like punched me in the back of my head not too

hard but not too lightly.” Id. at 29.

The younger child’s testimony was more equivocal. D.B.-F., then nearly

eleven years old, testified:

Q. Is [Florida] where you want to stay?

A. Well, I do — I don’t want to disappoint any of my parents.

Q. I know. You love them both, don’t you?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. I know. Don’t worry what they think right now. I just want to
know what you think.

A. Well, probably stay here.

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Id. at 63-64. D.B.-F. testified that he would feel “[h]appy and sad” if the

court directed that he returns to Pittsburgh for the school year. Id. at 68.

The evidentiary record concluded with Mother testifying on rebuttal. The

trial court then granted Mother’s petition for modification and provided its

rationale in open court. N.T., 6/27/22, at 559-582.

On July 21, 2022, the trial court granted Mother’s petition and fully set

forth the parties’ custodial rights.2 The order awarded Mother and Father

shared legal custody; Father physical custody during B.B.-F.’s and D.B.-F.’s

(1) winter and spring breaks; (2) the summer, and (3) “certain holidays”

defined in the order; and Mother physical custody “during all other times.”

Order, 7/21/22, at ¶¶ III(2)(a)(i), (ii). In addition, the order awarded Mother

and Father ten consecutive days of summer vacation with B.B.-F. and D.B.-F.

On August 2, 2022, Father filed a notice of appeal and a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on

September 8, 2022.

____________________________________________

2 While the trial court entered a preliminary order on June 29, 2022, advising
the parties of its decision to grant Mother’s petition, that order did not dispose
of the parties’ claims as to legal custody or provide a final schedule of physical
custody. In this vein, there is no dispute that the trial court intended the
July 21, 2022 order to “constitute a complete resolution of the custody claims
pending between the parties.” G.B. v. M.M.B., 670 A.2d 714, 720 (Pa.Super.
1996).

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On appeal, Father presents the following issues for review, which we re-

ordered for ease of disposition.

1) Did the trial court err by weighing the custody factors as though
the parties did not . . . already have a custody order in place,
rather than considering the factors as a modification of a
recently established custody order?

2) Did the trial court err in finding Mother met the burden
necessary for relocation?

3) Did the trial court err by ignoring the prior findings of fact and
orders of court?

4) Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in making
findings against Father for obtaining and following court orders
to limit Mother’s communications while supporting Mother’s
violation of the court orders?

5) Did the trial court err in reaching the conclusion that Mother
was better suited to meet [B.B.-F.’s and D.B.-F.’s] educational,
developmental and medical needs, when all evidence
presented indicated otherwise?

6) Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by concluding
that Father was unable to provide the same level of academic
support as Mother?

7) Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by finding [B.B.-
F. and D.B.-F.] would have better opportunities in Pittsburgh
based on B.B.-F. being able to play travel baseball in
Pittsburgh?

8) Did the trial court err in dismissing the evidence and testimony
regarding maternal grandparents’ efforts to turn [B.B.-F. and
D.B.-F.] against Father and his family, and then err in entering
findings against Father for having concerns that [B.B.-F. and
D.B.-F.] would be in maternal grandparents’ care?

9) Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in finding Mother
and maternal grandparents have greater logistical challenges
seeing [B.B.-F. and D.B.-F.] in Florida?

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10) Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in entering an
extremely limited custody schedule for Father that is much
more limited than either party proposed, and for failing to enter
any findings on how he would preserve his bond with [B.B.-F.
and D.B.-F.] under such a schedule?

Father’s brief at 5-7 (cleaned up) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

We review Father’s issues according to the following scope and standard

of review:

[T]he appellate court is not bound by the deductions or
inferences made by the trial court from its findings of fact,
nor must the reviewing court accept a finding that has no
competent evidence to support it. . . . However, this broad
scope of review does not vest in the reviewing court the
duty or the privilege of making its own independent
determination. . . . Thus, an appellate court is empowered
to determine whether the trial court’s incontrovertible
factual findings support its factual conclusions, but it may
not interfere with those conclusions unless they are
unreasonable in view of the trial court’s factual findings;
and thus, represent a gross abuse of discretion.

