In re Clayton B. CA2/3

Filed 4/5/23 In re Clayton B. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re Clayton B., a Person Coming B319817
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
_____________________________________
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND Super. Ct. No 21CCJP01791)
FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ESTELA L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Pete R. Navarro, Commissioner.
Affirmed.
 David M. Thompson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey M. Blount, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

Estela L. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
awarding mother monitored visitation with her son (Clayton B.)
under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 362.4 and the
judgment upon terminating jurisdiction. Mother argues the court
erred in denying her request for unmonitored visits. We disagree
and affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Dependency referral and petition
The family consists of mother, father, and their son Clayton
B. (born May 2006).2 The family has an extensive referral history
beginning in 1998 including substantiated allegations of sexual
abuse, physical abuse, general neglect, emotional abuse, and
domestic violence. In 2005, prior to Clayton’s birth, a dependency
proceeding stemming from mother and father’s domestic violence,
father’s substance abuse, mother’s inappropriate discipline, and
father’s sexual abuse of one of the children resulted in a grant of
sole legal and physical custody of the children to mother. In

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
2 Mother and father are parents to approximately five or six
other older children (the record is not clear as to the exact
number), but they are not parties to this case.

2
2012, a dependency proceeding prompted by father’s
inappropriate discipline and mother’s lack of protection resulted
in a grant of physical custody of five children, including Clayton,
to mother. Recent referrals included allegations of mother
hitting father with an iron, a piece of glass, and a laptop on
separate occasions, including in the presence of one of their
grandchildren. Police call logs reflected four calls to the home
over the past year because of conflicts between mother and
father.3
The current matter came to the attention of the Los
Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) in March 2021 after a referral alleging domestic violence
between mother and father in Clayton’s presence. When
interviewed, father confirmed that, on the day of the incident, he
was in the garage working on his car when a female neighbor
came by and said hello. Mother was watching from a window of
the home, and subsequently approached him and accused him of
cheating. Mother asked father to leave. Father initially refused,
but then relented and asked Clayton to help get the car ready.
Mother continued to berate them and grabbed an axe and swung
it at father, only to have Clayton take it away from her. Mother
then went after father with a tire iron, which Clayton also took
from mother. Clayton was not injured. Father called the police
and mother was arrested.

3 Mother’s criminal history included arrests for assault with
a deadly weapon and spousal battery, while father’s criminal
history included convictions for forgery, grand theft, petty theft,
possession of a controlled substance, robbery, and driving with a
suspended license.

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 Father told DCFS that mother’s violence was escalating
and she had used objects to try to hurt him in the past. Mother’s
“mood swings” and multiple personalities concerned father.
Mother’s issues included jealousy and insecurity; mother quit her
job so that she could be home to keep an eye on father. Father
had also observed mother talking to herself and he had told
mother she needed to seek help. Father did not believe that
mother was a danger to Clayton.
When interviewed, Clayton confirmed that he had
overheard mother accusing father of cheating on her, after which
he had to intervene to grab an axe and tire iron from mother.
Clayton also observed mother’s mood swings, talking to herself,
and her “rages” against father over the last six months. Clayton
felt safe and comfortable around father, but not mother, with
whom he did not feel close. Mother kicked Clayton out of the
home when he defended father.
Mother explained that the incident began when father was
talking to a female friend and the friend did not acknowledge
mother, which upset her. Mother confronted father, leading to an
argument and father leaving the home. Father returned home
the next day and the argument continued. Father told mother to
leave the home. Mother then grabbed an axe but did not intend
to hurt father. When Clayton took the axe away, mother grabbed
a tire iron, only to have Clayton take the tire iron away. Mother
was arrested and then father bailed her out.
Mother agreed that physical altercations were not
appropriate in front of children. Father’s involving Clayton in
mother and father’s arguments made mother upset at times.
Mother denied having any mental health issues, including mood
swings or hallucinations, but acknowledged having moments

