Cody Bragg v. State of Alabama

REL: March 24, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
_________________________

CR-21-0361
_________________________

Cody Bragg

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Sumter Circuit Court
(CC-17-57)

KELLUM, Judge.

The appellant, Cody Bragg, was convicted of robbery in the first

degree, a violation of § 13A-8-4(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, and carrying a

pistol without a license, a violation of § 13A-11-73, Ala. Code 1975. He

was sentenced to concurrent terms of 20 years in prison for the robbery
CR-21-0361

conviction and to 1 year for the carrying-a-pistol-without-a-license

conviction.

The State's evidence tended to show that Arnaud Laporte-Leleu, a

fighter pilot in the French Navy, was undergoing fighter-pilot training in

February 201 at a naval base in Meridian, Mississippi. Laporte-Leleu

owned a 2014 Mustang vehicle. Laporte-Leleu testified that at the

conclusion of his training he listed the vehicle for sale on Craig's List, an

internet market-place, for $15,000. Bragg, he said, texted him and said

that he was interested in purchasing the vehicle. Bragg came to Laporte-

Leleu's house and drove the vehicle. The next morning, Bragg returned

to look at the vehicle a second time and told Laporte-Leleu that he

wanted to purchase the vehicle. When filling out the title, Laporte-Leleu

said, he made a mistake, so he and Bragg agreed to meet at the

courthouse to get a duplicate title. While they were at the courthouse,

Bragg took the title, and Laporte-Leleu said that he did not see that title

again. The two traveled from Mississippi to the Bank of York in York,

Alabama, so that Bragg could get the money for the vehicle. Bragg could

not get the money at the bank, Laporte-Leleu said, because Bragg told

him that he did not have his credit card. (R. 58.) Laporte-Leleu's

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roommate, Antoine Gaffet, was following them in another vehicle. Bragg

had them go to his father's house and various other places in York and

Cuba, Alabama, to try and get the money for the vehicle. At one point,

Laporte-Leleu said, Bragg told him that there was trouble with the

engine so Bragg, who was driving the vehicle, stopped the Mustang.

"[Laporte-Leleu]: We opened the hood. There was
nothing. We closed the hood. And at this time, I remember
like Cody Bragg look at me very -- it was a cold look, very cold
look, and then we come back on the car. And the way we sit
down at this time, so he was in the driving place. I was in the
passenger place. He put the gun on me, and he said, 'Leave
the car. It's mine.'

"At this time, I attempted to put the gun out. I
attempted to put him out of the car, and I attempted to put
him on the ground without hurting him. …

"At this time, I call my friend Antoine Gaffet was still --
he was waiting on us, I think, at the bank, if I remember well.
And at this time, he came and put the gun out of the hands of
Cody Bragg. Pulled out the magazine. We can see all the
bullets in the magazine and put everything in his car, the gun
in one part of the car and the magazine in another part. …

"At this time, I call everybody in the French -- I call my
boss, U.S. and French boss. And Antoine attempted to stop
someone in the road to help us and to call police for them to
come very quickly.

"And at this time, there is another person coming from
house on the hood, [sic], and they put the gun on us as well,
big guns, and put us on the ground just to stabilize the
situation. And we were waiting for the police to come. …"

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(R. 60-62.) Police discovered the title for the vehicle inside Bragg's pants.

It appeared that Bragg had forged Laporte-Leleu's name on the title.

I.

Bragg argues that the circuit court erred in allowing two witnesses,

Laporte-Leleu and Gaffet, to testify via two-way-video link or Zoom video

teleconferencing because, he says, doing so violated his right to confront

his accusers. He asserts that the text of the Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution contains no exception to a defendant's right

to confront his accusers. The State argues that the circuit court's ruling

was proper according to the Florida Supreme Court's holding in Harrell

v. State, 709 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1998).

The record shows that in October 2021, the State moved that the

circuit court allow two witnesses to testify via two-way video link. The

State asserted that the victim, Laporte-Leleu, and another witness,

Antoine Gaffet, were both active-duty fighter pilots in the French Navy

and would not be able to appear in person to testify in the foreseeable

future. (C. 133-34.) Bragg objected. (C. 141.) The State filed an

extensive response to Bragg's objection. (Supp. C. 2-10.) In this response,

the State asserted, in part:

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"The two witnesses, Mr. Arnaud Laporte-Leleu and Mr.
Antoine Gaffet permanently reside in France and are beyond
the subpoena power of the court. The testimony of the two
French witnesses is absolutely essential to this case. Mr.
Laporte-Leleu is the sole victim of [Bragg's] attack and Mr.
Gaffet is the only other non-party witness to the incident. The
State cannot compel the presence and testimony of these
individuals. Additionally, the two witnesses are constantly
assigned to active-duty military missions with the French
Navy placing them on carrier ships and military planes for
months at a time. They cannot disobey the ordered
assignments for the extended period of time necessary to
testify in person nor do they wish to neglect their duties of
serving their country. Without the testimony of Mr. Arnaud
Laporte-Leleu and Mr. Antoine Gaffet, the State cannot
prosecute this case. The State further submits that the
violent offense of armed robbery is not an action that should
be unpunished in Sumter County simply because [Bragg]
criminalized a foreign victim who is permanently out of the
country. For these reasons combined, allowing the witnesses
to testify by way of Zoom is absolutely imperative to the
State's interest in the expeditious and just resolution of
violent offense pending in the state court system.

