State v. Freeman

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. ) ID: 2006010317
)
DASHAN FREEMAN, )
)
Defendant. )

Date Submitted: April 9, 2023
Date Decided: April 9, 2023
Date Revised: April 10, 2023 1

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Upon Defendant’s Motion to Suppress and/or Exclude Evidence from
Defendant’s Cell Phone: GRANTED
Upon Defendant’s Motion to Suppress and/or Exclude Defendant’s Department
of Correction Communications: DENIED
Upon Defendant’s Motion to Exclude All Evidence Obtained from Deona
Bethea’s Cell Phone: GRANTED, in part
Upon Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Certain § 3507 Statements as Hearsay:
DENIED
John Downs, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General and Cynthia Hurlock, Esquire,
Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorneys
for the State of Delaware.
Ross A. Flockerzie, Esquire and Alexandria M. Shaffer, Esquire, Office of Defense
Services, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorneys for Defendant.

Adams, J.

1
This Revised Memorandum Opinion corrects scrivener’s errors throughout
due to the expedited time frame upon which it was decided.
 INTRODUCTION

This first-degree murder trial is scheduled to begin on April 11, 2023.

Although this case has been pending for nearly three years, a flurry of activity has

occurred over the last three weeks relating to the trial. 2 On March 10, 2023, the

State: (1) produced 55,518 pages from an extraction of Deona Bethea’s cell phone,

even though the State had the data in its possession since June 25, 2020; and (2)

produced the Search Warrant associated with the extraction of data from

Defendant’s cell phone, despite being issued on November 18, 2020. On March 17,

2023, the State produced communications records from the Department of

Correction from January 2023 through March 2023. 3 During this time, the parties

also exchanged redactions to an interview of Deona Bethea dated June 25, 2020.

2
This flurry of activity includes the holiday weekend prior to trial, where the
State responded to Defendant’s various motions, and Defendant filed replies. Even
if not specifically mentioned herein, the Court has reviewed and considered all
submissions, including those in the text of emails. Each of these submissions will
be added to the docket in this matter as soon as reasonably practicable.
3
On April 7, 2023, the State also produced discovery consisting of January
2022 Department of Correction records. That same day, Defendant filed a Motion
to Dismiss for Prosecutorial Misconduct based on this late disclosure. The State
filed its response to the Motion to Dismiss on April 9, 2023. Because of the crunch
of time, the Court plans to issue a separate decision on the Motion to Dismiss on
April 10, 2023.
1
 On April 6, 2023, a jury was selected in this case. On April 7, 2023, the State

provided January 2022 Department of Correction Records to the defense, even

though the State received this information on March 23, 2023.

Pending before the Court are: (1) Defendant’s Motion to Suppress and/or

Exclude Evidence from Defendant’s Cell Phone, filed April 4, 2023; (2) Defendant’s

Motion to Suppress and/or Exclude Defendant’s Department of Correction

Communications, dated April 4, 2023; and (3) Defendant’s Motion to Exclude All

Evidence Obtained from Deona Bethea’s Cell Phone. The parties also requested that

the Court issue a decision regarding certain redactions to Ms. Bethea’s June 25, 2020

interview.

I. Motion to Suppress and/or Exclude Evidence from Defendant’s Cell
Phone4

On a motion to suppress, the burden of proof is on the defendant to

demonstrate that the search warrant was unlawful. 5 “The defendant must prove by

a preponderance of the evidence” that the search violated their rights under the U.S.

Constitution or Delaware law. 6

4
The Scheduling Order in this case required Motions to Suppress be filed by
June 9, 2021. The State, however, did not provide the Search Warrant at issue until
March 10, 2023. Therefore, in the interests of justice, the Court will consider the
motion.
5
State v. Reese, 2019 WL 1277390, at *3 (Del. Super. Mar. 18, 2019).
6
Id.
2
 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” 7 The

United States Supreme Court has observed that “the ultimate touchstone of the

Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness[.]’”8

The Supreme Court of Delaware “has held that our Constitution affords our

citizens protections somewhat greater than those of the Fourth Amendment.”9

Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution provides: “The people shall be

secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches

and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or thing,

shall issue without describing them as particularly as may be; nor then, unless there

be probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.”10 Section 2307(a) of Title 11

of the Delaware Code, relating the issuance of search warrants, contains a more

7
U.S. Const. amend. IV. (emphasis added).
8
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citations omitted).
9
Wheeler v. State, 135 A.3d 282, 298 (Del. 2016) (cleaned up).
10
Del. Const. art. I, § 6.

3
stringent requirement than the Fourth Amendment in that it requires the warrant to

“describe the things or persons sought as particularly as possible.” 11

There are two primary objectives of the warrant requirement: (1) to eliminate

searches that are not based on probable cause, and (2) to ensure that “those searches

deemed necessary [are] as limited as possible[,]” to prevent “exploratory rummaging

in a person’s belongings.”12 The particularity requirement is the mechanism that

ensures the proper scope of a search.13 Pursuant to Delaware law, the warrant must

describe things to be seized as particularly as they may be and must not be broader

than the probable cause on which it is based. 14

For a search warrant to be valid, the warrant must be supported by probable

cause. 15 An issuing judge or magistrate applies the “four corners” test, which looks

at the face of the affidavit to determine whether it establishes probable cause. 16 The

judge or magistrate should also evaluate the totality of the circumstances to

11
11 Del. C. § 2307(a). (emphasis added)
12
Wheeler, 135 A.3d at 298, quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).
13
Id. at 298-299.
14
Id. at 299.
15
State v. Reese, 2019 WL 1277390, at *3 (Del. Super. Mar. 18, 2019).
16
Id.

