Reliant Life Shares, LLC v. Cooper

Filed 4/4/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
RELIANT LIFE SHARES, LLC, B305544
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and
Appellant; Los Angeles County
SEAN MICHAELS et al., Super. Ct. No. BC604858

Cross-defendants and
Appellants;
PB CONSULTING #2, LLC, et al.,
Appellants,
v.
DANIEL B. COOPER et al.,
Defendants,
Cross-complainants and
Respondents.
[And four other cases.*]

APPEALS from amended judgments and orders of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Huey P. Cotton, Judge.
Affirmed.
Walton & Walton, L. Richard Walton and Javad Navran for
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant Reliant Life Shares,
LLC.

* Reliant Life Shares, LLC v. Cooper (No. B305946); Reliant
Life Shares, LLC v. Cooper (No. B308884); Reliant Life Shares,
LLC v. Cooper (No. B309686); Reliant Life Shares, LLC v. Cooper
(No. B313602).
 Grignon Law Firm, Margaret M. Grignon, Anne M.
Grignon; Winget Spadafora Schwartzberg, Timothy W. Fredricks
and Jared M. Ahern for Cross-defendants and Appellants Sean
Michaels and PB Consulting #1, LLC.
Law Offices of Christopher M. Stevens and Christopher M.
Stevens for Cross-defendant and Appellant Scott Grady.
Beitchman & Zekian, David P. Beitchman and Paul Tokar
for Appellants PB Consulting #2, LLC and 18LS Holdings, LLC.
Beitchman & Zekian, David P. Beitchman and Paul Tokar
for Appellant Romelli Cainong, as Trustee for 2007 Irrevocable
Octopus Trust, RLM Trust, and 2007 Irrevocable MMA Trust.
California Appellate Law Group and Complex Appellate
Law Group, Rex S. Heinke and Jessica Weisel for Defendants,
Cross-complainants and Respondents.
__________________________

SUMMARY
Reliant Life Shares, LLC (Reliant or LLC) was a profitable
limited liability company owned in equal parts by three members.
Two of them, Sean Michaels and Daniel Cooper, were longtime
friends and business partners. After Cooper stopped working out
of the offices of Reliant because of a medical condition, no one at
Reliant expected him to return to work, but Michaels assured
Cooper he remained a loyal business partner. Before long,
however, Michaels and the third member of Reliant, Scott Grady,
tried to force out Cooper, splitting the company’s profits and
other revenues 50/50 and paying Cooper nothing.
This violated the LLC’s operating agreement in multiple
ways. Nonetheless, the LLC sued Cooper, seeking a declaratory
judgment that he was properly removed as a member of the LLC.

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Cooper cross-complained against Michaels, Grady and the LLC,
alleging breach of contract, fraud, breach of the duty of loyalty
and several other causes of action, seeking damages, an
accounting and imposition of a constructive trust over funds
obtained through violation of fiduciary duties. (We sometimes
refer to Reliant, Michaels and Grady as the Reliant parties.)
At the behest of the Reliant parties, the equitable issues—
the LLC’s request for declaratory relief and Cooper’s request for
an accounting and constructive trust—were tried first, at a 12-
day bench trial (phase one). At the close of that trial, the court
concluded, among other things we relate post, that the efforts to
remove Cooper were improper. As the court put it, “It’s not even
a close call.”
The court found Cooper remained a current one-third
owner of the LLC and was entitled to receive one-third of all
monies paid to the other two members since November 2013. The
court set a January 1, 2019 valuation date, as of which the value
of Cooper’s equity interest in the LLC would be determined. The
court also ordered an accounting, and ultimately imposed a
constructive trust over certain assets to compensate Cooper for
millions of dollars wrongfully transferred from the LLC to
Michaels and Grady. The court further found Michaels and
Grady used the LLC and certain trusts and other entities they
controlled as extensions of themselves, and concluded the LLC
and the other entities and trusts were alter egos of Michaels and
Grady. (The court later observed Michaels and Grady “used the
corporate coffers of Reliant as their own personal piggy banks.”)
A nine-day jury trial (phase two) ensued on Cooper’s claims
against Michaels and Grady for breach of contract, fraud, breach
of the duty of loyalty, aiding and abetting breaches of common

3
law duty (as to Grady), and fraudulent transfer. The jury was
instructed that the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
entered in phase one of the bifurcated trial were binding on the
second phase of the trial, and these were submitted to the jury in
the second phase.
The jury awarded Cooper $6,028,786 in damages (as we
describe further, post), and in an advisory verdict, valued
Cooper’s equity interest in the LLC as of January 1, 2019, at
$5.7 million. The court ultimately found the value of Cooper’s
interest in the LLC to be $4.2 million, and awarded that amount
in damages jointly and severally against Michaels, Grady and
their respective entities. (The parties refer to this award as
“buyout damages.”) The jury also awarded punitive damages of
$500,000 against Grady and $1,001,000 against Michaels. We
will describe the judgment, which was amended twice to name
additional judgment debtors, in more detail later.
The LLC, Michaels, Grady, and several of their entities
appealed. They assert a multitude of arguments for reversal of
the judgment. Principal among them are that the trial court’s
findings in phase one exceeded the scope of the equitable issues
and deprived Michaels and Grady of a jury trial on legal claims;
the jury instructions and verdict form erroneously made phase
one findings binding in phase two; the buyout damages were
legally unauthorized; the alter ego findings were impermissible
and based on reverse veil piercing; and the punitive damages
should be reversed for failure to present evidence of Michaels’s
and Grady’s current net financial condition. There are also
claims of error in the award of prejudgment interest, and claims
of error relating to the constructive trust. There are claims that
a settlement agreement between Michaels and Cooper in another

4
case barred any tort liability or constructive trust remedy. There
are claims that the motion to amend the judgment to add the
trustee of several trusts as an alter ego judgment debtor was an
improper motion for reconsideration, and a claim of improper
service on the trustee.
We find no merit in any of the claims and affirm the
judgment in full.
FACTS
1. The Parties and Others
Reliant is the plaintiff in the declaratory relief action
against Cooper. Cooper cross-complained against Reliant,
Michaels, Grady, and other cross-defendants, including Andrew
Murphy, whom Michaels and Grady hired as Reliant’s chief
executive officer in 2015; Joel Kleinfeld, who held Grady’s
interest in the LLC for some period of time; and PB Consulting
#1, LLC (later found to be an alter ego of Michaels). Murphy and
Kleinfeld are not parties to these appeals; the jury found no
liability on their part.
Cooper’s interest in Reliant is held by a trust of which his
father, Richard Cooper, is trustee and who is also a party to this
action. We refer to both of them in the singular as Cooper.
The court found several trusts and other entities to be alter
egos of Michaels and Grady. The “Michaels entities” are
PB Consulting #1, LLC; PB Consulting #2, LLC; the 2007
Irrevocable Octopus Trust; the 2007 Irrevocable MMA Trust; the
RLM Trust; and 18LS Holdings, LLC. The “Grady entities” are
LaForce Holdings, LLC; Tristan Capital, Inc.; the RLS Trust; and
the SLG Trust.
Named as additional judgment debtors in the second
amended judgment in one or more causes of action are the three

5
Michaels limited liability companies listed above and Grady’s
LaForce Holdings, LLC. The third amended judgment named
Romelli Cainong, as trustee for the three Michaels trusts listed
above, as additional judgment debtors.
2. Outline of Significant Facts
We outline pertinent facts that are undisputed or were
found by the trial court. (Unless otherwise identified, items in
quotation marks are taken directly from the trial court’s fact
findings.) No appellant argues on appeal there is not substantial
evidence to support the trial court’s findings, other than the alter
ego findings. We will augment this outline as necessary in
connection with our discussion of the claims of error made on
appeal.
a. The background
Reliant was formed in 2011. Reliant buys life insurance
policies from purchasers who can no longer afford to pay the
premiums and then sells these policies in fractional shares to
investors, who are paid a share of the policy proceeds when the
insured dies. Reliant describes its business as “brokering
fractional shares in life settlement policies to qualified
customers.”
Michaels and Cooper were longtime friends who had
multiple business ventures together in the insurance industry.
Michaels and Cooper joined Reliant in 2011, jointly taking a
majority interest. As of April 2012, the members of Reliant were
Monaco Holding Company, Inc. (jointly owned by Michaels and
Cooper) with 51 percent and Joel Kleinfeld with 49 percent.
Kleinfeld’s ownership interest was held on behalf of Scott Grady;
Kleinfeld did no work for Reliant while he was an owner. As of
December 2012, Monaco owned two-thirds and Kleinfeld one-

6
third. Michaels and Cooper “agreed that Sean Michaels would
focus his efforts on Reliant’s day-to-day business while Daniel
Cooper would focus his efforts on other shared business
endeavors.”
b. Events in 2013
“In August 2013, Daniel Cooper stopped working out of the
offices of Reliant because of a medical condition.” “After Daniel
Cooper’s August 2013 departure from Reliant, there was no
expectation by any member or employee of Reliant that Daniel
Cooper would return to work at Reliant’s offices.” Michaels sent
Cooper an e-mail in August 2013 saying that “even though we
have our disagreements, I still am 1000% loyal to you as a
business partner.”
Sometime in 2013, Michaels and Cooper negotiated the
separation of the many business interests they held jointly. One
of the terms of their separation agreement (about which there is
more later) was that Monaco would be dissolved, and Cooper and
Michaels would each have a one-third interest in Reliant, the
other one-third remaining with Kleinfeld. “Cooper acquired his
individual one-third interest in Reliant on November 5, 2013.”
Under the terms of the separation agreement, the effective
date of which was December 31, 2013, “Michaels agreed to run
the day-to-day business of Reliant while Cooper would maintain a
one-third ownership interest.” The agreement stated Michaels
was entitled to a year-end bonus of $50,000 “as compensation for
his role as Manager of Reliant.” Michaels was appointed
manager of Reliant as of November 2013.
The trial court found that Michaels and Grady “began
conspiring to remove Daniel Cooper from Reliant beginning as
early as August 2013.”

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 c. The Reliant operating agreement
Reliant is governed by an operating agreement. The
operating agreement “did not require Daniel Cooper to spend any
time working for Reliant in order to maintain his one-third
ownership interest in Reliant and to receive all of its benefits,
including one third of Reliant’s profits.” The operating
agreement had several pertinent provisions.
The agreement required Reliant’s profits and losses to be
allocated in accordance with each member’s percentage interest.
It required copies of Reliant’s financial statements, quarterly and
year-end, to be given to all members. It allowed each member to
inspect and copy books of account of the company’s business, on
reasonable notice. (The separation agreement between Michaels
and Cooper also contained obligations to provide Cooper with
quarterly accountings of Reliant’s finances and “access to all
financial information when requested.”) The operating
agreement provided that company decisions required
consultations with all members followed by agreement among a
majority of members, and in the case of formal meetings,
required notice to members.
The operating agreement contained provisions governing
transfers of membership interests. These included a provision
identifying events with respect to a member that would trigger
an option right in Reliant and the other members to purchase
that member’s interest. Until February 2015, these triggering
events were events such as death, incapacity, bankruptcy, failure
to make capital contributions, and the like.
The operating agreement also provided procedures for
exercise of the option to purchase a member’s interest upon the
occurrence of a triggering event. These included an attempt to

8
agree on the valuation (the “fair option price”), failing which
three appraisers were to be appointed under specified procedures
and timelines to determine the fair option price.
d. Events in 2014 and 2015
Before January 2014, Michaels, Grady and Cooper “all
received equal member monetary distributions from Reliant.” In
January 2014, Michaels and Grady “agreed, without any notice to
Cooper, that Reliant would stop paying member distributions to
Cooper.” Cooper “was not consulted about, nor given notice of,
the January 2014 decision to stop paying member distributions to
him.”
In April 2014, Reliant hired Andrew Murphy as its new
CEO. Murphy replaced Michaels as Reliant’s manager. Cooper
was not consulted about these decisions either.
In June 2014, Michaels and Grady “agreed, without notice
to or consultation with Daniel Cooper, to pay themselves each
approximately $485,000 in back pay and a 3% commission on all
of Reliant’s sales, regardless of whether they participated in
those sales.”
Cooper “was not provided with notice of any Member
Meetings that took place in 2014 or 2015, as required under
Reliant’s Operating Agreement.” Nor was he provided with
quarterly or year-end financial statements, as also required.
According to Michaels, an offer to buy out Cooper’s interest
in Reliant was made in the summer of 2014, but Cooper wanted
to get an appraisal firm to review the books. Cooper hired an
accounting firm, Hersman Serles, to help him analyze Reliant’s
financials. “Hersman Serles could not complete its analysis of
Reliant’s financials because Reliant failed to provide Hersman