"The State further submits an additional factor for
consideration: accommodating the military service of the
French Navy witnesses who are on active-duty assignment
and unable to travel to the United States to testify. The
Alabama Armed Services Accommodation Act recognizes such
an exception to the Confrontation Clause and allows video
testimony by active-duty U.S. Military officers. …"

(Supp. C. 5-6.) A hearing was held on the motion. At the hearing, the

prosecutor discussed the reasons why the motion should be granted and

responded to Bragg's arguments made in his objection to the motion. The

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circuit court granted the State's motion "on the authority of Maryland v.

Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990)." (C. 157.)

"The Confrontation Clause [of the Sixth Amendment of the United

States Constitution] provides two types of protections for a criminal

defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against him, and

the right to conduct cross-examination." Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480

U.S. 39, 51 (1987). Likewise, the Alabama Constitution provides that

"in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right … to be confronted

by the witnesses against him." Ala. Const. Art. I, § 6.

The United States Supreme Court in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S.

836 (1990), recognized that the right of confrontation is not "absolute"

and that that right "must occasionally give way to considerations of

public policy and the necessities of the case." 497 U.S. at 849. The Craig

Court stated:

"[O]ur precedents establish that 'the Confrontation
Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at
trial,' [Ohio v.] Roberts, 448 U.S. [56], at 63, 100 S.Ct. [2531],
at 2537 [(1980)] (emphasis added; footnote omitted), a
preference that 'must occasionally give way to considerations
of public policy and the necessities of the case,' Mattox [v.
United States], 156 U.S. [237], at 243, 15 S.Ct. [337], at 339-
340 [(1895)]. '[W]e have attempted to harmonize the goal of
the Clause -- placing limits on the kind of evidence that may
be received against a defendant -- with a societal interest in

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accurate factfinding, which may require consideration of out-
of-court statements.' Bourjaily [v. United States], 483 U.S.
[171], at 182, 107 S.Ct. [2775], at 2782 [(1987)]. We have
accordingly interpreted the Confrontation Clause in a manner
sensitive to its purposes and sensitive to the necessities of
trial and the adversary process. See, e.g., Kirby [v. United
States], 174 U.S. [47], at 61, 19 S.Ct.[574], at 578 [(1899)] ('It
is scarcely necessary to say that to the rule that an accused is
entitled to be confronted with witnesses against him the
admission of dying declarations is an exception which arises
from the necessity of the case'); Chambers [v. Mississippi], 410
U.S. [284], at 295, 93 S.Ct. [1038], at 1045 [(1973)] ('Of course,
the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and
may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process'). Thus,
though we reaffirm the importance of face-to-face
confrontation with witnesses appearing at trial, we cannot
say that such confrontation is an indispensable element of the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to confront one's
accusers. Indeed, one commentator has noted that '[i]t is all
but universally assumed that there are circumstances that
excuse compliance with the right of confrontation.' Graham,
The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter
Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 Crim. L. Bull. 99, 107–108
(1972)."

497 U.S. at 850.

Alabama has not had occasion to address whether testimony via a

two-way live video link violates the Confrontation Clause. The majority

of courts that have addressed this issue have analyzed this issue using

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CR-21-0361

the test articulated in Maryland v. Craig.1 The United States Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, a circuit that includes Alabama, has

"acknowledge[d] that Craig supplies the proper test for admissibility of

two-way video conference testimony." United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d

1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006).

As stated above, the State relies on the Florida Supreme Court case

of Harrell v. State, supra, to support the court's ruling in this case. In

Harrell, two victims, whose residence was in Argentina, were robbed

while on vacation in Florida. The State moved that the couple be allowed

to testify via satellite transmission because of the distance and the health

problems of one of the witnesses. The court granted the State's motion,

and Harrell was convicted of robbery. On appeal, Harrell argued that his

right to confront his accusers was violated. In upholding the trial court's

ruling, the Supreme Court of Florida adopted the analysis used by the

United States Supreme Court in Craig. The court found that public-

1Our research revealed that the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir.
1999), used an "exceptional-circumstances" test to evaluate this issue.
The basis for that court's holding was that the testimony in Gigante was
via two-way video technology and the testimony in Craig was one-way
video. It held that the two-way technology "preserved the face-to-face
confrontation." Gigante, 166 F.3d at 81.
8
CR-21-0361

policy considerations justified remote testimony because the witnesses

were beyond the subpoena power of the court; it was "clearly in our state's

interest to expeditiously and justly resolve criminal matters that are

pending in the state court system"; one of the witnesses was in poor

health and could not travel to the U.S.; and the two witnesses were

essential to the case. Harrell, 709 So. 2d at 1369-70.

We agree that the proper analysis begins with the United States

Supreme Court's test in Maryland v. Craig. The Arizona Court of

Appeals in State ex rel. Montgomery v. Kemp, 239 Ariz. 332, 371 P.3d

660 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016), discussed Craig and subsequent decisions

addressing that holding.

"While recognizing the Constitution's preference for
face-to-face confrontation, however, the Supreme Court has
clarified that the right to face-to-face confrontation is not
absolute. [Maryland v.] Craig[, 497 U.S. 836 (1990),] set forth
a test for abridging the preference for face-to-face
confrontation with video testimony: the State must show that
(1) the denial of face-to-face confrontation is necessary to
further an important public policy; (2) the reliability of the
testimony is otherwise assured; and (3) there is a case-specific
showing of necessity for the accommodation. Id. at 850, 110
S.Ct. 3157. Although Davis notes that Craig involved one-
way closed-circuit television and child witnesses, including
the alleged victim, who could not see or hear the defendant,
nothing in its holding suggests its application is limited to
such cases. See People v. Wrotten, 14 N.Y.3d 33, 896 N.Y.S.2d
711, 923 N.E.2d 1099, 1103 (2009) ('Nowhere does Craig

9
CR-21-0361

suggest that it is limited to child witnesses or that a "public
policy" basis for finding necessity must be codified. Indeed,
federal courts have permitted live video testimony in a variety
of circumstances, including instances where public policy is
implicated by a key witness too ill to appear in court....' (citing
Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 317-18 (5th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Benson, 79 Fed. Appx. 813, 820-21 (6th Cir.
2003); United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir.
1999))).

