In re L.C.

Filed 4/18/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re L.C. et al., Persons Coming B322778
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, Nos. 20CCJP02608A–B)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Ashley Price, Judge Pro Tempore. Conditionally
reversed with directions.
Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
 I. INTRODUCTION

M.C. (mother) appeals from the termination of parental
rights as to two of her children (the children) under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends that the juvenile
court failed to determine whether it had jurisdiction over the
children under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (the UCCJEA; Fam. Code,1 § 3400, et seq.). The
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(the Department) responds that by failing to raise the issue
below, mother forfeited her right to raise it on appeal;
alternatively, the Department argues that substantial evidence
supports the court’s assertion of jurisdiction in this case.
Mother also contends the juvenile court and the
Department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et
seq.) and related California statutes (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et
seq.). The Department does not oppose a conditional remand
with instructions to conduct a limited ICWA inquiry.
We conclude the forfeiture doctrine does not bar mother’s
challenge to the juvenile court’s compliance with the UCCJEA
and the error requires conditional reversal of the parental rights
termination orders with directions to the court to undertake the
process that the UCCJEA requires. This disposition will permit
mother to raise the unopposed ICWA arguments she makes in
this appeal.

1 Further statutory references are to the Family Code unless
otherwise stated.

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 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In May 2020, the Department filed a dependency petition
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 subdivisions
(b)(1) and (b)(2) alleging mother was unable to care for the
children because of her substance abuse, mental and emotional
problems, and failure to take psychotropic medications as
prescribed. The children were one and five years old.2 The
whereabouts of their respective fathers remained unknown
throughout the dependency proceedings. The children initially
remained in mother’s custody.
In July 2020, the juvenile court denied a request to detain
the children after an incident during which the younger child
consumed bleach that mother was using to clean. The court,
however, placed conditions on the children’s continued placement
with mother.
In September 2020, the juvenile court granted the
Department’s request to detain the children without notice to
mother based on concerns about mother’s continuing lack of
compliance with court orders and her deteriorating mental
health. The court placed the children with a caregiver.
At the November 2020 jurisdiction and disposition hearing,
the juvenile court sustained the petition and ordered monitored
visits and reunification services for mother. A year later, the
court terminated mother’s reunification services. At the June
2022 Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing, the

2 The Department reports refer to two other children, but
they are not part of the current dependency case.

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court terminated parental rights to the children. Mother timely
filed a notice of appeal.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The UCCJEA

1. Background

Mother and the children first came to the Department’s
attention in March 2020. During an interview with a
Department social worker, mother stated that she was born in
Georgia, moved to Florida in 2013, and then to Texas. The older
child was born in Texas in 2014 and the younger child was born
there in 2019. Mother claimed that she continued to live in
Texas until December 2019, when she fled to Arizona for a few
months to escape an abusive relationship and then from there
moved to San Diego and then to Los Angeles. When the social
worker told mother that her timeline did not make sense, she
changed her story explaining that she only passed through
Arizona.
On January 30, 2020, the San Diego County Health and
Human Services Agency (the San Diego Agency) received a
referral regarding the family after mother tested positive for
amphetamine while the children were in her care. Mother told
hospital staff that she was visiting San Diego from Florida and
that she intended to return to Florida in a few days. The San
Diego Agency closed its investigation because mother no longer
resided in San Diego.

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 Mother denied neglecting or abusing the children and
advised that the only other child welfare case she had was in
Texas in April 2019, when the younger child was born prenatally
exposed to methamphetamine. According to mother, she had
completed all her required classes and the Texas case was closed.
When the Department filed its dependency petition and
detention report in May 2020, it did not ask the juvenile court to
make any findings under the UCCJEA, despite the reported facts
concerning mother’s recent out-of-state residence and the child
welfare case in Texas. An addendum report filed the same day,
however, did include a bullet-point list of items needing further
investigation, including four entries related to possible child
welfare proceedings in other states. The first of the four entries
was “UCCJEA – Texas and Arizona,” and the remaining three
entries were to investigate “CPS and criminal history in” Texas,
Arizona, and Florida.
There is no indication in the record that the Department or
the juvenile court inquired into the existence of child welfare or
custody proceedings in Texas, Arizona, or Florida. The record
also reveals no reason to believe the court undertook the
jurisdictional analysis required by the UCCJEA, which we next
discuss.