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 where she does not understand what is happening. Mother
wanted to work things out with father because they had been
together for 30 years.
In interviews later that month, mother and father reported
they had not yet enrolled in any programs because they were
busy renovating the house. They were also attempting to
reconcile. Father reported that he and mother recently had an
argument, prompting him to leave the home to avoid further
conflict.
Clayton denied any recent further incidents in the home,
but said mother was displaying odd behavior, including throwing
tiles when no one was present, slamming cabinet doors late at
night, and having “anger splats,” which Clayton described as
mother being upset and yelling. Mother did not attempt to harm
Clayton and Clayton was not afraid of mother. He stayed in his
room because that was the “ ‘safest place’ ” to be. Clayton’s school
records reflected he was failing his classes and had a 48 percent
attendance record.
In April 2021, mother informed the social worker that
juvenile court involvement was unnecessary because she
participated in programs when her other children were before the
court. The social worker responded that her lack of progress
despite those programs was concerning. Father informed the
social worker he would be moving out.
II. Petition and detention hearing
In April 2021, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on
Clayton’s behalf alleging: that mother and father engaged in
domestic violence in Clayton’s presence, including mother’s
brandishing an axe and tire iron at father; that mother had
untreated mental and emotional problems, including aggressive

5
 behavior, fluctuating moods, auditory hallucinations, and talking
to herself; and, that father failed to protect Clayton. The petition
accordingly alleged that mother’s conduct came within the
provisions of section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm),
(b) (failure to protect), and (j) (abuse of sibling). The petition
further stated that Clayton and his siblings are prior dependents
of the juvenile court due to his parents’ domestic violence. That
same month, the juvenile court detained Clayton from mother
and placed him with father.
At the detention hearing, which also took place in April
2021, mother and father entered a general denial. After the
parties submitted on DCFS’s recommendation that Clayton be
released to father’s custody, the juvenile court found a prima
facie case for detaining Clayton and showing he is a person
described by section 300 and continued his placement with
father. Mother was granted monitored visitation twice per week
not in father’s home. The court ordered family maintenance
services.
III. Jurisdiction and disposition
A. The jurisdiction and disposition report
The combined adjudication and disposition hearing was
scheduled for June 2021. Prior to it, DCFS submitted a report
with updated interviews.
Clayton continued to reside with father, with whom he
continued to feel safe. Mother no longer lived in the home but
she came by at times to get her belongings, and was angry when
she did so. Mother had not visited Clayton; Clayton “d[id] not
wish” to visit with mother “at this time.”
Clayton stated that he had grown accustomed to his
parents’ arguments and would go to his room during them.

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Regarding the referral incident, Clayton recalled that father had
gathered his belongings to leave but mother wanted him to leave
with nothing. Clayton had to stop the axe mid-air. While
Clayton struggled with mother over the axe, mother grabbed a
tire iron. Clayton was successful in getting both items away, and
then father called the police.
According to Clayton, mother needed “mental help” to get
in “the right mind set” because “if you love someone you don’t try
to hurt or physically abuse them.” He did not have a close
relationship with mother. He did not believe mother would hurt
him, but was concerned about her behavior. Mother had mood
swings, became very angry, and would threaten to kick Clayton
out of the home when he defended father.
When interviewed, mother’s thoughts were scattered and
she needed redirection. Addressing the referral incident, mother
said that a female friend of father’s came to the home and was
disrespectful. Mother and father argued and father left the
home. When father returned, the argument resumed. When
mother picked up an axe, she did so “just to pick it up” and did
not brandish the axe at father. However, mother acknowledged
wrestling with Clayton over the axe and then grabbing a tire
iron, which she then kicked to the side while struggling with
Clayton over the axe. Mother claimed the incident was a
“misunderstanding,” and said that her relationship with Clayton,
though needing “a little bit of work,” was still “pretty good.”
Mother denied physical altercations with father in the past,
saying that police only responded to the home during verbal
altercations.
Regarding her mental health, mother denied talking to
herself, saying she did not know what father was talking about

7
and would have been hospitalized if she were talking to herself.
Mother acknowledged that she previously saw “someone” for her
mental health but was not diagnosed with anything. That person
gave her Benadryl.
When interviewed, father reiterated that mother began
talking to herself at the beginning of the year and he told her she
needed to seek help. While father did not see her talking to
herself again, father described that mother had different
personalities, and one personality did not know what the other
was doing. Regarding the referral incident, father stated that it
happened quickly and was “shocking,” but he did not feel
personally threatened by mother. Father’s arguing with mother
had become physical and was “tiresome.” Mother would yell in
his face and he “couldn’t take it” anymore.
Paternal aunt was also interviewed, stating that mother
had stayed with her for a month and was helpful. Paternal aunt
claimed that Clayton was disrespectful to mother and she had
never seen mother raise her voice or get mad. Father and
Clayton got along well.
DCFS recommended that mother undergo a psychiatric
evaluation and participate in individual counseling, parenting
classes, and a 52-week domestic violence program and that father
participate in individual counseling, parenting classes, family
preservation services, a 52-week domestic violence program, and
drug testing.
B. The jurisdiction/disposition hearing
At the June 2021 jurisdictional and dispositional hearing,
the court admitted several exhibits into evidence and then heard
argument from counsel. Mother asked that the petition be
dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence and current risk to

