(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2022 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
REED v. GOERTZ
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 21–442. Argued October 11, 2022—Decided April 19, 2023
A Texas jury found petitioner Rodney Reed guilty of the 1996 murder of
Stacey Stites. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Reed’s
conviction and death sentence. In 2014, Reed filed a motion in Texas
state court under Texas’s post-conviction DNA testing law. Reed re-
quested DNA testing on certain evidence, including the belt used to
strangle Stites, which Reed contended would help identify the true per-
petrator. The state trial court denied Reed’s motion, reasoning in part
that items Reed sought to test were not preserved through an adequate
chain of custody. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and
later denied Reed’s motion for rehearing. Reed then sued in federal
court under 42 U. S. C. §1983, asserting that Texas’s post-conviction
DNA testing law failed to provide procedural due process. Reed argued
that the law’s stringent chain-of-custody requirement was unconstitu-
tional. The District Court dismissed Reed’s complaint. The Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed on the ground that Reed’s §1983 claim was filed too late,
after the applicable 2-year statute of limitations had run. The Fifth
Circuit held that the limitations period began to run when the Texas
trial court denied Reed’s motion, not when the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals denied rehearing.
Held: When a prisoner pursues state post-conviction DNA testing
through the state-provided litigation process, the statute of limitations
for a §1983 procedural due process claim begins to run when the state
litigation ends, in this case when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
denied Reed’s motion for rehearing. Pp. 3–6.
(a) Texas’s three threshold arguments lack merit. First, Reed has
standing because Reed sufficiently alleged an injury in fact: denial of
access to the requested evidence by the state prosecutor (the named
defendant). A federal court conclusion that Texas’s post-conviction
2 REED v. GOERTZ
Syllabus
DNA testing procedures denied Reed due process would “amount to a
significant increase in the likelihood” that Reed “would obtain relief
that directly redresses the injury suffered.” Utah v. Evans, 536 U. S.
452, 464. Second, Texas’s invocation of the State’s sovereign immunity
fails because the Ex parte Young doctrine allows suits like Reed’s for
declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers in their official
capacities. 209 U. S. 123, 159–161. Third, Reed’s procedural due pro-
cess claim does not contravene the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Pp. 3–4.
(b) The sole question before the Court is whether Reed’s §1983 suit
raising a procedural due process challenge to Texas’s post-conviction
DNA testing law was timely under the applicable 2-year statute of lim-
itations. The statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff
has a “complete and present cause of action,” Bay Area Laundry and
Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S.
192, 201, a determination the Court makes by focusing first on the spe-
cific constitutional right alleged to have been infringed. See
McDonough v. Smith, 588 U. S. ___, ___. Here, that right is procedural
due process. A procedural due process claim is complete not “when the
deprivation occurs” but only when “the State fails to provide due pro-
cess.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S. 113, 126. Texas’s process for con-
sidering a request for DNA testing in capital cases includes both trial
court proceedings and appellate review, which under Texas Rule of Ap-
pellate Procedure 79.1 encompasses a motion for rehearing. In Reed’s
case, the State’s alleged failure to provide Reed with a fundamentally
fair process was complete when the state litigation ended—when the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Reed’s motion for rehearing.
Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run on Reed’s §1983
claim when Reed’s motion for rehearing was denied. Pp. 4–6.
995 F. 3d 425, reversed.
KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opin-
ion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 21–442
_________________
RODNEY REED, PETITIONER v. BRYAN GOERTZ
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[April 19, 2023]
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.
In many States, a convicted prisoner who still disputes
his guilt may ask state courts to order post-conviction DNA
testing of evidence. If the prisoner’s request fails in the
state courts and he then files a federal 42 U. S. C. §1983
procedural due process suit challenging the
constitutionality of the state process, when does the statute
of limitations for that §1983 suit begin to run? The
Eleventh Circuit has held that the statute of limitations
begins to run at the end of the state-court litigation denying
DNA testing, including the state-court appeal. See Van
Poyck v. McCollum, 646 F. 3d 865, 867 (2011). In this case,
by contrast, the Fifth Circuit held that the statute of
limitations begins to run when the state trial court denied
DNA testing, notwithstanding a subsequent state-court
appeal. See 995 F. 3d 425, 431 (2021). We conclude that
the statute of limitations begins to run at the end of the
state-court litigation.
I
In 1996, Stacey Stites was strangled to death in Bastrop
County, Texas. The State charged Rodney Reed with
murdering Stites. At trial, Reed claimed that he was
2 REED v. GOERTZ
Opinion of the Court
innocent and that Stites’s fiancé or another acquaintance
had committed the murder. A jury rejected that defense
theory and found Reed guilty. Reed was sentenced to death.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
conviction and death sentence. Reed’s state and federal
habeas petitions were unsuccessful.
Then in 2014, Reed filed a motion in state court under
Texas’s post-conviction DNA testing law. See Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann., Arts. 64.01–64.05 (Vernon 2018). Reed
requested DNA testing on more than 40 pieces of evidence,
including the belt used to strangle Stites. Reed contended
that DNA testing would help identify the true perpetrator.
The state prosecutor, respondent Bryan Goertz, agreed to
test several pieces of evidence, but otherwise opposed the
motion and refused to test most of the evidence.
The state trial court denied Reed’s motion. The court
reasoned in part that (i) many items Reed sought to test—
including the belt—were not preserved through an
adequate chain of custody and (ii) Reed did not demonstrate
that he would have been acquitted if the DNA results were
exculpatory. On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the trial court and later denied Reed’s
motion for rehearing.
Reed next sued in federal court under 42 U. S. C. §1983,
asserting that Texas’s post-conviction DNA testing law
failed to provide procedural due process. Among other
things, Reed argued that the law’s stringent chain-of-
custody requirement was unconstitutional and in effect
foreclosed DNA testing for individuals convicted before
“rules governing the State’s handling and storage of
evidence were put in place.” App. 39.
The U. S. District Court for the Western District of Texas
dismissed Reed’s complaint. The U. S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed on the ground that Reed’s §1983
suit was filed too late, after the applicable 2-year statute of
limitations had run. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 3
Opinion of the Court
statute of limitations began to run when the Texas trial
court denied Reed’s motion (which occurred more than two
years before Reed filed his §1983 suit in federal court), not
when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied
rehearing.
Because the federal Courts of Appeals disagree about
when the statute of limitations begins to run for a §1983
suit regarding a State’s post-conviction DNA testing
procedures, we granted certiorari. 596 U. S. ___ (2022).
II
Texas raises three threshold arguments.
First, Texas argues that Reed lacks standing. We
disagree. Reed sufficiently alleged an injury in fact: denial
of access to the requested evidence. The state prosecutor,
who is the named defendant, denied access to the evidence
and thereby caused Reed’s injury. And if a federal court
concludes that Texas’s post-conviction DNA testing
procedures violate due process, that court order would
eliminate the state prosecutor’s justification for denying
DNA testing. It is “substantially likely” that the state
prosecutor would abide by such a court order. Utah v.
Evans, 536 U. S. 452, 464 (2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In other words, in “terms of our ‘standing’
precedent, the courts would have ordered a change in a
legal status,” and “the practical consequence of that change
would amount to a significant increase in the likelihood”
that the state prosecutor would grant access to the
requested evidence and that Reed therefore “would obtain
relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.” Ibid.
Second, Texas invokes the State’s sovereign immunity.
But the Ex parte Young doctrine allows suits like Reed’s for
declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers in their
official capacities. 209 U. S. 123, 159–161 (1908).