9
Serles with accurate, reliable, and complete financial
information.”
“On November 5, 2014, Andrew Murphy, on behalf of
Reliant, communicated to Cooper an offer to acquire Cooper’s
one-third membership interest that did not include any cash
component. The offer also threatened to impose tax liability on
Cooper if he refused the offer.” In response to Murphy’s offer,
Cooper requested certain information about Reliant’s finances
that had not been provided to him, but Reliant did not comply
with his request.
In February 2015, Michaels and Grady purported to adopt
Reliant’s third amended operating agreement. They amended
the agreement to include as a triggering event a “determination
by the Majority of Members that another Member should
surrender his Membership Interest for the best interest of the
Company.” Cooper was not consulted about this change, and was
not provided with notice of the attempt to change the operating
agreement.
In March 2015, Cooper retained RGL Forensics to conduct
a forensic accounting of Reliant “because Reliant, Michaels,
Murphy, and Grady failed to provide Cooper with full and
complete access to Reliant’s books and records.” Reliant provided
RGL with two “materially different versions of its QuickBooks
files, the most recent of which included altered historical data.”
RGL concluded, among many other points, that Michaels, Grady
and related entities received total outflows from Reliant of
approximately $3.7 million between 2012 and August 2015;
Reliant’s financial statements understated revenues by
approximately $3.8 million between 2013 and 2015; and Reliant
was significantly more profitable than reported.

10
 On November 12, 2015, a member meeting took place at
which Michaels and Grady voted to approve the termination of
Cooper’s ownership interest in Reliant. This vote constituted a
triggering event as defined in the third amended operating
agreement that Michaels and Grady purportedly adopted without
Cooper. Cooper was not given notice of the November 12, 2015
meeting.
On November 19, 2015, Reliant sent Cooper a letter which
“constituted a Notice of Triggering Event under Reliant’s
Operating Agreement.” The operating agreement gives the
parties a maximum period of 105 days to establish the fair option
price of a member’s interest, a period that would end on March 3,
2016. (The parties have 40 days from the option date (receipt of
notice of a triggering event, here November 19, 2015) to appoint
their appraisers, who then have an additional five days to choose
a third appraiser, and the three appraisers must determine the
fair option price within 60 days after the appointment of the third
appraiser.)
Reliant filed this lawsuit on December 21, 2015, only
32 days after its notice of triggering event, alleging among other
things that Cooper refused to disclose the identity of his
appraiser, making it impossible for the two to select a third and
provide the valuation contemplated by the operating agreement.
“Reliant and its principals never paid anything to acquire
Cooper’s one-third interest in Reliant.” Cooper “did not engage in
any behavior that was disruptive to Reliant’s business operations
at any point in time after August 2013.”
e. Other pertinent facts and events
In 2016, after the efforts to terminate Cooper’s ownership
interest, Reliant started paying member distributions to Grady

11
and Michaels. “Grady regularly used Reliant’s company credit
card for personal expenses.” “Michaels ensured that he was paid
whatever Grady was paid. This included receiving payment to
compensate him equally for personal expenses that Grady
charged to Reliant’s company credit card.” “When Michaels
reduced his workload at Reliant, he was still paid the same
amount of money as Grady.”
In February 2018, Michaels sold his interest in Reliant to
Grady for at least $1.5 million. “Michaels also received
consideration in the form of Reliant writing off a $404,000 loan
that Michaels had previously received from Reliant. Reliant also
agreed to pay Michaels’ legal bills in this action.” (In its ruling
denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), the trial
court observed that the deal included an indemnity agreement
“by which Reliant/Grady agreed to indemnify Michaels for all
damages owed to Cooper,” and referred to this transaction as a
“sweetheart buyout deal” and a sham.)
“Reliant did not provide Cooper with access to documents
underlying transfers from Reliant to Michaels and Grady until
April 2018,” when Reliant’s bookkeeper provided copies of her
files in response to a deposition subpoena.
As of December 31, 2018, Michaels and Grady and their
respective entities “have received at least $11,724,675.94 in
payments and distributions based on their position as owners of
Reliant.” Cooper was paid a total of $212,748 by Reliant; the last
payment he received was for $10,000 on January 29, 2014.
f. The Friwat policy and the “tails”
Michaels, through PB Consulting #2, LLC, was the owner
of a $5.4 million policy issued by Lincoln National Life Insurance
Company (Lincoln National), insuring the life of Salim Friwat.

12
“PB Consulting 2, LLC was established solely for the purpose of
investing in the Friwat Policy.” “Money from Reliant was used to
invest in and pay the premiums on the Friwat Policy.”
“Tails” are policies that investors have forfeited to Reliant
by failing to pay the premiums after purchasing the policies from
Reliant. “18LS [Holdings], LLC, an entity owned by Michaels,
Grady, and Luke Walker, own[ed] forfeited and unsold portions
(the ‘Tails’) of life insurance policies sold by Reliant. Grady did
not pay anything for the tails he received and 18LS [Holdings],
LLC paid $1,000 for the entirety of Tails it received.” (The tails
were later valued at $880,225.98.)
3. The Litigation
a. The pleadings and phase one of the trial
Reliant’s December 2015 complaint for declaratory relief
asked for a declaration of the rights and obligations of the parties
under the third amended operating agreement, and specifically
requested a declaration that Reliant “has acted properly and in a
legally enforceable manner” regarding Cooper’s membership
interest, and that the removal of Cooper’s interest “is proper and
in the best interests of Reliant.” (Reliant also sought damages,
including punitive damages, for conversion; the trial court
granted nonsuit on that claim.)
In July 2016, Cooper filed an answer and a cross-complaint
against Michaels, Grady, PB Consulting #1, Reliant and others,
as mentioned above. In addition to breach of contract, fraud and
other legal claims, Cooper sought an accounting and imposition of
a constructive trust on Reliant’s assets obtained by cross-
defendants in violation of their fiduciary and contractual
obligations.

13
 In February 2018, the Reliant parties sought bifurcation of
Reliant’s declaratory relief claim, and pointed out that Cooper’s
equitable causes of action for constructive trust and an
accounting “are properly bifurcated.” Cooper opposed bifurcation.
The trial court granted Reliant’s motion, ordering that the first
phase of the trial would include Reliant’s declaratory relief cause
of action and Cooper’s accounting and constructive trust causes of
action.
On January 18, 2019, after closing arguments in the 12-day
phase one trial, the trial court announced its tentative ruling for
Cooper. “The actions by [Michaels, Grady, and Murphy] in
withholding information, and yet demanding an appraisal and
analysis and demanding compliance with the operating
agreement, or demanding compliance with the partnership law
and good faith is just absolutely inconsistent positions for those
defendants to take. So no, they did not follow any proper
procedures concerning [Cooper’s] removal.”
The court also ruled Cooper was entitled to costs and fees,
and ordered an accounting, but requested further briefing on the
constructive trust claim.
On February 4, 2019, the court ordered Lincoln National to
hold $3 million of the first proceeds of the Friwat policy pending
further order of the court. The Reliant parties and their entities
were enjoined from directly or indirectly distributing those
proceeds or assigning any portion of the Friwat policy. Reliant
was ordered to complete an accounting detailing, among other
things, the amount of monies or assets transferred from Reliant
to Michaels, Grady, and their respective entities.
On June 27, 2019, the court granted Cooper’s request for a
constructive trust. The court ordered Lincoln National to

14
transfer to Cooper immediately “an ownership and beneficial
interest totaling $2,500,000” of the Friwat policy, in addition to
continuing to hold the $3 million of proceeds as previously
ordered. The court also ordered the Michaels and Grady entities
to transfer ownership of and beneficial interest in the tails to
Cooper, with Reliant to pay all premiums associated with the
tails.
On August 19, 2019, after Mr. Friwat’s death, the court
issued an addendum to its earlier orders and ordered distribution
of the $10 million death benefit of the Friwat policy. This
included distribution of $5,428,666.65 plus interest to the
superior court’s trust account.
On September 6, 2019, the trial court entered its findings of
fact and conclusions of law in phase one. We have described
many of the fact findings in part 2, ante. As is apparent from
those findings, the court concluded Reliant did not act in a legally
enforceable manner and did not follow the proper procedure for
removing Cooper as a member. Reliant and its manager failed to
provide Cooper with sufficient time to appoint an appraiser,
instead filing this suit eight days before Cooper was required to
appoint an appraiser, violating the operating agreement. “As a
result, Daniel Cooper remains a current 1/3 owner of Reliant, and
is entitled to receive one-third of all monies paid to Michaels and
Grady from November 2013 through the present.”
Other conclusions were as follows.
The court found Reliant violated its obligations to provide
Cooper with accurate and reliable financial information as
required by the operating agreement. “Based on its willful
disobedience and violation of the Operating Agreement, Reliant is
estopped from attempting to enforce the provisions of the

15
Operating Agreement at the time that it sought to terminate
Daniel Cooper’s ownership interest.”
As mentioned earlier, the court set the valuation date “for
any analysis of Cooper’s interest in Reliant” as January 1, 2019.
The court awarded attorney fees and costs under the operating
agreement of $1,021,620.42.
Because the Reliant parties “actively interfered with the
efforts of consultants working on Daniel Cooper’s behalf to
acquire” financial information to which Cooper was entitled
under the operating agreement, the court stated it had ordered a
court-appointed third party accountant to provide an accounting
“detailing the amount of money transferred from Reliant to
Michaels, Grady, or their respective entities,” as well as other
specified items, including information on the value of the tails
and the total amount of personal credit card charges Grady
processed using Reliant’s corporate credit card.
The court made alter ego findings (discussed post), and
imposed a constructive trust as described above “[t]o compensate
Cooper for monies wrongfully transferred from Reliant to Grady
and Michaels.”
On November 13, 2019, the trial court denied a motion by
Michaels and PB Consulting #1 to vacate the court’s findings on
the ground the findings violated the right to jury trial.
b. Phase two of the trial and the jury verdict
As mentioned at the outset, a nine-day jury trial began on
December 10, 2019, on several of Cooper’s legal claims against
Michaels and Grady. The jury was instructed that the court’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law in the first phase were
binding in the second phase, and pertinent findings were also
contained in the jury verdict form.

16
 On December 20, 2019, the jury found as follows.
In an advisory verdict, the jury valued Reliant at
$17.1 million as of January 1, 2019, and found the value of
Cooper’s equity interest to be $5.7 million.
The jury awarded Cooper $6,028,786 in damages for breach
of the operating agreement, and found Grady and Michaels each
caused 50 percent of the total damages. The jury awarded the
same amount against Michaels for breach of the separation
agreement with Cooper.
On the cause of action for fraud, the jury found against
Michaels and Grady, and awarded $2,743,626 against each of
them. The jury also found that Michaels acted with malice,
oppression, or fraud justifying an award of punitive damages.
On the cause of action for breach of the duty of loyalty, the
jury found against Michaels and Grady, and awarded damages of
$3,014,393 against each of them. The jury found both of them
acted with malice, oppression, or fraud justifying an award of
punitive damages.
The jury found against Grady on the cause of action for
aiding and abetting breaches of common law duty, and awarded
damages to Cooper of $6,028,786.
On the fraudulent transfer causes of action against Grady
and Michaels, respectively, the jury found each of them
transferred monies or assets from Reliant to himself and/or his
respective entities for inadequate consideration, and awarded
damages of $146,667 against each of them.
Cooper presented no further evidence on punitive damages,
relying on the evidence already presented to the jury. The court
instructed the jury, and the jury then awarded punitive damages
of $500,000 against Grady and $1,001,000 against Michaels.