4
determine probable cause. 17 The facts stated in the affidavit must be sufficient to

establish a “reasonable inference or logical nexus”18 “between the crime and the

place to be searched.” 19 The warrant application must describe things sought and

their location as particularly as may be and must also recite facts upon which such

suspicion is based.20

A reviewing court applies the “substantial basis” test to determine whether an

affidavit establishes probable cause that evidence of a crime will be found in the

place to be searched and that the magistrate’s determination was based on the totality

of the circumstances.21 In its review, the court is limited to the four corners of the

affidavit and must also consider the totality of the circumstances. 22 A reviewing

court should give “great deference” to a magistrate’s determination of probable

cause. 23

17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Buckham v. State, 185 A.3d 1, 16 (Del. 2018).
20
Id. quoting 11 Del. C. § 2306.
21
See id.; Reese, 2019 WL 1277390, at *3.
22
Reese, 2019 WL 1277390, at *3.
23
Id.

5
 The Supreme Court of Delaware has held that special attention should be

given to warrants involving electronic devices:

[W]arrants issued to search electronic devices call for particular
sensitivity given the enormous potential for privacy violations that
“unconstrained searches of cell phones” pose. Modern smartphones
store an “unprecedented volume of private information, and a top-to-
bottom search of one can permit the government access to ‘far more
than the most exhaustive search of a house. 24

The Evidence from Defendant’s Cell Phone Must Be Suppressed

The evidence from Defendant’s cell phone must be suppressed on the

following bases: (1) there is insufficient evidence to establish probable cause that

the specific “Red in color Apple iPhone cell phone” at issue in the warrant was the

phone that Defendant used to communicate with Deona Bethea (“Bethea”) the day

before the crime occurred through the date of Defendant’s arrest; and (2) the Search

Warrant was overbroad and insufficiently particular.

The Court will begin its analysis by reviewing the pertinent sections of the

affidavit and warrant. In the Affidavit, the affiant, Detective Justin Kane (“Kane”),

averred that, on June 25, 2020, Wilmington Police were dispatched in response to a

call from the female victim, Bethea, who stated “that her boyfriend had shot

24
Buckham, 185 A.3d at 18, quoting Wheeler 135 A.3d at 299. See also Taylor
v. State, 260 A.3d 602, 613-14 (Del. 2021) (“Given the substantial risk that warrants
for digital and electronic devices may take on the character of general warrants, this
reality necessitates heightened vigilance, at the outset, on the part of judicial officers
to guard against unjustified invasions of privacy.”) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
6
someone.”25 Upon arrival, police encountered a male victim with multiple gunshot

wounds and a female victim who made the report. 26 At the scene of the crime,

Bethea stated to officers that she was “cheating on” her boyfriend, the Defendant,

and that Defendant walked in on her and the male victim, while they were having

sexual intercourse.27 Bethea advised that Defendant became enraged and began

shooting.28

At a recorded interview that day at Christiana Hospital, where Bethea was

being treated for her injuries, Bethea further advised that she had “broken up” with

Defendant on May 31 of that year, and that she had subsequently blocked Defendant

on her cell phone. Bethea further stated that she unblocked Defendant on June 24,

2020, Defendant’s birthday, and that they communicated via cell phone throughout

that day.29 Bethea again identified Defendant as the perpetrator. 30

25
Affid. Of Probable Cause ¶ 3 [hereinafter “Affidavit”].
26
Id. ¶ 4. The male victim ultimately succumbed to his injuries at Christiana
Hospital. Id.
27
Id. ¶ 5.
28
Id.
29
Id. ¶ 6.
30
Id.

7
 The Affidavit indicates that on June 25, 2020, Bethea consented to a search

of her cell phone and that Wilmington Police downloaded its contents on this date.31

An examination of the contents of Bethea’s phone confirmed that Bethea had contact

with Defendant throughout the day on June 24, via call and text.32 On June 25, 2020,

an arrest warrant was issued for the charges of Murder in the First Degree, as well

as other related charges. 33 Defendant was taken into custody on September 23, 2020,

at which point his cell phone was seized.34

Paragraph 11 of the Affidavit, which is crucial to the Court’s analysis of the

nexus between the probable cause and the scope of the search, states that “due to”

the cellular communication between Defendant and Bethea on June 24, 2020, “this

investigator believes that there is possible cellular communication between the

defendant and V2 [Victim] after the incident as well.”35

31
Id. ¶ 7-8.
32
Id. ¶ 8. This paragraph, however, does not state how Detective Kane knew
that Bethea and Defendant had contact with each other. The Court is aware, through
review of the police report in this matter, that Detective Kane was able to find
Defendant’s nick name in Bethea’s contact list on her phone, along with his
associated cell phone number. See footnote 42, infra. None of this information,
however, was contained in the Affidavit. The Court limits its review solely to the
four corners of the search warrant.
33
Id. ¶ 9.
34
Id. ¶ 10.
35
Id. ¶ 11.
8
 Paragraphs 12-23 seek to establish probable cause of locating evidence of the

crime on Defendant’s cell phone by making vague and general assertions.36 For

example, Detective Kane averred that, based on his training and experience, subjects

involved in illegal activities sometimes take pictures or make recordings of

themselves with weapons, that said subjects sometime search for weapons on the

internet, and that said subjects use social media applications to post information

about crimes they have been involved in.37

The Affidavit requested a top-to-bottom examination of Defendant’s cell

phone for the time frame of June 24, 2020—the day before the crime occurred,

through September 23, 2020—the date of Defendant’s arrest. 38 The warrant

authorized the search requested for this time period.39

The Court infers from the Affidavit that investigators sought to examine

Defendant’s cell phone for communications between Defendant and Bethea that

occurred the day before the crime occurred and over the approximately three-month

36
See id. ¶ 12-23.
37
See e.g. ¶¶ 12-23.
38
Id. at ¶ 25. Although the warrant does not use the problematic “any and all”
language from the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor, the warrant, for all intents
and purposes, requested just about all possible information that could be found in a
smartphone.
39
Search Warrant (Nov. 18, 2020).

