Summer Lashley v. Spartanburg Methodist College

USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 1 of 23

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-1447

SUMMER D. LASHLEY, Ph D

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

SPARTANBURG METHODIST COLLEGE; W. SCOTT COCHRAN; MARK W.
GIBBS, Ph D; TERESA D. FERGUSON; JONATHAN J. KEISLER, Ph D;
ANGELIA A. TURNER; CLEVON A. BOYD, in his individual capacity

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Spartanburg. Joseph Dawson, III, District Judge. (7:18−cv−02957−JD)

Argued: March 7, 2023 Decided: April 18, 2023

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge
Niemeyer and Judge King joined.

David Eliot Rothstein, ROTHSTEIN LAW FIRM, PA, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellant. Todd Russell Flippin, HOLCOMBE BOMAR, P.A., Spartanburg, South
Carolina, for Appellees.
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 2 of 23

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

In 2017, Summer Lashley signed a one-year contract to teach criminal justice

courses at Spartanburg Methodist College (SMC). Less than a year later, SMC decided not

to renew Lashley’s contract and terminated her shortly thereafter. Lashley brought a mix

of state and federal law claims against SMC, essentially arguing that her contract non-

renewal and termination were unlawful. The district court granted summary judgment in

favor of SMC on all federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

the state law claims. Lashley now appeals. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA), Lashley accuses SMC of discrimination, retaliation, and engaging in an unlawful

health inquiry. Under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (Title IX), she

accuses SMC of retaliation. For the following reasons, we shall affirm the district court.

I.

A.

In May 2017, Summer Lashley signed a contract to teach criminal justice courses at

Spartanburg Methodist College and to serve as the Director of the Criminal Justice

Program. Per the one-year contract, Lashley taught a full course load in the Fall 2017 and

Spring 2018 semesters. During her time at SMC, Lashley was supervised by Mary Jane

Farmer, the Chair of the Social Sciences Department, Mark W. Gibbs, the Dean of

Instruction, and Anita Bowles, the Executive Vice President of Academic Affairs.

The facts relevant to this appeal can be divided into three sections: (1) facts

underlying Lashley’s Title IX and ADA claims, (2) facts pertaining to SMC’s decision not

to renew her contract, and (3) facts surrounding her termination.

2
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 3 of 23

1.

Lashley’s Title IX retaliation claim stems from complaints she raised on behalf of

students. Lashley informed SMC’s Human Resources and Title IX Coordinator, Jenny

Dunn, of several incidents between September and December 2017 in which she thought

female students were being harassed by male students. These included reports of male

athletes allegedly violating Title IX by sexually exploiting and bullying female athletes.

According to Lashley, some of these incidents involved SMC employees covering

up any misbehavior. So Lashley, assuming the posture of whistleblower, felt compelled to

take her concerns to HR personnel. See Opening Br. at 8 (“Lashley had been very

outspoken in raising numerous injustices that she became aware of at SMC.”). Lashley

believed many students brought their issues to her because she was the Director of the

Criminal Justice Program. She also claims not everyone at SMC was happy with her

reports. Following one such complaint, Mark Gibbs allegedly confronted her and said he

heard a rumor that Lashley told a female student to get an attorney. Gibbs denies this.

Lashley’s ADA allegations originate from a series of incidents starting in January

2018, when Lashley complained of ostensible mold or mildew in her office building.

Lashley claimed the mold exacerbated her respiratory problems due to her asthma. SMC’s

maintenance department brought these concerns to the attention of Gibbs and others. Gibbs

met with Lashley at the end of January to discuss her health concerns.

During this meeting, Lashley claims that Gibbs was “angry” and stated, “tell me

about your health issues.” Lashley v. Spartanburg Methodist Coll., No. 7:18-CV-02957-

KFM, 2022 WL 872604, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 24, 2022). In response, Lashley informed

3
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 4 of 23

Gibbs that she suffered from Lupus, asthma, post-traumatic stress disorder, and severe

gastrointestinal issues. Id. at *3. Gibbs denies demanding that Lashley tell him about her

medical issues, J.A. 912, but he testified that he did meet with her to “assess what could be

done to accommodate her health,” Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *3. Gibbs offered to move

Lashley’s office to a different building a short walk away to address her concerns, but

Lashley rejected this option.