R.M.G., Jr. v. F.M.G., 986 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Pa.Super. 2009)
(quoting Bovard v. Baker, 775 A.2d 835, 838 (Pa.Super. 2001)).
Moreover,

[O]n issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we
defer to the findings of the trial [court] who has had the
opportunity to observe the proceedings and demeanor of
the witnesses.

The parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial
court places on evidence. Rather, the paramount concern
of the trial court is the best interest of the child. Appellate
interference is unwarranted if the trial court’s consideration
of the best interest of the child was careful and thorough,
and we are unable to find any abuse of discretion.

R.M.G., Jr., supra at 1237 (internal citations omitted). The test
is whether the evidence of record supports the trial court’s

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conclusions. Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 539 (Pa.Super.
2006).

A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818, 820 (Pa.Super. 2014).

We have explained, “It is not this Court’s function to determine whether

the trial court reached the ‘right’ decision; rather, we must consider whether,

based on the evidence presented, giv[ing] due deference to the trial court’s

weight and credibility determinations, the trial court erred or abused its

discretion.” King v. King, 889 A.2d 630, 632 (Pa.Super. 2005) (cleaned up).

Additionally, this Court has recognized that “the knowledge gained by a trial

court in observing witnesses in a custody proceeding cannot adequately be

imparted to an appellate court by a printed record.” Ketterer, supra at 540

(quoting Jackson v. Beck, 858 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa.Super. 2004)).

The primary concern in custody cases is the best interests of the child.

“The best-interests standard, decided on a case-by-case basis, considers all

factors that legitimately have an effect upon the child’s physical, intellectual,

moral, and spiritual well[-]being.” Saintz v. Rinker, 902 A.2d 509, 512

(Pa.Super. 2006)(citing Arnold v. Arnold, 847 A.2d 674, 677 (Pa.Super.

2004)).

Child custody actions are governed by the Child Custody Act (“Act”), 23

Pa.C.S. §§ 5321-5340, which requires the trial court to consider Mother’s

petition for modification under the following parameters.

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Pursuant to § 5338(a), “[u]pon petition, a court may modify a custody

order to serve the best interest of the child.” In this vein, the Act sets forth

the following best-interest custody factors:

§ 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody.

(a) Factors. – In ordering any form of custody, the court
shall determine the best interest of the child by considering all
relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors
which affect the safety of the child, including the following:

(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
frequent and continuing contact between the child and
another party.

(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
member of the party’s household, whether there is a
continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and
which party can better provide adequate physical safeguards
and supervision of the child.

(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1) and
(2) (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement
with protective services).

(3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf
of the child.

(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s
education, family life and community life.

(5) The availability of extended family.

(6) The child’s sibling relationships.

(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the
child’s maturity and judgment.

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the
other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where
reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the
child from harm.

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(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate
for the child's emotional needs.

(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily
physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special
needs of the child.
(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

(12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability
to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one
another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by
another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to
cooperate with that party.

(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
member of a party’s household.

(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or
member of a party’s household.

(16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a).

As the modification of physical custody would require the children to

move from Florida to Pennsylvania, the trial court also considered the relevant

§ 5337(h) relocation factors,

(h) Relocation factors.--In determining whether to grant a
proposed relocation, the court shall consider the following factors,
giving weighted consideration to those factors which affect the
safety of the child:

(1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration
of the child’s relationship with the party proposing to relocate and
with the nonrelocating party, siblings and other significant persons
in the child’s life.

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(2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child and
the likely impact the relocation will have on the child’s physical,
educational and emotional development, taking into consideration
any special needs of the child.

(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the
nonrelocating party and the child through suitable custody
arrangements, considering the logistics and financial
circumstances of the parties.

(4) The child’s preference, taking into consideration the age
and maturity of the child.

(5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of
either party to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and
the other party.

(6) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality
of life for the party seeking the relocation, including, but not
limited to, financial or emotional benefit or educational
opportunity.