9
period after the crime occurred. Detective Kane averred to statements made by

Bethea that Bethea was in communication with Defendant via cell phone the day

before the crime occurred and a forensic examination of Bethea’s phone confirmed

this. The Affidavit, however, only states that Detective Kane “believe[d] that

[Defendant] was using the Red in color Apple iPhone cell phone from the date of

the incident until the day of his arrest on 23 September 2020.”40

The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence to establish probable cause

that the specific “Red in color Apple iPhone cell phone” at issue was the phone that

Defendant used to communicate with the Bethea the day before the crime occurred

through the date of Defendant’s arrest. In the Affidavit, Detective Kane fails to

provide the telephone number associated with the “Red in color Apple iPhone.” The

only statement connecting the red iPhone to communications with Bethea is the

following: “[t]his officer believes that Freeman was using the Red in color Apple

iPhone cell phone from the date of the incident until the day of his arrest on 23

September 2020.”41 An officer’s “belief,” with nothing more, cannot meet the

probable cause requirement of the United States and Delaware Constitutions.

40
Affidavit ¶11.
41
Affidavit ¶11 (emphasis added). In fact, police “had no knowledge of any
cellular communications by Mr. Freeman from June 25, 2020 (the date of the
incident) to September 23, 2020 (the date of his arrest), as they had no subscriber
information, no verification of a phone number associated with him and/or the
phone, etc.” Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, ¶3.
10
 Therefore, it is impossible to tell whether the red iPhone was used by

Defendant to exchange text messages with Bethea at any point during the relevant

time period.42 Although it is possible that Bethea was communicating with

Defendant, the Affidavit is devoid of information connecting any messages between

Bethea and the red iPhone at issue.

Even if the Affidavit could connect the text messages between Bethea and the

red iPhone, the search that was authorized was not limited to a search for such

evidence and the general averments, based only upon the affiant’s training and

experience of subjects involved in illegal activity, do not provide a substantial basis

for the magistrate’s probable cause finding.

42
Detective Kane, who signed the Affidavit, was aware of one phone number
associated with Defendant because of his review of Bethea’s cell phone that was
turned over to Wilmington Police the day of the incident (June 25, 2020) with its
data extracted that same day. In the Wilmington Police Report, discussed in Section
III, Detective Kane was able to associate a phone number for Defendant from
Bethea’s contact list. Therefore, it appears this information was reasonably available
to Detective Kane and could have been included in the Affidavit dated November
18, 2020. The Court will not speculate as to whether Detective Kane knew and chose
not to include the cell phone number for the red iPhone in the Affidavit because it
either was – or was not – the same as the contact number found in the Bethea’s
contact list.
The Court also notes that Defendant stated in his April 9, 2023 Letter that police
learned that before the incident, Bethea was communicated with a phone number
associated with Defendant: (610) 504-4362. Upon Defendant’s arrest, the phone
seized from him was associated with an entirely different phone number: (302) 565-
7261. (Defendant’s April 9, 2023 Letter at 3). None of this information is found in
the Affidavit.

11
 In Buckham v. State, the Supreme Court of Delaware found that generalized

suspicions such as “criminals often communicate through cellular phones” do not

provide a substantial basis to support a probable cause finding. 43 The suspicions

contained in paragraphs 12-23 of the Affidavit are no less general or vague.44 For

example, paragraph 14 states that “subjects involved in illegal activities sometimes

take notes and or write documents electronically about their involvement in illegal

activities.”45 Paragraph 23 states that “through training, knowledge, and experience

. . . persons involved in criminal acts will utilize Mobile Electronic Devices such as

cellular telephones to further facilitate their criminal acts.46 The Affidavit does not

contain any information that, aside from phone calls and text messages to and from

Bethea, evidence of the crime would be found in any other areas or formats in

Defendant’s phone, yet the Affidavit requested and the warrant authorized a search

of the phone’s entire digital universe.

In Buckham, although there may have been probable cause that GPS data from

the phone could indirectly assist in locating the weapon used in the crime, the

43
185 A.3d 1, 17 (Del. 2018).
44
See Affidavit at ¶ 12-23.
45
Id. at ¶ 14.
46
Id. at ¶ 23.