"Since deciding Craig, the Supreme Court has not
further examined the constitutionality of remote video
testimony or considered new types of technology available to
facilitate remote testimony, such as the two-way video
conferencing the State seeks to use in this case that would
allow E.P. and Davis to hear and see one another
simultaneously. See State v. Rogerson, 855 N.W.2d 495, 499-
500 (Iowa 2014); see also Wrotten v. New York, 560 U.S. 959,
959, 130 S.Ct. 2520, 177 L.Ed.2d 316 (2010) (Sotomayor, J.,
respecting denial of petition for writ of certiorari) (noting that
the question of and standards for the use of two-way video
testimony in a petitioner's trial 'is not obviously answered by
Maryland v. Craig'). Moreover, no Arizona opinion has
addressed the question of allowing adult witnesses to testify
using two-way video technology.

"Numerous federal and state courts have extended
Craig to the use of two-way video testimony for adult
witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307,
1313 (11th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging Craig as the proper test
for the admissibility of two-way video conference testimony
and noting agreement with the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits); Rogerson, 855 N.W.2d at 506-07 (Iowa
Supreme Court approving the use of two-way video testimony
for adult witnesses, provided the Craig factors are met); White
v. State, 223 Md. App. 353, 116 A.3d 520, 540-49 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2015) (applying Craig to allow a witness in a cold
case to testify by two-way video because it would be 'cruel and

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unnecessary to require her to fly' given her health concerns);
People v. Buie, 285 Mich. App. 401, 775 N.W.2d 817, 825
(2009) (applying Craig to two-way video testimony, '[l]ike the
majority of federal courts that have examined this issue'); City
of Missoula v. Duane, 380 Mont. 290, 355 P.3d 729, 734 (2015)
(applying Craig to allow the two-way video testimony of a
doctor whose testimony in three trials would cause a
prohibitive expense to the city and place a significant burden
on the doctor); Commonwealth v. Atkinson, 987 A.2d 743, 750-
51, ¶¶ 16-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (applying Craig and
concluding that the defendant's right to confrontation had
been violated because expediting disposition of the case was
an insufficient reason for allowing the use of two-way video
testimony); Bush v. State, 193 P.3d 203, 215-16, ¶¶ 52–53
(Wyo. 2008) (applying Craig to allow a witness's testimony via
two-way video 'to further the important public policy of
preventing further harm to his already serious medical
condition')."

239 Ariz. at 335-36, 371 P.3d at 663-64. See also Rivera v. State, 381

S.W.3d 710, 713 (Tex. App. 2012) ("We conclude that under the

circumstances, the preference for having witnesses testify in the

courtroom must give way to the practical considerations involving

Taylor's military obligation that made his physical presence impractical.

The procedure the trial court followed, allowing Taylor to participate in

the trial by live videoconference while in full view of those participating

in the courtroom, did not violate Rivera's rights under the Confrontation

Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. VI.").

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Thus, this Court will consider whether the use of two-way video

testimony was necessary to further an important public policy or

necessity and whether the witnesses' testimony was reliable. Maryland

v. Craig, 497 U.S. at 850.

Public Policy/Necessity. "There is … a general consensus among

courts that mere convenience, efficiency, and cost-saving are not

sufficiently important public necessities to justify depriving a defendant

of face-to-face confrontation." State v. Rogerson, 855 N.W.2d 495, 507

(Iowa 2014). "Illness has been [a] justification that courts have found

sufficient to satisfy the Craig 'necessity' prong." Rogerson, 855 N.W.2d

at 506; Harrell v. State, 709 So. 2d at 1370. The Texas Court of Appeals

in Rivera v. State, supra, held that a witness's military service was also

a sufficient necessity to warrant two-way video testimony.

In 2015, the Alabama Legislature passed "The Alabama Armed

Services Accommodation Act" codified at § 12-21-135.1, Ala. Code 1975.

This Act provides, in part:

"(b) The Legislature finds it to be an important matter
of public policy that an accommodation be made for military
members who are asked to testify in civil or criminal trials in
this state but are unable to attend in person. The purpose of
this section is to ease the burdens on military personnel and
their families brought on by the duty of appearing as a

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witness in a trial in this state when summoned. The purpose
of this section is also to allow members of the armed services
to assist in trials in this state as witnesses without
interrupting their military service, while protecting the rights
of all parties in civil or criminal litigation. The purpose of this
section is also to better enable the fact-finder to obtain crucial
evidence and will aid in the expeditious resolution of cases in
this state by providing a procedure in which testimony of a
person serving in the armed services may be taken without
undue hardship.)"

Based on the wording of the above statute, Alabama has recognized the

important public policy in making accommodation for active-duty

military personnel who are witnesses in an Alabama court.

In this case, the two witnesses were active-duty fighter pilots in the

French Navy. Laporte-Leleu and Gaffet both testified that they were

currently stationed at an air station in France and were also on the

Aircraft Carrier Charles de Gaulle. They were thus outside the subpoena

power of the State. One of the witnesses was the victim and the other

was an eye witness to the events. The testimony of the two witnesses

was necessary for the State's prosecution of Bragg, and their active-duty

military service made it extremely difficult to travel to Alabama to

testify. This prong of the Craig test was satisfied.

Reliability.