8
 Clayton. She asked that Clayton be released to home of parents
or, if the petition was sustained, for unmonitored visits. Father
asked that he be stricken from the petition as nonoffending, and
objected to any drug testing requirement given that the petition
was based upon mother’s mental health issues. He did not
oppose participating in parenting or domestic violence classes,
individual counseling, or Clayton remaining placed in his care.
Clayton’s counsel asked that the petition be sustained as to
mother and that Clayton remain with father. Clayton did not
want to see mother and was “concern[ed]” about her. Clayton
therefore requested that visits remain monitored.
The juvenile court sustained the allegations under section
300, subdivision (a) as pled, but struck the reference to father’s
failure to protect under section 300, subdivision (b).4 At the
disposition hearing that followed, Clayton was adjudged a
dependent and released to father. Mother was granted family
maintenance services to include a domestic violence program,
conjoint counseling with Clayton, individual counseling to
address case issues, mental health counseling, and monitored
visitation with discretion to liberalize.
IV. Six-month status review report and hearing
In December 2021, DCFS reported that Clayton continued
to reside with father and was doing well in father’s care. Mother
had been showing up to the home unannounced and refusing to

4 For completeness, we note the record appears to be silent
as to how the court proceeded with the allegation made under
section 300, subdivision (j). The reporter’s transcript does not
indicate the court struck the allegation. However, the minute
order from that hearing indicates that the court sustained only
the allegations under subdivisions (a) and (b).

9
leave, and was admonished not to do so. Mother began domestic
violence counseling but was discharged for missing four sessions.
She received a psychiatric evaluation in October 2021 and did not
meet medical necessity for mental health services. However, the
social worker referred her to individual therapy services so that
she could be assessed for non-acute, long-term conditions.
Mother had a scheduled intake appointment but the social
worker could not confirm confirmation of enrollment. Mother had
not received a psychological assessment nor been prescribed
psychiatric medication. Because mother had not made progress
in individual counseling, mother’s conjoint counseling with
Clayton had not commenced.
Clayton attended monitored visits with mother once or
twice per month. The visits were infrequent because Clayton
chose to put his schooling, homework, after school swim lessons
and social life ahead of visits with mother. The social worker
believed that, while Clayton was receptive to suggestions
regarding visits, he was “ultimately . . . not interested in
consistently visiting” mother. During the visits that did occur, no
safety issues or concerns were reported. Because visits were
infrequent, mother’s visits with Clayton were not liberalized to
unmonitored.
The Department recommended that mother and father
receive an additional six months of services, and that the court
set a three-month progress review hearing to address possible
termination of jurisdiction.
Later that month, the juvenile court found that mother and
father were in compliance with their services plan. Finding that
continued jurisdiction was necessary, services were extended,
Clayton’s placement continued, and a section 364 review hearing

10
was set. After mother’s counsel requested that visits be
unmonitored, the court afforded DCFS the discretion to liberalize
visits.
V. Nine-month status review report and hearing
In March 2022, DCFS reported that mother enrolled in a
domestic violence program, but had attended only one session so
it was too early to determine her progress. Mother was actively
participating in individual counseling as of January 2022.
Mother was diagnosed with adjustment disorder with mixed
anxiety and depressed mood. She attended four of six sessions,
which, according to her therapist, was not enough time for her to
make “any real progress.” However, psychiatric services were
unnecessary and mother was ready to partake in conjoint therapy
with Clayton.
Clayton was still living with father and doing well. Mother
and Clayton engaged in monitored visits two or three times per
month. The visits were not more frequent because Clayton did
not prioritize them. Visits were not liberalized because of
mother’s insufficient programmatic progress. Further, Clayton
was uncomfortable with unmonitored visits, explaining that,
while he was not afraid of mother, he was concerned that mother
might bring up her relationship with father, which made him
stressed. When the social worker conveyed Clayton’s comments
to mother, mother insisted there was a misunderstanding
because Clayton had never conveyed these sentiments to mother.
This response concerned the social worker because mother could
not understand Clayton’s point of view, underscoring the need for
conjoint counseling.