12
Supreme Court of Delaware found that the trial court committed plain error in

denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because the warrant authorized a “top-

to-bottom search” of the phone, and to that extent was “plainly mismatched” to the

probable cause it cited to justify it. 47 The incongruence between the scope of the

search authorized by the warrant and the scope of the search substantially supported

by probable cause is very similar here. Here, even if the Court found probable cause

connecting the red iPhone at issue to communicating with Bethea (which it does

not), there simply is no probable cause supporting a wholesale search of all the data

contained in Defendant’s phone. 48

Defendant’s cell phone evidence must also be suppressed because the warrant

fails to “describe the items to be searched for and seized with as much particularity

as the circumstances allow.” 49 “A warrant cannot be broader than the probable cause

it is based upon and it must describe the items with as much particularity as the

circumstances reasonably allow.” 50 Even if there was probable cause that evidence

of phone calls and text messages between Defendant and Victim would be found,

47
Buckham, 185 A.3d at 18.
48
See id. (the scope of the warrant was “plainly mismatched” to the probable
cause justifying it).
49
Reese v. State, 2019 WL 1277390, at *5 (Del. Super. Mar. 18, 2019).
50
Id., citing Buckham, 185 A.3d at 18-19.

13
the warrant authorized a search that far exceeded that category of evidence by

authorizing a comprehensive search of Defendant’s cell phone data.51

Moreover, the averments in the Affidavit suggest that the warrant application

could have reasonably described the items to be seized with greater particularity. On

June 25, 2020, approximately five months before the magistrate issued the instant

search warrant, Wilmington Police had already downloaded data from Bethea’s

phone. 52 This fact creates a reasonable inference that from an examination of

communications between Defendant and Bethea found on Bethea’s cell phone, the

affiant possessed or could have possessed information to more accurately describe

the types of items likely to be found on Defendant’s cell phone. Yet, the Affidavit

makes a blanket request for virtually all of the data on Defendant’s phone supported

only by the affiant’s “training and experience” that “subjects involved in illegal

activity” tend to use the various forms of technology on their cell phones.

Defendant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there was not a

substantial basis for a finding of probable cause, let alone probable cause justifying

the scope of data to be searched. Moreover, the Search Warrant was overbroad and

51
The State relies on Taylor v. State for its position that because the search
warrant here was not a general warrant because it does not include the “any and all”
and “including but not limited to” language. State’s Response to Defendant’s
Motion to Suppress and/or Motion to Exclude Cell Phone Evidence (April 9, 2023)
at 8.
52
Affidavit at ¶ 8.
14
insufficiently particular. As such, the Search Warrant was invalid. On this basis,

the Court grants Defendant’s motion to suppress all evidence obtained from his cell

phone.

The Court will address, briefly, the State’s attempt to limit the exclusion of

all evidence from the red iPhone. The State concedes that the Search Warrant for

the red iPhone is overbroad, but argues that it is not a “general” warrant and therefore

can be limited in scope. Specifically, the State wishes to limit the search to

communications between Defendant and Bethea. The Court rejects this for two

reasons: (1) as previously stated, there is no probable cause connecting the red

iPhone at issue to any communications with Bethea; (2) the Search Warrant is, in

fact, a general search warrant and must be suppressed in its entirety.

The Supreme Court of Delaware, in Taylor v. State, adopted the Third

Circuit’s description of a general warrant and an overly broad warrant, and the

proper remedy for each:

There is a legal distinction between a general warrant, which is invalid
because it vests the executing officers with unbridled discretion to
conduct an exploratory rummaging through [the defendant’s] papers in
search of criminal evidence, and an overly broad warrant, which “
describe[s] in both specific and inclusive general terms what is to be
seized,’ but ‘authorizes the seizure of items as to which there is no
probable cause ….’” [A]n overly broad warrant can be redacted to
strike out those portions of the warrant that are invalid for lack of
probable cause, maintaining the remainder of the warrant that satisfies

15
 the Fourth Amendment. In contrast, the only remedy for a general
warrant is to suppress all evidence obtained thereby.53

As the Court previously held, the warrant lacks probable cause tying the red iPhone

at issue to any communications with Bethea. Therefore, the Search Warrant

authorizes the seizure of items to which there is no probable cause. Moreover, the

fact that the warrant does not use the language “any and all” puts form over

substance. A review of the request for the Search Warrant reveals that the warrant

lists essentially any and all items within the phone – from photos to location, and

any possible piece of data that could be included in one’s smartphone. This is

evidenced by the fact that the State downloaded 43,426 pages of evidence from the

red iPhone. 54 Therefore, the Court suppresses the evidence from Defendant’s red

iPhone in its entirety.

II. Defendant’s Motion to Suppress and/or Exclude Defendant’s
Department of Correction Communications

The Attorney General’s authority to seize evidence is limited to the subpoena

powers provided by 29 Del. C. § 2504(4). 55 The Attorney General’s subpoena

53
Taylor v. State, 260 A.3d 602, 617 (Del. 2021) (quoting United States v. Yusuf,
461 F.3d 374, 393 n.19 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
54
Defendant’s Letter in Support of its Motion to Suppress and/or Exclude the
red iPhone Evidence (April 9, 2023).
55
Section 2504(4) provides that the Attorney General has authority to
“investigate matters involving the public peace, safety and justice and to subpoena
witnesses and evidence in connection therewith….”
16
powers are “always subject to control by the court.” 56 The State seized Defendant’s

Department of Correction (“DOC”) communications for two time periods: (1)

January-February 2022; and (2) January-March 2023. The State issued subpoenas

for both sets of communications, although it does not appear that the defense was

aware of the existence of the March 2023 subpoenas until the State filed its response

to the Motion to Suppress on April 8, 2023. Defendant seeks exclusion of all DOC

communications from use by the State at trial.