17
 c. The judgment and amended judgments
At a January 29, 2020 hearing on the proposed judgment,
the court stated it would set the valuation of Cooper’s one-third
interest at $4.2 million. The court stated that, “with respect to
the valuation, I think I’m certainly within my equitable powers
to—especially given the fraud . . . judgment—to order the buyout
of Mr. Cooper’s interest at the 4.2 million.” Cooper submitted an
amended proposed judgment, and on March 6, 2020, the trial
court entered the “Amended Judgment.”
The March 6, 2020 amended judgment determined Reliant,
Michaels and Grady were jointly and severally liable for the
$4.2 million valuation amount, plus prejudgment interest of
$494,794.52, in exchange for the transfer of Cooper’s ownership
interest in Reliant. After eliminating duplicative damages, the
court awarded monetary damages on Cooper’s legal causes of
action of $6,028,786, plus prejudgment interest of $1,492,747.98,
jointly and severally against Michaels, Reliant and Grady.
The judgment awarded punitive damages (as above) and
attorney fees, and included alter ego findings and the
constructive trust provisions previously ordered. The court
ordered the $5.4 million from the Friwat policy to be disbursed to
the trust account of Cooper’s counsel, and set the order in which
the funds were to be applied (various attorney fees, the valuation
amount, and so on).
Michaels filed a motion for JNOV and for a new trial on all
issues tried to the jury. The trial court denied the motion for
JNOV (except on points not relevant to these appeals), but
granted Michaels a partial new trial limited to the amount of the
punitive damages award.

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 On October 6, 2020, the court entered the second amended
judgment, adding PB Consulting #1, LLC; PB Consulting #2,
LLC; 18LS Holdings, LLC; and LaForce Holdings, LLC, as
additional judgment debtors.
On May 12, 2021, the court entered a third amended
judgment, finding the trustees of three Michaels trusts (the 2007
Irrevocable Octopus Trust, the RLM Trust, and the 2007
Irrevocable MMA Trust), Romelli Cainong, and any successor
trustees to be additional judgment debtors.
d. The appeals
There are four sets of appellate briefs in these appeals, all
of which have been consolidated. Appeals were filed from the
judgments and various orders by Michaels and PB Consulting #1,
LLC; by Grady and Reliant; by PB Consulting #2, LLC and 18LS
Holdings, LLC; and by Romelli Cainong as trustee for the three
Michaels trusts.
DISCUSSION
1. Claims About the Scope of Phase One Findings
The Reliant parties contend the trial court’s findings of fact
and conclusions of law in phase one exceeded the scope of the
equitable issues, depriving them of a fair jury trial on Cooper’s
legal claims. Relatedly, they contend the jury instructions and
verdict form erroneously made phase one findings binding on the
jury, leading to the exclusion of significant evidence and
requiring a new trial. We disagree with both claims.
a. The law
The applicable principles appear in Darbun Enterprises,
Inc. v. San Fernando Community Hospital (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 399 (Darbun), the case on which Michaels
primarily relies.

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 “A jury trial is a matter of right in a civil action at law, but
not in equity. [Citation.] [¶] ‘Complications arise when legal
and equitable issues (causes of action, requested remedies, or
defenses) are asserted in a single lawsuit. . . . In most instances,
separate equitable and legal issues are “kept distinct and
separate,” with legal issues triable by a jury and equitable issues
triable by the court. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The order of trial in
these mixed actions has ‘great significance because the first fact
finder may bind the second when determining factual issues
common to the equitable and legal issues.’ ” (Darbun, supra,
239 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)
Darbun continues: “Generally, in mixed actions, the
equitable issues should be tried first by the court, either with or
without an advisory jury. [Citations.] Trial courts are
encouraged to apply this ‘equity first’ rule because it promotes
judicial economy by potentially obviating the need for a jury
trial.” (Darbun, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 408–409,
fn. omitted; see Hoopes v. Dolan (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 146, 158
[allowing first fact finder’s factual determination to bind the
second “minimizes inconsistencies,” “avoids giving one side two
bites of the apple,” and “prevents duplication of effort”].)
b. Contentions and conclusions
Contrary to Michaels’s contention, Darbun does not support
his claim that the court could not determine that Michaels (and
not just the LLC) breached the operating agreement. We are at a
loss to understand how that could be so, given the LLC acts
through its members. Further, the trial court found Reliant and
Michaels (and Grady, and their entities) were alter egos of each
other (as to which, more post).

20
 It was the Reliant parties, not Cooper, who sought
bifurcation of the trial. In seeking bifurcation, they argued that
“[t]his court may decide the equitable issues first, and this
decision may result in factual and legal findings that effectively
dispose of the legal claims. This is perfectly acceptable.” As the
trial court observed in denying Michaels’s new trial motion, “all
parties agreed this issue [entitlement to ownership and
distribution] was to be decided by the court in Phase 1, at least
they agreed until the decision was issued.”
Michaels insists the court made “myriad factual findings
exceeding the equitable claims’ scope,” citing the court’s entire
27-page ruling. These included the findings that Cooper did not
have to spend any time working for Reliant; that Grady and
Michaels began conspiring to remove Cooper in August 2013;
“setting forth the terms of the Separation Agreement” between
Cooper and Michaels; Reliant’s failure to pay Cooper monies paid
to Grady and Michaels; the attempt to adopt the third amended
operating agreement without consulting Cooper; and Grady’s
obtaining the tails for inadequate consideration. Michaels tells
us that “[n]one of these factual findings were necessary” to
adjudicate the equitable claims.
Similarly, Michaels contends the jury should not have been
instructed that phase one findings were binding. These included
findings such as that Michaels and Grady did not give notice to or
consult with Cooper on paying themselves back pay and
commissions; did not give notice of member meetings; did not
consult with Cooper on multiple matters; violated the obligation
to provide Cooper with accurate and reliable financial
information; and so on. Likewise, Michaels complains that the
verdict form stated that Reliant had improperly removed Cooper

21
as a member, itemizing Michaels’s conduct (as just recited), and
that this “prevented the jury from making any independent
breach determination.”
First, as for Michaels’s contention the fact findings were
not “necessary,” it was the trial court’s prerogative to decide what
facts had been proven in support of its equitable judgment. As
the court stated in Orange County Water Dist. v. Alcoa Global
Fasteners, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 252, 359 (Orange County),
“All of the trial court’s equitable findings were binding on the
[plaintiff’s] legal claims, regardless of whether they were
necessary for the judgment. ‘Issues adjudicated in earlier phases
of a bifurcated trial are binding in later phases of that trial and
need not be relitigated. [Citations.] No other rule is possible, or
bifurcation of trial issues would create duplication, thus
subverting the procedure’s goal of efficiency. [Citation.]
“[D]uplication of effort is the very opposite of the purpose of
bifurcated trials.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 359.)
Second, all the fact findings are relevant either to Reliant’s
request for a declaration that Michaels and Grady “properly
determined that [Cooper] must surrender [his] Membership
Interest in the best interests of the Company” and that Reliant
“acted properly . . . regarding the membership interests of
[Cooper],” or to Cooper’s claims for an accounting and a
constructive trust—the latter of which requires, among other
things, the “wrongful acquisition or detention” of an interest in
property by one “who is not entitled to it” (Communist Party v.
522 Valencia, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 980, 990 (Communist
Party)). Michaels’s arguments that the court “had no authority to
find wrongdoing by Michaels,” and that Reliant merely sought a
declaration that it had complied with “technical provisions” in the

22
operating agreement and “not a finding of breach” have no merit.
The law does not support the Reliant parties’ claim they were
improperly deprived of a jury trial.
Orange County expressly rejected a contention that it was
error for the trial court in that case to give preclusive effect to its
factual findings in connection with the plaintiff’s equitable
claims. (Orange County, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 358.) The
court explained that, while the plaintiff had a right to a jury trial
on legal claims, “this jury trial right is not inconsistent with the
further principle that any factual findings made following a
bench trial on the [plaintiff’s] equitable claims may be binding on
its legal claims, and the right is not infringed by its application.”
(Id. at p. 359; see also Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th
1229, 1244 [“Here, the fact that the trial of the equitable issues
first resulted in factual findings that implicated the legal claims
does not mean that [the plaintiff] was improperly denied the
right to a jury trial.”].)
The Reliant parties’ reliance on Darbun does not help. In
that case, the court held that, “in cases involving mixed issues of
equity and law, a trial court may not act as a fact finder on issues
it specifically reserves for jury determination. Here, in granting
JNOV, the court improperly transformed its equitable finding of
unenforceability as to specific performance into a finding of
unenforceability as to the legal issue of damages.” (Darbun,
supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 402.) The court further observed:
“The difficulties presented in this case stem mainly from the trial
court’s inconsistent and misleading statements, which resulted in
confusion among the parties and complicated the issues on

23
appeal.” (Id. at p. 409; see the next footnote.)1 Those
inconsistent and misleading statements were the basis for
Darbun’s conclusion that “a trial court may not act as a fact
finder on issues it specifically reserves for jury determination.”
(Id. at p. 402.) Nothing like that happened here.
The Orange County court similarly explains Darbun:
“Darbun found error based on the trial court’s ‘inconsistent and
misleading statements’ regarding, among other things, which
issues would be decided during the first-phase bench trial.
[Citation.] ‘The parties proceeded through the first phase of trial,
then to jury trial, under the court’s assurances that the jury
would decide the issue of breach.’ [Citation.] The trial court
subsequently decided the issue of breach, which Darbun held
deprived the plaintiff of its jury trial right.” (Orange County,

1 Darbun continued: “The trial court explicitly stated, on
several occasions, that it did not want to hear the issue of breach
in the equitable phase of trial—that issue was for the jury to
decide. The only evidence it was interested in during the
equitable phase was that which pertained to specific
performance. Yet, it made statements on the record in ruling on
nonsuit that Darbun had failed to perform and had breached the
contract. The court also suggested the jury was an advisory jury
on breach, but had not treated it as such. Despite a seemingly
dispositive ruling on Darbun’s failure to perform, the court then
told Darbun, ‘If you can get your damages, get your damages’ and
continued with jury trial. During the JNOV hearing, the court
insisted that its statement pertaining to Darbun’s breach was the
basis for its decision to grant nonsuit, and that left nothing for
the jury to decide.” (Darbun, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 409–
410, fns. omitted.)

24
supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 358–359, quoting Darbun, supra,
239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 409–410, 411.)
In short, the only pertinent principle from Darbun,
confirmed in other cases, is that “ ‘the first fact finder may bind
the second when determining factual issues common to the
equitable and legal issues.’ ” (Darbun, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at
p. 408.) That is exactly what happened here.
We will not burden this opinion with an explanation why
each of the court’s fact findings is common to the equitable and
legal issues. We have recited those findings, and the connection
is apparent. One example will do: Michaels complains that the
court should not have found Cooper did not have to spend time
working for Reliant, and Cooper was not expected to return to
Reliant after August 2013. But the Reliant parties claimed at the
bench trial that Cooper abandoned Reliant, justifying the
decision to terminate his interest; in closing argument, counsel
argued Cooper was equitably estopped from taking the position
he had membership rights. It was plainly appropriate for the
court to find Cooper was not required to work for Reliant, based
on the operating agreement and the separation agreement.
Last, Michaels argues the trial court could not make any
alter ego findings in phase one. For this assertion, he cites King
v. King (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 319, which in turn refers to “the
general rule that the judgment must be confined to the issues
raised by the pleadings” (and then finding an exception to that
principle applied). (Id. at p. 324.) King does not discuss alter ego
principles. The only thing King said about alter ego was in a
footnote, where the court said the evidence established the
defendant completely dominated and controlled the affairs of two

25
business enterprises, and that they were alter egos of the
defendant. (Id. at p. 328, fn. 5.)
King aside, the court acted well within its discretion when
it decided alter ego claims in phase one. Cooper’s cross-complaint
alleged Reliant paid monies to shell business entities associated
with Michaels and Grady, and that Michaels and Grady funneled
unauthorized payments and withdrawals into shell business
entities. These allegations were realleged and incorporated by
reference in Cooper’s accounting and constructive trust causes of
action which the Reliant parties agreed should be tried with all
equitable claims in phase one.
2. The Buyout Damages
As mentioned earlier, the court valued Cooper’s one-third
interest in Reliant at $4.2 million. The judgment found Michaels,
Grady and Reliant, as well as additionally named judgment
debtors PB Consulting #1, LLC; PB Consulting #2, LLC; 18LS
Holdings, LLC; and LaForce Holdings, LLC, jointly and severally
liable to pay the valuation amount plus prejudgment interest to
Cooper in exchange for the transfer of his ownership interest in
Reliant.
The Reliant parties and additionally named judgment
debtors contend the buyout damages were legally unauthorized.
Their argument is, there was no action for dissolution; an
equitable buyout is not a remedy for Cooper’s fraud claim; and
the buyout damages duplicated the jury’s fraud damages. We
reject these claims.
First, we reject the Reliant parties’ claim that the court had
no jurisdiction to order a buyout in the absence of a dissolution
action. They say that under the Revised Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act (Act; Corp. Code, § 17701.01 et seq.), a