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"The reliability portion of [the] test [in Maryland v.]
Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990)] is met by a 'combined effect of
these elements of confrontation -- physical presence, oath,
cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier
of fact.' Craig, 497 U.S. at 846, 110 S.Ct. 3157. Because the
Craig Court stated the combination of oath, cross-
examination, and observation of a witness's demeanor
'adequately ensures that the testimony is both reliable and
subject to rigorous adversarial testing in a manner
functionally equivalent to that accorded live, in-person
testimony,' the reliability portion of Craig’s test is generally
not discussed in detail by courts. Id. at 851, 110 S.Ct. 3157."

State v. Smith, 636 S.W.3d 576, 583 (Mo. 2022).

The record shows that before the two witnesses testified via two-

way video, they were given an oath. The following is contained in the

record:

"[T]he oath is being administered by Honorable Consulate of
the United States assigned to Paris, France by J. Etprng
pursuant to the 1998 United States France Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty.[ 2] This was approved by or facilitated by
Justice Attache Andrew Finkleman of the Department of
Justice in the United States Embassy in Paris, France."

2The Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters is a Treaty
between the United States and France that was signed in Paris on
December 10, 1998. "The Treaty provides for a broad range of
cooperation in criminal matters. Mutual assistance available under the
Treaty includes: obtaining the testimony or statements of person. …"
Article 8(4) of the Treaty further provides that if a person gives false
testimony they are subject to prosecution. "[A]n oath is only effective if
the witness can be subjected to prosecution for perjury upon making a
knowingly false statement." Harrell v. State, 709 So. 2d at 1371.
14
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(R. 42.) The witnesses were subject to cross-examination. In fact, the

cross-examination of Laporte-Leleu was extensive. (R. 70-92.) The two

witnesses were also in view of the jury, and the defendant was able to see

and hear both witnesses. Nothing in the record suggests that problems

were encountered in the two-way video during the witnesses' testimony.

Thus, this prong of the Craig test was also satisfied.

For the above reasons, we find that the two factors in Craig were

satisfied and that the two-way video testimony of the two active-duty

military witnesses did not violate Bragg's right to confront his accusers.

Therefore, Bragg is due no relief on this claim.

II.

Bragg also argues that the circuit court erred by allowing the

admission of evidence in violation of the Alabama Rules of Evidence at

the hearing on the State's motion for two-way video testimony.

Specifically, he argues that the prosecutor was allowed to explain to the

court why the victim should be allowed to testify via two-way video, but

he had no opportunity to cross-examine the prosecutor's statements to

the court.

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CR-21-0361

Initially, we question whether the Alabama Rules of Evidence apply

to a pretrial hearing. Rule 1101(b), Ala. R. Evid, addresses those

situations where the Rules of Evidence do not apply:

"Rules Inapplicable. These rules, other than those with
respect to privileges, do not apply in the following situations:

"(1) Preliminary Questions of Fact. The determination
of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence
when the issue is to be determined by the court under Rule
104.

"(2) Grand Jury. Proceedings before grand juries.

"(3) Miscellaneous Proceedings. Proceedings for
extradition or rendition; preliminary hearings in criminal
cases; sentencing, or granting or revoking probation; issuance
of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses, and search
warrants; and proceedings with respect to release on bail or
otherwise.

"(4) Contempt Proceedings. Contempt proceedings in
which the court may act summarily."

Rule 104, Ala. R. Evid., states, in part:

"(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally. Preliminary
questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of section (b). In making its determination it is not
bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges."

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Second, the State argues that the United States Supreme Court in

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), recognized that the right to

confrontation is a trial right. Many courts have held that the right to

confrontation does not extend to pretrial hearings. See State v. Zamzow,

374 Wis. 2d 220, 242, 892 N.W.2d 637, 649 (2017) ("The right to

confrontation arose at common law as a tool to test witness reliability at

trial. With the advent of pretrial evidentiary hearings during the

twentieth century, the Supreme Court has signaled that the right to

confrontation persists as a trial protection and does not apply during

pretrial proceedings."); State v. Timmerman, 218 P. 3d 590, 593 (Utah

2009) ("[The] holding [in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004),]

does not extend to preliminary hearings in state proceedings."); State v.

Daly, 278 Neb. 903, 924, 775 N.W.2d 47, 66 (2009) ("[I]t is well

established that Confrontation Clause rights are trial rights that do not

extend to pretrial hearings in state proceedings."); Vanmeter v. State,

165 S.W.3d 68-74-75 (Tex. App. 2005) ("In summary, we conclude that

Crawford did not change prior law that the constitutional right of

confrontation is a trial right, not a pretrial right which would transform

it into a 'constitutionally compelled rule of discovery.' ").

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Furthermore, if any error occurred that error was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986).

The questions that Bragg posed during the pretrial hearing that he says

he was not allowed to ask the prosecutor were questions that Bragg asked

Laporte-Leleu during his cross-examination.3 Specifically, counsel

questioned Laporte-Leleu extensively about his ability to travel to the

United States to testify. Laporte-Leleu's answers were consistent with

the statements made by the prosecutor at the hearing on the motion and

in the prosecutor's lengthy written response to Bragg's objection to the

remote testimony. Thus, if any error occurred, that error was harmless.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Bragg's convictions for robbery

and for carrying a pistol without a license.

AFFIRMED.

Windom, P.J., and McCool, J., concur. Cole, J., concurs in the result.

Minor, J., dissents, with opinion.

3Bragg also argued at the hearing that the circuit court should have
placed the prosecutor under oath. "Ultimately, 'attorneys are officers of
the court and "when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter
before the court, their declarations are virtually made under oath." ' "
State v. Miller, 975 N.W.2d 807, 814 (Iowa 2022), quoting Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 486 (1978).
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MINOR, Judge, dissenting.