Third, Texas contends that Reed’s procedural due process
claim contravenes the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See
4 REED v. GOERTZ
Opinion of the Court
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413 (1923); District
of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462
(1983). That doctrine prohibits federal courts from
adjudicating cases brought by state-court losing parties
challenging state-court judgments. But as this Court
explained in Skinner v. Switzer, even though a “state-court
decision is not reviewable by lower federal courts,” a
“statute or rule governing the decision may be challenged
in a federal action.” 562 U. S. 521, 532 (2011). Here, as in
Skinner, Reed does “not challenge the adverse” state-court
decisions themselves, but rather “targets as
unconstitutional the Texas statute they authoritatively
construed.” Ibid.
III
This Court’s case law “severely limits the federal action a
state prisoner may bring for DNA testing.” Skinner v.
Switzer, 562 U. S. 521, 525 (2011). The Court has “rejected
the extension of substantive due process to this area, and
left slim room for the prisoner to show that the governing
state law denies him procedural due process.” Ibid.
(citation omitted); see District Attorney’s Office for Third
Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U. S. 52, 69, 72 (2009).
Seeking to fit his §1983 suit within the “slim room” left
by this Court’s precedent, Reed raised a procedural due
process challenge to Texas’s post-conviction DNA testing
law. The sole question now before this Court is whether
Reed’s §1983 suit was timely. The parties agree that the
statute of limitations for Reed’s claim is two years. But the
parties disagree about when that 2-year limitations period
began to run. That question is one of federal law. See
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U. S. 384, 388 (2007).
As a general matter, the statute of limitations begins to
run when the plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of
action.” Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust
Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S. 192, 201 (1997)
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 5
Opinion of the Court
(internal quotation marks omitted). To determine when a
plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, the
Court focuses first on the specific constitutional right
alleged to have been infringed. See McDonough v. Smith,
588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 4).
Here, the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed
is procedural due process. A procedural due process claim
consists of two elements: (i) deprivation by state action of a
protected interest in life, liberty, or property, and
(ii) inadequate state process. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494
U. S. 113, 125 (1990). Importantly, the Court has stated
that a procedural due process claim “is not complete when
the deprivation occurs.” Id., at 126. Rather, the claim is
“complete” only when “the State fails to provide due
process.” Ibid.
Reed contends that the State’s process for considering his
DNA testing request was fundamentally unfair in violation
of the Due Process Clause. Texas’s process for considering
a request for DNA testing in capital cases includes not only
trial court proceedings, but also appellate review by the
Court of Criminal Appeals. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.,
Art. 64.05. And under longstanding Texas rules of
appellate procedure, the Court of Criminal Appeals’s
appellate review process encompasses a motion for
rehearing. Tex. Rule App. Proc. 79.1 (2022).
In Reed’s case, the State’s alleged failure to provide Reed
with a fundamentally fair process was complete when the
state litigation ended and deprived Reed of his asserted
liberty interest in DNA testing. Therefore, Reed’s §1983
claim was complete and the statute of limitations began to
run when the state litigation ended—when the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals denied Reed’s motion for rehearing.
The soundness of that straightforward conclusion is
“reinforced by the consequences that would follow” from a
contrary approach. McDonough, 588 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
at 9). If the statute of limitations for a §1983 suit like
6 REED v. GOERTZ
Opinion of the Court
Reed’s began to run after a state trial court’s denial of a
plaintiff ’s motion for DNA testing (or even after the appeal
before the plaintiff ’s rehearing proceedings), the plaintiff
would likely continue to pursue relief in the state system
and simultaneously file a protective federal §1983 suit
challenging that ongoing state process. That parallel
litigation would “run counter to core principles of
federalism, comity, consistency, and judicial economy.” Id.,
at ___ (slip op., at 10). We see no good reason for such
senseless duplication.
Moreover, significant systemic benefits ensue from
starting the statute of limitations clock when the state
litigation in DNA testing cases like Reed’s has concluded.
If any due process flaws lurk in the DNA testing law, the
state appellate process may cure those flaws, thereby
rendering a federal §1983 suit unnecessary. And if the
state appellate court construes the DNA testing statute,
that construction will streamline and focus subsequent
§1983 proceedings.
In sum, when a prisoner pursues state post-conviction
DNA testing through the state-provided litigation process,
the statute of limitations for a §1983 procedural due process
claim begins to run when the state litigation ends. In
Reed’s case, the statute of limitations began to run when
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Reed’s motion
for rehearing. Reed’s §1983 claim was timely.1
We reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.
It is so ordered.
——————
1 According to Reed, a plaintiff may forgo full appellate review in the
state-court system and still bring a procedural due process suit
challenging a State’s post-conviction DNA testing law. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 9–14. As this Court indicated in Osborne, it may be “difficult” as a
practical matter “to criticize the State’s procedures when [the prisoner]
has not invoked them.” 557 U. S., at 71. In any event, we need not
address that hypothetical scenario.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 1
THOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 21–442
_________________
RODNEY REED, PETITIONER v. BRYAN GOERTZ
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[April 19, 2023]
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”) affirmed
the denial of petitioner Rodney Reed’s state-law motion for
postconviction DNA testing. Reed petitioned this Court for
certiorari, arguing that the CCA’s interpretation and appli-
cation of the relevant state law violated his federal due pro-
cess rights. After we denied his petition, Reed repackaged
it as a complaint in Federal District Court, naming re-
spondent (the Bastrop County District Attorney) as a place-
holder defendant. Like his earlier certiorari petition,
Reed’s complaint assails the CCA’s state-law reasoning as
inconsistent with due process, and it seeks a declaration
that the CCA’s interpretation and application of state law
was unconstitutional.
Reed’s action should be dismissed for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. Federal district courts lack appellate
jurisdiction to review state-court judgments, and Reed’s ac-
tion presents no original Article III case or controversy be-
tween him and the district attorney. Because the Court er-
roneously holds that the District Court had jurisdiction
over Reed’s action, I respectfully dissent.
I
A
On April 23, 1996, 19-year-old Stacey Stites failed to re-
port for her 3:30 a.m. shift at the H.E.B. grocery store in
2 REED v. GOERTZ
THOMAS, J., dissenting
Bastrop, Texas. The truck Stites drove to work was found
abandoned in the Bastrop High School parking lot a couple
of hours later. That afternoon, a passerby discovered Stites’
body in a ditch by a country road, her clothing disturbed in
a manner suggesting sexual violence. Medical examiners
determined that Stites had been strangled to death with
her own belt, which was found in two pieces—one near the
truck, the other near Stites’ body. There was semen in
Stites’ vagina and rectum and saliva on her breasts. The
police concluded that Stites had been raped and murdered.
Despite a wide-ranging investigation, the police were in-
itially unable to find a DNA match for the bodily fluids re-
covered from Stites’ corpse. Then, about six months after
Stites’ death, Reed was arrested for kidnaping and attempt-
ing to rape and murder another young woman near the
route Stites typically took to work and around the same
time of night when Stites had gone missing. Reed lived
near the high school and was often seen walking the sur-
rounding area at night. Intrigued, the police checked
Reed’s DNA profile, which Texas had on file from an earlier
sexual-assault case against him. A series of tests estab-
lished a conclusive, one-in-the-world-population match be-
tween Reed and the fluids recovered from Stites’ corpse.
When first questioned, Reed insisted that he did not
know Stites at all, unaware that the police had DNA evi-
dence disproving that claim. By the time of his trial, he had
changed his story: He and Stites were having a consensual
affair, and someone else—perhaps her jealous fiancé—had
committed the murder. The jury rejected that post hoc nar-
rative and found Reed guilty. In the separate penalty
phase, Reed’s kidnaping victim testified about how Reed
had abducted, threatened, and attempted to rape her before
she was fortuitously able to escape. Four other women—
and one underage girl—also testified that Reed had bru-
tally beaten and raped them in the past. Reed was sen-
tenced to death.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 3
THOMAS, J., dissenting
The CCA affirmed Reed’s conviction and sentence in
2000. In the 23 years since, he has kept up a constant
stream of postconviction filings asserting his innocence.