26
dissolution cause of action is “a mandatory prerequisite to a
buyout remedy.” For this they cite Kennedy v. Kennedy (2015)
235 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1485–1487, and the buyout procedure
described in Corporations Code section 17707.03,
subdivisions (c)(1) through (5). Since none of the pleadings in
this case requested a buyout, they say, the trial court could not
order one. We disagree.
Corporations Code section 17707.03 does indeed allow a
member to file an action for dissolution, in which case the court
can decree the dissolution whenever specified events occur. (Id.,
subds. (a) & (b).) If such a suit is filed, other members may avoid
dissolution by purchasing the interest of the member initiating
the action, and the statute specifies the procedures for doing so.
(Id., subd. (c).)
But nothing in Corporations Code section 17707.03, or in
the Kennedy case, states or suggests that a court has no equitable
power to order buyout damages under other circumstances not
involving a member’s decision to seek dissolution. The court did
not “disregard the Act’s requirements”; those requirements
simply do not apply here because Cooper did not seek a decree of
dissolution, and Cooper did not have to seek a decree of
dissolution to obtain buyout damages in this case.
The Reliant parties cite Marina Tenants Assn. v. Deauville
Marina Development Co. (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 122 for the
proposition the court “did not have the equitable power to
disregard the Act’s requirements.” Marina Tenants has nothing
to do with LLC’s or buyouts. The court merely stated the general
principle that “a court of equity is without power to decree relief
which the law denies.” (Id. at p. 134.) Nothing in the law forbids
the court’s action here.

27
 Indeed, as Cooper argues, a buyout of Cooper’s interest is
consistent with the relief Reliant sought in the first place: a
declaration that Cooper’s membership had been terminated and
Reliant’s manager could authorize a valuation for the purpose of
calculating the fair option price for Cooper’s interest. Of course,
the results were not what the Reliant parties wanted—but
Reliant’s complaint was filed to do exactly what the court has
now done, and had the equitable power to do. “A court of equity
has broad powers and comparatively unlimited discretion to do
equity without being bound by any strict rules of procedure.”
(Richmond v. Dofflemyer (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 745, 766.)
Next, the Reliant parties criticize the trial court’s
statement, in its ruling denying JNOV, that “[n]othing in
Corporations Code Section 17707.03 precludes an equitable
buyout as a remedy for fraudulent activity.” They say the jury’s
award of damages for fraud “demonstrates an adequate legal
remedy existed,” and the trial court “awarded double fraud
damages in the guise of buyout damages.” We reject this
assessment.
There were no duplicative damages awarded. The jury
awarded damages for breach of contract ($6,028,786) and for
fraud ($2,743,626 against each of Michaels and Grady). The
court found the damages for fraud were “duplicative of and
included within” the damages awarded for breach of the
operating agreement. The court limited the damages award in
the phase two trial to $6,028,786. The buyout damages are not
fraud damages. The jury’s award compensated Cooper for the
monies he should have received as distributions as a one-third
owner. The court’s award of $4.2 million compensates Cooper for

28
his equity interest in Reliant, in return for which he gives up his
ownership interest. There is no duplication anywhere.
Finally, Michaels contends he cannot be liable for buyout
damages because he was not a Reliant member on the date the
court set as the valuation date, i.e., the date as of which the value
of Cooper’s equity interest in the LLC was determined. (The
reader will recall that Michaels sold his one-third interest in
Reliant to Grady in February 2018, and the valuation date was
January 1, 2019.) This argument goes nowhere either. We agree
with the trial court’s assessment in its ruling denying JNOV on
Michaels’s claim that he should not be forced to pay the buyout
damages: “Michaels cannot escape liability to Cooper by arguing
that he washed his hands of Reliant . . . . Michaels’ sweetheart
buyout deal between Michaels and Reliant/Grady, that included
an indemnity agreement by which Reliant/Grady agreed to
indemnify Michaels for all damages owed to Cooper, is relevant to
show that the Michaels buyout was a sham. Given the well-
established pattern of deception and misdirection employed by
Michaels in using various corporate maneuvers in attempts to
shield himself from liability to Cooper, it is reasonable to infer
that the Michaels buy-out was simply another example of the
same.”
3. The Alter Ego Issue
The Reliant parties, PB Consulting #1, PB Consulting #2,
and 18LS Holdings, contend the trial court’s alter ego findings
were improper because they were primarily based on reverse veil
piercing and were unsupported by the evidence. We see no error.
a. The facts
In its conclusions of law after phase one, the trial court
stated: “Here, the evidence established that Michaels utilized

29
Reliant and his entities PB Consulting [1], LLC, PB Consulting 2,
LLC, the 2007 Irrevocable Octopus Trust, the 2007 MMA Trust,
the RLM Trust, and 18LS [Holdings], LLC (the ‘Michaels
Entities’) as an extension of himself by disregarding corporate
formalities, comingling money, and transferring assets without
consideration, so much so that Reliant and the Michaels Entities
are alter egos of Michaels.” The court explained:
“Michaels exerted such a unity of ownership over Reliant
by dictating when payments would be made and how they would
be classified without any methodology for doing so, such that
there was essentially no separation between Michaels and
Reliant. Michaels also made decisions regarding Reliant without
input from Cooper, despite the fact that Cooper was and is a one-
third member of Reliant. Payments to Michaels were casually
made without the use of a payroll company. Further, Michaels
artificially manipulated Reliant’s books and records by (among
other things) reclassifying historical data to negatively impact
the perceived profitability of Reliant, to the detriment of Cooper.
Additionally, Michaels authorized transfers from Reliant to
himself and to some of the Michaels Entities without regard for
whether Reliant was properly capitalized to conduct business on
an ongoing basis.”
The court reached similar conclusions as to Grady.
“Likewise Grady utilized Reliant and his entities LaForce
Holdings, LLC, Tristan Capital, Inc., the RLS Trust, and the SLG
Trust (the ‘Grady Entities’) as an extension of himself, by
disregarding corporate formalities, comingling money, and
transferring assets without consideration; so much so that
Reliant and the Grady Entities are alter egos of Grady.” The

30
court recited the same facts supporting this conclusion that we
have just recited with respect to Michaels and his entities.
b. Contentions and conclusions
The Reliant parties first contend the trial court’s alter ego
findings were improper because “outside reverse” piercing of the
corporate veil “is not permitted in California.” They rely on one
opinion, Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp. (2008)
162 Cal.App.4th 1510 (Postal Instant Press) to argue that, while
traditional alter ego doctrine allows an individual shareholder to
be held liable for claims against a corporation, it does not allow a
corporation to be held liable for claims against an individual
shareholder. Postal Instant Press rejected the “variant of the
alter ego doctrine, called third party or ‘outside’ reverse piercing
of the corporate veil,” and held that “a third party creditor may
not pierce the corporate veil to reach corporate assets to satisfy a
shareholder’s personal liability.” (Id. at pp. 1512–1513.)
The opinion in Postal Instant Press includes a thorough
analysis of cases from California, federal and other state courts
discussing “outside reverse piercing of the corporate veil,” both
cases accepting, and others rejecting that theory of alter ego.
(Postal Instant Press, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1519–1525.)
The Postal Instant Press opinion rejected it as “a radical and
problematic change in standard alter ego law.” (Id. at p. 1521.)
The opinion explains outside reverse piercing of the corporate veil
creates unanticipated exposure for innocent investors and
secured and unsecured creditors who relied on the impregnability
of the corporate form; and that other remedies are available to
the creditor of an individual shareholder, such as enforcing the
judgment against the shareholder’s assets, including his shares
in the corporation. (Id. at p. 1524.)

31
 In Postal Instant Press, the corporation at issue had other
shareholders, the plaintiff failed to show that innocent creditors
would be adequately protected, and the plaintiff admittedly did
not pursue other available legal remedies because it was “simply
more expedient” to add the corporation as a judgment debtor.
(Postal Instant Press, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1524, 1523.)
In other words, the equities of the case did not justify
disregarding the corporate form.
The facts and governing law in this case are entirely
different. We find neither the holding nor the reasoning of Postal
Instant Press governs the alter ego determination in this case.
(See Curci Investments, LLC v. Baldwin (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th
214, 222 [“Postal Instant Press does not preclude application of
outside reverse veil piercing in this case for several reasons,”
including that Postal Instant Press “was expressly limited to
corporations”; “different facts before us, as well as the nature of
LLCs, do not present the concerns identified in Postal Instant
Press”; and “[t]here simply is no ‘innocent’ member of [the LLC]
that could be affected by reverse piercing here”]; see also Blizzard
Energy, Inc. v. Schaefers (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 832, 847 [“There
is no reason to depart from [Curci’s] sound analysis.”].) The same
is true here, where the entities are closely held and controlled by
the individual who engaged in the wrongdoing.
Next, the Reliant parties contend Cooper did not establish
“a unity of interest or equitable right to find any entities alter
egos of Michaels.” (Grady and Reliant join in Michaels’s
arguments.) Their arguments, however, do not mention the
substantial evidence standard of review, or mention substantial
evidence at all.

32
 Instead, the Reliant parties make the unsupported
assertion that “no liability findings were made against Michaels
for which a Michaels entity could be an alter ego.” That is clearly
wrong, as already discussed (see Discussion, at pp. 25–26, ante).
Then they say that only trustees, not trusts, can be alter egos.
That is a correct principle of law, but a moot one, given that the
third amended judgment added the trustees as additional
judgment debtors. (The issues raised by the trustees are
discussed in part 9, post.)
After making the legally meaningless claim there was only
“limited evidence” that 18LS Holdings and PB Consulting #2
purchased the Friwat policy and tails from Reliant, Michaels
argues that Cooper already received all of the economic interests
Michaels or his related entities had in the Friwat policy and the
tails by way of the constructive trust the trial court imposed.
There is no evidence, Michaels says, that PB Consulting #2 or
18LS had any other assets, “thus mooting any request to add
them to the judgment in an alter ego capacity.” He cites no
authority for this principle. We are unaware of any requirement
that the fact or amount of an alter ego’s assets must be shown to
establish alter ego status.
Michaels makes a similar argument about PB Consulting
#1, saying there was no evidence PB Consulting #1 held any of
Michaels’s assets by the time of the phase one alter ego findings
in 2019, and therefore Cooper did not prove an injustice would
result absent an alter ego finding. Again, no relevant authority is
cited.
We note, and agree with, the trial court’s denial of
Michaels’s JNOV motion on this issue: “There was also
substantial evidence, indeed admissions, that Michaels and

33
Grady created shell companies such as PB Consulting LLC (for
Michaels) and LaForce Holdings LLC (for Grady) as conduits
through which they could funnel money from Reliant to other
entities, such as the Friwat policy, for their own benefit. These
shell companies were part of the fraud determined by the jury
that prevented Cooper from discovering all sums paid to Michaels
and Grady.” The trial court also stated in its JNOV ruling, that
“there was ample evidence that an injustice would result, given
that Cooper demonstrated that Michaels and Grady had used the
corporate coffers of Reliant as their own personal piggy banks.”
PB Consulting #2 and 18LS Holdings separately contend
there was no evidence they were undercapitalized, commingled
corporate and personal funds, or failed to observe corporate
formalities. They also say Michaels was not the sole member of
either of them, and there was “no evidence to support any
impropriety or funneling of money between Michaels, PB
Consulting #2, 18LS, and/or Reliant.” That is not accurate. As
we have already observed, the trial court expressly found that PB
Consulting #2 “was established for the purpose of investing in the
Friwat Policy,” and “[m]oney from Reliant was used to invest in
and pay the premiums on the Friwat Policy.” The court further
found that 18LS Holdings, “an entity owned by Michaels, Grady,
and Luke Walker, own[ed] forfeited and unsold portions (the
‘Tails’) of life insurance policies sold by Reliant”; and 18LS “paid
$1,000 for the entirety of Tails it received.” The trial court’s alter
ego findings are supported by the evidence.
4. Punitive Damages
The jury awarded $1,001,000 in punitive damages against
Michaels and $500,000 in punitive damages against Grady.
Michaels and Grady both appeal the punitive damages awards.

