USCA11 Case: 21-10192 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 04/10/2023 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-10192
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL JEROME SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-00262-TWT-JSA-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-10192
Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Smith, a federal prisoner now represented by coun-
sel, appeals the district court’s denial of his pro se 1 motion for com-
passionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). No reversible
error has been shown; we affirm.
In 2013, Smith pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery of a
mail carrier, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a), and to attempted
burglary of a post office, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2115. Briefly
stated, Smith’s convictions stem from Smith’s participation in two
separate robberies of a U.S. Post Office in Conley, Georgia -- one
of which involved holding a victim at gunpoint -- and an attempted
burglary of the same post office. Smith is serving a sentence of 235
months’ imprisonment.
In 2020 in district court, Smith moved pro se for compas-
sionate release under section 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First
Step Act. 2 Smith sought relief based on the COVID-19 pandemic.
Smith said his medical conditions (chronic hepatitis C, a liver tu-
mor, and hypertension) and his age (62) put him at increased risk
of serious illness if he were to contract COVID-19.
1 We construe liberally pro se pleadings. See Tannenbaum v. United States,
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
2 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).
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21-10192 Opinion of the Court 3
The district court denied Smith’s motion based on three in-
dependent alternative grounds. The district court first determined
that Smith had offered no documentation of his alleged medical
conditions and, thus, could show no extraordinary and compelling
reason warranting compassionate release.
The district court next concluded that compassionate re-
lease was unavailable because Smith posed a threat to the commu-
nity. In making that determination, the district court described
Smith’s criminal record as reflecting “a pattern of violence and
criminality stretching over decades.” The district court observed
that the violent nature of Smith’s underlying convictions was con-
sistent with Smith’s “track record [as] a career offender who com-
mitted violent offenses into his 50s” and further “underscore[d] the
threat that Smith poses to the community.”
The district court then determined that -- even if Smith
could demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling reason war-
ranting relief and that he posed no threat to the public -- a reduced
sentence would be inappropriate in the light of the sentencing fac-
tors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In particular, the district court
determined that Smith’s sentence of 235 months’ imprisonment
was necessary to reflect the seriousness of Smith’s underlying rob-
bery and attempted-burglary offenses, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment.
We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s deci-
sion about whether to grant or to deny a defendant compassionate
release. See United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-10192
2021). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect
legal standard, follows improper procedures in making the deter-
mination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.”
United States v. Khan, 794 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2015).
As amended by the First Step Act, section 3582(c)(1)(A) au-
thorizes a district court to modify a term of imprisonment under
these circumstances:
[T]he court may reduce the term of imprison-
ment . . . after considering the factors set forth in sec-
tion 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it
finds . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons war-
rant such a reduction and that such a reduction is con-
sistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
The policy statements applicable to section 3582(c)(1)(A) are
found in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; United States v.
Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2021). Pertinent to this ap-
peal, section 1B1.13 provides that the district court may reduce a
term of imprisonment if the court determines that “the defendant
is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the commu-
nity.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2); id. comment. (n.1).
We have said that a district court may reduce a defendant’s
term of imprisonment under section 3582(c)(1)(A) only if each of
these three conditions is met: “(1) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors
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21-10192 Opinion of the Court 5
favor doing so, (2) there are ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’
for doing so, and (3) doing so wouldn’t endanger any person or the
community within the meaning of § 1B1.13’s policy statement.”
See United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021).
When the district court determines that a movant fails to satisfy
one of these conditions, the district court may deny compassionate
release without addressing the remaining conditions. Id. at 1237-
38, 1240.
On appeal, Smith argues chiefly that the district court clearly
erred by stating that Smith had submitted no documentation of his
medical conditions. Smith contends further that the district court’s
alleged failure to consider his supporting documentation also
tainted the district court’s alternative rulings about dangerousness
and about the section 3553(a) factors. According to Smith, the dis-
trict court’s purported error constituted an abuse of discretion war-
ranting a remand for additional factfinding.
The record reflects that -- after the government opposed
Smith’s motion based in part upon a lack of medical records --
Smith supplemented his motion with 90 pages of documents.
These documents included 68 pages of medical records, a list of
Smith’s prison job assignments, a course transcript, and class-com-
pletion certificates for classes Smith took while in prison.
Even when we assume that the district court overlooked
Smith’s supplemental documentation, nothing in the supplemental
documents appears pertinent to the district court’s determination
that Smith’s 235-month sentence was necessary to achieve the
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-10192
purposes of sentencing set forth in section 3553(a). Nor can we
conclude that the supplemental documents -- including the docu-
ments that seem to corroborate statements in Smith’s motion
about his efforts at post-conviction rehabilitation -- are likely to
have altered the district court’s ruling that Smith posed a danger to
the community. In considering whether Smith posed a danger, the
district court acknowledged expressly -- and did not dispute --
Smith’s statements about his post-conviction rehabilitation. The
district court nevertheless concluded that Smith’s mitigating evi-
dence was outweighed by Smith’s long history of violent crimes.
The district court abused no discretion in denying compas-
sionate release based on a finding that Smith would pose a danger
to the community if released. In determining the potential danger
posed by a defendant, the court considers these kinds of factors: (1)
the nature and circumstances of the offense, including whether the
offense involved a controlled substance or a firearm; (2) the weight
of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the defendant’s history
and characteristics, including his past conduct and criminal history;
and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger that would be
posed by the defendant’s release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
The record supports the district court’s finding that Smith
had a decades-long history of committing violent crimes. Accord-
ing to the undisputed facts in the Presentence Investigation Report,
Smith had two convictions for aggravated assault (one of which in-
volved a firearm), a conviction for simple assault, and five convic-
tions for battery or family-violence battery. Given Smith’s history
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21-10192 Opinion of the Court 7
of violent offenses, Smith qualified as a career offender. The nature
and circumstances of Smith’s underlying offenses of conviction --
committing two robberies and an attempted burglary, one of
which involved a firearm -- also support a finding of dangerousness.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1).
Given the serious nature of Smith’s offenses and Smith’s
criminal history, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred
in finding that Smith posed a danger. That the district court af-
forded more weight to Smith’s criminal record than the court did
to other mitigating factors is no abuse of discretion. Cf. United
States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The weight
to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to
the sound discretion of the district court, and we will not substitute
our judgment in weighing the relevant factors.” (quotations and
alteration omitted)). The seriousness of Smith’s underlying of-
fenses also supports the district court’s determination that a re-
duced sentence would be inconsistent with the section 3553(a) fac-
tors.
Because Smith failed to satisfy all three of the conditions nec-
essary to justify a reduced sentence under section 3582(c)(1)(A), the
district court abused no discretion in denying Smith’s motion for
compassionate release. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237-38, 1240.
AFFIRMED.