2. The Statutory Scheme

The UCCJEA is a carefully crafted statutory scheme—
enacted not just by California but also by 48 other states

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(excluding only Massachusetts)3—to determine the appropriate
forum for child custody proceedings and avoid conflicting state
child custody orders. (In re R.L. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 125, 136
[“The UCCJEA is designed to avoid jurisdictional conflicts
between states and relitigation of custody decisions, promote
cooperation between states, and facilitate enforcement of another
state’s custody decrees”]; In re Jaheim B. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th
1343, 1348 [“The purposes of the UCCJEA in the context of
dependency proceedings include avoiding jurisdictional
competition and conflict, promoting interstate cooperation,
litigating custody where child and family have closest
connections, avoiding relitigation of another state’s custody
decisions, and promoting exchange of information and other
mutual assistance between courts of other states”]; see also In re
Marriage of Nurie (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 478, 497 [“[C]oncurrent
assertion of jurisdiction by more than one court was one of the
chief problems that led to the enactment of the UCCJEA. The
absence of a specific provision for continuing jurisdiction had
‘caused considerable confusion,’ with conflicting judicial
interpretations and ‘a loss of uniformity among the States.’
[Citations.]”].) The UCCJEA applies to dependency proceedings
(§ 3402, subd. (d); In re Aiden L. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 508, 516),
and is the exclusive method for determining the proper forum in
child custody proceedings involving other jurisdictions (§ 3421,
subd. (b); In re Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 516).

3 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(1997) Editors’ Notes.

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 The Family Code provision implementing the UCCJEA
with which we are concerned is section 3421. It provides, in
relevant part:
“(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 3424, a court of
this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody
determination only if any of the following are true:
“(1) This state is the home state of the child on
the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or
was the home state of the child within six months
before the commencement of the proceeding and the
child is absent from this state but a parent or person
acting as a parent continues to live in this state.
“(2) A court of another state does not have
jurisdiction under paragraph (1), or a court of the
home state of the child has declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the grounds that this state is the more
appropriate forum under Section 3427 or 3428, and
both of the following are true:
“(A) The child and the child’s parents, or the
child and at least one parent or a person acting as a
parent, have a significant connection with this state
other than mere physical presence.
“(B) Substantial evidence is available in this
state concerning the child’s care, protection, training,
and personal relationships.
“(3) All courts having jurisdiction under
paragraph (1) or (2) have declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is
the more appropriate forum to determine the custody
of the child under Section 3427 or 3428.

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 “(4) No court of any other state would have
jurisdiction under the criteria specified in
paragraph (1), (2), or (3).”
These four interrelated scenarios that permit a court in
California (and, reciprocally, in any of the other states that have
enacted the same scheme) to make a child custody determination
have been helpfully clarified and summarized by case law:
“California may assume jurisdiction to make an initial child
custody determination only if any of the following apply:
California is the child’s ‘home state,’ meaning the state in which
the child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at
least six consecutive months immediately before the child custody
proceeding was commenced (§§ 3421, subd. (a)(1), 3402, subd.
(g)); a court of another state does not have jurisdiction because it
is not the child’s home state (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2)); a court of the
child’s home state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground California is the more appropriate forum (ibid.); all courts
having jurisdiction have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground California is the more appropriate forum (§ 3421, subd.
(a)(3)); or no other state has jurisdiction under the foregoing tests
(§ 3421, subd. (a)(4)).”4 (In re A.M. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 593,

4 A court without jurisdiction under section 3421 subdivision
(a) may still exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction. (In re
Cristian I. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097; In re Gino C.
(2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 959, 965.) “A court of this state has
temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in this
state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an
emergency to protect the child because the child . . . is subjected
to, or threatened with, mistreatment or abuse . . . .” (§ 3424,
subd. (a).) The juvenile court, however, “may not address the