(7) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality
of life for the child, including, but not limited to, financial or
emotional benefit or educational opportunity.

(8) The reasons and motivation of each party for seeking or
opposing the relocation.

(9) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
member of the party’s household and whether there is a continued
risk of harm to the child or an abused party.

(10) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h).

This Court has emphasized that the trial court, as the finder of fact,

determines “which factors are most salient and critical in each particular case.”

M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 339 (Pa.Super. 2013)(citing A.D. v. M.A.B.,

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989 A.2d 32, 35-36 (Pa.Super. 2010)). Further, we have explained that

§ 5323(d) of the Act “requires the trial court to set forth its mandatory

assessment of the [. . .] factors prior to the deadline by which a litigant must

file a notice of appeal.” A.V., 87 A.3d at 823 (citations omitted).

Instantly, the trial court ruled in favor of Mother’s petition for

modification and provided its reasoning on the record at the conclusion of the

trial. N.T., 6/27/22, at 559-582. In addition, in its opinion accompanying the

subject order, the court reiterated its assessment of the custody and

relocation factors. The court weighed the following custody factors in Mother’s

favor: § 5328(a)(1), (2), (5), (7), (9), (10), and (12). It found that (a)(4)

militated in Father’s favor, and the remaining factors were either neutral or

inapplicable. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/21/22, at 1-15.

As to the concomitant relocation factors, the court determined that

§ 5337(h)(1), (2), (3), (4), (7), and (9) weighed in Mother’s favor. None

favored Father. Factor eight was neutral and factors six and ten were

inapplicable. See id. at 15-20.

Critical to its determination were the undisputed facts that B.B.-F.

prefers to return to Pittsburgh for his transition to high school, Mother provides

“greater support to [B.B.-F.’s and D.B.-F.’s] emotional health,” and B.B.-F.’s

and D.B.-F.’s maternal and paternal relatives reside in the Pittsburgh area,

particularly their maternal grandfather, with whom they share a close

relationship. Id. at 11-12.

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In his first issue, Father assails the trial court for not placing the burden

of proof with Mother. Father asserts that the court erred insofar as it “weighed

the factors as though there was no custody order in place, putting each party

on equal footing.” Father’s brief at 20. He argues that, had the court placed

the burden of proof with Mother, it would have given determinative weight to

B.B.-F.’s and D.B.-F.’s stability in Florida. We discern no error.

Under the Act, custody orders are always subject to modification. See

23 Pa.C.S. § 5338(a) (permitting modification of a custody order upon petition

“to serve the best interest of the child”). The Act altered the analysis for both

custody and relocation matters by requiring trial courts to consider and weigh

all the statutory relocation and best interest factors. S.J.S. v. M.J.S., 76 A.3d

541, 548 (Pa.Super. 2013). With respect to primary physical custody, the Act

provides, “In any action regarding the custody of the child between the

parents of the child, there shall be no presumption that custody should be

awarded to a particular parent.” See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5327(a).

Father cites M.J.S. v. B.B., 172 A.3d 651 (Pa.Super. 2017), for the

principle that “[o]nce a custody order has been established, the burden of

production and persuasion falls to the party seeking modification.” Father’s

brief at 21. Father’s reliance on M.J.S. is misplaced for two reasons. First,

there was no pre-existing custody order in M.J.S. Thus, neither party was

seeking a modification of an existing order. More importantly, M.J.S. did not

invalidate the statutory principle espoused in § 5327(a) that no presumption

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exists between parents in cases concerning primary physical custody. In

actuality, the M.J.S. Court reversed the trial court order granting a

grandmother primary physical custody because the court erred in: (1) failing

to apply the evidentiary presumption favoring father over a third party

pursuant to § 5327(b); and (2) improperly placing the burden of proof with

the father. Id. at 660. Thus, contrary to Father’s assertion, M.J.S. did not

hold that the burden of proof falls to the party seeking modification in an

action between two parents.