Every few years, Reed’s lawyers have produced a new the-
ory and a new purportedly exculpatory affidavit. With the
patience of Job, the Texas courts have duly considered them
all. On one such occasion, the CCA noted “the complete lack
of a cohesive theory of innocence” across Reed’s unending
series of attempts to relitigate his guilt. Ex parte Reed, 271
S. W. 3d 698, 746 (2008).1
B
In Texas, a convict has two distinct avenues to obtain
postconviction DNA testing of evidence—one executive and
discretionary, the other judicial and legal. As for the first,
the convict can attempt to reach an agreement with the dis-
trict attorney, who has broad discretion to order or allow
DNA testing. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 39–40. In the case of the
second, the convict can file a motion under Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann., Arts. 64.01 through 64.05 (Vernon 2018) (Chap-
ter 64), which requires “the convicting court” to “order test-
ing” if the movant establishes certain requirements.
Ex parte Gutierrez, 337 S. W. 3d 883, 889–890 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011).
In 2014, on the same day that the trial court held a hear-
ing to set Reed’s execution date, Reed filed a Chapter 64
motion for DNA testing of a large number of items. The
——————
1 One example encapsulates the meritlessness of those attempts. In
one of his many state postconviction proceedings, Reed submitted an af-
fidavit from his own father, Walter, stating that an acquaintance had
told him that he knew where Stites was the night she died. Reed sub-
mitted no affidavit from the acquaintance. The State then obtained an
affidavit from the acquaintance, in which he swore that he “ ‘never told
Walter Reed that I knew where Stacey Stites was on the night she was
killed. All I ever told Walter was that Rodney Reed was a crackhead who
raped girls on the [railroad] tracks. I have no idea where Stacey Stites
was when she died.’ ” Ex parte Reed, 271 S. W. 3d, at 736.
4 REED v. GOERTZ
THOMAS, J., dissenting
district attorney consented to test some of the items outside
of the Chapter 64 framework, but he otherwise opposed
Reed’s request. The trial court denied the motion, finding
that Reed had not established two necessary elements for
Chapter 64 testing: (1) that he “would not have been con-
victed if exculpatory results had been obtained through
DNA testing,” Art. 64.03(a)(2)(A); and (2) that his Chapter
64 motion was “not made to unreasonably delay the execu-
tion of sentence or administration of justice.” Art.
64.03(a)(2)(B). Reed appealed, and the CCA remanded for
the trial court to address the other elements of the Chapter
64 rubric. After making supplemental findings, the trial
court again denied Reed’s motion, and Reed again appealed.
In April 2017, the CCA issued an opinion affirming the
trial court. First, the CCA held that the record supported
the trial court’s finding that many of the items had not
“been subjected to a chain of custody sufficient to establish
that [they had] not been substituted, tampered with, re-
placed, or altered in any material respect.” Art.
64.03(a)(1)(A)(ii); see Reed v. State, 541 S. W. 3d 759, 769–
770. Second, it held that Reed had not shown “a reasonable
likelihood” that many of the items “contain[ed] biological
material suitable for DNA testing.” Art. 64.03(a)(1)(B); see
541 S. W. 3d, at 772. Third, addressing only the items that
survived the previous two holdings, the CCA held that Reed
had not established that exculpatory results from DNA
testing of those items would have prevented his conviction.
See id., at 773–777. Finally, the CCA held that Reed had
failed to establish that his Chapter 64 motion was not made
for purposes of delay. See id., at 777–780. The CCA noted
that “Chapter 64 had existed with only slight variations for
over thirteen years at the time Reed filed his motion,” and
that Reed’s motion was suspiciously filed “on the same day
the judge heard the State’s motion to set an execution date.”
Id., at 779.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 5
THOMAS, J., dissenting
Reed moved for rehearing, arguing that the CCA had mis-
applied the Chapter 64 elements and asserting, in broad
terms, that those errors violated his due process rights. See
App. to Pet. for Cert. in Reed v. Texas, O. T. 2017, No. 17–
1093, pp. 263a–272a. The CCA denied rehearing by sum-
mary order in October 2017.
Reed then timely petitioned this Court for a writ of certi-
orari to review the CCA’s judgment. His petition contended
that the CCA’s judgment “violate[d his] due process rights”
because it was based on “arbitrary and fundamentally un-
fair interpretation[s]” of Chapter 64’s chain-of-custody and
unreasonable-delay elements. Pet. for Cert. in No. 17–
1093, pp. i–ii. We denied certiorari. See Reed v. Texas, 585
U. S. ___ (2018).
C
In August 2019, Reed sued the district attorney under
Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983 in the U. S. District
Court for the Western District of Texas. As relevant here,
Reed’s complaint alleges that he successfully “proved each
of the statutory requirements of [Chapter] 64” in the state-
court proceedings, App. 31, ¶52, but that “the CCA’s adop-
tion of non-statutory criteria to preclude . . . Reed from test-
ing key trial evidence to prove his innocence violate[d] fun-
damental notions of fairness and denie[d] him due process
of law,” id., at 14, ¶2. Reed proceeds to allege “several
ways” in which “[t]he CCA’s interpretation and application
of [Chapter] 64 violate[d] fundamental fairness,” id., at 41,
¶79, with particular focus on the CCA’s allegedly arbitrary
constructions of the chain-of-custody, unreasonable-delay,
and exculpatory-results elements, see id., at 41–42, ¶¶79–
81; 43–45, ¶¶84–87. For relief, “Reed seeks a declaration
that [Chapter] 64, as interpreted, construed and applied by
the Texas courts to deny his motion for DNA testing, vio-
lates his rights under” the Constitution. Id., at 14, ¶3; see
also id., at 49 (prayer for relief ).
6 REED v. GOERTZ
THOMAS, J., dissenting
The district attorney moved to dismiss Reed’s complaint
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state
a claim. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). The
District Court held that it had jurisdiction but dismissed
Reed’s complaint on the merits, concluding that Reed had
alleged only “that he disagree[d] with the state court’s con-
struction of Texas law” and that none of the issues in the
complaint “r[ose] to the level of a procedural due-process vi-
olation.” 2019 WL 12073901, *7 (WD Tex., Nov. 15, 2019).
The Fifth Circuit affirmed on the alternative ground that
Reed’s claim was untimely: Applying Texas’ 2-year statute
of limitations for personal-injury claims, it reasoned that
Reed’s due process claim accrued when the trial court first
denied his Chapter 64 motion, rendering his complaint sev-
eral years too late. 995 F. 3d 425, 431 (2021).
II
Two intertwined principles of federal jurisdiction—Arti-
cle III standing and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine2—man-
date a finding that the District Court lacked jurisdiction
over this action. The majority gives short shrift to these
principles, and its holding that Reed’s claim was timely
serve only to underscore its antecedent jurisdictional er-
rors.
A
The Constitution limits the federal courts’ jurisdiction to
“Cases” and “Controversies,” Art. III, §2, cl. 1, constraining
judicial power to “the determination of real, earnest and vi-
tal controvers[ies] between” contending litigants. Chicago
& Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 345
(1892). “[A]n essential and unchanging part of [this] case-
or-controversy requirement” is the doctrine of Article III
standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560
——————
2 See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462
(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413 (1923).