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598; see also In re Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 518 [“A
child’s home state has priority over other jurisdictional bases”].)
When it is clear some jurisdiction other than California is
the home state of the child in question, efforts to consult with the
court in that jurisdiction are required under the UCCJEA. (In re
Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at pp. 518–519.) Similarly,
where the information before a juvenile court objectively suffices
to raise a genuine question about whether another jurisdiction is
the child’s home state, a juvenile court must obtain additional
information as necessary to make a home state determination—
and is empowered to contact the court in the other jurisdiction to
that end. (§ 3410 [“A court of this state may communicate with a
court in another state concerning a proceeding arising under [the
UCCJEA]”]; In re Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 523 [“it is
for the juvenile court in the first instance to hold an evidentiary
hearing and to evaluate witness credibility, resolve conflicts in
the evidence and make the factual findings necessary to
determine whether Arizona was Aiden’s home state in August
2014 when the dependency petition was filed”]; cf. § 3426, subd.
(b) [“[A] court of this state, before hearing a child custody

merits of the dependency petition or otherwise make a final child
custody determination until it properly asserts jurisdiction under
the nonemergency jurisdiction provisions of the UCCJEA.” (In re
Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 518; In re Gino C., supra,
224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 965–966.) A court exercising emergency
jurisdiction under section 3424 is required to contact and provide
notice to another state’s court to determine whether the other
state wishes to assert jurisdiction under section 3421. (In re
Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at pp. 518–519; In re R.L., supra,
4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 142–143.)

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proceeding, shall examine the court documents and other
information supplied by the parties pursuant to [s]ection 3429. If
the court determines that a child custody proceeding has been
commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction
substantially in accordance with this part, the court of this state
shall stay its proceeding and communicate with the court of the
other state”].)

3. Forfeiture

The Department suggests that the juvenile court was not
obligated to pursue any UCCJEA inquiry because mother’s
attorney did not object to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction on
that ground. The Department would have us hold that the
UCCJEA issue is forfeited for that reason, relying on In re J.W.
(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 347, in which the Court of Appeal found
inapplicable the rule that bars forfeiture of “fundamental
jurisdiction” issues. According to the court in In re J.W., the
jurisdiction conferred by the UCCJEA is not “fundamental.” (Id.
at p. 355 [“Forfeiture would not apply if the UCCJEA provisions
governing jurisdiction implicated the courts’ fundamental
jurisdiction, but, as we explain, they do not.”].)
In our view, In re J.W., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th 347 does not
settle the matter because its analysis is focused only on the
answer to a limited question. Even if it is true that the UCCJEA
does not concern issues of fundamental jurisdiction that cannot
be forfeited, In re J.W. says nothing about whether there are
other reasons why the forfeiture doctrine should not apply to the
UCCJEA issue raised in this appeal. As we next explain, there
are several such reasons—chief among them the purpose of

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forfeiture rules generally, the comity-driven purpose of the
UCCJEA, and the comprehensive statutory scheme that our
Legislature enacted when adopting the UCCJEA.
The forfeiture doctrine provides that a reviewing court will
ordinarily decline to consider a challenge to a ruling if an
objection to the ruling was not made in the trial court. Our
Supreme Court has explained the purpose of the doctrine is to
encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial
court so that they may be corrected. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1287, 1293; accord, In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 881.)
Our Supreme Court has also cautioned, however, that the
forfeiture doctrine is “not automatic” (In re S.B., supra, 32
Cal.4th at p. 1293) and should not apply for a variety of reasons
(see, e.g., In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889 [pure
question of law]; In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293
[important legal issue]; see also In re Frank R. (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [conflict with due process]). In addition to
these reasons, we identify another: As a doctrine of largely
judicial creation (see People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119,
1130 (conc. opn. of Baxter, J.)), forfeiture should not apply when
it would be incompatible with the fundamental purposes of a
statutory scheme.
Here, the usual benefit from the application of the
forfeiture doctrine—to encourage parties to bring issues to the
trial court—would not be conferred under the facts of this case.
The periods where mother and the children were recently living
out-of-state were apparent on the face of the Department’s
reports—indeed, the UCCJEA was expressly identified as a
matter for “further investigation.” Thus, although the
Department or mother could have done more to urge the juvenile