34
 Michaels does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s
ruling on his JNOV motion except with respect to the court’s
denial of his motion for JNOV on punitive damages. Michaels
argues the court should have granted JNOV on punitive
damages, and not just a new trial on the amount of punitive
damages. Michaels does not contend there is insufficient
evidence to support the jury’s finding he was liable for punitive
damages. Instead, he argues only that Cooper failed to present
evidence of Michaels’s current net financial condition.
Grady, who did not file a JNOV motion, likewise contends
the award against him was erroneous for the same reason.
a. The facts
Michaels’s counsel sought bifurcation of the trial on
punitive damages in the phase two jury trial. Counsel stated
there would be evidence in the liability phase of trial of assets
and monies being transferred from Reliant to the individual
defendants, “[b]ut to the extent that those individual defendants
have other means or assets, . . . I don’t think those things ought
to come in.” The court granted the bifurcation motion. It turned
out that a considerable amount of evidence was admitted about
specific dollar amounts—in the many millions of dollars—that
Michaels and Grady looted from Reliant and took as their own
personal assets. That evidence, together with the evidence (not
challenged on appeal) of their malice, oppression and fraud, was
sufficient to support the punitive damages award.
During the liability phase of the trial, the jury was
provided with the court’s findings, including that Michaels and
Grady and their respective entities had received at least
$11.7 million in payments and distributions based on their
position as owners of Reliant as of December 31, 2018. The jury

35
received considerable evidence of Michaels’s and Grady’s
financial condition. The jury heard evidence that Michaels and
his related entities received at least $4.1 million from Reliant in
distributions and other payments as of December 2018; Michaels
himself so testified. The jury heard evidence Michaels formed a
new company “to have an empty corporate shell that would be
ready to go to replace Reliant in the event . . . we couldn’t use it
as a business anymore.” Michaels was paid an additional
$1.5 million when Grady purchased his interest in February 2018
(in a transaction the trial court characterized as a sham). The
jury saw evidence that Reliant’s annual net income for 2017 and
2018 was more than $3 million and $3.2 million, respectively,
with more than $13 million in revenue in each year. The jury
knew that Michaels was the owner of a $5.4 million insurance
policy benefit (the Friwat policy).
Just before closing arguments in the liability stage of the
jury trial (which included liability for punitive damages), counsel
for Cooper stated that, “With respect to punitive damages, we
want to get this done as soon as possible, and so we don’t think
we need to present additional evidence for punitive damages. I
don’t want to waste the jury’s time or the court’s time.”
After closing arguments, the jury rendered its verdict on
each of the causes of action at issue. Its verdict on Cooper’s cause
of action for breach of the duty of loyalty included a finding that
Michaels and Grady acted with malice, oppression, or fraud
justifying an award of punitive damages. Similarly, the verdict
on the fraud cause of action included a finding that Michaels
acted with malice, oppression or fraud.
The court then instructed the jury on the factors it should
consider in determining the amount, if any, of punitive damages,

36
including that any award could not exceed the defendant’s ability
to pay. Neither counsel for Michaels nor counsel for Grady
moved for a directed verdict or objected to the court instructing
the jury on the amount of punitive damages and submitting the
question to the jury on the ground that the evidence of their net
worth was insufficient to permit the court to submit the question
to the jury.
After a short deliberation, the jury assessed $1,001,000 in
punitive damages against Michaels, and $500,000 against Grady.
Michaels sought JNOV, contending the award was not
supported by evidence of his current financial condition. The
trial court denied Michaels’s motion. The court rejected the
argument that Michaels’s liabilities were not considered, stating
the record showed no objections on that basis. The court said
there was evidence of certain liabilities, but did not describe that
evidence. (Michaels says the only evidence of his current
liabilities was his testimony that Reliant had paid his legal fees,
about $225,000.) The court observed “[t]here was also evidence of
Michaels unchanging practice of using shell companies to funnel
money out of Reliant and withholding of essential accounting
records of Reliant to reduce any chance of determining Michaels’
total income and liabilities.”
The court ultimately concluded that, “[t]ogether with all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, jury had
sufficient evidence of Michaels financial condition to make their
award.”
b. The law
“A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is proper only
when no substantial evidence and no reasonable inference

37
therefrom support the jury’s verdict.” (Hauter v. Zogarts (1975)
14 Cal.3d 104, 110, italics omitted.)
“[A]n award of punitive damages cannot be sustained on
appeal unless the trial record contains meaningful evidence of the
defendant’s financial condition.” (Adams v. Murakami (1991)
54 Cal.3d 105, 109 (Adams).) “[A] plaintiff who seeks to recover
punitive damages must bear the burden of establishing the
defendant’s financial condition.” (Id. at p. 123.)
The Supreme Court has not “prescribe[d] any rigid
standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay.” (Adams,
supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 116, fn. 7.) “Accordingly, there is no one
particular type of financial evidence a plaintiff must obtain or
introduce to satisfy its burden of demonstrating the defendant’s
financial condition. Evidence of the defendant’s net worth is the
most commonly used, but that metric is too susceptible to
manipulation to be the sole standard for measuring a defendant’s
ability to pay.” (Soto v. BorgWarner Morse TEC Inc. (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 165, 194 (Soto).) “Yet the ‘net’ concept of the net
worth metric remains critical.” (Ibid.) “ ‘Thus, there should be
some evidence of the defendant’s actual wealth’ [citation], but the
precise character of that evidence may vary with the facts of each
case [citations].” (Id. at pp. 194–195; see also Baxter v.
Peterson (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 673, 680 (Baxter) [“Normally,
evidence of liabilities should accompany evidence of assets, and
evidence of expenses should accompany evidence of income.”].)
“The evidence should reflect the named defendant’s financial
condition at the time of trial.” (Soto, at p. 195.)

38
 c. Contentions and conclusions
As mentioned, Michaels and Grady contend there was no
meaningful evidence of their personal financial condition at the
time of trial. We disagree.
As just related, Soto tells us that the “precise character” of
the evidence of actual wealth “may vary with the facts of each
case” (Soto, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 194–195), and Baxter
tells us that “[n]ormally,” evidence of liabilities should
accompany evidence of assets (Baxter, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at
p. 680). But there is nothing “normal” about the facts of this
case. The jury heard evidence of millions of dollars Michaels and
Grady funneled from Reliant to themselves and the entities they
owned; evidence of Grady’s extravagant lifestyle, with purchases
of luxury cars, expensive jewelry, renting a mansion for $20,000 a
month, and the like; evidence of Reliant’s multimillion dollar net
income for 2017 and 2018; and evidence of Michaels “withholding
of essential accounting records of Reliant to reduce any chance of
determining Michaels’ total income and liabilities.”
Michaels and Grady cite cases like Baxter, where the court
held the plaintiff “failed to present meaningful evidence of [the
defendant’s] liabilities, or other evidence, that would indicate her
ability to pay a punitive damage award.” (Baxter, supra,
150 Cal.App.4th at p. 681.) The record in Baxter showed the
defendant owned substantial assets, but was “silent with respect
to her liabilities.” (Ibid.) The assets were real properties, but
there was no evidence whether they were encumbered or whether
they generated a profit. (Ibid.) In contrast (and as the trial court
observed), here “the assets that the jury considered were cash
assets and could not have been encumbered in the way real
property is.” In Soto, the court, citing Baxter, said the record

39
showed that the defendant company “earned substantial
revenues from one of its business lines, but is silent in all other
respects.” (Soto, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 196.) Here, the
record showed Reliant, alter ego of Michaels and Grady, earned
millions in net income in 2017 and 2018.
Michaels cites other cases as well. He describes Kenly v.
Ukegawa (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 49, 56–57 as finding in that case
the “profit defendant reaped from fraud [was] not evidence of
defendant’s entire financial picture.” That description fails to
fully capture the court’s discussion. The court observed the
punitive damages award was “based solely on high paper profit
from the fraudulent transaction,” and stated further that “[w]e
know from the facts of this case that the defendants were in
difficult financial straits, juggling balance sheet items in the
millions of dollars.” (Id. at p. 58.) There are no such facts here.
Michaels cites Lara v. Cadag (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1061.
In Lara, the court held that “where, as here, the evidence is
limited to proof of the defendant’s annual income, there is
insufficient evidence to support an award of punitive damages.”
(Id. at p. 1063.) And Michaels cites Farmers & Merchants Trust
Co. v. Vanetik (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 638 (Farmers), where the
court made the general statement that “[w]e may not infer
sufficient wealth to pay a punitive damages award from a narrow
set of data points, such as ownership of valuable assets or a
substantial annual income.” (Id. at p. 648.) These cases are not
instructive because here, the record is not limited to only a
narrow set of data points on an individual’s annual income or on
mere ownership rights in valuable assets.
We find more instructive Zaxis Wireless Communications,
Inc. v. Motor Sound Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 577, where the

40
court found evidence of large revenues and the ability to borrow
demonstrated a corporate defendant’s ability to pay a $300,000
punitive damages award, despite reporting a negative net worth
of $6.3 million. (Id. at pp. 579–580.) The corporation’s net worth
calculation included accumulated depreciation of approximately
$4.9 million and a note to the sole shareholder of $6 million.
(Id. at p. 583.) “Although this represents a loss for accounting
purposes, it did not impact [the defendant’s] ability to pay a
damage award as would, for example, salary and wage expenses.”
(Ibid.) The defendant had $2.2 million cash on hand; a checking
account balance of over $19 million; and a $50 million line of
credit. (Id. at pp. 580, 583.) The court affirmed the award
“[c]onsidering the large volume of [the defendant’s] revenues, the
ease with which net worth is subject to adjustment . . . , and the
fact that [the defendant] had the capacity to borrow
$50 million . . . .” (Id. at p. 583.)
In short, the cases demonstrate the pertinence of Soto’s
observation that the “precise character” of the evidence of actual
wealth “may vary with the facts of each case.” (Soto, supra,
239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 194–195.) Here, there was little evidence
of the defendants’ personal liabilities, but a lot of evidence of the
profitability of their alter ego Reliant and the millions of dollars
of revenues they received (and in Grady’s case, continues to be
entitled to receive as owner of Reliant). Given their efforts
throughout to funnel revenues through shell companies and
withhold accounting records (as the court found and the jury was
aware, “a constantly evolving method for Michaels, Grady, and
others to receive cash outflows from Reliant”), we think the jury
could reasonably infer their ability to pay the relatively modest

41
awards of punitive damages. Neither Michaels nor Grady was
entitled to JNOV on the punitive damages award.
5. The Claim of Excluded Evidence
Grady and Reliant contend the trial court improperly
excluded evidence and argument to the jury that Cooper
breached his obligation of good faith and fair dealing, and his
duty of care to Reliant and its members, under Corporations Code
section 17704.09, subdivisions (c) and (d). This is because,
according to Grady and Reliant, Cooper “concealed an appraisal
he was required to exchange during the buy-out process,
thwarting and obstructing the process and making the
appointment of the third appraiser . . . impossible,” and the jury
“was improperly deprived of that information.” The court
“compounded that error,” they say, by binding the jury to its
findings that the operating agreement did not require Cooper to
spend any time working for Reliant to maintain his ownership
and receive one-third of its profits, and there was no expectation
Cooper would return to work after August 2013.
These contentions are without merit. The claim about
Cooper’s concealing an appraisal is directly contrary to the trial
court’s conclusion that Reliant initiated this lawsuit “before
Daniel Cooper was required to appoint an appraiser.” This and
other objections to the court’s findings of fact are founded on the
proposition that the trial court’s findings and conclusions should
not have been binding on the jury—a proposition we have already
rejected. (See pt. 1 of the Discussion, ante.)
6. Prejudgment Interest
Civil Code section 3287 authorizes the recovery of
prejudgment interest. Under subdivision (a), “[a] person who is
entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made

