USCA11 Case: 22-11113 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 04/14/2023 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11113
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ILEANA RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20453-AMC-2
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11113
Before WILSON, LUCK, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ileana Rodriguez, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of her pro se motion for compassionate release under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by § 603(b) of the First Step
Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (Dec. 21, 2018) (First
Step Act). She asserts she established extraordinary and compelling
reasons for compassionate release based on her medical conditions
of Type 2 diabetes and abnormal pap smear results as well as her
time spent in solitary confinement. She also contends her
time-served is sufficient punishment for her crimes, she must be
released from prison to obtain adequate medical care, and her sen-
tence is disparate from her codefendant’s sentence. The Govern-
ment responds by moving for summary affirmance of the district
court’s order and to stay the briefing schedule, arguing Rodriguez
failed to show her medical conditions rose to the level of extraor-
dinary and compelling and that solitary confinement was not a suf-
ficient reason to grant compassionate release.
District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a term
of imprisonment but may do so within § 3582(c)’s provisions.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1251
(11th Cir.) cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021). As amended by
§ 603(b) of the First Step Act, § 3582(c) now provides, in relevant
part, that:
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22-11113 Opinion of the Court 3
the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons [BOP], or upon motion of the defendant
after the defendant has fully exhausted all administra-
tive rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a
motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30
days from the receipt of such a request by the warden
of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may
reduce the term of imprisonment . . . after consider-
ing the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to the
extent that they are applicable, if it finds that . . . ex-
traordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sen-
tencing Commission . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
Section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides the ap-
plicable policy statement for § 3582(c)(1)(A). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.
The application notes to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 list four categories of
extraordinary and compelling reasons: (A) the defendant’s medical
condition, (B) her age, (C) her family circumstances, and (D) other
reasons. Id., comment. n.1(A)–(D). In Bryant, we held § 1B1.13 “is
an applicable policy statement that governs all motions under Sec-
tion 3582(c)(1)(A),” including those filed by defendants. 996 F.3d
at 1262. Likewise, we held that, following the enactment of the
First Step Act, § 1B1.13 continued to constrain a district court’s
ability to evaluate whether extraordinary and compelling reasons
were present and that Application Note 1(D) did not grant
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11113
discretion to courts to develop ‘other reasons’ that might justify a
reduction in a defendant’s sentence. Id. at 1248.
The Government is entitled to summary affirmance of the
district court’s denial of Rodriguez’s § 3582(c)(2) motion because
its position is clearly correct as a matter of law. See Groendyke
Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969) 1 (explain-
ing summary disposition is appropriate where “the position of one
of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be
no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where, as
is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous”). First, as to
Rodriguez’s reliance on her medical conditions as extraordinary
and compelling reasons, she has not shown the district court
abused its discretion when it found that neither condition was a
terminal illness, nor did they diminish her ability to provide self-
care while incarcerated. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, comment n.1(A)
(providing the defendant’s medical condition qualifies as an ex-
traordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release if she
is “suffering from a serious physical or medical condition” that
“substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide
self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from
which . . . she is not expected to recover”). Rodriguez’s medical
records show her Type 2 diabetes and hypertension are “well
1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-
cuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.
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22-11113 Opinion of the Court 5
controlled,” and she is receiving ongoing pharmaceutical interven-
tion to manage both conditions. Regarding her neuropathy, her
medical records show she refused medication to manage her con-
dition. Rodriguez also received three doses of the COVID-19 vac-
cine, which undermines her claims that she is at risk of severe ill-
ness from COVID-19. Finally, regarding her abnormal pap smear
results, her medical records show she underwent a colposcopy, and
biopsies were taken, but the results were normal. Thus, Rodriguez
did not establish any of her medical conditions substantially dimin-
ish her ability to provide self-care in prison, or that they are termi-
nal illnesses from which she is not expected to recover. Id. To the
extent Rodriguez relies on “other reasons” as listed in § 1B1.13 to
support her motion for compassionate release, such as her time in
solitary confinement, her arguments are foreclosed by Bryant. See
Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1248.
The district court did not abuse its discretion 2 when it de-
nied Rodriguez’s motion for compassionate release because Rodri-
guez did not establish her medical conditions were terminal ill-
nesses or diminished her ability to provide self-care while incarcer-
ated. Likewise, Rodriguez could not establish extraordinary and
compelling reasons based on her conditions of confinement.3
2 We review a district court’s denial of a prisoner’s 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)
motion under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Harris, 989
F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021).
3 We need not reach the issue of whether the district court abused its discre-
tion when it denied Rodriguez’s motion for compassionate release based on
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11113
Accordingly, because the Government’s position is clearly correct
as a matter of law, we GRANT the Government’s motion for sum-
mary affirmance and DENY its motion to stay the briefing schedule
as moot per 11th Cir. R. 31-1(c). Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d
at 1162. Rodriguez’s motion for release to home confinement is
DENIED AS MOOT.
AFFIRMED.
the § 3553(a) factors because its finding she failed to establish an extraordinary
and compelling reason for compassionate release was sufficient to preclude
relief. See United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 2021)
(stating the absence of any one of the necessary conditions—support in the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, extraordinary and compelling reasons, and adher-
ence to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13’s policy statement—forecloses a sentence reduction,
and nothing on the face of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) requires a court to con-
duct the compassionate release analysis in any particular order).