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 7
THOMAS, J., dissenting
(1992). Under that doctrine, any party requesting relief
from a federal court must assert “an injury” that is “con-
crete, particularized, and actual or imminent,” and he must
show that his injury is both “fairly traceable to the chal-
lenged action” and “redressable by a favorable ruling.”
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U. S. 139, 149
(2010); see also Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 581
U. S. 433, 438–439 (2017). Absent that showing, the court
has no jurisdiction and thus no “power to adjudicate the
case.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523
U. S. 83, 89 (1998) (emphasis deleted).
Jurisdiction, moreover, comes in two types—original and
appellate—and the application of the Article III standing
elements is interwoven with that constitutionally grounded
distinction. See Art. III, §2, cl. 2. In an original case or con-
troversy, the plaintiff traces his injury “to the defendant’s
allegedly unlawful conduct,” Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737,
751 (1984), and, correspondingly, seeks a remedy that runs
against the defendant and determines that defendant’s du-
ties or liabilities (e.g., a judgment for money damages or an
injunction). On the other hand, “[t]he criterion which dis-
tinguishes appellate from original jurisdiction, is that it re-
vises and corrects the decisions of another tribunal.” Ex
parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 86 (1807); see also Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175–176 (1803). As such, a case or
controversy is appellate in nature when the relief-seeking
party’s injury is traceable to the allegedly erroneous action
of another court and requires a remedy correcting that judi-
cial action (e.g., reversal or vacatur of the challenged judg-
ment).3 See, e.g., Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader
——————
3 The limited exceptions to these generalizations only prove the rules.
Appellate courts sometimes issue remedies that operate directly on the
parties (e.g., injunctions pending appeal), but such remedies are “ex-
traordinary” and appropriate only when “ ‘in aid of ’ ” the court’s primary
appellate jurisdiction. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Federal Election
8 REED v. GOERTZ
THOMAS, J., dissenting
Media, 588 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (slip op., at 4–5); Mon-
santo, 561 U. S., at 150–153. Thus, whenever a party seeks
relief from a federal court, the elements that bring his claim
within Article III in the first place—the nature and source
of his injury and the remedy needed to redress it—also dic-
tate whether his claim invokes original or appellate juris-
diction.
The conceptual distinction between original and appel-
late jurisdiction also animates the Rooker-Feldman doc-
trine—which, despite its name, is not so much a “doctrine”
as a basic fact of federal statutory law. This Court has dis-
cretionary appellate jurisdiction to review certain state-
court judgments by certiorari. 28 U. S. C. §1257(a). But no
other federal court has appellate jurisdiction over state-
court judgments, and, in particular, “[t]he jurisdiction pos-
sessed by the District Courts is strictly original.” Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413, 416 (1923); see, e.g., 28
U. S. C. §1331 (“The district courts shall have original ju-
risdiction of all civil actions arising under [federal law]”).
Thus, if the losing party in a state judicial proceeding
“claim[s] that the state judgment itself violates [his] federal
rights”—a claim that calls for an exercise of appellate juris-
diction—his only remedy in the federal system is certiorari
——————
Comm’n, 542 U. S. 1305, 1305–1306 (2004) (Rehnquist, C. J., in cham-
bers) (quoting 28 U. S. C. §1651(a)). And, while certain original reme-
dies, like declaratory judgments and quiet title decrees, do not neces-
sarily impose new duties on the losing defendant, they conclusively
establish the parties’ legal relations from which such duties flow. See
Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 261–265 (1933).
Significantly, this Court has long held that an action for declaratory re-
lief alone implicates the same constitutional “case or controversy” as
would an action for coercive relief involving the same parties and subject
matter, see ibid., and that declaratory relief “cannot alone supply juris-
diction otherwise absent,” California v. Texas, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021)
(slip op., at 9); see also R. Fallon, J. Manning, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro,
Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 841
(7th ed. 2015).
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 9
THOMAS, J., dissenting
in this Court. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1006
(1994). He may not “see[k] what in substance would be ap-
pellate review of the state judgment” under the guise of an
original action in federal district court. Id., at 1005–1006;
see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.,
544 U. S. 280, 284–285 (2005); District of Columbia Court
of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462, 482–488, and nn. 15,
16 (1983).
Yet, that is precisely what Reed has done here. While his
complaint purports to bring an original action against the
district attorney, in reality, it seeks appellate review to re-
dress an alleged injury inflicted by the CCA’s adverse deci-
sion “in [his] particular cas[e].” Id., at 487, n. 18. The gra-
vamen of Reed’s claim—made clear again and again
throughout his complaint—is that the CCA violated his due
process rights through its reasoning in his case. See, e.g.,
App. 14, ¶2; 31–33, ¶¶53–57; 38, ¶69; 39–40, ¶¶71, 74; 41,
¶79; 42–43, ¶¶83–84; 44–45, ¶¶86–87. All of those alleged
injuries are traceable to the CCA, not the district attorney.
And, redressing them would require an exercise of appellate
jurisdiction over the CCA—jurisdiction that the District
Court does not have. Confirming the point, Reed’s com-
plaint does not ask the District Court to control the district
attorney’s actions at all. Instead, the only relief it requests
is “[a] declaration that the CCA’s interpretation and appli-
cation of [Chapter] 64 . . . is unconstitutional.” Id., at 49.
The complaint transparently seeks nothing more than the
District Court’s “review and rejection” of the CCA’s judg-
ment. Exxon Mobil, 544 U. S., at 284. As such, it founders
upon the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as well as the Article III
traceability and redressability requirements with which
that doctrine is intertwined.
Any doubt that Reed seeks de facto appellate review
should be dispelled by one undisputed fact: Every due pro-
cess violation that Reed alleges could have been considered
on direct review of the CCA’s judgment in this Court. After
10 REED v. GOERTZ
THOMAS, J., dissenting
all, determining whether state-court judgments applied un-
constitutional constructions of state law is a classic use of
this Court’s appellate jurisdiction under §1257(a). See, e.g.,
Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U. S. 451, 453 (2001); Bouie v. City
of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347, 349 (1964); Brinkerhoff-Faris
Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 678 (1930). That is
why Reed originally petitioned this Court for certiorari to
review the CCA’s judgment. And it is why he agreed at oral
argument that we could have granted that petition. See Tr.
of Oral Arg. 32–33.
Yet, even after repackaging his failed certiorari petition
as an original §1983 complaint, Reed not only concedes but
affirmatively argues that his claim is analogous to the due
process arguments presented in Rogers, Bouie, and
Brinkerhoff-Faris. See Brief for Petitioner 33–34. That he
is correct on that front should be fatal to his complaint.
Like the petitioners in those cases, Reed contends that the
rules of decision applied against him in a state-court pro-
ceeding violated his due process rights. Because those con-
tentions would have been appropriate subjects for this
Court’s appellate review, it follows that Reed cannot press
the same due process challenges and seek the same relief in
an original action in the District Court. See Feldman, 460
U. S., at 482–486, and n. 15; accord, id., at, 489 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
In holding otherwise, the majority improperly separates
the Rooker-Feldman and Article III inquiries and applies a
different theory of Reed’s claim to each. But, Reed’s claim
must satisfy two conditions at once: It must implicate an
Article III case or controversy between the parties to this
action, and that case or controversy must fall within the
District Court’s “strictly original” jurisdiction. Rooker, 263
U. S., at 416. The majority articulates no theory of how
Reed’s claim can satisfy both conditions. That is because
there is no such theory.