Pursuant to § 5327(a), Mother and Father had an equal burden to

demonstrate B.B.-F.’s and D.B.-F.’s best interests under § 5328(a). As

discussed infra, the trial court considered all the relevant factors and based

its decision on that analysis. Father’s first issue fails.

In the alternative, Father asserts in his second issue that Mother’s move

to a new school district triggered the § 5337 relocation provisions, which

places the burden of proof with the party proposing the relocation. See 23

Pa.C.S. § 5337(i)(1). Further, Father baldly asserts that the court erred in

evaluating the § 5337(h) relocation factors secondary to the § 5328(a)

custody factors.3 We disagree.

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3 In support of his argument, Father inappropriately cites to C.W. v. T.J.T.,
178 A.3d 174 (Pa. Super. 2017), an unpublished memorandum that was filed
prior to May 1, 2019, the effective date of Pa.R.A.P. 126(b). Accordingly,
Father cannot rely upon that decision.

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First, Mother is not encumbered with the burden of proof because she

did not propose a “relocation,” which the Act defines as “[a] change in a

residence of the child which significantly impairs the ability of a nonrelocating

party to exercise custodial rights.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 5322. This Court has stated,

“Under this definition, while relocation is in part defined by a change in

residence of the child, it is evident that a relocation as contemplated in the

statute requires a negative custodial impact on a ‘nonrelocating party.’” D.K.

v. S.P.K., 102 A.3d 467, 472 (Pa.Super. 2014). We conclude that Mother’s

move from the Shaler Area School District to the Hampton Township School

District is insignificant to Father’s exercise of custody in this case where he

resides in Florida and Mother remains in the Pittsburgh area. Stated plainly,

pursuant to D.K., § 5337 was not per se triggered in this case both because

the custodial parent is not seeking to relocate and because Mother’s move to

the Hampton Township School District will not impact Father’s custodial rights

any more than her former residence in the Shaler Area School District. Thus,

once again, Father’s attempt to shift the burden of proof is unavailing.

However, the relocation factors outlined in § 5337(c) were nevertheless

relevant to the trial court’s best-interest determination. In D.K., supra, this

Court explained:

[I]n a case such as this, which involves a custody determination
where neither [parent] is relocating and only the children stand to
move to a significantly distant location, the relocation provisions
of the Child Custody Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337, are not per
se triggered and the notice requirement of section 5337(c) does
not apply. However, in such cases, the trial court shall consider

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the relevant factors set forth in section 5337(h) insofar as they
impact the final determination of the best interests of the children.

Id. at 468. Further, we recognized, “Several of the factors of section 5337(h)

are encompassed, either directly or implicitly, by the custody factors of section

5328(a). Trial courts should also consider those relevant factors of section

5337(h) that are not otherwise encompassed directly or implicitly by the

section 5328(a) factors pursuant to the catchall provision of section

5328(a)(16).” Id. at 476-477.

Hence, as explained in D.K., because B.B.-F. and D.B.-F. stood to move

a significant distance from Florida if the court granted Mother’s request for

primary physical custody, the trial court properly considered the relevant

§ 5337(h) relocation factors in determining B.B.-F.’s and D.B.-F.’s best

interests even though the procedural aspects of the section were never

triggered. D.K., supra at 476-477. Therefore, this component of Father’s

second argument also fails.

Father’s third and fourth assertions are that the trial court erred by

ignoring the provision in the existing custody order concerning telephone

communication with B.B.-F. and D.B.-F. while in the other party’s custody.

Essentially, Father complied with the 2019 order permitting him to limit the

frequency, duration, and timing of Mother’s calls to the children when they

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were in his care.4 Father contends that the court erred in weighing his

compliance with the order against him. These issues implicate § 5328(a)(1),

concerning which party is more likely to encourage and permit frequent and

continuing contact between the children and another party. As noted supra,

the court found that this factor militated in Mother’s favor.