42
certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in
the person upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover
interest thereon from that day . . . .” Under subdivision (b),
“[e]very person who is entitled under any judgment to receive
damages based upon a cause of action in contract where the claim
was unliquidated, may also recover interest thereon from a date
prior to the entry of judgment as the court may, in its discretion,
fix, but in no event earlier than the date the action was filed.”
Here, the court awarded prejudgment interest of
$1,492,747.98 on the damages award of $6,028,786. (There is no
claim that prejudgment interest on the buyout damages was
improper.) Interest was calculated based on payments to
Michaels and Grady beginning in February 2014, when Reliant
first began excluding Cooper from distributions, and was
calculated to run from the various dates on which payments were
made to Michaels and Grady.
On appeal, the Reliant parties argue that the court
awarded damages under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (b),
“based on Cooper’s unliquidated damages,” and the award was
erroneous because under subdivision (b), the court cannot award
interest from a date earlier than the date Cooper filed his cross-
complaint (July 8, 2016). They also contend the court awarded
prejudgment interest on all payments to Grady and Michaels,
instead of on Cooper’s one-third share. Neither contention is
correct.
a. The background
Cooper initially requested, in his proposed judgment,
prejudgment interest on the contract causes of action beginning
on December 21, 2015 (the date Reliant filed its complaint),
“pursuant to California Civil Code Section 3287(b).” However, at

43
a January 29, 2020 hearing on the proposed judgment, the court
stated interest must be calculated from the date that individual
payments or transfers were made to Grady and Michaels.
Michaels’s counsel agreed with the court, stating that
“I appreciate the court basically buying our argument on only
getting interest from each date of payment.”
At the January 29, 2020 hearing, the court requested a
schedule showing all monies coming out of Reliant to Michaels
and Grady, plus a calculation of interest from those hundreds of
dates. The court explained: “[T]he amounts were certain at the
time of those distributions. So do it in this gross amount. I’ll
round it down to make it consistent with the jury’s final award.
Some of it will come from the front end. Some of it will come
from the back end. But eventually it will round out to a number
consistent with the jury’s award and consistent with not paying
an excess amount on the interest.” The court emphasized that
the schedule had to show “all monies coming out,” not just the
first $6 million, but then observed, “I may opt for the first
6 million just to avoid argument.”
Cooper prepared the requested schedule “tracking these
transfers and calculating prejudgment interest on said transfers.”
In his posttrial brief, Cooper requested the court award interest
“based on the first $6,028,786.00 transferred from Reliant to or
for the benefit of Michaels, Grady, or their respective entities.”
In response to Cooper’s posttrial brief and schedule, Reliant
continued to argue prejudgment interest in any amount was
“utterly unwarranted.” Quoting Civil Code section 3287,
subdivision (a), Reliant argued that section 3287 does not
authorize prejudgment interest where the amount of damage

44
“depends upon a judicial determination based upon conflicting
evidence.”
The Reliant parties did not argue that Civil Code
section 3287, subdivision (b) applied, or that prejudgment
interest could not be awarded on payments made before Cooper
filed his cross-complaint in July 2016. Indeed, without waiving
the claim that no prejudgment interest was warranted, Reliant
provided interest calculations that made various changes to
Cooper’s presentation, but included distributions beginning in
February 2014, long before this litigation was filed. (Reliant filed
its complaint in December 2015, and Cooper filed his cross-
complaint in July 2016.) And Michaels once again observed that
“the Court agreed with Michaels that prejudgment interest could
only accrue on damages from the date the payments representing
those damages were paid to Michaels.”
Cooper’s reply argued to the trial court that Civil Code
section 3287, subdivision (a) “specifically mandates an award of
prejudgment interest,” and observed that he submitted “exactly
what was requested by the Court,” namely, “that all transfers be
identified so that the Court could determine which would apply.”
Cooper pointed out that the court found Cooper was entitled to
receive one-third of all monies paid to Michaels and Grady and
their entities, and those monies “were—or at the very least
should have been—recorded in Reliant’s financial books and
records and thus would have been either known by Reliant,
Michaels, and Grady or capable of being calculated by them.”
There was a final hearing on the judgment on March 5,
2020, the day before it was entered. Cooper argued from his
spreadsheet that interest calculated from the first $6 million of
payments to Michaels and Grady totaled $2,980,092.21. Reliant’s

45
counsel explained that his spreadsheet removed items on
Cooper’s spreadsheets that were not payments to Michaels or
Grady, using only “the distributions that were personal to
Mr. Michaels and Mr. Grady for their entities,” and calculated
interest “on the first 6 million of distributions from that corrected
table.” (The excluded payments were those Reliant apparently
demonstrated at trial “to not be subject to interest calculations,”
such as payments for policy acquisitions, attorney fees and other
items that Cooper claimed were transfers for the benefit of
Michaels and Grady.) Reliant’s calculation of prejudgment
interest on that basis was $1,114,116.08.
The court told Cooper’s counsel that his spreadsheets had
“amounts that clearly didn’t belong there,” and stated that “the
best numbers available are [Reliant’s counsel’s],” with the proviso
that several specific entries should not have been removed.
The court also explained the basis for using the first
$6 million in distributions for the interest calculation: “Because
they were so clearly divesting Mr. Cooper of any of that money
and . . . I asked for at least two demarcations. One, where they
were just bleeding money because they were petulantly refusing
to give any of it to Cooper. [¶] Then when they tried to do the
corporate restructuring to exclude him—and you have that sort of
argument that the jury didn’t buy that they were somehow
innocently distributing money 50/50 because they thought Cooper
was out. [¶] And then the third point is where they—we’re in
trial and we’re post phase 1. Those are sort of my three markers.
And that—the easily accounted for money is in that first group.
[¶] Second group is a little fuzzy, but I think all the money out
throughout that phase is pretty clear. But I think you might
have a decent argument that after Michaels left the company

46
[February 2018], and we’re in litigation, you could debate
whether Michaels—each of that—any of the money should be
allocated to that period because Michaels is gone and it’s now
Grady doing things. [¶] The cleanest period is when they were
both dipping in the till together. Hence, the front end is where
I’m starting.”
The parties recalculated the interest based on Reliant’s
spreadsheet (and adding payments relating to the tails and the
Friwat policy that should not have been removed from the
calculation), resulting in $1,492,747.98 in prejudgment interest.
In his new trial motion on this issue, Michaels again
contended “[p]rejudgment interest should not have been awarded
at all and therefore the interest awarded is excessive.” This was
because the “amount of compensatory damages based on . . . one-
third of all money received by Grady and Michaels [was] subject
to conflicting evidence [and] complex accountings,” making
prejudgment interest “not justified in this case under the law.”
Michaels did not argue that Civil Code section 3287,
subdivision (b) applied to prevent prejudgment interest on
transactions before the cross-complaint was filed.
The court denied Michaels’s new trial motion. After
quoting Civil Code section 3287 in its entirety, the court said only
this: “As a starting point, prejudgment interest is available on a
contract-based claim whether or not the claim is capable of
certainty under subdivision (b) and is left to the court’s
discretion. Thus, as to Cooper’s first and second causes of action
for breach of contract . . . , it is within the court’s discretion to
award prejudgment interest and the court did so.”

47
 b. Contentions and conclusions
Michaels’s opening brief states the trial court awarded
prejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3287,
subdivision (b), citing the court’s new trial ruling.2 Michaels then
states interest was awarded from the dates of hundreds of
payments made by Reliant before this action was filed, which
exceed the court’s authority under subdivision (b). That is the
extent of Michaels’s argument on this point in his opening brief.
Cooper responds that prejudgment interest on the contract
damages “was based on [Civil Code section 3287,] subdivision (a),
not (b), because the damages were capable of being made certain
by calculation.” Cooper says “all one needed to do was calculate
the amount Michaels and Grady received and divide by three.”
Further, Cooper contends that Michaels did not argue in the trial
court that prejudgment interest could not accrue before the date
the action was filed, and so has forfeited the argument.
In his reply brief, Michaels says Cooper has “fabricated an
argument” and contends Cooper is not entitled to prejudgment
interest under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) because he
did not request it. Neither of those contentions is true, as is
apparent from the proceedings we have just recited.
Then Michaels contends Cooper cannot recover interest
under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) because the
damages “were not capable of being made certain by calculation,”

2 Michaels repeatedly cites the trial court’s new trial ruling
when he contends the court awarded prejudgment interest under
Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (b). We do not view the trial
court’s statement to mean that it intended the award to be based
on subdivision (b). We view it as a statement that its award
would be within its discretion “whether or not the claim is
capable of certainty,” and nothing more.

48
and “[d]amages the trier of fact determines based on conflicting
evidence do not satisfy this requirement of certainty.” Michaels
relies on Lineman v. Schmid (1948) 32 Cal.2d 204, 212
(Lineman). But Lineman actually held that “[t]he rule appears to
be uniform, whether the case involved contract price or
reasonable value, that interest is not allowable when damages
cannot be computed except on conflicting evidence . . . because of
the absence of established or reasonably ascertainable market
prices or values.” (Ibid., italics added; see also County of Los
Angeles v. Southern California Edison Co. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th
1108, 1123 [“Damages that must be determined by the trier of
fact based on conflicting evidence of the property value do not
satisfy this [certainty] requirement.”].) This is not such a case.
Here, the amounts and dates of transfers to or on behalf of
Michaels and Grady are established and certain; the disputes on
the calculations were over whether certain payments to parties
other than Michaels and Grady should or should not be included
in the schedule.
The precedents discussing the issue of certainty make it
clear that this is a proper case for prejudgment interest under
Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a). As Watson Bowman
Acme Corp. v. RGW Construction, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 279
(Watson) tells us, under subdivision (a), “the trial court has no
discretion—it must award prejudgment interest from the first
day there exists both a breach and a liquidated claim.” (Watson,
at p. 293.)
Watson explains: “From the defendant’s perspective, the
certainty requirement promotes equity because liability for
prejudgment interest occurs only when the defendant knows or
can calculate the amount owed and does not pay. (Chesapeake

49
[Industries, Inc. v. Togova Enterprises, Inc. (1983)]
149 Cal.App.3d [901,] 906.) In Chesapeake, the court
acknowledged the tension between compensating the plaintiff’s
loss and fairness to the defendant, stating: ‘These competing
policy considerations have led the courts to focus on the
defendant’s knowledge about the amount of the plaintiff’s claim.
The fact the plaintiff or some omniscient third party knew or
could calculate the amount is not sufficient. The test we glean
from prior decisions is: did the defendant actually know the
amount owed or from reasonably available information could the
defendant have computed that amount. Only if one of those two
conditions is met should the court award prejudgment interest.’
(Id. at p. 907, italics omitted.)” (Watson, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 293–294.)
Here, there is no question whether the Reliant parties
could have computed the amounts they owed Cooper from each of
the distributions Reliant made to Michaels and Grady, because
that is exactly what they did in the trial court.
Michaels makes a second argument: that the trial court
awarded prejudgment interest “on all payments to Grady and
Michaels, instead of Cooper’s one-third share,” and this gave
Cooper a “windfall” because it gave him interest “on amounts he
had no right to recover yet.” Instead, Michaels claims, Cooper’s
damages “should have vested incrementally over a five-year
period ending November 2019, as Reliant made payments to
Michaels and Grady.”
Again, Michaels did not make this argument to the trial
court (or at least does not point us to any place in the record
where he did so), and we may consider it forfeited. In any event,
there was nothing “arbitrary,” as Michaels claims in his reply