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court to undertake the UCCJEA process, the objective facts
supporting the need for such a process were readily apparent
from the record. Because the UCCJEA process often involves
direct court-to-court consultations in which the parties do not
participate, the statute places a greater degree of focus on the
actions a court itself must undertake, rather than actions
required of the parties. The independent obligations imposed by
the UCCJEA on a court making custody decisions support the
imposition of a corollary duty to be attuned to UCCJEA issues
even without proactive advocacy by litigants.
Furthermore, the costs of holding the UCCJEA issue here
forfeited are substantial. As we have explained, the comity-
driven purpose of the UCCJEA is to avoid jurisdictional conflict
between states, promote interstate cooperation, litigate custody
where the children and family have the closest connections, avoid
relitigation of another state’s custody decisions, and facilitate
enforcement of another state’s custody decrees. (In re R.L.,
supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 136.) These are important goals, and
applying a forfeiture rule risks undermining them. If applied
broadly—including in other states that may also be moved to
adopt a forfeiture rule (but see, e.g., Nemes v. Tutino (N.Y. App.
Div. 2019) 173 A.D.3d 16, 23 [UCCJEA issue not waivable];
J.M.R. v. J.M. (Pa. Super. Ct., 2010) 1 A.3d 902, 908 [rejecting
waiver and addressing UCCJEA issue raised for the first time on
appeal])—the number of jurisdictional conflicts and potentially
inconsistent judgments among states would rise and, in many
instances, be left to turn only on whether an attorney had the
presence of mind to object (or a perceived strategic interest in
objecting) during a particular hearing. As our Supreme Court
has observed in another context, where a statute protects the

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interests of other sovereigns that are separate and distinct from
the interests of parents, “‘the parents’ inaction does not constitute
a waiver or otherwise preclude appellate review.’” (In re Isaiah
W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 13.)
Moreover, holding the UCCJEA issue forfeited under these
circumstances would be inconsistent with the “‘“the context of the
statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme . . . .”’” (In re
Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 13.) Section 3421 delineates four
bases for the exercise of a court’s jurisdiction to make an initial
child custody determination. The statute emphasizes that a
court may make an initial child custody determination “only” if
one or more of these four statutorily specified criteria are
satisfied. We are confident the Legislature did not go to the
trouble of adopting such a carefully designed and comprehensive
scheme only to permit courts, under the auspices of forfeiture,
effectively to add a fifth, unspecified category to the statute, one
which permits a court to exercise jurisdiction regardless of the
location of the child’s home state or the preferences of a foreign
court simply because the parties before it do not object.5
We accordingly decline to hold that the UCCJEA issue in
this case is forfeited because the parties did not object in the
juvenile court. Instead, we proceed to analyze the issue on the
merits, to the extent the record permits.

5 Because UCCJEA issues typically involve out-of-state
parties and proceedings, we expect there will be cases in which
all interested parties—and, indeed, the parties with an incentive
to object—will not be before a juvenile court in this state to
interpose a UCCJEA objection.

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 4. Conditional Reversal and Remand Is Required

According to mother, because the juvenile court did not
investigate the possibility that Texas was the children’s home
state, all of the court’s jurisdictional findings and subsequent
orders must be reversed. The Department, while conceding that
California is not the home state, counters that there was
substantial evidence that no state was a “home state” under the
UCCJEA because the children had not resided in any one place
for the six months immediately prior to the commencement of
dependency proceedings in California in May 2020. We believe
neither party is correct.
A “home state” under the UCCJEA is “the state in which a
child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at
least six consecutive months immediately before the
commencement of a child custody proceeding . . . . A period of
temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the
period.” (§ 3402, subd. (g).) Here, there is evidence in the record
that both children were born in Texas and resided there until
December 2019, when the family left Texas and ultimately came
to the attention of California authorities. Without a finding or
inquiry about whether mother or either of the children’s absence
from Texas was temporary, there is no substantial evidence that
there was “no home state” for the children.
We next consider the Department’s contention that the
juvenile court’s error was harmless because (1) “Texas did not
qualify as the children’s home state, thus the juvenile court did
not need to contact the Texas court;” and (2) “the evidence
demonstrated there had been no dependency proceedings in
Texas.” Assuming for argument’s sake that the error here is