Father testified that when B.B.-F. and D.B.-F. first moved to Florida in

2019, their telephone calls with Mother “were a major problem.” N.T.,

6/27/22, at 390. He stated, “The [calls] would occur as soon as the boys

came back from school, before school started, and they would be on the

phones all the way up to dinner time. And then I’d have to try and get them

off for dinner . . . for showers . . . and [for] just getting the bookbags in order

for the next day of school.” Id. The trial court acknowledged that the matter

“became litigious and [o]rders of [c]ourt were issued restricting Mother’s

contact with” B.B.-F. and D.B.-F. Trial Court Opinion, 9/8/22, at 5. It is

important to note that Father acknowledged on direct examination that he

took steps beyond the existing court order to limit telephone

communication in 2020 “when Covid started, because it was getting really bad

and out of control.” N.T., 6/27/22, at 392. Specifically, Father testified that

B.B.-F. communicated frequently with the maternal grandfather, who resided

____________________________________________

4 The pertinent provision provided that “phone calls between Mother and the
children shall be limited to once per day. Mother shall initiate the call, between
7:30-8:30 p.m. each night, and the calls shall be limited to thirty (30)
minutes.” Order, 9/11/19.

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in Pittsburgh with the maternal grandmother, using applications on his mobile

phone, which had been provided by the maternal grandmother and paid for

under her phone plan. Id. at 393-396; N.T., 6/24/22, at 36-37. Father

confiscated the phone and shipped it back to maternal grandparents. Id. at

396.

Although Father testified that the level of communication with Mother

and the maternal grandparents had a negative effect on B.B.-F.’s and D.B.-

F.’s transition to Florida and relationship with him, the trial court made

credibility determinations in favor of Mother being the party to permit more

frequent and continuing contact under § 2511(a)(1). Mother testified that she

“waited for [B.B.-F. and D.B.-F.] to contact me” by telephone, and when they

did, “it was very helpful” to their transition. N.T., 6/24/22, at 39-40. Mother

testified that the move to Florida in 2019 “was a very hard, emotional

adjustment” for B.B.-F. and D.B.-F. Id. Mother also testified that Father did

not provide privacy to B.B.-F. and D.B.-F. during their telephone conversations

with her. Id. at 45-46. In contrast, she explained that she would allow

unrestricted and private telephone communication between B.B.-F., D.B.-F.,

and Father. Id. at 47-50.

We are not persuaded that the court ignored the telephone

communication provision under the existing custody order or that it

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invalidated the prior finding that the restrictions were warranted.5 Rather, the

court determined that Father’s strict compliance with the order was evidence

that he “did not understand how limiting contact, which he considered

interruptions, with Mother, and maternal side of the family is harmful to” B.B.-

F. and D.B.-F. Trial Court Opinion, 9/8/22, at 5. There is ample evidence to

support the trial court’s findings under § 2511(a)(1) in this regard.

Father also asserts that the trial court erred by ignoring provisions in

the existing custody order concerning the directive to enroll B.B.-F. and D.B.-

F. in individual counseling to facilitate their adjustment to the relocation.6

Father’s brief at 18. This argument implicates § 5328(a)(10), concerning

which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical, emotional,

developmental, educational, and special needs of the children. The court

____________________________________________

5 Father’s attempt to invoke aspects of the concurrent jurisdiction rule and
collateral estoppel are unpersuasive. As discussed in the body of this
memorandum, the trial court did not purport to overturn the prior court’s
finding that the telephone restrictions were warranted when they were
imposed in 2019. Rather, the court determined that Father’s continued over-
enforcement of those restrictions was relevant evidence that Father was
presently less likely than Mother to encourage frequent and continuing
contact. Nothing in that determination implicates the coordinate jurisdiction
rule.
6 The existing custody order provided:

10. Father shall enroll both children in individual counseling to
facilitate their adjustment to the relocation. The term of the
counseling and frequency of the sessions shall be directed by the
counselor. Parties shall cooperate and follow all recommendations
of the counselor.

Order, 9/23/19, at ¶ 10.

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found that the factor “slightly favors” Mother. Trial Court Opinion, 7/21/22,

at 12.