A useful way to view this is to work backwards from the
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 11
THOMAS, J., dissenting
majority’s Rooker-Feldman holding. The majority accepts
Reed’s representation that he “does ‘not challenge the ad-
verse’ state-court decisions themselves,” but only “ ‘targets
as unconstitutional the Texas statute [Chapter 64] they au-
thoritatively construed.’ ” Ante, at 4 (quoting Skinner v.
Switzer, 562 U. S. 521, 532 (2011)). But this workaround to
Rooker-Feldman raises a glaring Article III problem: As this
Court has repeatedly explained, a federal court may not en-
tertain a free-floating challenge to a statute unmoored from
a concrete case or controversy. See, e.g., California v.
Texas, 593 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2021) (slip op., at 7–9); Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 471–472 (1982);
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923); Musk-
rat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 360–362 (1911). Unless
Reed merely seeks an advisory opinion, his due process
challenge to Chapter 64 must seek relief from some concrete
enforcement or application of that law that affects him.
More specifically, Reed must be challenging either (1) some
conduct of the district attorney constituting enforcement of
Chapter 64 against him or (2) the CCA’s application of
Chapter 64 as a rule of decision in his case.4 If it is the
——————
4 I acknowledge that our most recent DNA-testing precedent, Skinner
v. Switzer, 562 U. S. 521 (2011), contains loose language suggesting that
Skinner’s due process claim challenged neither “the [defendant] prosecu-
tor’s conduct [n]or the decisions reached by the CCA” in his case, but only
“Texas’ postconviction DNA statute ‘as construed’ by the Texas courts.”
Id., at 530. But, the majority surely cannot think that federal courts
have subject-matter jurisdiction over challenges to statutes in the ab-
stract, nor does Skinner actually stand for that proposition. Skinner’s
only jurisdictional holding was that the petitioner’s claim was not barred
by Rooker-Feldman. See 562 U. S., at 532–533. Skinner did not address
Article III standing and thus has “ ‘no precedential effect’ ” on that issue.
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 511 (2006). Yet, for the curious,
Skinner’s complaint did in fact allege that the defendant prosecutor was
violating his due process rights through her conduct, and it expressly
requested injunctive relief against her. See App. in Skinner v. Switzer,
O. T. 2010, No. 09–9000, pp. 5–6, ¶¶1–2; 20–21, ¶33; 22, ¶37. Thus,
12 REED v. GOERTZ
THOMAS, J., dissenting
former, Reed’s suit is original; if it is the latter, it requires
an exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
So, which is it? As already indicated, the correct answer
is the latter: Fundamentally, Reed’s complaint—like his
certiorari petition before it—contests how “the Texas
courts” “interpreted, construed[,] and applied” Chapter 64
“to deny his motion for DNA testing,” App. 14, ¶3, which is
why the only relief he requests is an abstract “declaration
that the CCA’s interpretation and application of [Chapter]
64 . . . is unconstitutional.” Id., at 49. The idea that his
claim “does not challenge the adverse state-court deci-
sions,” ante, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted), cannot
survive even a cursory examination of his complaint. See
supra, at 9–10.
Nor would the other possibility make any sense. Reed
cannot be seeking relief from the district attorney’s enforce-
ment of Chapter 64, because the district attorney has not
enforced that law against Reed at all. The sum total of the
district attorney’s relevant conduct is as follows. First, he
declined to order Reed’s desired testing in his executive dis-
cretion, independent of Chapter 64. Next, when Reed asked
the Texas courts to grant testing under Chapter 64, the dis-
trict attorney opposed his motion. Finally, after Reed’s mo-
tion proved unsuccessful, the district attorney continued to
decline to order Reed’s desired testing. To say that this con-
duct amounts to enforcing Chapter 64 makes as much sense
as saying that a party to a discovery dispute, who defeats a
motion to compel, in effect, “enforces” the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure by continuing not to turn over the de-
manded documents. Again, any due process injury that
Chapter 64 has caused Reed is traceable to the CCA’s judi-
cial application of that law in his case, not to any executive
——————
Skinner’s claim as pleaded clearly was original in nature, but for pre-
cisely the same reasons that Reed’s is not: Where Skinner claimed injury
from and sought relief against the party whom he had sued, Reed claims
injury from and seeks relief against an adverse judicial decision.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 13
THOMAS, J., dissenting
acts or omissions of the district attorney.
The majority permits Reed to evade that problem by
framing his Article III injury as the mere lack of access to
his desired evidence, independent of any alleged due pro-
cess denial. See ante, at 3. But, if framing Reed’s injury
that way helps with traceability, it only worsens his redress-
ability problem. Suppose that the District Court accepted
Reed’s due process arguments and issued his requested re-
lief: an abstract declaration that the interpretation of Chap-
ter 64 that the CCA applied in his case is unconstitutional.
How, exactly, would that redress Reed’s injury of not having
the evidence tested? The CCA’s Chapter 64 judgment
would remain untouched; Reed would have obtained an
opinion disapproving its reasoning, but without any appel-
late “revis[ion] and correct[ion]” to disturb its finality. Boll-
man, 4 Cranch, at 86. Nor would a declaration that the
CCA’s construction of Chapter 64 was unconstitutional im-
ply anything about the district attorney’s duties or liabili-
ties.
The majority asserts that such a declaration would cause
“ ‘a significant increase in the likelihood’ ” that the district
attorney would grant Reed’s desired testing. Ante, at 3
(quoting Utah v. Evans, 536 U. S. 452, 464 (2002)). But the
district attorney has made clear that he does not under-
stand Reed’s requested relief to “require any change in con-
duct” from him and that it is not “likely to bring about such
change.” Brief for Respondent 38–39. If the majority
thinks the district attorney is wrong about that, it would
only be fair to explain exactly what change in conduct would
be legally required of him if Reed prevailed on his due pro-
cess claim. The majority fails to do so.5
——————
5 This failure will have troubling consequences if Reed’s claim ever pro-
gresses beyond the pleading stage. To survive summary judgment, Reed
cannot “rest on mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other
evidence specific facts” showing that his requested relief will make it
likelier that he obtains the desired testing. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l
14 REED v. GOERTZ
THOMAS, J., dissenting
Instead, it offers a number of vague pronouncements, all
of which wilt under scrutiny. Consider the claim that
Reed’s victory in this action would “eliminate the [district
attorney’s] justification for denying DNA testing.” Ante, at
3. If this means that Reed’s requested relief would entitle
him to testing under Chapter 64, it is wrong because the
CCA’s unreversed judgment would stand as a final, binding
determination of Reed’s Chapter 64 rights even if the Dis-
trict Court were to declare that, in its opinion, the CCA had
applied that law unconstitutionally in Reed’s case. Alter-
natively, if the majority means that the success of Reed’s
due process claim would require the district attorney to per-
mit testing in his independent executive discretion, it is
also wrong because Reed is not challenging the district at-
torney’s denial of discretionary testing as unlawful—only
the CCA’s “interpretation and application of [Chapter] 64.”
App. 49.
The majority also misses the mark when it asserts that it
is “substantially likely that the [district attorney] would
abide by [Reed’s requested] court order.” Ante, at 3 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). Again, the only “court order”
Reed seeks is a declaration disapproving the legal under-
pinnings of the CCA’s judgment. Such an “order” would
have no bearing on the district attorney’s future conduct; in
a literal sense, there would be nothing for him to “abide by.”