The Constitution protects actual rights, not virtual ones. 4 Our

founding charters—the United States Constitution5 and the Alabama

Constitution 6—protect the ancient right to confront one's accusers in

open court face-to-face and in person. 7 A jury convicted Cody Bragg based

on evidence from two witnesses who testified, not in person in the Sumter

County courthouse where Bragg was tried, but remotely by video from a

courtroom in France. "The simple truth is that confrontation through a

video monitor is not the same as physical face-to-face confrontation,"8

4See Order of the Supreme Court, 207 F.R.D. 89, 94 (2002)
(statement of Scalia, J.) ("Virtual confrontation might be sufficient to
protect virtual constitutional rights; I doubt whether it is sufficient to
protect real ones.").

5U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him
...").

6Art.I, § 6, Ala. Const. 2022 ("[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused has a right … to be confronted by the witnesses against him …").

7See Ex parte Rodriguez, [No. SC-2022-0845, Jan. 21, 2023] ___ So.
3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2023) (Parker, C.J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]he
common-law right to confront one's accusers face to face goes back to the
Roman Empire and ancient Israel" and discussing the protection of the
right to confrontation in the common law and in the founding of America).

8United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2006).
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and, understandably, Bragg objected repeatedly to the trial court's

permitting the witnesses to testify via video. This Court holds that the

testimony by video did not violate Bragg's right to confront his accusers.

I respectfully dissent.

Bragg was arrested and charged with the offenses in March 2017.

The two main witnesses at trial were the alleged victim, Arnaud Laporte-

Leleu, and his roommate, Antoine Gaffet. Laporte-Leleu and Gaffet were

members of the French military who were temporarily in the United

States for training. They remained in the United States until at least

June 2017. More than four years later, the State moved the trial court to

allow Laporte-Leleu and Gaffet to testify against Bragg remotely via a

two-way video. In response to Bragg's objections, the State asserted that

the witnesses lived in France, that they were beyond the subpoena power

of the trial court, and that their testimony was "absolutely essential to

this case."

At the hearing on the State's motion, the State offered only

representations by the prosecutor in support of the motion, including that

the witnesses allegedly were out of the United States within a month of

the offense and that "[t]here's no question [the witnesses] can't come

20
CR-21-0361

back" to the United States. The State also cited the Alabama Armed

Services Accommodation Act, § 12-21-135.1, Ala. Code 1975, in support

of its motion, although the State conceded that § 12-21-135.1 applies only

to members of the United States military. See § 12-21-135.1(d)(2), Ala.

Code 1975 (defining "armed services" as "[t]he federal military forces of

the United States including the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force,

Coast Guard, a reserve component thereof, and the National Guard").

Bragg pointed out that § 12-21-135.1 allows testimony by video in a

criminal case only if both parties consent. § 12-21-135.1(f), Ala. Code

1975. Bragg also asserted that the State had made no effort to depose the

witnesses before they left the United States. See Rule 16.6, Ala. R. Crim.

P. After the hearing, the circuit court granted the State's motion, stating,

with no elaboration, that it granted the motion "on the authority of

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990)."

On appeal, Bragg asserts that (1) the trial court had no evidence to

support its pretrial decision to allow the witnesses to testify by video and

(2) that the testimony by video violated his right to confront his accusers.

In support, Bragg cites, among other authorities, United States v. Yates,

438 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2006).

21
CR-21-0361

In Yates, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit held that "witness testimony presented on a television

monitor at a criminal trial in Montgomery, Alabama, by live, two-way

video conference with witnesses in Australia, violated the Defendants'

Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against them." 438

F.3d at 1309. After noting that the federal circuit courts of appeals

disagreed over whether Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), provides

the proper test for admissibility of two-way video conference testimony,

the court evaluated the claim under Eleventh Circuit precedent applying

Craig:

"Because Defendants were denied a physical face-to-face
confrontation with the witnesses against them at trial, we
must ask whether the requirements of the Craig rule were
satisfied, justifying an exception to the physical face-to-face
confrontation requirement of the Sixth Amendment. As
indicated earlier, under Craig, such testimony may be offered
'only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to
further an important public policy and only where the
reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.' 497 U.S. at
850, 110 S. Ct. at 3166.

"We reject the Government's argument that Craig does
not apply because two-way video conference testimony is
necessarily more protective of defendants' confrontation
rights than the method of admitting testimony of an
unavailable witness prescribed by Rule 15.5 First, the
Government's argument ignores the fact that Rule 15 gives
22
CR-21-0361

the defendant the opportunity to be present at the deposition
and thus an opportunity for physical face-to-face
confrontation. Second, the Government concedes that the
procedure used in this case is not authorized by the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rather, the Government argues,
admission of video testimony is within the inherent powers of
trial courts. But history demonstrates otherwise. In 2002, the
Advisory Committee on the Criminal Rules suggested a
revision to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26 that would
have allowed testimony by means of two-way video
conferencing. Thereafter, the Supreme Court transmitted to
Congress proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The Court declined to transmit the
proposed revision to Rule 26 that would have allowed
testimony by two-way video conference. Justice Scalia filed a
statement explaining that he shared 'the majority's view that
the Judicial Conference's proposed Fed. Rule Crim. Proc.
26(b) is of dubious validity under the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution ....'
Order of the Supreme Court, 207 F.R.D. 89, 93 (2002). He
remarked that the proposed amendments were 'contrary to
the rule enunciated in Craig in that they would not limit the
use of remote testimony to 'instances where there has been a
"case-specific finding" that it is "necessary to further an
important public policy." ' Id. (citation omitted). Rule 26 was
not revised to allow such testimony.