As stated by the trial court, “Father has made legal custody decisions

without including Mother. For example, Father seemingly disobeyed an order

of court when he selected a therapist for [B.B.-F. and D.B.-F.] without

consulting Mother beforehand.” Id. at 13. The record supports the trial

court’s finding insofar as Mother testified that Father excluded her from the

selection of B.B.-F.’s and D.B.-F.’s therapist contrary to the award of shared

legal custody. N.T., 6/24/22, at 72-80. Moreover, even if the court abused

its discretion in this finding of fact, which it did not, the determination was

trivial considering the slight weight the court placed on § 5328(a)(10). See

Trial Court Opinion, 7/21/22, at 12-13.

Father’s fifth issue also relates to this factor. He asserts that the trial

court abused its discretion in weighing § 5328(a)(10) “slightly” in Mother’s

favor. The trial court found:

Mother has demonstrated a slightly stronger ability to care for
[B.B.-F.’s and D.B.-F.’s] emotional and developmental needs, and
particularly for D.B.-F.’s special needs resulting from his ADHD
diagnosis. For instance, when D.B.-F.’s appetite decreased and
he lost significant weight because of his prescribed medication,
Mother decided to administer his medication at bedtime, which
has worked well and not impacted the medication’s efficacy.
Mother is diligent in connecting [B.B.-F. and D.B.-F.] with
therapist and tutors. . . .

Trial Court Opinion, 7/21/22, at 12; see also N.T., 6/24/22, at 66-80.

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Mother’s testimony supports the court’s findings regarding the

administration of D.B.-F.’s medication at bedtime, which has not impacted its

efficacy during the summer while D.B.-F. was residing in her primary physical

custody. See N.T., 6/24/22, at 66-80. Mother testified that, in general, she

is concerned about the side effects of the medication, and, if she was awarded

primary physical custody, she would intend to take D.B.-F. “to his long-time

pediatrician that he’s had here since he was born and . . . for [Father] and I

to have him evaluated and to take it from there.” Id. at 69. In addition,

Mother’s testimony supports the court’s findings regarding her diligence in

supporting B.B.-F.’s and D.B.-F.’s needs for a therapist and D.B.-F. for a tutor.

See id. at 72-80. With respect to D.B.-F.’s academic needs, Mother testified

that she advised Father that they obtain a tutor for him during the 2019-2020

school year, but Father failed to do so until he and Mother received notice

from D.B.-F.’s school stating that he “was potentially failing third grade.” Id.

at 59-60. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion with respect to the

court’s consideration of § 5328(a)(10).

Next, Father asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in

concluding that he was unable to provide the same level of academic support

as Mother. This challenge implicates the court’s finding under § 5328(a)(4),

which it weighed in Father’s favor. In so doing, the court credited

Dr. Bernstein’s testimony that “Father has done well to ensure that [B.B.-F.

and D.B.-F.] have begun to establish academic and social lives in Florida.”

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Trial Court Opinion, 7/21/22, at 6. The court recognized that B.B.-F. “earned

straight ‘A’s’ on his last report card;” D.B.-F. “has actively participated in and

received recommended tutoring and IEP for occupational and speech

therapy;” and that Father assists D.B.-F. with homework as needed.7 Id.

However, the impact of the court’s finding was reduced by the

contemporaneous finding with respect to § 5337(h)(7), which addressed

whether the relocation would enhance the general quality of life for the

children, including educational opportunities. The court found that Father

“cannot provide the same level of academic support” as Mother. Id. at 19. It

based this finding on Mother’s testimony that she recognized D.B.-F.’s need

for a tutor before his school recommended one, and she “has supplemented

D.B.-F.’s reading assignments with books of special interest to D.B.-F.” Id.

The testimony of Mother and Ms. Bundrick, D.B.-F.’s fifth grade teacher,

supports the court’s findings, and its conclusion in favor of Mother in this

regard is reasonable. See N.T., 6/24/22, at 59-60, 62-63; N.T., 6/27/22, at

339.