Finally, the majority says that the District Court “ ‘would
have ordered a change in a legal status’ ” were it to grant
the declaration Reed seeks. Ibid. (quoting Utah, 536 U. S.,
at 464). The intended meaning of this statement is com-
pletely obscure. The “status” that the majority has in mind
cannot be that of Chapter 64 itself. See California, 593
——————
USA, 568 U. S. 398, 412 (2013) (alteration and internal quotation marks
omitted). It is far from clear what such a showing would entail, and the
majority leaves the parties in the dark.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 15
THOMAS, J., dissenting
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (explaining that judicial reme-
dies “ ‘operate with respect to specific parties,’ ” not “ ‘on le-
gal rules in the abstract’ ”); see also Mellon, 262 U. S., at
488 (explaining that courts “have no power per se to review
and annul [statutes] on the ground that they are unconsti-
tutional,” only “the negative power to disregard an uncon-
stitutional enactment” when “declaring the law applicable
to [a justiciable] controversy”). Nor can the majority mean
that the District Court could change the “status” of the
CCA’s judgment. In reality, the only way that the District
Court could possibly help Reed obtain DNA testing is by di-
rectly controlling the district attorney’s actions. But, again,
Reed’s complaint neither requests nor sets forth a basis for
any such relief.6
——————
6 This case is thus very different from Utah v. Evans, 536 U. S. 452
(2002), on which the majority relies heavily (indeed, exclusively). There,
as earlier in Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788 (1992), we held
that a State had standing to sue the Secretary of Commerce for injunc-
tive and declaratory relief against an allegedly improper census report
that would have diminished the State’s congressional delegation. See
Utah, 536 U. S., at 459–464; Franklin, 505 U. S., at 801–803 (plurality
opinion). In both cases, Justice Scalia argued in dissent that redressa-
bility was lacking because the causal link between the Secretary’s prep-
aration of a new report and redress of the States’ apportionment injuries
depended on the actions of other officials not bound by the court’s judg-
ment. See Utah, 536 U. S., at 511; Franklin, 505 U. S., at 824–825. The
Court answered that objection by “assum[ing]”—in large part because
“the Solicitor General ha[d] not contended to the contrary”—that it was
“substantially likely” that those other officials would cooperate with a
judgment in the suing State’s favor. Franklin, 505 U. S., at 803 (plural-
ity opinion); see Utah, 536 U. S., at 460–461, 463–464. Utah and Frank-
lin thus represent nothing more than a context-specific application of the
settled rule that “standing is not precluded” (although it is “more difficult
to establish”) when the connection between the defendant’s court-ordered
remedial conduct and ultimate redress of the plaintiff ’s injury partly de-
pends on the actions of third parties. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U. S. 555, 562 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, by con-
trast, the majority finds redressability in an abstract declaration—in
truth, an advisory opinion—that would not require any change in con-
16 REED v. GOERTZ
THOMAS, J., dissenting
In sum, there is no getting around the essential problem
with Reed’s due process claim: To the extent he is not
merely seeking an advisory opinion, he is complaining
about a court-inflicted injury, and redressing that injury
would require an exercise of appellate jurisdiction that the
District Court does not possess. In substance, his complaint
in this action is a mere reprise of his prior certiorari peti-
tion, camouflaged as an original action against the district
attorney. Thus, I would vacate the Fifth Circuit’s judgment
and remand this case to the District Court with instructions
to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion.
B
The majority next holds that Reed’s §1983 due process
claim was timely because it did not accrue until the CCA
denied rehearing. The little reasoning the majority offers
for this conclusion helpfully accentuates its antecedent ju-
risdictional errors.
First, the majority points out that a procedural due pro-
cess claim is not necessarily “ ‘complete when the depriva-
tion occurs,’ ” but “only when ‘the State fails to provide due
process.’ ” Ante, at 5 (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S.
113, 126 (1990)). Yet, “the general rule” is that due process
itself “requir[es] predeprivation notice and hearing,” so the
truism for which the majority quotes Zinermon matters
only in those “extraordinary situations” in which “[w]e tol-
erate” postdeprivation process as sufficient. United States
v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 53 (1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Zinermon, 494
U. S., at 127–130. The majority proceeds to show, however,
that it does not regard this case as a postdeprivation case
at all, for it says that the State “deprived Reed of his as-
serted liberty interest in DNA testing” at the very moment
——————
duct on the part of the only defendant in this case. Nothing in our prec-
edents supports that holding.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 17
THOMAS, J., dissenting
when “the State’s alleged failure to provide Reed with a fun-
damentally fair process was complete.” Ante, at 5. Given
this understanding of Reed’s claim, the “[i]mportan[t]”
proposition with which the majority begins its analysis is
doctrinally irrelevant. Ibid.
After that red herring, the majority engages in an obvious
equivocation, conflating the Chapter 64 “process” that Reed
challenges as “fundamentally unfair” with the Texas courts’
generally applicable decisional procedures. Ibid. But of
course, those procedures are not what Reed challenges. In-
stead (and, again, exactly like the arguments in his prior
certiorari petition), his due process claim “ ‘targets as un-
constitutional’ ” the substantive requirements of Chapter 64
as construed. Ante, at 4. His claim plainly would be no dif-
ferent if the CCA did not entertain rehearing motions.
Still, the majority’s confused accrual reasoning is useful
for the added light that it shines on Reed’s jurisdictional
problems. As the majority says, a procedural due process
claim has two elements: (1) a deprivation and (2) inade-
quate process. The majority then acknowledges that the
state courts effectuated Reed’s deprivation, and it treats the
state courts’ ordinary decisional mechanics as the allegedly
inadequate process. But, after both elements of Reed’s
claim are thus laid at the feet of the state courts, what role
is left for the nominal defendant here, the district attorney?
What part did he play in violating Reed’s procedural due
process rights, and what makes him a proper defendant to
Reed’s §1983 claim?
The majority has no answer. At bottom, its approval of
Reed’s claim is intelligible only upon the supposition that
the district attorney may be sued as a mere stand-in for the
State as a whole, such that Reed can urge against him the
due process violations that the State allegedly committed
through its courts. That is a profound mistake. True, the
district attorney and the CCA are both state actors. But,
States act in different ways through their different entities
18 REED v. GOERTZ
THOMAS, J., dissenting
and officers, and the nature of a challenged state action de-
termines what federal-court remedy may be available.
As this Court has explained, “[a] State acts by its legisla-
tive, its executive, or its judicial authorities,” and “in no
other way.” Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 347 (1880).
The Due Process Clause applies to action through any of
these agencies, ibid., but not every alleged due process vio-
lation may be asserted in an original §1983 action. By it-
self, a State’s legislative enactment of an unconstitutional
law does not give rise to a justiciable case or controversy.
See California, 593 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 7–9); Musk-
rat, 219 U. S., at 361. Next, when a State allegedly violates
due process through executive action, the aggrieved party
may bring an original action for appropriate relief against
the relevant executive officer. See Mellon, 262 U. S., at 488;
Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908).7 And, when a State
allegedly violates due process through its judicial actions—
——————
7 Young cautioned that,
“[i]n making an officer of the State a party defendant in a suit to enjoin
the enforcement of an act alleged to be unconstitutional[,] it is plain that
such officer must have some connection with the enforcement of the act, or
else it is merely making him a party as a representative of the State, and
thereby attempting to make the State a party.” 209 U. S., at 157 (em-
phasis added).