On February 5, 2018, Lashley requested a reasonable accommodation form. HR

Coordinator Dunn sent her the form, along with SMC’s faculty handbook. Lashley

responded via email a few days later and informed the HR department that she had been

diagnosed with Crohn’s Disease, that she had informed her supervisor of this diagnosis,

and that she wanted the information to remain confidential. Despite her response, Lashley

never filled out or returned the reasonable accommodation form.

2.

SMC eventually decided not to renew Lashley’s contract for the following academic

year. SMC claims this decision was the product of growing concerns regarding Lashley’s

performance, professionalism, and conflicts with faculty and students. Mary Jane Farmer,

Lashley’s direct supervisor, reported that though she was “pleased” with Lashley’s job

performance after the Fall semester, she noted a variety of problems. Lashley, 2022 WL

872604, at *2.

Farmer reported that Lashley exhibited a proficiency with course material, but her

classes lacked structure due to inadequate preparation. Lashley complained that she did not

have enough time to get ready for class, so Farmer advised Lashley to use the ten hours of

4
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 5 of 23

weekly office time to prepare. Yet Farmer worried that Lashley was instead spending this

time fraternizing with students, calling Lashley’s office a “student lounge”—a sentiment

shared by other faculty. Id. Farmer further stated that Lashley maintained an

unprofessionally close relationship with a work-study student. By late January 2018,

Farmer described Lashley as “emotional, volatile, and [] uncontrollable.” Id.

This was not the only cause for concern. Throughout Lashley’s time at SMC, Gibbs

received numerous complaints from Lashley about various students, faculty, and staff. The

complaints were “quite regular” and suggested that Lashley was struggling to “settle[] into

her position.” Id. at *3. According to Gibbs, Lashley informed him on “multiple occasions

that SMC was not a good fit for her.” J.A. 575. Lashley’s inability to work with others was

demonstrated by the numerous conflicts that arose around her. The district court

highlighted a few examples.

First, Lashley complained about her identity appearing in a SMC press release. She

lodged this complaint even though she had consented to the use of her name. Next, Lashley

appeared to have an ongoing conflict with Dale Hyder, an adjunct faculty member in the

Criminal Justice Program. Gibbs observed that Lashley “had a personality conflict with

Mr. Hyder” and “was allowing the conflict to disproportionately affect her job

performance.” Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *4. Farmer likewise described the conflict as

a “petty thing between the two of them” that seemingly revealed a “professional rivalry.”

J.A. 853–54. Further, echoing concerns from other SMC faculty, Gibbs noted that Lashley

had an inappropriately close relationship with her work-study student. She was spending

5
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 6 of 23

too much time with the student, even once requesting that the student drive to Lashley’s

home a good distance away to deliver teaching materials.

Lashley’s multiple contentious interactions led Gibbs to worry that she was not

forming constructive relationships with faculty and students and would have difficulty

maintaining the professionalism required to perform as a SMC professor. In consultation

with other SMC administrators, Gibbs decided not to renew Lashley’s contract for the

following year. On February 13, 2018, Gibbs informed Lashley that her contract was not

being renewed, explaining that she “and SMC were not a good fit for each other.” Lashley,

2022 WL 872604, at *4.

3.

Lashley did not take kindly to this news. Various employees at SMC reported

troubling behavior from Lashley in the following three days. On the same day Lashley was

notified of the decision not to renew her contract, Gibbs claims he saw Lashley cleaning

out her office and taking boxes to her car. When he asked her what she was doing, she

angrily shouted at him for betraying her. The following day, a professor who shared an

office with Lashley testified that she overheard Lashley tell a group of students that she

felt like “blowing the school up.” Id. Then on February 15, another member of the faculty

testified that Lashley spoke with him and said, “Bad stuff happens when people cross me.