"Thus, to accept the Government's reasoning on this
point, we would need to accept its implicit claim that it knows
best how to protect defendants' confrontation rights. We do
not accept this claim. To do so would require that we disregard
the history of the proposed amendments to Rule 26. Further,
to accept the Government's claim, we would have to ignore the
carefully-crafted provisions of Rule 15 that were designed to
protect defendants' rights to physical face-to-face

23
CR-21-0361

confrontation and instead approve a procedure not
contemplated by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

"The simple truth is that confrontation through a video
monitor is not the same as physical face-to-face confrontation.
As our sister circuits have recognized, the two are not
constitutionally equivalent. See, e.g., United States v.
Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 554-55 (8th Cir. 2005). The Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of the right to confront one's accuser
is most certainly compromised when the confrontation occurs
through an electronic medium. Indeed, no court that has
considered the question has found otherwise; even the
Gigante court acknowledged that, 'the use of remote, closed-
circuit television testimony must be carefully circumscribed.'
United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1999).

"As stated above, where a defendant's right to confront
a witness against him will be affected, the determination of
whether a particular case requires a departure from usual
procedures must be made, by the trial court, on a case-by-case
basis. Craig, 497 U.S. at 854, 110 S. Ct. at 3169. The court
generally must: (1) hold an evidentiary hearing and (2) find:
(a) that the denial of physical, face-to-face confrontation at
trial is necessary to further an important public policy and (b)
that the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured. Id.
at 850, 855, 110 S. Ct. at 3166, 3169. The first part of this test
requires that the trial court find that it is essential to deny
the defendant his right to face-to-face physical confrontation
in order to serve the interest the government asserts. See, id.
at 855, 110 S. Ct. at 3169 (stating that, in order to separate
the witness and defendant, the problem must be the physical
presence of the defendant during the witness's testimony, not
some other problem that could be remedied by a less intrusive
solution).

24
CR-21-0361

"In this case, the district court applied the Craig test to
permit the Australian witnesses to testify by two-way video
conference broadcast on a television monitor at the trial
convened in the United States Attorney's Office in
Montgomery, Alabama. … However, it held no hearing to
consider evidence of the necessity for the video conference
testimony. Rather, the trial court allowed the two-way video
testimony based only on the Government's assertions in its
motion that the Australian witnesses were unwilling to travel
to the United States for trial, … and the Government's posited
'important public polic[ies] of providing the fact-finder with
crucial evidence,' … 'expeditiously and justly resolving the
case,' … and 'ensuring that foreign witnesses can so testify.'
… The district court considered sufficient the Government's
stated 'important public policy of providing the fact-finder
with crucial evidence,' … and 'interest in expeditiously and
justly resolving the case.' … We accept the district court's
statement that the witnesses were necessary to the
prosecution's case on at least some of the charges, as the
record supports the Government's assertion that the
testimony was crucial to a successful prosecution of the
Defendants and aided expeditious resolution of the case. The
Government's interest in presenting the fact-finder with
crucial evidence is, of course, an important public policy. We
hold, however, that, under the circumstances of this case
(which include the availability of a Rule 15 deposition), the
prosecutor's need for the video conference testimony to make
a case and to expeditiously resolve it are not the type of public
policies that are important enough to outweigh the
Defendants' rights to confront their accusers face-to-face.

"The district court made no case-specific findings of fact
that would support a conclusion that this case is different
from any other criminal prosecution in which the Government
would find it convenient to present testimony by two-way

25
CR-21-0361

video conference. All criminal prosecutions include at least
some evidence crucial to the Government's case, and there is
no doubt that many criminal cases could be more
expeditiously resolved were it unnecessary for witnesses to
appear at trial. If we were to approve introduction of
testimony in this manner, on this record, every prosecutor
wishing to present testimony from a witness overseas would
argue that providing crucial prosecution evidence and
resolving the case expeditiously are important public policies
that support the admission of testimony by two-way video
conference. See, e.g., Remote Testimony—A Prosecutor's
Perspective, 35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 719 (2002).

"Craig requires that furtherance of the important public
policy make it necessary to deny the defendant his right to a
physical face-to-face confrontation. 497 U.S. at 852, 110 S. Ct.
at 3167. In this case, there simply is no necessity of the type
Craig contemplates. When one considers that Rule 15 (which
provides for depositions in criminal cases) supplied an
alternative, this lack of necessity is strikingly apparent.

"The version of Rule 15 in effect at the time of
Defendants' trial states:

" 'Whenever, due to exceptional
circumstances of the case it is in the interest of
justice that the testimony of a prospective witness
of a party be taken and preserved for use at trial,
the court may upon motion of such party and
notice to the parties order testimony of such
witness be taken by deposition ....'

"Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(a) (2002). The rule continues,
guaranteeing the defendant's right to physical face-to-face
confrontation by specifically providing for his presence at the

26
CR-21-0361

deposition. Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(b) (2002); see also, Don v. Nix,
886 F.2d 203, 206 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the opportunity
to be present at the deposition of an accuser); United States
v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979) (same); In re
Letters of Request from Supreme Court of Hong Kong, 821 F.
Supp. 204, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that Rule 15
guarantees defendants a right to be present at deposition so
as to prevent use of deposition testimony at trial from
violating Sixth Amendment right to confrontation). Even a
defendant in custody 'shall' be produced for the deposition,
unless the defendant waives the right to be present in writing
or is disruptive. Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(b) (2002). Indeed, the
defendant's presence at the deposition is so important that, if
he cannot afford to attend, the government may be ordered to
pay the costs of travel and subsistence expenses for him and
his attorney. Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(c) (2002).