Invoking this language, the district attorney argues that Reed’s suit is
independently barred by state sovereign immunity, in addition to Article
III and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It appears fairly debatable
whether the “connection” requirement described in Young is best under-
stood as a precondition to Young’s sovereign-immunity exception or as a
simple application of Article III traceability. Compare Okpalobi v. Fos-
ter, 244 F. 3d 405, 410–424 (CA5 2001) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (tak-
ing the former view), with id., at 439 (Benavides, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that “modern standing doctrine has sub-
sumed the connection inquiry”). I see no need to tackle that question
here, since Article III and Rooker-Feldman amply establish the jurisdic-
tional impropriety of Reed’s suit. I add only that, on either interpreta-
tion, Young makes it clear that a state officer cannot be sued “as a rep-
resentative of the State” writ large—rather, he can only be sued for legal
violations attributable to his own office.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 19
THOMAS, J., dissenting
be it through the denial of a fundamentally fair judicial pro-
cedure or through the application of a rule of decision that
itself violates due process—the remedy that Congress has
provided is appellate “review of the [challenged] judgmen[t]
in this Court.” Feldman, 460 U. S., at 482; see, e.g., Rogers,
532 U. S., at 453; Bouie, 378 U. S., at 349; Brinkerhoff-
Faris, 281 U. S., at 678; cf. Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 560 U. S.
702 (2010) (reviewing judicial-taking claim on certiorari to
the challenged state-court judgment). But, if that remedy
proves unsuccessful—as it did for Reed—the aggrieved
party cannot simply substitute an executive officer as a de-
fendant, charge the state court’s errors to that officer, and
seek redress for a court-inflicted injury in a purported orig-
inal action.
Properly understood, therefore, Article III, the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, and procedural due process principles
work in harmony. The majority’s piecemeal analysis re-
places this natural coherence with chaos. It dilutes Article
III’s traceability and redressability requirements to the
point of irrelevance. It creates a system in which the same
state-court actions simultaneously give rise to identical
original and appellate claims for relief. See this Court’s
Rule 13.3 (“[T]he time to file [a] petition for a writ of certio-
rari . . . runs from the date of the denial of rehearing” by the
lower court). It allows Reed to convert his failed certiorari
petition into a §1983 complaint. And, in doing so, it author-
izes a proceeding in which the District Court can do nothing
except opine on the constitutional merits of a state-court
adjudication.
* * *
If there is a mitigating factor to today’s decision, it is that
the §1983 action that the Court misguidedly allows to pro-
ceed is no barrier to the prompt execution of Reed’s lawful
sentence. See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 583–584
20 REED v. GOERTZ
THOMAS, J., dissenting
(2006). Indeed, Reed conceded at oral argument “that you
do not get a stay of execution just because you brought [a
Chapter] 64 proceeding or just because you’re in [§]1983
proceedings . . . challenging the adequacy of the procedures
available to you from the state.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 68. Texas
is free to take him at his word. But, because the majority
undermines vital principles of federal jurisdiction and de-
stabilizes the orderly working of our judicial system, I re-
spectfully dissent.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 1
ALITO, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 21–442
_________________
RODNEY REED, PETITIONER v. BRYAN GOERTZ
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[April 19, 2023]
JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, dis-
senting.
This case involves a suit brought by petitioner Rodney
Reed under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, against
Bryan Goertz, the District Attorney of Bastrop County,
Texas. Reed claims that Goertz violated his due process
rights when, based on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’
interpretation of the Texas statute that allows post-trial
DNA testing under specified circumstances, Article 64 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Goertz continued to
deny Reed’s request for DNA testing of certain items found
near the scene of the murder for which he was convicted 25
years ago.
As the Court notes and the parties agree, the statute of
limitations for Reed’s claim is two years. Ante, at 4; Brief
for Petitioner 17; Brief for Respondent 17. Reed filed his
complaint on August 8, 2019, and the lower courts held that
this was too late. The question before us is when the 2-year
statute of limitations began to run, that is in legal parlance,
when Reed’s claim “accrued.” As the parties agree, the gen-
eral rule is that a claim accrues when the plaintiff has “a
complete and present cause of action,” Wallace v. Kato, 549
U. S. 384, 388 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Reed contends that his claim did not accrue until the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) denied his petition for re-
hearing on October 4, 2017, and thus refused to retract the
2 REED v. GOERTZ
ALITO, J., dissenting
interpretation of Article 64 that the court had unanimously
adopted on April 12, 2017. Goertz, on the other hand, ar-
gues that Reed’s claim accrued no later than the date of the
CCA’s April 12 decision, and because that date preceded the
federal lawsuit by more than two years, Goertz maintains
that we should affirm the Fifth Circuit’s decision that
Reed’s complaint was filed too late.
As I will explain, there is room for debate about exactly
when Reed’s DNA testing claim accrued, but in my view,
the notion that this did not take place until rehearing was
denied is clearly wrong.
I
Before getting to the nub of this case, I briefly explain
why Reed’s claim might have accrued even earlier than
April 12, 2017. First, it can be argued that Reed’s claim
against Goertz accrued on or before July 2014, when Goertz
initially refused Reed’s testing request.1 The general rule
is that a plaintiff ’s §1983 claim against a state official for
violating a constitutional right accrues when the alleged vi-
olation takes place. See Wallace, 549 U. S., at 384 (§1983
claim “normally commence[s] to run” from when wrong oc-
curs). And the Court does not disclaim the possibility that
a plaintiff could file a §1983 claim as soon as a state prose-
cutor denies a DNA testing request. See ante, at 6, and n.
1.
Another possibility is that the particular claim Reed now
asserts did not accrue until the state trial court held that
Goertz had properly denied Reed’s testing request. Reed
does not claim that the bare text of Article 64 is unconstitu-
tional. (Had he done so, he could hardly argue, as he does
——————
1 We are told that Reed and Goertz engaged in lengthy negotiations
about the testing of certain items prior to the date in July 2014 when
Reed filed his claim in the District Court of Bastrop County under Article
64. Brief for Petitioner 13; Brief for Respondent 5–6; see Reed v. State,
541 S. W. 3d 759, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 3
ALITO, J., dissenting
now, that his claim did not accrue until the end of the ap-
pellate process.) Instead, he stresses that his claim con-
cerns the state courts’ construction of that statute and in
particular, their holding that the evidence for which testing
is sought must not be contaminated. Brief for Petitioner 3,
15, 29. In response to this argument, Goertz contends that
every allegedly unconstitutional aspect of the judicial inter-
pretation of the statute was adopted by the time the state
trial court issued amended findings of fact and conclusions
of law in 2016, and Goertz therefore takes the position that
Reed’s unconstitutional-construction claim accrued at that
time. Brief for Respondent 18–19.
II
A
For present purposes, it is not necessary to decide
whether Reed’s claim accrued on either of these two dates.
We need only decide whether accrual was put off until the
CCA denied rehearing, and it is clear to me that this de-
layed accrual date is wrong.2 As noted, the claim that Reed
asserts is not based on the bare text of Article 64, but on
what he claims is an erroneous interpretation of that provi-
sion by the Texas courts. He thus submits that his claim
accrued when the “authoritative construction of Article 64”
that he challenges was pronounced by the CCA. Brief for
Petitioner 17.
——————
2 We have noted that a couple special cases can displace that “presump-
tiv[e]” accrual rule, such as where “a particular claim may not realisti-
cally be brought while a violation is ongoing,” or where a special accrual
rule governed “the most natural common-law analogy.” McDonough v.
Smith, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 4). But the majority (cor-
rectly) does not adopt Reed’s view, see Brief for Petitioner 32–39, that
this matter raises one of those special cases. Under Reed’s theory as
expressed as argument, he could have proceeded with a claim under
Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U. S. 521 (2011), at any time in the process. Tr.
of Oral Arg. 12 (stating that “a prisoner could exit the state court proce-
dures at any point” and bring a challenge).
4 REED v. GOERTZ
ALITO, J., dissenting
I will assume for the sake of argument that Reed’s claim
accrued when the CCA issued its “authoritative construc-
tion of Article 64,” but I cannot agree with Reed’s argu-
ment—which the Court conspicuously declines to defend—
that the CCA’s interpretation did not become “authorita-
tive” until rehearing was denied.