Insofar as Father challenges the limited weight the court placed on

§ 5328(a)(4), no relief is due. It is beyond cavil that this Court defers to the

trial court on matters of credibility and weight of the evidence. See A.V.,

____________________________________________

7 Similarly, while Father asserts that the trial court blamed him for erecting
barriers in a manner that implicated § 5328(a)(4), we reiterate that the court
found that § 5328(a)(4) militated in Father’s favor. Thus, this argument also
fails.

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supra at 820. Furthermore, to the extent Father contends that the trial

court’s findings contradicted those of the prior court that issued the existing

custody order in 2019, his claim is also without merit. As we previously

observed, custody orders are always subject to modification based on the

enduring interests of the children. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5338(a). Instantly, the

trial court carefully considered the evidence presented by the parties during

the modification hearing. We discern no abuse of discretion.

In his seventh issue, Father argues that the trial court abused its

discretion in finding that B.B.-F. had better opportunities to play travel

baseball in Pittsburgh than in Florida. With respect to § 5328(a)(7),

concerning the well-reasoned preferences of the children, the trial court found,

in part:

Among his reasons for desiring to return to Pittsburgh during the
school year, B.B.-F. expressed eagerness to play travel baseball
in Pittsburgh, to reunite with friends in the area, and to spend
greater time with Mother and [the m]aternal [g]randparents. . . .
Baseball is clearly very important to B.B.- F. and it is a sport he
intends to pursue at a high level. B.B.-F. testified that, in addition
to high school baseball, he looked forward to playing for a travel
team in Pittsburgh if he were to return to the area. Since residing
with Father in Florida, B.B.-F. has not been enrolled in travel
baseball. . . .

Trial Court Opinion, 7/21/22, at 9.

Father asserts that the evidence does not support the court’s findings

because Mother testified on cross-examination that she did not know whether

B.B.-F. would be able to play on a travel baseball team if the court awarded

her primary physical custody during the school year. The record supports this

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assertion. See N.T., 6/24/22, at 109-112. However, the trial court merely

found that B.B.-F. believed he would play on a travel baseball team if he

returned to Pittsburgh, and this was one of at least three reasons that he

preferred to return to Mother’s primary physical custody during the school

year. N.T., 6/9/22, at 23-24.

To the extent that the court considered B.B.-F.’s desire to play baseball

in Pittsburgh, it did not abuse its discretion. The certified record supports

B.B.-F.’s preference to return to Pittsburgh to pursue baseball, a passion that

he shares with maternal grandfather. N.T., 6/24/22, at 190. Mother testified

that the maternal grandfather was “scouted by the Milwaukee Brewers years

ago.” Id. at 27. In addition, Dr. Bernstein testified on cross-examination that

B.B.-F. “truly supports returning to the area where he has family and

opportunities for baseball.” N.T., 6/27/22, at 276. Dr. Bernstein continued:

Q. And isn’t it possible that some of [B.B.-F.]’s desire to play
baseball in Pittsburgh has to do with all the support in Pittsburgh
that he gets from his family being around to support him in playing
baseball? Is that possible?

A. I would presume that that is a benefit of him playing sports, as
it is oftentimes an important aspect for children to have those
whom they love provide support and validation for their hard work
and fun in play[ing]. So I would assume it is interrelated.

Q. I’ll direct you to page 10 of your report, the fourth paragraph
from the bottom, the last sentence.

....

Q. [B.B.-F.] said during his first interview, and that was I believe
the interview where his father brought him, he said his father does

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not support his travel play nor have time to facilitate his
participation.

A. I see that.

Id. at 278-279. As such, the record supports the trial court’s consideration

of B.B.-F.’s preference to return to Mother’s primary physical custody during

the school year, in part, to play baseball in Pittsburgh.

In his eighth issue, Father argues that the court abused its discretion in

dismissing his allegations that the maternal grandparents attempted to

alienate him from the children. Father focuses on a specific footnote in the

court’s discussion of § 5328(a)(12), regarding each party’s availability to care

for the children or ability to make appropriate childcare arrangements. The

footnote in question observed that “Father exhibited disdain, distress, and

dislike for [the maternal g]randparents, particularly ‘maternal

[g]randfather/Pip’ which has affected his ability to put [B.B.-F.’s and D.B.-

F.’s] best interests first.” Father’s brief at 51 (citing Trial Court Opinion,

7/21/22, at 13, n.4).