The Supreme Court of Delaware has held that in order to lawfully seize a

defendant’s prison communications, the Attorney General is required to issue a

subpoena that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.57 The reasonableness

requirement requires a reviewing court to analyze whether: “(1) the contested actions

furthered an important or substantial government interest…, and (2) the contested

actions were no greater than necessary for the protection of that interest.” 58

56
In re Henry C. Eastburn & Son, Inc., 147 A.2d 921, 925 (1959).
57
Whitehurst v. State, 83 A.3d 362, 367 (Del. 2013), quoting Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 423 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989)). The Court will refer to the two-pronged
reasonableness requirement as the “Martinez Standard.”
58
Id.

17
February 2022 DOC Subpoena

On February 22, 2022, the State issued a subpoena (the “February 2022

Subpoena”) to the Delaware DOC seeking:

[A]ll records regarding telephone, visiting room conversations and iPad
records for inmate Dashan Freeman SBI 00394097, including, but not
limited to any and all available approved phone number lists, outgoing
call log entries and conversations for the time period of January 1,
2022 to present (*Present to mean the date Department of Corrections
produces these materials to the DOJ).

The undersigned DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL hereby confirms
that the information sought is relevant and material to the above-
captioned law enforcement inquiry. The request is specific and has
been limited in scope to the extent reasonably practicable in light of the
facts and circumstances of the above-captioned law enforcement matter
and deidentified information can not reasonably be used.59

Defendant argues that the February 2022 Subpoena is not reasonable because

the State has not articulated “an important or substantial government interest” in

these records because the “issuing subpoena is entirely devoid of an articulation of

the need by the government for these records.”60 Defendant also challenges the

February 2022 Subpoena on the basis that it relies on “boilerplate language” and that

seeking “‘all records’ is the antithesis of a specific request which is limited in scope.”

59
Mtn. to Suppress and/or Exclude Defendant’s DOC Communications (April
4, 2023), Ex. A. (emphasis in original).
60
Id. at 3.

18
 In support of the subpoena’s reasonableness, the State argues that Bethea

signed and delivered a notarized affidavit in February 2022 where she avers that she

made a mistake in identifying Defendant as the perpetrator. Moreover, before

Defendant was arrested, Bethea and Defendant had been texting each other, leading

the State to believe that Bethea and Defendant may have been communicating prior

to her signing the affidavit.61 As such, the State issued a subpoena to DOC in

February 2022 for Defendant’s DOC communications for telephone, visiting room

and iPad records for Defendant from January 1, 2022 to February 22, 2022, the day

of Bethea’s affidavit.62

The State also argues that there is not a probable cause requirement under the

Fourth Amendment for obtaining prisoner phone calls by subpoena because

prisoners have no expectation of privacy in prison phone calls. 63 Finally, the State

argues that the subpoena for Defendant’s prison calls was motivated by the State’s

valid concern that of Defendant was attempting to contact Bethea and influence her

61
State’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Prison Phone Call
Evidence at 2 (April 8, 2023). Defendant, in a letter to the Court later in the day on
April 8, 2023, argues that the State “attempts to justify its subpoena based on
information learned from the subpoena.” As such, “the State puts the cart before the
horse.” It is not clear whether this is directed to the February 2022 Subpoena or the
January-March 2023 Subpoenas.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 5-7.

19
testimony. 64 The State also argues that any attempt or actual contact by Defendant

to contact Bethea “would further an important government interest.”65

The Court finds that the State has met the reasonableness requirements of the

Martinez Standard.66 The Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Whitehurst is

instructive. In Whitehurst, the Supreme Court held that the State met the first prong

of the Martinez Standard because an “on-going investigation in one crime and the

investigation of a potential subsequent crime, witness tampering, fall within the

important government interest of investigating and preventing criminal activity.”67

This was so, even though the tip about the crime came from an uncorroborated

source.68

The same is true here. In February 2022, a notarized affidavit was delivered

to the Department of Justice, signed with the name Deona Bethea. 69 The State knew

64
Id. at 10.
65
Id. at 11.
66
There is no requirement that the reasonableness requirements must be located
in the body of the subpoena, and Defendant has not cited any authority that would
require as such. See Johnson v. State, 983 A.2d 904, 921 (Del. 2009) (discussing
the fact that the State’s proffered basis for issuing the subpoena was argued at the
suppression hearing).
67
Whitehurst, 83 A.3d at 367.
68
Id.
69
State’s Response to Mtn. to Suppress DOC Comm. at 2.
20
from their investigation that although Bethea identified Defendant as the perpetrator

on the day of the incident, Bethea wanted no assistance from Wilmington Police

Department Victim Services personnel. The State also knew that Defendant and

Bethea communicated with each other prior to the incident. In light of Bethea’s

affidavit, the State continued its investigation into the incident and Defendant’s

involvement, and also the reasonable possibility that Defendant had made contact

with Bethea to sign the affidavit, despite a no contact order. As such, the State has

met the first prong of the Martinez Standard in identifying both an important and

substantial government interest. 70

Second, the Court also finds that the contested actions – the State’s request

for DOC Communications from “January 1, 2022 to present” – were no greater than

necessary for the protection of their interest. Here, the Court assumes that the State

is not seeking to introduce into evidence any records after February 22, 2022 related

to the February 2022 Subpoena, even though the February 2022 Subpoena indicates

70
Based on the Court’s review of the State’s Response, it does appear that the
State relies on certain information obtained from the 2022 DOC records to justify its
subpoena. The Court finds this to be the result of sloppy drafting, as the State does
identify important and substantial government interests based on the information
known by the State prior to issuing the 2022 DOC Subpoena. Again, the Court
reiterates that the State is not required to have probable cause to subpoena the phone
recordings, only reasonableness. Whitehurst, 83 A.3d at 368. The State here meets
the reasonableness requirements for the reasons stated herein.