Reed cites no authority for the proposition that the filing
of a petition for rehearing typically suspends the authorita-
tive force of an appellate court’s decision, and in fact, it ap-
pears that the opposite is true—as this Court’s “GVR” prac-
tice illustrates. On or shortly after the day when we hand
down a decision, we often “GVR” cases in which petitions
raising similar issues are pending before us. (That is, we
grant the petition, vacate the decision below, and remand
the case for reconsideration in light of the decision we have
handed down.) On June 30, 2022, for example, we did this
in no fewer than 33 cases.3 We do not wait to see if a peti-
tion for rehearing will be filed; nor do we hold off until a
mandate is issued or a certified copy of the judgment is pre-
pared. See this Court’s Rules 45.2 and 45.3. If our decisions
did not become authoritative and binding as soon as they
are issued, this practice would be impermissible.
There is no reason why decisions of the CCA should be
viewed any differently. On the contrary, it appears that the
CCA has followed a practice similar to our GVR practice.
See Oliver v. State, 872 S. W. 2d 713, 716 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994) (vacating judgment and remanding for reconsidera-
tion in light of decision on same day). And neither Reed nor
the Court has cited any contrary Texas authority. Accord-
ingly, Reed’s “authoritative construction” argument became
complete, at the latest, when the CCA adopted that con-
struction on April 12, 2017, two years and 11 months before
Reed filed his §1983 complaint.
——————
3 Journal of the Supreme Court 711–716 (June 30, 2022); see, e.g., id.,
at 685–689 (June 27, 2022) (granting, vacating, and remanding 28 cases).
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 5
ALITO, J., dissenting
B
Unlike Reed, the Court does not contend that the CCA’s
interpretation lacked “authoritative” status until rehearing
was denied. Instead, the Court merely proclaims that the
State, acting through Goertz, did not deny Reed due process
of law until “the state litigation ended.” Ante, at 5.4 I cer-
tainly see the logic in this view: until the process afforded
by a State has been exhausted, it may be said that the State
has not definitively denied the process that the Constitu-
tion is alleged to demand. This logic leads to the conclusion
that a prisoner like Reed should exhaust state remedies—
something that would generally be required if the proper
vehicle for contesting the denial of a DNA testing claim
were a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U. S. C.
§2254(b)(1). But the Court rejected that proposition in Dis-
trict Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne,
557 U. S. 52 (2009), and it is well-established that a §1983
plaintiff need not exhaust state remedies. Patsy v. Board
of Regents of Fla., 457 U. S. 496, 500–501 (1982); Edwards
v. Balisok, 520 U. S. 641, 649 (1997). Not only is this the
general rule, but the Osborne Court found that the rule ap-
plies in cases involving constitutional challenges to the de-
nial of requested DNA testing. 557 U. S., at 71. Thus, the
Court’s reasoning collides with precedent.
On top of this, the Court’s reasoning, if taken to its logical
conclusion, points to a result that neither Reed nor the
Court is willing to embrace: namely, that a due process
challenge to the denial of a request for DNA testing is not
ripe until state remedies have been exhausted. (Reed
——————
4 Even the CCA’s denial of rehearing in a DNA testing case may not
mark the end of state court litigation on that issue, to the extent that the
issue may be taken up again in a state collateral review proceeding or
otherwise renewed. Cf. Darnell v. State, 2004 WL 1088755, *1 (Tex.
App., May 13, 2004) (discussing “reconsider[ation]” granted in DNA-
testing action “after submission of additional information”).
6 REED v. GOERTZ
ALITO, J., dissenting
squarely rejects that conclusion, Brief for Petitioner 48; Tr.
of Oral Arg. 12–13, and the Court reserves judgment. Ante,
at 6, n. 1.) But that is where the Court’s reasoning is likely
to lead.
Reed tries to circumvent this problem by distinguishing
between a claim that challenges the literal terms of a state
law and one that challenges the law as authoritatively in-
terpreted by the State’s highest court. Brief for Petitioner
30, 48. On this view, only claims of the latter type would
have to proceed through the entire state court appellate
process before a §1983 challenge could be brought. But this
categorization of DNA-testing claims is problematic. When
a State’s high court interprets a state law, it generally set-
tles what the law always meant, and therefore it is hard to
see the difference between a claim that the text of a state
statute is unconstitutional and a claim that the text is un-
constitutional as interpreted by the State’s highest court.
In the case of a state law like Article 64, which permits DNA
testing under limited circumstances, the court may inter-
pret the statute to impose requirements that are not ex-
pressly spelled out in the statutory text. (That is what hap-
pened here.) Or the state high court may interpret
requirements in the text more leniently than a literal read-
ing of the text would demand. In either event, the statute
means what the state high court says it means, and if ac-
crual in the first of these situations does not take place until
the end of appellate review, it is hard to see why the same
should not be true in the second as well.
In light of these problems, it is not surprising that the
Court declines to say anything about whether prisoners
who wish to challenge a state DNA testing law may sue as
soon as their testing requests are denied. The Court says
only that it “need not address th[e] hypothetical scenario”
of a plaintiff who declines “full appellate review,” ante, at 6,
n. 1, but what does that mean? Does it mean that such a
plaintiff must exhaust state remedies at the trial level but
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 7
ALITO, J., dissenting
need not appeal? Does it mean that such a plaintiff must
pursue some (but not “full”) appellate review? Litigants and
the lower courts are left to guess. Instead of clarifying the
law, the Court’s decision may sow confusion.
C
Much of Reed’s argumentation is not aimed at the argu-
ment that his claim accrued when the CCA issued its con-
tested interpretation of Article 64. Instead, Reed directs his
attack on the earlier possible accrual dates discussed in
Part I of this opinion and in particular the Fifth Circuit’s
holding that a claim like Reed’s accrues when testing is de-
nied at the trial level. He says that this rule is unfair be-
cause he “isn’t Nostradamus,” lacks “supernatural fore-
sight,” and therefore could not have predicted at the time of
the trial court decision whether the CCA would ultimately
agree. Brief for Petitioner 26, 32. He argues that his rule
promotes federalism (because it encourages resort to state
court litigation before turning to the federal courts), judicial
economy (because it tends to avoid contemporaneous litiga-
tion in both state and federal court), comity (because it al-
lows state courts to adopt interpretations of their statutes
that avoid federal constitutional problems), and practical
reality (because a prisoner bringing an authoritative-con-
struction claim cannot know in advance how a State’s high
court will interpret the relevant statute). Id., at 36–39. The
Court makes related arguments. Ante, at 5–6.
Whatever merit these arguments might have in relation
to the accrual date adopted by the Fifth Circuit, they ring
hollow as applied to the choice between the date when a
state high court issues a decision interpreting the state test-
ing statute and the date when that court refuses to rehear
and overturn that interpretation. One need not have “su-
pernatural foresight” in order to predict that rehearing is
unlikely to be granted. And it is hard to see how requiring
a §1983 plaintiff to sue within two years after a state high
8 REED v. GOERTZ
ALITO, J., dissenting
court decision is issued is unfair or does any damage to fed-
eralism, comity, or judicial economy.
Reed has provided no explanation why he could not have
filed his §1983 action within two years after the CCA’s de-
cision. Instead, he waited until an execution date was set.
While that event may have “concentrate[d] his mind won-
derfully,” that is not an excuse for the basic mistake of miss-
ing a statute of limitations.5
* * *
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment below,
and I therefore respectfully dissent.
——————
5 J. Boswell, Life of Samuel Johnson, in 44 Great Books of the Western
World 351 (R. Hutchins & M. Adler eds. 1952).