The court found that, in this case, § 5328(a)(12) related to (a)(5),

concerning the availability of extended family, both of which it weighed in

Mother’s favor. The court noted:

Because Father’s extended family does not reside in Florida,
Father relies on child-care arrangements from a young-adult
babysitter and academic tutoring from a tutor, Nayia Diaz. While
these arrangements are adequate to meet [B.B.-F.’s and D.B.-
F.’s] needs, the [c]ourt finds that [B.B.-F. and D.B.-F.] would
receive superior care from [B.B.-F.’s and D.B.F.’s] extended
family. Father testified that he believes it is preferable for a young

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adult babysitter to care for [B.B.-F. and D.B.-F.] as opposed to
[m]aternal [g]randparents.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/21/22, at 13.

We do not find an abuse of discretion with respect to the court’s

conclusion that it is preferable for the maternal grandparents to provide care

to B.B.-F. and D.B.-F. Concerning Father’s testimony that his relationship with

the maternal grandfather is “not so good,” and that the maternal grandfather

would “bad-mouth [the paternal grandparents] and myself” to B.B.-F., we will

not disturb the trial court’s determinations on the credibility of Father and the

maternal grandfather and the weight of the evidence in this regard. N.T.,

6/27/22, at 396, 398; see A.V., supra at 820 (this Court defers to trial court

on matters of credibility and weight of evidence).

Father frames his final issues as objections to the trial court’s

consideration of factors relating to the relative logistics of exercising periods

of partial custody in Florida and Pennsylvania. He complains that the court

committed an abuse of discretion in finding that his “familial ties to Pittsburgh

present lesser logistical challenges” to him visiting B.B.-F. and D.B.-F. than

Mother visiting the children in Florida. Father’s brief at 35. Insofar as the

certified record supports the trial court’s determination of the parties’ relative

hardships of exercising physical custody out of state in light of the

considerable testimony regarding Father’s extended family in the Pittsburgh

area, we do not disturb it.

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However, the crux of Father’s actual complaint is that the award of

partial physical custody scheduled during the school year is deficient

considering his ability to exercise physical custody in Pennsylvania without

disturbing the children’s school calendar. Id. at 35 (“However, the trial court

then simultaneously provided Father with no custody time with the children

during the school year other than a few days during Christmas and Spring

Break, and alternating Thanksgiving”). Father observes that Mother proposed

that he exercise custody in Pennsylvania up to seven days every calendar

month during the school year, which is what she exercised in Florida under

the existing custody order. Id. at 36, 46. Nevertheless, the court restricted

Father’s physical custody during the academic year to certain school breaks

and holidays. Father argues that this portion of the custody schedule is

deficient and impairs his ability to maintain his relationships with B.B.-F. and

D.B.-F. Id. at 47-48. We agree with this aspect of Father’s argument.

Father’s partial physical custody schedule is unreasonable in view of the

court’s findings that Father has “lesser logistical challenges” to visiting B.B.-

F. and D.B.-F. in Pittsburgh. Indeed, there is no record evidence that Father

would have significant logistical challenges in exercising custody in Pittsburgh

during the school year as Mother proposed. Thus, considering that the

certified record demonstrates that Father can exercise physical custody in the

Pittsburgh area while the children are in school, we conclude that the trial

court abused its discretion in failing to fashion a custody schedule that

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preserves Father’s relationship with B.B.-F. and D.B.-F. during the academic

year.

Accordingly, although we do not disturb the trial court’s award of

primary physical custody to Mother, we vacate the custody order with respect

to Father’s schedule of partial physical custody and remand for the trial court

to formulate a custody arrangement suitable for Father to preserve his

relationship with B.B.-F. and D.B.-F. during the academic year. We affirm the

order in all other respects.

Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/3/2023

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