21
that “present” means the date of production. 71 This time frame is sufficiently limited

in scope and tailored to the investigation of Defendant’s potential contact of Bethea,

and therefore meets the second prong of the Martinez Standard.

March 2023 Subpoenas

In March 2023, the State issued several subpoenas: 72

1. Issued March 9, 2023: You are hereby commanded to provide all records
regarding telephone, visiting room conversations and DOC electronic
messages or video calls for inmate DASHAN FREEMAN, SBI# 00394097,
DOB: 06/24/1982, including, but not limited to any and all available approved
phone number lists, outgoing call log entries and conversations for the time
period of 01/01/2023 through the present.73
2. Issued March 15, 2023: You are hereby commanded to provide any and all
phone calls and inmate information for calls that have been placed to phone
number: (484) 860-5151 from 03/10/2023 through 03/14/2023.74

71
See State’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress and/or Exclude
Prison Phone Call Evidence at 2. (indicating that the State was only seeking records
from January 1, 2022 to February 22, 2022 as a result of the February 2022 DOC
Subpoena).
72
Initially, the Defense, in its Motion to Suppress and/or Exclude Defendant’s
DOC Communications, indicated that no subpoenas were issued for the 2023
communications. The Court requested clarification on this issue after the State’s
Response attached the March 2023 Subpoenas. It appears that although the March
2023 Subpoenas were issued, the Defense saw them for the first time on April 8,
2023 when it received the State’s Response. In any event, the Defense filed a
response letter in Support of its Motion to Suppress and/or Exclude the DOC
Subpoenas, so any harm by the failure of the State to provide the subpoenas earlier
is minimal.
73
State’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress and/or Exclude Prison
Phone Call Evidence, Ex. C. (emphasis in original) (April 8, 2023).
74
Id. at Ex. D. (emphasis in original).

22
 3. Issued March 17, 2023: You are herby commanded to provide any and all
phone calls and inmate information for calls that have been placed to phone
number: (484) 860-5151 from 01/01/2022 through 03/31/2022.75
4. Issued March 23, 2023: You are hereby commanded to provide any and all
phone calls and inmate information for calls that have been placed to phone
number: (484) 860-5151 from 01/01/2022 through 03/17/2023.76
5. Issued March 23, 2023: You are hereby commanded to provide any and all
phone calls and call detail sheets for all calls placed from 03/10/23 through
03/23/23 by the DOC PIN assigned to inmate, Ryan Flamer SBI 00480896,
DOB: 06/30/1980, AND which were placed to any of the following phone
numbers: (267) 261-7052, (484) 860-5151, (484) 868-2555. 77
6. Issued March 24, 2023: You are hereby commanded to provide all records
regarding telephone, visiting room conversations and DOC tablet electronic
messages or video calls for inmate DASHAN FREEMAN, SBI# 00394097,
DOB: 06/24/1982, including, but not limited to any and al available approved
phone number lists, outgoing call log entries and conversations for the time
period of 03/21/2023 through 03/24/2023.78

The Court finds that the State has met the reasonableness requirements of

Martinez for the March 2023 Subpoenas. As to the first prong, the State indicates

that as trial neared, the State’s Investigator, Guillermo Santiago, made contact with

Bethea to hand deliver subpoenas for her for a trial preparation meeting and trial.79

Inv. Santiago spoke with Bethea on March 9, 2023, but Bethea was reluctant to speak

75
Id. (emphasis in original).
76
Id. (emphasis in original).
77
Id. (emphasis in original).
78
Id. (emphasis in original).
79
State’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress and/or Exclude Prison
Phone Call Evidence at 3.

23
with Santiago and did not seem interested in any part of the upcoming trial. As a

result of this, the State believed there was still on-going communications between

Bethea and Defendant, and the State issued the March 9, 2023 subpoena.

Moreover, on March 13, 2023, Bethea came to the Department of Justice after

being issued a subpoena. At that time, Bethea told the State “she was not going to

testify, she was not going to come to court, she wanted nothing to do with the case.”80

After a continued investigation, the State believed that Bethea was using the name

“Gab Jackson” to speak to Defendant.81 The State also believed that Defendant may

have asked another inmate to put Bethea on the other inmate’s DOC call log, or PIN

sheet, thereby avoiding detection. 82 As a result, the State issued the subpoenas listed

in numbers two through five, above. 83

The Court finds that the State meets the first prong of the Martinez Standard

because the State was continuing its ongoing investigation of the incident, along with

the possibility of witness tampering by Defendant. Again, Defendant argues that the

State attempts to justify the subpoena based on information learned from the

80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.

24
subpoena, but that is not the case. The State only issued the March 2023 Subpoenas

after the State met with Bethea and she indicated she was not willing to testify and

“wanted nothing to do with the case.” The March 2023 Subpoenas were also issued

after the State discovered that Bethea may be communicating to Defendant under

the name “Gab Jackson” and that between January 1, 2022 to February 17, 2023 one

hundred and thirty nine (139) calls were made to Bethea’s phone, utilizing the PIN

numbers of three other inmates.84

For all these reasons, the State had reason to believe that Defendant was

tampering with a witness, Bethea, although he had a no contact order. The Supreme

Court in Johnson v. State held that potential witness tampering supports the first

prong of the Martinez Standard.85 The Court also finds that the time period in the

March 2023 Subpoenas also meets the Martinez Standard. Again, as the Supreme

Court held in Johnson, “[i]t was reasonable to require the production of all letters

that Johnson sent during the entirety of his incarceration pending trial in order to

ascertain whether he had contact with [the witness] either directly or indirectly.”86

The same is true here.