11
 DCFS recommended termination of the case with a custody
order granting father full physical custody and mother and father
joint legal custody.
At the initially scheduled March 2022 review hearing,
mother requested to return to the family home and keep the case
open for an additional three months for reunification. Mother
was participating in her programs and conjoint counseling was
about to begin. Clayton’s counsel asserted that Clayton did not
want unmonitored visits and submitted on DCFS’s
recommendation. The hearing was adjourned to address an
unrelated matter relating to the family’s housing benefits.
At the continued April 2022 review hearing, mother’s
counsel reported that mother was actively engaged in domestic
violence and individual counseling. Counsel reiterated that
mother wished to reunify and requested joint physical and legal
custody, or in the alternative, unmonitored visits. Counsel for
Clayton, father, and DCFS submitted on DCFS’s
recommendation that jurisdiction be terminated. Clayton’s
counsel stated that Clayton wanted to remain in father’s home
with only monitored visits with mother, describing that a “rift”
was present between Clayton and mother even prior to the
referral incident, and that rift widened since mother has not been
in the home.
The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction, granting father
sole physical custody and joint legal custody to both parents. The
court ordered monitored visits for mother, citing the “disturbing”
nature of mother’s conduct and her failure to complete her case
plan, and further noting that Clayton “in no uncertain terms,

12
wishes the visits to remain monitored.”5 The court further
ordered that visits occur two times a week for two hours per visit,
and further provided that those visits could be “amplified” to four
hours upon agreement of the parties, including Clayton.
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, mother contends the juvenile court erred in
denying her request for unmonitored visits with Clayton.
Specifically, mother asserts that the order was not supported by
the evidence because unmonitored visits posed no emotional or
physical risk or detriment to Clayton. Further, the juvenile court
improperly delegated authority to Clayton to set the terms of
visitation and effectively refuse visits altogether. We find no
abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s ruling.
A juvenile court that is terminating jurisdiction is
authorized to make orders addressing custody and visitation.
(§§ 361.2, 362.4; In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513 [“When
terminating its jurisdiction over a child who has been declared a
dependent child of the court, section 362.4 authorizes the juvenile
court to issue a custody and visitation order (commonly referred
to as an ‘exit order’).”]) In making exit orders, a juvenile court
must consider the best interests of the child. (In re John W.
(1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 973.) We review those orders for an
abuse of discretion. (Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 285, 300.) We cannot disturb the juvenile court’s
custody determination without an arbitrary, capricious, or

5 Counsel for DCFS added that although mother was ordered
into conjoint counseling with Clayton, Clayton “does not have any
interest in conjoint [counseling].”

13
patently absurd exercise of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994)
7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319; In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81,
102.) Where the juvenile court applied the correct legal
standards and substantial evidence supports the order, there is
no abuse of discretion. (Jane J. v. Superior Court (2015) 237
Cal.App.4th 894, 901; In re Daniel C. H. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d
814, 839.)
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
that mother’s visits with Clayton be monitored. The two primary
factors that the juvenile court cited in support of its order were
supported by substantial evidence. First, mother had engaged in
a sequence of “disturbing” and violent conduct evincing her
deteriorating mental health, culminating in her attacking father
with an axe and a tire iron, which, but for Clayton’s intervention,
could have resulted in serious injury or death to father and/or
Clayton. Mother repeatedly minimized the seriousness of her
violent actions and the existence of any mental health issues.
Second, the court correctly relied upon mother’s undisputed
shortcomings in adhering to her case plan. This ranged from
mother’s visiting the family’s home unannounced and refusing to
leave (despite DCFS’s admonitions not to do so) to mother’s
spotty attendance of individual counseling and domestic violence
programming. These considerations alone reflect the visitation
order was in Clayton’s best interest and supported by substantial
evidence.
Mother nonetheless contends that monitored visits were
not necessary to ensure Clayton’s security or well-being.
According to mother, her issues stemmed from her relationship
with father—not Clayton—and those issues caused Clayton no

