NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 19 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY No. 22-55359
COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT, a
Connecticut corporation; TRAVELERS D.C. No.
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY OF 2:18-cv-02482-CAS-GJS
AMERICA, a Connecticut corporation,
Plaintiffs-counter- MEMORANDUM*
defendants-Appellees,
v.
WALKING U RANCH, LLC, a California
limited liability company; KATHLEEN P.
MARCH, an individual; PATRICK
BRIGHT, an individual,
Defendants-counter-
claimants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 17, 2023**
Pasadena, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: WARDLAW and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL,***
District Judge.
Kathleen March, Patrick Bright, and Walking U Ranch, LLC (collectively,
the “Insureds”) appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Travelers Indemnity Co. (“Travelers”) on the Insureds’ claim for a bad faith breach
of the insurance policy and request for attorney’s fees. The Insureds also appeal the
district court’s decision not to exclude an expert declaration from Andre E. Jardini
(the “Jardini report”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
“We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment,
considering the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” G & G
Closed Circuit Events, LLC v. Liu, 45 F.4th 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 2022). We “may
affirm the district court on any grounds the record supports.” Id. at 1117 (citing
Sully v. Ayers, 725 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013)).
1. The Insureds may not recover attorney’s fees from Travelers for work that
the former performed representing themselves in an underlying property dispute
(the “underlying action”) for which Travelers had a duty to defend the Insureds.
Under California law, attorneys may not recover fees for work they perform
representing themselves. Trope v. Katz, 902 P.2d 259, 262 (Cal. 1995). This
***
The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
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principle also bars attorney’s fees that insured, self-represented attorneys seek to
recover from insurers with duties to defend them. See Richards v. Sequoia Ins. Co.,
195 Cal. App. 4th 431, 436–38 (2011) (finding that a self-represented attorney
suffered no damages from an insurer’s alleged breach of its duty to defend,
because the attorney would not, in any event, have been entitled to compensation
from the insurer for his self-representation). Nor does the Insureds’ assertion that
March and Bright performed legal work on behalf of attorneys that Travelers
appointed to represent them entitle them to attorney’s fees. Attorneys may not
circumvent the restriction on fees for self-representation by hiring a “straw man”
attorney to nominally represent them while they do all the work. Trope, 902 P.2d at
270.
2. March and Bright argue that they are entitled to attorney’s fees because
they represented Walking U Ranch, LLC, a distinct legal entity. Under California
law, however, attorneys may not recover for work performed only on behalf of
themselves and another party with identical interests. See Gorman v. Tassajara
Dev. Corp., 178 Cal. App. 4th 44, 95–96 (2009) (no attorney’s fees for a husband
attorney’s representation of his wife in a dispute over property they jointly owned).
March and Bright are married, and are the sole owners of Walking U Ranch, LLC.
The Insureds therefore all shared the same interest in the outcome of the
underlying action. There is also no indication that March or Bright spent any extra
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time in the underlying action representing Walking U Ranch, LLC rather than
themselves. Id. at 95.
PLCM Group v. Drexler, 997 P.2d 511 (Cal. 2000) does not compel a
contrary result. In that case, the Supreme Court of California held that a
corporation could recover attorney’s fees for work performed by in-house counsel.
Id. at 513. The Court explained that “[a] corporation represented by in-house
counsel is in an agency relationship, i.e., it has hired an attorney to provide
professional legal services on its behalf.” Id. at 517. In this case, however, March
and Bright are on both sides of this “agency relationship,” as they are both
members of the LLC and the attorneys hired by the LLC. Accordingly, no fees are
warranted.
3. Because Travelers did not breach its duty to defend the Insureds by failing
to pay the requested attorney’s fees, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to Travelers on the Insureds’ claim for bad faith. See Grebow
v. Mercury Ins. Co., 241 Cal. App. 4th 564, 581–82 (2015) (no claim for bad faith
under an insurance policy if the policy was not breached).
4. The Insureds argue that the district court erred by considering the Jardini
report. The Jardini report’s conclusions related solely to the reasonableness of the
fees that the Insureds requested for March and Bright’s work. Because the Insureds
are not entitled to any of these fees, the Jardini report was irrelevant to the
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disposition of the party’s claims. With or without the Jardini report, moreover, the
record supports the district court’s decision. See G & G Closed Circuit Events,
LLC, 45 F.4th at 1117.
AFFIRMED.
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