50
brief, about the trial court’s decision to compute interest based on
the first $6 million of payments to Michaels and Grady, as
recounted above (“[t]he cleanest period is when they were both
dipping in the till together”). Those payments were improper
when made, and we see nothing inequitable about calculating
interest based on the entirety of the improper payments, until the
$6 million in jury-awarded damages is reached. Cooper did not
obtain a “windfall” in prejudgment interest.
Finally, we turn to an argument offered by Grady and
Reliant, who say that Cooper elected a tort remedy (because he
sought and obtained punitive damages on his causes of action for
fraud and breach of the duty of loyalty). According to Grady and
Reliant, any prejudgment interest is therefore available only
under Civil Code section 3288, which provides that in an action
for breach of an obligation not arising from contract, “interest
may be given, in the discretion of the jury” (ibid.), and “that did
not happen here.”
Grady and Reliant cite no relevant authority for their claim
that Cooper elected a tort remedy, and refer us to another section
of their brief. There, they argue that “contract and tort damages
cannot both be properly awarded.” By this they apparently refer,
as the trial court put it, to an argument that “Cooper must elect
between punitive damages on his fraud claim and attorney fees,
prejudgment interest and other amounts auxiliary to a breach of
contract claim.” This argument fails for multiple reasons.
First, Grady and Reliant fail to support their assertions
with references to the record. They say the court concluded the
argument was waived because it was not timely raised, and
assert the court was wrong. They do not cite the court’s ruling.
They refer to a November 20, 2019 declaration by Grady’s

51
counsel, but do not tell us where that can be found. (We found it
on our own. The declaration says nothing about election of
remedies.) They say the election of remedies doctrine was “timely
raised and vigorously litigated” but refer only to “various filings
prior to trial” and “the trial transcripts,” citing nothing. The only
record citation in their argument is to the answer to Cooper’s
cross-complaint, the 13th affirmative defense of which states
Cooper’s claims “are barred by laches, waiver or estoppel.” On
this basis alone, we may consider the argument forfeited.
Second, the trial court rejected a similar claim by Michaels
(that Cooper cannot elect inconsistent remedies in the judgment)
when the court denied his JNOV motion. The court pointed out
the judgment was structured to avoid double recovery; that fraud
damages and breach of contract damages do not always require
election; that there was no duplication of regular damages; and
that “Michaels has not sufficiently demonstrated that the
attorney fees and the punitive damages arise from the exact same
facts, and they do not.”
Third, Grady and Reliant offer no discussion of the
authorities on election of remedies, citing but not discussing
Roam v. Koop (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 1035 (Roam). As pertinent
here, Roam explained that the doctrine of election of remedies “is
theorized on the principle of estoppel. ‘Whenever a party entitled
to enforce two remedies either institutes an action upon one of
such remedies or performs any act in the pursuit of such remedy,
whereby he has gained any advantage over the other party, or he
has occasioned the other party any damage, he will be held to
have made an election of such remedy, and will not be entitled to
pursue any other remedy for the enforcement of his right.’ ” (Id.
at pp. 1039–1040, italics added; see also Glendale Fed. Sav. &

52
Loan Assn. v. Marina View Heights Dev. Co. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d
101, 137, 138 [“the doctrine of election of remedies, bottomed
upon the equitable principle of estoppel, operates only where
pursuit of alternative and inconsistent remedies substantially
prejudices the defendant”; “[e]lection of remedies is a harsh
doctrine and is currently looked upon with disfavor by courts and
commentators”].)3
Here, of course, Cooper occasioned no injury to Grady or
Reliant and gained no advantage over them in the course of the
litigation. We find no merit in the election of remedies argument,
either as it relates to prejudgment interest or anything else.
7. The Cooper-Michaels Settlement Agreement
In their briefs on appeal from the third amended judgment,
Michaels, PB Consulting #1, PB Consulting #2 and 18LS
Holdings contend that a settlement agreement between Michaels
and Cooper in another litigation barred any tort liability or
constructive trust remedy imposed against Michaels or his
related entities in this lawsuit. They say the judgment should be
reversed and sent back to the trial court to determine whether

3 The issue in Roam was “whether the trial court erred in
granting a tort remedy when [the plaintiff], after filing his
complaint, had levied on certain of defendant’s property under a
writ of attachment.” (Roam, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 1037.)
Levying under the writ “deprived [the defendant] of the use of his
property and plaintiff obtained an advantage over him.” (Id. at
p. 1040.) Under those circumstances, “presumptively the
doctrine of election of remedies is applicable.” (Ibid.) The court
ultimately affirmed the judgment because the defendant failed to
raise the election defense at trial and therefore waived it. (Id. at
p. 1045.)

53
the settlement agreement bars the tort claims and related
equitable remedies. We think not.
a. The facts
Cooper and Michaels were parties to a settlement
agreement effective December 18, 2017, relating to their
separation agreement, various lawsuits and other disputes. (The
parties refer to this as the SMDC case (Cooper v. Michaels,
Super. Ct. L.A. County (2018) No. LC105527).) The parties
released each other from all claims and liabilities relating to the
separation agreement, the lawsuits and ancillary disputes, with
the exception of the claims alleged in this case. As to this “non-
released matter,” the parties agreed that Cooper would “dismiss
without prejudice Michaels, in his individual capacity only,” as to
the tort causes of action (as relevant now, fraud, breach of the
duty of loyalty, fraudulent transfer, and constructive trust). “In
exchange for this dismissal without prejudice, Michaels agrees to
make best efforts, including utilizing his vote as a member of
Reliant, to secure a distribution from Reliant in the amount of
$20,000 per month for six months starting immediately.”
Michaels then sent two e-mails to Grady and one to
Murphy about the settlement in December 2017, telling them he
was “open to giving [Cooper] the money as a show of good faith
but this is something the owners and manager would have to
discuss.” In March 2018, Cooper’s counsel inquired what steps
Michaels took to secure the distribution to Cooper. Then in
October 2018, after the subject of the dismissal came up at
Cooper’s deposition, Cooper’s counsel wrote to Michaels’s counsel,
saying he had never received a response to his March 2018
request. Cooper’s counsel asserted Michaels had confirmed at his
deposition that he made no efforts, and “[a]s a result, Mr. Cooper

54
has not and will not dismiss any tort claims alleged against
Mr. Michaels.”
On November 13, 2018, Michaels filed an ex parte
application for (among other things) an order compelling Cooper
“to dismiss with prejudice the intentional tort claims” pursuant
to the settlement agreement.
The trial court held a hearing on the ex parte application
on November 28, 2018. As to the tort-dismissal issue, the court
expressed its preliminary thoughts: that the ex parte “doesn’t
make clear to me that there’s anything for the court to do in this
case. I do agree that this is not the right vehicle for it. A motion
to enforce the settlement under the LC105527 case would be the
more appropriate vehicle for it for any failure by [Cooper] to
dismiss . . . the tort claims against that one individual
[Michaels].”
The court also wondered “where does that get you” when
“the most you get is dismissal of those claims without prejudice.”
“[I]f [Cooper] would simply re-file those same claims, I guess,
based on everything that’s happened since 2015 or whenever the
settlement agreement was signed, where does that get you on the
one hand?” On the other hand, Cooper “didn’t dismiss the claims,
so they don’t have to pay. . . . [W]here does that go?” The court
observed that “now you’re on the eve of trial,” and “[h]ow do you
do any of that without prejudicing [Cooper]? I suspect the
response and the argument at this point is that you waived.”
When the court asked for responses to its preliminary
thoughts, Michaels’s counsel stated: “Your Honor, I’ll take you
up on the invitation to refile it in the SMDC matter. I think, as a
practical matter, that may end up in front of you.” Counsel
agreed with the court that procedurally, the SMDC case would be

55
the right vehicle, and “We’ll employ that. That being said, I won’t
get into the balance of it, because there’s not going to be a ruling
on it.” The court interjected that it was “not stating any firm
opinion on any of it. These are just observations. It . . . didn’t sit
right as an ex parte and untethered to a more substantial
motion.” Michaels’s counsel replied, “Understood.” Later
comments by the court (“[w]e’ll leave that [a jurisdictional issue]
for the motion”) make it clear that both the court and counsel
anticipated a further motion being made on the issue. So far as
the record discloses, none was made. (Cooper requested judicial
notice of the docket in the SMDC litigation, which we grant.)
b. Contentions and conclusions
Now, Michaels contends “[i]t was error for the trial court
not to decide the Ex Parte Application to enforce the settlement
agreement” before the phase one trial. Michaels cites no
authority for this proposition.
We note that when Michaels sought a new trial, arguing
the court erred in excluding evidence of the December 2017
settlement from the phase two jury trial, the court denied the
motion, stating: “The evidence was irrelevant to the issues to be
tried. There would have needed to be a mini trial on whether
Cooper did breach the settlement agreement. The evidence
would have resulted in wasting trial resources on a tangential
issue.” We agree with that conclusion.
Michaels’s argument here is similarly unavailing. The
facts we have recited show the court chose to wait for a further,
“more substantial,” motion in the other action on the issue of
enforcement of the settlement agreement, a conclusion with
which counsel concurred. That ruling was well within the trial

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court’s discretion, and the court did not err in excluding evidence
of the December 2017 settlement from the phase two jury trial.
8. Constructive Trust Issues
PB Consulting #2 and 18LS Holdings—the two LLC’s found
to be Michaels’s alter egos—contend it was error to include them
in the orders imposing a constructive trust over the Friwat policy
and the tails. The two LLC’s say they were indispensable parties
who were not made parties to the action; they were deprived of
due process because their interests were not represented before
the court’s June 27, 2019 order; and there was insufficient
evidence to warrant a constructive trust because the amount of
damages had not been determined by a jury. We see no error.
a. The facts
To recap, both LLC’s were found to be alter egos of
Michaels, and we have already concluded sufficient evidence
supported that finding. (See Discussion, pt. 3, ante.)
PB Consulting #2 was formed for the sole purpose of
investing in the Friwat policy. Michaels owned 51.83 percent of
PB Consulting #2, having invested more than $5.1 million in the
Friwat policy. That money was money from Reliant, and Reliant
money was also used to pay the premiums on the Friwat policy.
18LS Holdings was formed by Michaels and Luke Walker
(a nonparty), and Michaels then transferred unsold policy tails to
18LS Holdings from Reliant. Michaels paid $1,000 to Reliant for
the $440,000 in tails transferred to 18LS Holdings. (Grady paid
nothing for his $440,000 in tails.) Mr. Walker’s testimony
confirmed 18LS Holdings “exists solely for the purpose of owning
portions of unsold insurance policies [forfeited positions] that
belong to Reliant.”

57
 Upon Mr. Friwat’s death, Michaels was to receive
$5,428,666.65 of the policy proceeds, with the rest of the proceeds
going to PB Consulting #2’s other members. When Mr. Friwat
died, the trial court ordered the insurer to distribute the amounts
due members of PB Consulting #2 (other than Michaels) to
PB Consulting #2, and ordered PB Consulting #2 to distribute
those proceeds to those members. Thus, the only amounts from
the Friwat policy remaining subject to the constructive trust were
the Michaels proceeds (distributed to Cooper when the judgment
was entered).
b. Contentions and conclusions
On the facts just recounted, it is hard to see any prejudice
to PB Consulting #2, whose sole purpose was to invest in and
distribute proceeds of the Friwat policy to its members. That has
been done. As for 18LS Holdings, Luke Walker was the only
nonparty member, and there is no evidence he paid anything for
the tails, so he cannot have been prejudiced either. The bottom
line is that both LLC’s were entities controlled by Michaels, and
found to be his alter egos.
In any event, the two LLC’s fail to establish they were
indispensable parties. They made no such claim in the trial
court. Here, they say it is “readily apparent” from the court’s
February 4, 2019 and June 27, 2019 constructive trust orders
that they were “in fact indispensable parties necessary to afford
Cooper the relief he sought and purportedly that which he was
entitled to.” They do not explain how or why, merely claiming
they were required to be parties “for the trial court to exercise
jurisdiction over them, and bind them by its orders.” They cite
Kraus v. Willow Park Public Golf Course (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d
354, but do not explain how it helps them. Kraus explained, for

58
example, that “the failure to join an ‘indispensable’ party is not ‘a
jurisdictional defect’ in the fundamental sense; even in the
absence of an ‘indispensable’ party, the court still has the power
to render a decision as to the parties before it which will stand.”
(Id. at p. 364.) Kraus also quoted with approval the principle
that “ ‘[t]he only justification for the [indispensable party] rule
permitting the issue to be raised for the first time on appeal is
that the absence of a party has precluded the trial court from
rendering any effective judgment between the parties before it.’ ”
(Id. at p. 369.) That is not the case here.
In short, the indispensable party claim has no merit.
Neither does the claim that the two LLC’s were deprived of due
process because they received no notice or opportunity to object to
the orders imposing a constructive trust over their assets. This
claim fails for the reasons already discussed. Both LLC’s were
entities controlled by Michaels and found to be his alter egos. PB
Consulting #2 had no real interest in the proceeds of the Friwat
policy; it existed only as a vehicle for investing and transferring
the proceeds to its members.
Michaels likewise controlled 18LS Holdings; when the
parties discussed how a constructive trust “might be more fairly
created . . . and reach beyond the Friwat policy alone,” the
Reliant parties themselves suggested the insurance tails as a
component of the constructive trust. Counsel stated at the
subsequent hearing: “We’re willing and know how to put that
into a trust.” We agree with Cooper that this “not only bolsters
the trial court’s finding that 18LS was Michaels’s alter ego, but
establishes that the parties with authority to transfer the tails
were before the trial court.”