14
detriment. Instead, Clayton did not wish to visit with mother
because he did not like her. Mother is mistaken.
Clayton never stated he did not wish to visit with mother or
did not like mother. To the contrary, he participated in visits,
albeit not as often as permitted by the court given his school and
social obligations. This led the social worker to conclude that he
was “not interested” in more regular visits with mother, not that
Clayton did not wish to see mother at all. Indeed, Clayton’s
discomfort appeared to be rooted not in the visits occurring, but
the conditions under which they occurred. Clayton was
concerned mother would bring up her relationship with father,
and the prospect of that occurring in an unmonitored setting
made him stressed.
Therefore, even accepting mother’s suggestion there was
“no indication” that mother actually had brought up mother and
father’s relationship with Clayton during their visits, the juvenile
court could fairly credit Clayton’s statements that he was
concerned about the likelihood there would be further issues
without a monitor present, especially given the traumatizing
nature of the referral incident and the extensive history of
mother and father involving Clayton in their disputes. Although
Clayton insisted he was not afraid of mother, mother’s difficulties
in her relationship with father and in managing her deteriorating
mental health had conspicuous, adverse effects on Clayton, who
was struggling in school and often—including during events
subsequent to the referral—had to retreat to his room in order to
feel safe. For these reasons, the conclusion that monitored

15
visitation was in Clayton’s best interest was eminently
reasonable.6
Additionally, the juvenile court did not improperly delegate
its authority to fashion visitation orders. Mother’s contrary
arguments misread the record and the relevant authorities. As
mother’s cases themselves reflect, a juvenile court must often
balance the need for regular parent-child visitation with the need
to be flexible and receptive to the changing needs of the child and
dynamic family circumstances. (In re S.H. (2003) 111
Cal.App.4th 310, 317.) A juvenile court is solely empowered to
determine whether any visitation occurs, and may not delegate
that authority to another party, including the child. (Id. at pp.
317–318.) However, as to the time, place, and manner of
visitation, the inquiry remains whether any limitations are in the
child’s best interest. Accordingly, the child’s input and refusal
must be considered, though it may not be the “ ‘sole factor.’ ” (In

6 To the extent that mother suggests that a juvenile court
must find a detriment to the child in order to impose limitations
on visitation in an exit order, mother is mistaken. Because the
relevant inquiry as to exit orders made pursuant to section 362.4
is the best interest of the child (In re John W., supra, 41
Cal.App.4th at p. 973; In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th
704, 712), this is not like other contexts where a detriment
finding is required to deny visitation. (§ 362.1, subd. (a); In re
Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008; In re C.C.
(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1491 [visitation under § 362.1 is
mandatory unless court finds visitation would pose a threat to
the child’s safety].) In any event, for the reasons we have set
forth above, the juvenile court could have reasonably concluded
unmonitored visits were detrimental to Clayton’s well-being.

16
re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 49–50; accord In re S.H., at
p. 317.)
The juvenile court’s exit order adhered to these principles.
As mother acknowledges, all of the juvenile court’s orders,
including its exit orders, contained a required minimum amount
of visits, and Clayton was never permitted to entirely refuse
visits. Mother’s complaints instead appear to stem from the
infrequency of visits with Clayton (i.e., the manner of visitation).
But the court was well within its authority—and was, in fact,
required—to consider Clayton’s input in determining the manner
of visitation, provided it was not the sole factor in its calculus.
(In re Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 49–50; accord In re
S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 317.) That was hardly the case
here, given the court’s sound reliance upon the severity of the
allegations and mother’s inability to adhere to her case plan in
fashioning its visitation order.
Mother’s further suggestion that the juvenile court “left the
door open” for Clayton to “possibly stop all visits” by providing
that visitation could be changed upon “ ‘agreement of the parties
including Clayton’ ” is again inaccurate. The portion of the
court’s order referenced by mother pertains to the expansion (not
limitation) of visitation, providing that visitation could be
“amplified” to four hours by agreement of the parties, including
Clayton. In other words, the court did not afford Clayton the veto
power that mother suggests.7

7 Mother suggests for the first time in her reply brief that by
allowing Clayton to refuse to participate in conjoint counseling,
Clayton foreclosed any hope that mother had of gaining
unmonitored visits. However, even if we were to consider it on

17
 On this record, the juvenile court’s order for monitored
visits was not an abuse of discretion.

the merits (In re Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1269
[appellate court need not consider arguments raised for the first
time in reply]), mother’s argument once again lacks record
support. None of the court’s prior orders permitted Clayton to
refuse conjoint counseling. The primary impediment to conjoint
counseling throughout the proceedings was mother’s delayed
progress with her case plan. Though counsel for DCFS briefly
remarked at the end of the section 364 hearing that Clayton was
not interested in conjoint counseling, the court had by that point
nearly finished rendering its termination and exit orders, and
mother cites no other evidence that Clayton had previously
refused conjoint counseling.

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 DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s April 2022 judgment and order are
affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

NGUYEN (KIM), J.*

We concur:

LAVIN, Acting P. J.

EGERTON, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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