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amenable to harmlessness review, we do not agree the record
sufficiently demonstrates that Texas was not the children’s home
state. Furthermore, mother’s statement that the children had
been the subject of dependency proceedings in Texas belies the
Department’s contention that there were no child welfare
proceedings in Texas. Finally, to the extent the Department
suggests that mother’s statement concerning the closure of the
proceedings in Texas is dispositive, the record does not reflect
whether the courts of that state made any custody orders before
or at the time the case was closed (if it was indeed closed, which
we cannot determine on this record). Thus, the court’s failure to
determine whether it had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA cannot
be deemed harmless in this case.
We disagree with mother, however, that unconditional
reversal of all the juvenile court’s prior orders is necessarily
required. Because we have concluded that the UCCJEA issue is
not forfeited for reasons independent of a “fundamental
jurisdiction” analysis, we believe the appropriate course of action
is to reverse the prior orders conditionally and to remand the
matter with instructions to comply with UCCJEA procedures.
(See, e.g., In re A.M., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 599–600.)

B. ICWA

Mother next contends that the juvenile court’s ICWA
determination was not supported by substantial evidence because
the Department did not ask one of three people identified by
mother as the children’s maternal grandmother about possible
Indian ancestry. As we are conditionally reversing the parental
rights termination orders and remanding the matter to the

15
juvenile court, mother can pursue the issue on remand informed,
as appropriate, by the Department’s concessions in this appeal.

IV. DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s June 13, 2022, orders terminating
parental rights to the children under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 366.26 are conditionally reversed and the matter is
remanded to permit the court to determine whether it has
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and for any other proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion. If the court on remand determines
that it has jurisdiction over the children under the UCCJEA and
considers and resolves any ICWA-related issues raised by
mother, the orders terminating parental rights are to be
reinstated. If the court determines that it does not have
jurisdiction over the children under the UCCJEA, the court shall
proceed as required by the UCCJEA, nullify the parental rights
termination orders, and, as necessary, prior orders.

KIM, J.

I concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

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MOOR, J., Concurring.

I agree with the majority’s dispositional order conditionally
reversing the June 13, 2022, orders terminating parental rights
and remanding the matter to the juvenile court to address the
issue of jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA; Fam. Code, 3400 et
seq.).1
I write separately, however, to emphasize that the doctrine
of appellate forfeiture is not incompatible with the UCCJEA
statutory scheme. It is my view that a parent’s failure to object
in the juvenile court to the lack of compliance with the UCCJEA
can result in forfeiture of that issue on appeal. (See In re J.W.
(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 347, 355, 367.) The UCCJEA does not
place upon the juvenile court alone the burden to identify the
appropriate forum for child custody proceedings and avoid
conflicting state child custody orders. Parties to a child custody
proceeding are obligated to provide the information necessary to
determine jurisdictional issues and to bring possible conflicts
with other state proceedings to the juvenile court’s attention.
(Fam. Code, § 3429.) Application of the forfeiture rule—and its
purpose of “encourag[ing] parties to bring errors to the attention
of the trial court, so that they may be corrected” (In re S.B. (2004)
32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293)—therefore facilitates compliance with,
and the making of correct determinations under the UCCJEA.

1 I also agree with the majority’s resolution of the issue
raised under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA;
25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California statutes (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.).
 Nevertheless, the record here includes important reasons to
exercise our discretion to hear the UCCJEA issue on the merits.
Although the discretion to excuse forfeiture “must be exercised
with special care” in dependency proceedings, because they
“involve the well-being of children” and “considerations such as
permanency and stability are of paramount importance” (In re
S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293), where a juvenile court may
have committed legal error on an issue of vital importance
affecting the placement of a child, it may warrant relaxing the
rule of forfeiture (In re Alexandria P. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th
1322, 1348). This is not a case where mother remained silent
about her connections to other states and where the need for
investigation of other state proceedings went unnoticed by the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services. Particularly where the fathers were never located, and
therefore did not have an opportunity to participate, the
UCCJEA issue is a significant one: there is at least a potential
concern that another state has information about the absent
fathers, or an interest in their relationship with one or both
minors.
Therefore, I join the majority’s conditional reversal of the
termination orders and the remand order instructing the juvenile
court to ensure compliance with the UCCJEA.

MOOR, J.

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