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 Finally, the two LLC’s argue the constructive trust itself
was improper, because “[t]here was no determination as to how
much Cooper was owed,” so the court “could not know how much
to issue a constructive trust for, or over what.” The two LLC’s
cite no authority for this proposition, and it is plainly untrue.
The trial court determined that Cooper remained a one-
third owner of Reliant and was entitled to receive one-third of all
monies and assets that had been transferred from Reliant to
Michaels, Grady and their respective entities, an amount found
to be at least $11,724,675.94. That suffices for the imposition of a
constructive trust over Michaels’s interest in the Friwat policy
and the tails.
Three conditions must be satisfied to impose a constructive
trust: “(1) the existence of a res (property or some interest in
property); (2) the right of a complaining party to that res; and
(3) some wrongful acquisition or detention of the res by another
party who is not entitled to it.” (Communist Party, supra,
35 Cal.App.4th at p. 990; see Calistoga Civic Club v. City of
Calistoga (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 111, 116 [“All that must be
shown is that the acquisition of the property was wrongful and
that the keeping of the property by the defendant would
constitute unjust enrichment.”].) The facts we have just
recounted demonstrate there was no abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s imposition of a constructive trust.
9. The Third Amended Judgment
On March 2, 2021, Cooper filed a motion to amend the
second amended judgment to add Romelli Cainong, the trustee
for three of Michaels’s trusts (the 2007 Irrevocable Octopus
Trust, the RLM Trust, and the 2007 Irrevocable MMA Trust), as

60
additional judgment debtors. The trial court granted that motion
on April 28, 2021.
Ms. Cainong appeals, claiming the court had no jurisdiction
over her because she was not properly served with Cooper’s
moving papers. Michaels contends the motion was an improper
motion for reconsideration that should have been denied.
We reject both claims.
a. The background
On August 17, 2020, Cooper moved to amend the March 6,
2020 judgment to include the Michaels and Grady entities,
including Ann-Marissa Cook as trustee for the three Michaels
trusts, as additional judgment debtors. This was because, despite
the court’s alter ego findings, the judgment did not allow Cooper
to take enforcement actions against those entities.
The court found that PB Consulting #1, LLC; PB
Consulting #2, LLC; 18LS Holdings, LLC; and LaForce Holdings,
LLC, were additional judgment debtors. But in its September 29,
2020 ruling, the court declined to add the trustees of the various
trusts as additional judgment debtors. Accordingly, the second
amended judgment was entered on October 6, 2020, adding only
the LLC entities, not the trustees of the trusts. Five months
later, the court recognized and corrected its error.
In March 2021, Cooper moved to amend the second
amended judgment to add Ms. Cainong, as trustee of the
three Michaels trusts. His motion stated that evidence was
produced in connection with Michaels’s debtor examinations (on
October 6 and November 16, 2020) establishing that Ms. Cainong
(Michaels’s partner) had replaced his sister (Ms. Cook) as the
trustee, and that Michaels exerted such control over the trusts
that the trustees (Ms. Cainong) were a figurehead who complied

61
with his instructions, and there was no distinction between the
two. (One of the exhibits to Michaels’s November 16, 2020
deposition is a January 2, 2020 e-mail from Ann-Marissa Cook
stating she was resigning as trustee.)
At the hearing on April 7, 2021, the court “acknowledge[d]
that the Court made an erroneous ruling in denying the motion
to amend the judgment to add . . . Ann-Marissa Cook as trustee of
the various Michaels-related trusts.” “[I]n looking at the analysis
and the ruling, the Court just flat out got it wrong.” But the
court believed it had no jurisdiction to correct the error because
“at the end of the day, it is a motion for reconsideration” with no
material change in circumstances, citing Code of Civil Procedure
section 1008.
Counsel for Cooper asserted that the court had made its
September 29, 2020 ruling without prejudice, and the court
requested further briefing on whether denial without prejudice
would allow the court to treat the current motion as an original
request and proceed accordingly. A hearing was set for April 28,
2021. The court also stated, in response to assertions that the
written ruling did not state it was without prejudice, that if the
transcript reflected a denial without prejudice, the court could
correct the written decision to reflect what the court intended.
There was further briefing, not in the record, and at the
April 28, 2021 hearing, no mention was made questioning the
court’s jurisdiction, with the parties arguing only the merits of
the control issue. The court granted the motion to amend the
judgment, stating it was “satisfied based on the Cooper parties
moving papers and the arguments set forth this date.” The third
amended judgment was entered May 12, 2021.

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 b. The trustee’s jurisdictional claim
The trustee of the three trusts, Ms. Cainong, contends her
due process rights were violated because the trial court had no
jurisdiction over her. She claims she was not properly served
with Cooper’s motion to amend the judgment. She is mistaken.
Cooper served his motion to amend the judgment by
Federal Express on March 2, 2021, at an address in Las Vegas,
where Ms. Cainong lived with Michaels (according to Michaels’s
testimony).4
Ms. Cainong contends that Code of Civil Procedure
section 415.40 applies. Section 415.40 governs service of a
summons and complaint on a person outside the state. (Service
may be done “in any manner provided by this article or by
sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the
person to be served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, requiring
a return receipt.” (§ 415.40.)) Ms. Cainong says the various
methods for service of a summons and complaint do not include
Federal Express.
As Ms. Cainong necessarily concedes, the service at issue
here is not the service of a summons and complaint, and she
offers no authority for her contention that the motion to amend
the judgment was “akin” to service of a summons and complaint.
In the absence of any such authority, we see no reason to treat
Cooper’s motion to amend the judgment as subject to different

4 Cooper also served the motion by personal service on the
owner of Postal Annex at 21781 Ventura Blvd., Woodland Hills,
California, on March 4, 2021. That address had been listed by
the previous trustee, Ann-Marissa Cook, as her office address,
and Ms. Cainong’s opening brief states that Ms. Cook “kept an
office at 21781 Ventura Blvd.”

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procedural requirements than any other motion. Particularly is
this so given the court’s findings in phase one of the trial that the
evidence established Michaels used the three trusts as extensions
of himself.
In her reply brief, Ms. Cainong contends that service of the
motion was improper under Code of Civil Procedure section 1013
(cited by Cooper in his respondent’s brief). She makes an
elaborate argument that service was defective under
section 1013, subdivision (a), because it did not provide the
additional 10 days allowed by subdivision (a) for service by mail
out of state. Ms. Cainong is wrong on this point, too.
Assuming Code of Civil Procedure section 1013 applies,
subdivision (c), not subdivision (a), would govern service by
overnight delivery, and that subdivision provides that any period
of notice after service by overnight delivery “shall be extended by
two court days.” (Id., subd. (c).) Moreover, section 1005,
subdivision (a)(13) applies to any proceeding “under this code in
which notice is required, and no other time or method is
prescribed by law or by court or judge.” Section 1005 provides
that, “[u]nless otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law,
all moving and supporting papers shall be served and filed at
least 16 court days before the hearing,” and “if the notice is
served by . . . another method of delivery providing for overnight
delivery, the required 16-day period of notice before the hearing
shall be increased by two calendar days. Section 1013, which
extends the time within which a right may be exercised or an act
may be done, does not apply to a notice of motion . . . governed by
this section.” (§ 1005, subd. (b).)
Cooper’s motion was served on March 2, 2021, and the
hearing was held 36 days later, on April 7, 2021. There is no

64
merit to the claim that service was defective or that
Ms. Cainong’s due process rights were violated.
c. Michaels’s appeal
Michaels contends Cooper’s motion to amend the second
amended judgment was an improper motion for reconsideration
that should have been denied. Michaels argues the motion “did
not comport with the procedural requirements” of Code of Civil
Procedure section 1008, citing Even Zohar Construction &
Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th
830, 833 (Even Zohar) (section 1008 “imposes special
requirements on renewed applications for orders a court has
previously refused. A party filing a renewed application must,
among other things, submit an affidavit showing what ‘new or
different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed’ (id., subd. (b))
to justify the renewed application, and show diligence with a
satisfactory explanation for not presenting the new or different
information earlier.”).
Here, Michaels argues, the only substantive difference
between this motion and Cooper’s previous motion to amend—
which the court denied as to the trustees (then Ms. Cook)—is the
identity of the trustee. He also says the declaration submitted in
support of the motion “does not explain how Trustee Cainong or
the trusts acted as alter egos for Michaels,” and so the judgment
should be reversed.
Cooper responds that his motion to amend the judgment
was not a motion for reconsideration; rather, the motion sought
to add a different trustee, and it was based on evidence from
Michaels’s later judgment debtor examinations. That evidence
revealed that Ms. Cainong had replaced Ms. Cook in January
2020, before Cooper’s previous motion; the new evidence also

65
showed Michaels’s involvement in and control over the trusts.
Cooper further argues that, even if treated as a motion for
reconsideration, an exception stated in Even Zohar would apply:
Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 “ ‘do[es] not limit
a court’s ability to reconsider its previous interim orders on its
own motion,’ even while it ‘prohibit[s] a party from making
renewed motions not based on new facts or law . . . .’ ” (Even
Zohar, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 840, quoting Le Francois v. Goel
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1096–1097 (Le Francois).)
We agree with Cooper. Even if his motion to amend the
judgment was an improper motion for reconsideration—and it
was not—under Le Francois, the trial court had the authority to
change its previous erroneous ruling on its own motion. That is
effectively what the court did. At the April 7, 2021 hearing, the
court began the discussion by stating, referring to its ruling
denying the motion to amend the judgment to add Ms. Cook as
trustee, that “the Court just flat out got it wrong.” The court was
concerned about its jurisdiction to correct the error, sought
further briefing, and held a further hearing before granting the
motion to amend the judgment.
We acknowledge that it was Cooper, not the court, who
initiated the motion to amend the judgment. But the court’s
actions thereafter comport with the principles announced in Le
Francois, and with precedents after Le Francois.
Le Francois involved successive summary judgment
motions on the same grounds; the first was denied and the second
was granted by a second judge. (Le Francois, supra, 35 Cal.4th at
p. 1097.) Le Francois found the trial court erred in granting the
motion, but did not order the case to trial, holding only that the
court erred in granting an impermissible motion. (Id. at p. 1109.)

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“On remand, nothing prohibits the court from reconsidering its
previous ruling on its own motion, a point on which we express no
opinion.” (Ibid.)
Le Francois construed section 1008 “as limiting the parties’
power to file repetitive motions but not the court’s authority to
reconsider interim rulings on its own motion.” (Le Francois,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1107.) The court stated, “If a court
believes one of its prior interim orders was erroneous, it should
be able to correct that error no matter how it came to acquire that
belief.” (Id. at p. 1108.)
In In re Marriage of Barthold (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1301,
the court concluded that “the trial court’s inherent authority to
correct its errors applies even when the trial court was prompted
to reconsider its prior ruling by a motion filed in violation of
section 1008.” (Id. at pp. 1303–1304; id. at p. 1313 [“In our view,
the California Constitution requires that in any case in which a
trial judge reconsiders an erroneous order, and enters a new
order that is substantively correct, the resulting ruling must be
affirmed regardless of any procedural error committed along the
way.”].)
Here, even if Cooper’s motion “did not comport with the
procedural requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1008,”
as Michaels asserts, the trial court had the authority to correct
its error on its own motion. It did so by acknowledging its error,
soliciting further briefing, and holding a further hearing. And,
since there was in any event no error in the court’s substantive
ruling, no prejudice can be shown.

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 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Cooper parties are to
recover their costs on appeal.

GRIMES, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

WILEY, J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

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