"The Government argues that depositions later read
into the record at trial, in fact, do occur without the defendant
having been present. While that may be so, it is only the rare,
exceptional case. Rule 15, properly utilized, protects a
defendant's confrontation rights by affording the defendant
an opportunity to be present at the deposition. United States
v. Drogoul, 1 F.3d 1546, 1556 (11th Cir. 1993). It is the
extraordinary circumstance where deposition testimony is
taken despite a defendant's want of opportunity to be present.
See, e.g., United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944, 949 (2d Cir.
1988) (finding that deposition may be taken, despite foreign
country's refusal to allow defendant to be present but
deferring question of whether admission of such a deposition
would violate the Confrontation Clause). Even in those
exceptional cases, courts have said that the government must
have made diligent and reasonable efforts to produce the
defendant at the taking of the deposition. Id. at 950-51; see

27
CR-21-0361

also United States v. McKeeve, 131 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997).
Other circuits have recognized that failure to make such
efforts, followed by use of the deposition at trial, violates the
defendant's confrontation rights. See, e.g., Christian v. Rhode,
41 F.3d 461, 465-67 (9th Cir. 1994).

"On this record, there is no evidentiary support for a
case-specific finding that the witnesses and Defendants could
not be placed in the same room for the taking of pre-trial
deposition testimony pursuant to Rule 15. Other than stating
that the witnesses would not come to the United States, the
trial court gave no reason why the witnesses and Defendants
could not all be in the same room for a pre-trial deposition.
The district court did not find that there was anything to
prevent the Defendants from traveling to Australia to be
present for a Rule 15 deposition. In fact, it found that the only
reason a Rule 15 deposition may not have been an appropriate
alternative to the video conference was that the Government
had waited too long to request such a deposition. …

"Moreover, in this case, the Government never
requested a Rule 15 deposition. The Government has never
maintained that any special circumstance created an inability
to take such a deposition or that it would have been impossible
to allow Defendants to attend such a deposition. Instead, it
has argued only that testimony presented by two-way video
conference is superior to testimony taken by Rule 15
deposition with witness and defendant in the same room.
While that might be the opinion of some, it was not the opinion
of Defendants. Should they have wished to waive their rights
to confrontation, they were able to do so. In the absence of
such a waiver or case-specific findings of exceptional
circumstances creating the type of necessity Craig
contemplates, however, witnesses and criminal defendants
should meet face-to-face. The Sixth Amendment so requires.

28
CR-21-0361

" 'The right guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause
includes not only a "Personal examination," but also "(1)
insures that the witness will give his statements under oath
thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and
guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for
perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination,
the 'greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth'; [and] (3) permits the jury that is to decide the
defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in
making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his
credibility." ' Craig, 497 U.S. at 845-46, 110 S. Ct. at 3163
(citations omitted). Defendants contend that the oath sworn
by the Australian witnesses was not meaningful, either
because it was invalid (as it was not administered in
Australia, by someone authorized by federal law to give an
oath outside of the United States) or because it did not subject
the witnesses to a plausible threat of prosecution for perjury.
We need not address these contentions. Because we find that
denial of Defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to face-to-face
confrontation was not necessary to further an important
public policy in this case, we proceed no further with the Craig
analysis. We therefore do not consider the meaningfulness of
the oath as administered."

438 F.3d at 1314-18.

The State on appeal, like this Court in the main opinion, does not

address Yates but relies instead on Harrell v. State, 709 So. 2d 1364 (Fla.

1998). This Court summarizes Harrell:

"In Harrell, two victims, whose residence was in Argentina,
were robbed while on vacation in Florida. The State moved
that the couple be allowed to testify via satellite transmission

29
CR-21-0361

because of the distance and the health problems of one of the
witnesses. The court granted the State's motion, and Harrell
was convicted of robbery. On appeal, Harrell argued that his
right to confront his accusers was violated. In upholding the
trial court's ruling, the Supreme Court of Florida adopted the
analysis used by the United States Supreme Court in Craig.
The court found that public-policy considerations justified
remote testimony because the witnesses were beyond the
subpoena power of the court; it was 'clearly in our state's
interest to expeditiously and justly resolve criminal matters
that are pending in the state court system'; one of the
witnesses was in poor health and could not travel to the U.S.;
and the two witnesses were essential to the case. Harrell, 709
So. 2d at 1369-70."

___ So. 3d at ___.

This Court's use of Harrell is problematic for at least two reasons.

First, the Harrell court required the government to support its motion

with evidence. Second, the Harrell court justified creating an exception

to in-person confrontation by emphasizing "reliability"—a rationale that

has increasingly been questioned since Harrell.

As to the showing required, the Harrell court imposed these

conditions for virtual testimony:

"[I]n all future criminal cases where one of the parties makes
a motion to present testimony via satellite transmission, it is
incumbent upon the party bringing the motion to (1) verify or
support by the affidavits of credible persons that a prospective
witness resides beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court

30
CR-21-0361

or may be unable to attend or be prevented from attending a
trial or hearing and (2) establish that the witness's testimony
is material and necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Upon
such a showing, the trial judge shall allow for the satellite
procedure."

709 So. 2d at 1371 (emphasis added). At the hearing on the State's

motion for video testimony, the State supported its motion with only

arguments from the prosecutor, and Bragg objected repeatedly to the

State's lack of evidence. " '[T]he arguments of counsel are not evidence.' "

Morrissette v. State, 183 So. 3d 1009, 1017 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014)

(quoting and adopting the trial court's order). The problems with the trial

court's approach became clear at trial when, in response to cross-

examination, Laporte-Leleu testified (1) that he earned six to eight weeks

of vacation time annually; (2) that he was not forbidden from traveling

outside France; and (3) that, contrary to the State's representations at

the hearing on its motion for video testimony, he had remained in the

United States longer than "a month or less" after the alleged crimes.