84
Id. at 7, ¶¶5-7.
85
Johnson v. State, 983 A.2d 904, 921 (Del. 2009) (holding that potential
witness tampering met the first prong of Martinez).
86
Id. at 922.
25
Late Disclosure of DOC Records

Defendant argues that because the DOC records were not disclosed in a timely

manner, all DOC records must be excluded. The Court notes that the January 2023

through March 2023 DOC records were sent to defense counsel on March 17, 2023.

On April 7, 2023, the State provided additional discovery from January 2022 to

defense counsel. The Court focuses this decision on the records sent on March 17,

2023, as the records received on April 7, 2023 are subject to Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss for Prosecutorial Misconduct, which is not a part of this decision.

The Court will not exclude the DOC records sent to the defense on March 17,

2023 due to their late disclosure. As indicated in the State’s Response, the State only

sent subpoenas to the DOC in March 2023 after Bethea indicated she did not wish

to have anything to do with this trial and that she would not testify voluntarily. It

appears the State then promptly turned these records over to the defense. Therefore,

any prejudice to the defense is minimal, especially in light of the fact that the State

only recently received the records as well.

III. Defendant’s Motion to Exclude All Evidence Obtained from Deona
Bethea’s Cell Phone
The alleged incident in this case occurred on June 25, 2020. On that same

date, the State downloaded Bethea’s cell phone and obtained 55,518 pages worth of

evidence.

26
 On October 21, 2020, prior counsel for Defendant sent a discovery letter to

the State requesting, among other things, “[a]ny books, papers, documents,

photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, which are material to the

preparation of the defendant’s defense or are intended for use by the state as evidence

in chief at trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant.” 87

On February 16, 2022, 88 the State provided certain discovery to Defendant,

including the Wilmington Police Report dated April 13, 2021 (the “Police Report”)

related to the June 25, 2020 incident. 89 The Police Report listed as physical evidence

a “Signed Consent to Search Form for Deona Bethea’s cellular phone, signed by

Bethea” along with “Phone Extractions.” Included in the Police Report are text

messages exchanged between the Defendant and Bethea, including dates and time

stamps. None of the 55,518 pages of evidence from Bethea’s phone, including text

messages, were provided to the defense until March 10, 2023.

87
April 6, 2023 Supplemental Letter to the Court from Ross A. Flockerzie and
Alexandria M. Shaffer, Exhibit B.
88
The Court set April 21, 2021 as the discovery deadline in this matter.
89
See Wilmington Police Department complaint #30-20-53253, and includes:
Supplemental police report by Detective Kane, Redacted Supplemental police report
by Corporal Santana, Supplemental police report by Detective Kane and Redacted
Supplemental police report by Detective Kane.

27
 Defendant argues that the entire extraction from Bethea’s cell phone should

be excluded.90 According to Defendant, a discovery violation has occurred, and

therefore the only proper remedy is to exclude the evidence from Bethea’s cell phone

in its entirety. 91 The State argues that because Defendant did not specifically request

the cell phone extraction, it was not obligated to provide it to Defendant. 92 The State

also argues that Defendant has had the relevant text messages at issue, even though

it was in a different format, because the verbatim text messages were included in

Detective Kane’s police report provided to Defendant on February 16, 2022.93

All Evidence from Bethea’s Cell Phone, Except the Text Messages from the
Police Report, are Excluded

Superior Court Criminal Rule 16(a)(1)(C) requires the State to permit the

defendant to examine “books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects,

buildings or places,” provided that they “are within the possession, custody or

control of the [S]tate” and are either (1) “material to the preparation of the defense,”

(2) “intended for use by the [S]tate as evidence in chief at the trial,” or (3) “were

90
Defendant’s Motion to Exclude All Evidence Obtained from Deona Bethea’s
Cell Phone (April 5, 2023).
91
Id.
92
State’s Letter Response to Defendant’s Motion to Exclude (April 8, 2023).
93
Id. at 2.

28
obtained from or belong to the defendant.” 94 Under this rule, the State has an

obligation to look for discoverable evidence and a continuing responsibility to

disclose the existence of such evidence.95 Rule 16(d)(3)(B) requires the State to

respond to a discovery request served upon it within twenty days after service of the

request unless some other time is ordered by the Court.96

In evaluating discovery violations, the Court is required to engage in a two-

step inquiry. First, the Court must determine if a violation of Superior Court

Criminal Rule 16 occurred.97 If no violation occurred, the Court will end its

inquiry.98 If, however, the Court concludes a discovery violation has occurred, the

Court will apply the following three-factor test considering: “(1) the centrality of the

error to the case; (2) the closeness of the case; and (3) the steps taken to mitigate the

results of the error.”99

The Court finds that a discovery violation occurred because the State did not

provide Bethea’s cell phone extraction – containing 55,518 pages that the State has

94
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 16(a)(1)(C).
95
Patterson v. State, 276 A.3d 1055, at *4 (Del. 2022) (TABLE).
96
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 16(d)(3)(B).
97
Wharton v. State, 246 A.3d 110, 116 (Del. 2021) (citation omitted).
98
Wright v. State, 25 A.3d 747, 753 (Del. 2011).
99
Oliver v. State, 60 A.3d 1093, 1096-97 (Del. 2013).
29
had in its possession for nearly three years – until a month prior to trial. The Court

will therefore apply the three-factor test to the facts of this case. Here, the error is

central to this case – the cell phone extraction at issue is from one of the alleged

victims. This is also a close case. From the voluminous filings over the past few

days, the Court can infer that Bethea is a key witness, and her testimony is central to

the case. Defendant has indicated that there is no DNA evidence, no fingerprint

evidence, no confession, no firearm, and no cell site location data. 100 Finally, it does

not appear to the Court that the State took any steps to mitigate the error, other than

dumping tens of thousands of pages of a cell phone approximately three weeks prior

to trial.

The Court finds that the appropriate remedy here is to exclude the entire

extraction from Bethea’s cell phone, except for the text messages contained in

Detective Kane’s Police Report. Defendant will not be prejudiced by the inclusion

of the text messages from the Police Report in evidence because the defense has

been in possession of the exact contents of the messages since May 2022. If the

defense uses any documents from Bethea’s cell phone in his case (other than the text

100
See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Prosecutorial Misconduct (April 7,
2023) at 2.
30
messages from the Police Report), the Court will consider to what extent the State

may use the excluded documents in rebuttal during trial. 101

IV. Deona Bethea’s Police Interview Transcript

On April 6, 2023, in a conference with the Court during a break from jury

selection, the parties discussed potential redactions to Bethea’s June 25, 2020

statement to Detective Kane (the “3507 Statement”). At issue here is a back-and-

forth between Detective Kane and Bethea, where Bethea recounts a text exchange

she purportedly had with the Defendant the day of the incident. 102 The Court gave

both parties an opportunity to supplement the record with case law on the issue, but

only Defendant chose to make a submission. 103

The Court will not discuss the requirements of 11 Del. C. § 3507, as the only

issue currently before the Court is whether Bethea’s recounting of her text exchange

101
See State v. McGuinness, 2022 WL 1580601, at * (Del. Super. May 18, 2022)
(balancing the appropriate sanction for a discovery violation of failing to produce
evidence timely).
102
See Interview of Deona B[e]thea, dated June 25, 2020 at 4:16-6:20.
103
See Defendant’s Letter re: 3507 Statement (April 7, 2023). On Sunday, April
9, 2023, the Court inquired whether the State intended to make a submission, since
the Court had ordered the parties submit any case law by April 8, 2023. The State
wrote to the Court that it “will submit nothing more on the[] 3507 issue, other than
it recounts statements by a party opponent and the conversation lends context for
what transpires later.” See email from John Downs, Esquire, to the Court, dated
April 9, 2023 at 5:21 p.m.

31
with Defendant constitutes hearsay. Hearsay is a statement that: “(1) [t]he declarant

does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) [a] party offers

in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” 104 Hearsay is

“not admissible except as provided by law or by these Rules.”105

The State argued during the conference with the Court on April 6, 2023 that

the State is not offering the 3507 Statement for the truth of the matter asserted, and

it is therefore not hearsay. Defense counters in its letter to the Court that “Ms. Bethea

testifying on the witness stand about what Ms. Bethea said in a [text] message is

hearsay,” because “[i]t is an out of court statement offered for the truth of the matter

asserted.106

The Court finds that Bethea’s Section 3507 Statement telling Detective Kane

what Defendant told her is not hearsay, as it is not being offered for the truth of the

matter asserted. “Where the significance of an offered statement lies solely in the

fact that it was made, no issue is raised as to the truth of the matter asserted, and the

104
D.R.E. 801(c).
105
D.R.E. 802.
106
Defendant’s April 7, 2023 Letter to the Court at 4. Defendant states that the
message is a social media message, but upon the Court’s review of the transcript, the
message at issue appears to be a text message. Whether the message is a text
message or social media message does not change the Court’s analysis.

32
statement is not hearsay.”107 Here, the statements were made in a context of a police

interview discussing the events of that night, and Bethea was discussing the fact that

she and Defendant were exchanging text messages. The State is not seeking to admit

the statements for their truth, but rather that the conversation occurred. Therefore,

this specific portion of Bethea’s Section 3507 Statement is not hearsay and will not

be excluded. 108

107
Edwards v. State, 925 A.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Del. 2007) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
108
Id. Even if the 3507 could be considered hearsay, Defendant’s statements to
Bethea are admissible as an admission by a party-opponent under D.R.E. 801(2)(A).
The Supreme Court of Delaware in Flonnory v. State held that a witness’s 3507
statement, recounting what the defendant told him, was admissible even though it
was double hearsay as an admission by a party-opponent. 893 A.2d 507, 512 (Del.
2006). The same is true here. As such, the relevant portions of Bethea’s Section
3507 Statement will not be excluded if the statement ends up being used at trial.
This ruling, of course, does not relieve the State of its burden of properly offering
Bethea’s Section 3507 Statement into evidence.

33
 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress and/or Exclude

Evidence from Defendant’s Cell Phone is GRANTED; Defendant’s Motion to

Suppress and/or Exclude Defendant’s Department of Correction Communications is

DENIED; Defendant’s Motion to Exclude All Evidence Obtained from Deona

Bethea’s Cell Phone is GRANTED, in part; and Defendant’s Motion to Exclude

Certain § 3507 Statements as Hearsay is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Meghan A. Adams
Meghan A. Adams, Judge

34