As for "reliability," the Harrell court stated:

"The second part of our analysis concerns whether the
procedure in this case satisfied the additional safeguards of
the Confrontation Clause—oath, cross-examination, and
observation of the witness's demeanor. We conclude that it
did. Both of the witnesses were placed under oath by a court

31
CR-21-0361

clerk in Miami. Further, the defense had an opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses. Finally, the procedure allowed
the jury to observe the witnesses as they testified, and it also
allowed the witnesses to see the jury. Because each of these
additional safeguards was present in the satellite procedure,
we are convinced that the witnesses' testimony was
sufficiently reliable. Thus, the second prong of our analysis is
satisfied."

709 So. 2d at 1371.

A prevailing rationale for the allowance in Craig of testimony by

video is an emphasis on ensuring "reliability." As I have written

elsewhere, I have serious questions "about the continuing validity, after

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177

(2004), of Craig, to the extent that it subjects a defendant's right to face-

to-face confrontation to a balancing of interests." Rodriguez v. State, [No.

CR-21-0141, July 8, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2022)

(Minor, J., dissenting).

"As Judge Sutton of the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has noted, although Crawford
did not overrule Craig, the two decisions are in tension on at
least six points: (1) Craig relied almost exclusively on Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980),
a decision that Crawford overruled as to 'testimonial
statements'; (2) 'Craig treated the [Confrontation] Clause as
a safeguard for evidentiary reliability as measured by the
judge in that case and today's rules of evidence .... But
Crawford held that it was a procedural guarantee that
32
CR-21-0361

"commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability
be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible
of cross-examination" in front of the accused'; (3) Craig
characterized the right to face-to-face confrontation as 'not
absolute,' but Crawford described it as essential; (4) Craig
relied on newer 'academic literature' to examine the validity
of exceptions to the right of confrontation, but Crawford relied
on 'the original publicly understood meaning of confrontation
to determine when the exception-free words of the guarantee
("[i]n all criminal prosecutions") should have exceptions'; (5)
Craig was concerned that a literal interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause would abrogate current rules of
evidence, but Crawford emphasized that rules of evidence
must yield to the rights protected by the Confrontation
Clause; and (6) Craig did not suggest 'any limit to the kinds
of exceptions that the Roberts balancing test would allow then
or in the future[, b]ut Crawford carefully identified the kinds
of exceptions that might be allowed under its approach and
conspicuously never mentions Craig as one of them.' United
States v. Cox, 871 F.3d 479, 492-93 (6th Cir. 2017) (Sutton,
J., concurring). I share Judge Sutton's opinion that Craig and
Crawford appear to be irreconcilable. Id. at 493-95."

Rodriguez, ___ So. 3d at ___ (Minor, J., dissenting).

Our Chief Justice shares these doubts about the continuing validity

of Craig:

"After Craig, the Supreme Court declared in Crawford
that it was not willing to 'replac[e] categorical constitutional
guarantees with open-ended balancing tests' based on
'amorphous notions of "reliability." ' Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61,
67-68, 124 S. Ct. 1354. That was because '[t]he text of the
Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended
exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be
33
CR-21-0361

developed by the courts.' Id. at 54, 124 S. Ct. 1354. Rather,
the Confrontation Clause is 'most naturally read as a
reference to the right of confrontation at common law,
admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the
founding.' Id. Thus, the sole question to ask to determine
whether a practice that implicates the protections of the
Confrontation Clause is permissible is whether an exception
existed at the time of the founding under the common law.

"I believe that this method, rather than judicially
created tiers of scrutiny, is the best mode of constitutional
analysis. Like the scope of rights under the Second
Amendment, see New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v.
Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, ___, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2130, 213 L. Ed. 2d
387 (2022), or the First Amendment, see Kennedy v.
Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. ___, ___, 142 S. Ct. 2407, 2428,
213 L. Ed. 2d 755 (2022), the scope of the confrontation right
under the Sixth Amendment must be determined primarily
by looking to the history and tradition that define the content
and contours of the right. Our role is not to 'balance'
constitutional safeguards like mere 'interests,' but to enforce
them as definitive protections of concrete rights. …

"In short, the Confrontation Clause protects a
defendant's right to have witnesses’ faces visible to the
defendant and the jury. The voices of our common-law
tradition, as well as decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, strongly support this conclusion."

Ex parte Rodriguez, ___ So. 3d at ___ (Parker, C.J., dissenting).

Putting aside questions about the demise of Craig, if Alabama

courts use Craig to allow virtual confrontation, the State and the trial

court must do more than happened here. At a minimum, the State must,
34
CR-21-0361

as Harrell and Yates require, support the request with evidence. And in

a case such as this, as the Yates court emphasized and as Bragg argued

to the trial court, the State must show that it exercised reasonable efforts

to secure in-person testimony by deposition under Rule 16.6, Ala. R.

Crim. P. Finally, a trial court should make specific findings, based on

the evidence presented, showing that the State has satisfied Craig.

Courts should not enter a perfunctory order stating merely that Craig is

satisfied. And courts should not, as the Court does today by citing § 12-

21-135.1, justify an exception to a textually protected right by relying on

a law that by its text does not apply. 9

For these reasons, I would reverse Bragg's convictions and

sentences and remand this case for new proceedings. I respectfully

dissent.

9As stated above and as Bragg argued to the trial court and to this
Court—and as the State conceded in the trial court—§ 12-21-135.1
applies only to members of the United States military, not members of
the French military, and it requires the consent of the parties in a
criminal case.
35