My dad says it’s true. They turn up dead.” Id. Lashley allegedly called certain individuals

like Gibbs “evil people” who would “get theirs.” Id.

Reports of these incidents made their way to SMC’s President, W. Scott Cochran.

Even though Lashley denies ever making these alleged remarks, President Cochran came

6
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 7 of 23

to believe Lashley’s behavior revealed she was a threat to the safety of the SMC

community. On February 16, 2018, Cochran made the decision to immediately terminate

Lashley. He informed Lashley that her termination was due to “unprofessional,

inappropriate interactions” with faculty. Id.

B.

After receiving a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, Lashley brought suit against SMC on November 1, 2018. Her verified

complaint alleged a mixture of state and federal law violations centering on her contract

non-renewal and her termination.

On October 15, 2021, Lashley moved for sanctions against SMC, claiming it had

failed to comply with her discovery requests. The same day, SMC moved for summary

judgment. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation to grant summary

judgment in SMC’s favor on all federal law claims and to grant partial summary judgment

on the state law claims. See Lashley v. Spartanburg Methodist Coll. (Lashley R&R), No.

7:18-CV-2957-JD-KFM, 2021 WL 8014689, at *32 (D.S.C. Dec. 20, 2021).

The district court adopted the report and recommendation, granting summary

judgment in SMC’s favor on all federal law claims. Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *10. The

district court declined to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law

claims, which were thus remanded to state court. Id.

Lashley filed a timely notice of appeal, objecting to the district court’s findings on

four federal law issues. She now presses claims of (1) discrimination in violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; (2) retaliation in

7
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 8 of 23

violation of the ADA; (3) unlawful health inquiry in violation of the ADA; and

(4) retaliation in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C.

§§ 1681 et seq. She withdrew all other federal claims on appeal. Opening Br. at 4 n.1.

“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Equal Emp.

Opportunity Comm’n v. McLeod Health, Inc., 914 F.3d 876, 880 (4th Cir. 2019). Summary

judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). We of course construe the evidence and reasonable inferences at this stage “in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party.” McLeod Health, 914 F.3d at 880; Halpern

v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 460 (4th Cir. 2012). The “nonmoving

party must demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists ‘by offering sufficient

proof in the form of admissible evidence’ instead of ‘relying solely on the allegations of

her pleadings.’” Webster v. Chesterfield Cnty. Sch. Bd., 38 F.4th 404, 410 (4th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Guessous v. Fairview Property Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016)).

II.

We first address Lashley’s ADA and Title IX retaliation claims. The ADA’s

retaliation provision prohibits “discriminat[ing] against any individual because such

individual has” taken an action protected by the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). Title IX lacks

an explicit cause of action for retaliation, but the Supreme Court has held that “the private

right of action implied by Title IX encompasses claims of retaliation.” Jackson v.

Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005). In the absence of a statutory backdrop

for evaluating Title IX retaliation claims, our circuit has looked to Title VII to provide an

8
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 9 of 23

applicable legal framework. Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 694 (4th

Cir. 2018).

Under both the ADA and Title IX, the crux of a successful retaliation claim is that

the plaintiff engaged in activity protected by law, and then, because of this, the defendant

took an adverse employment action against him. See Hurley, 911 F.3d at 694 (explaining

elements of Title IX retaliation); Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 577

(4th Cir. 2015) (explaining elements of ADA retaliation).

Lashley argues that she engaged in ADA-protected activity by requesting an

accommodation for her disability. Opening Br. at 26. Lashley also asserts she engaged in

Title IX-protected activity by helping female students raise complaints about SMC students

and employees. Id. at 29. Because of these actions, Lashley argues, SMC retaliated against

her by not renewing her contract and terminating her employment.

To prevail on her retaliation claims, Lashley must either offer “sufficient direct and

indirect evidence of retaliation, or proceed under a burden-shifting method.” Smith v.

CSRA, 12 F.4th 396, 416 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 577). Lashley

concedes that the “burden-shifting framework[] is applicable to [her] retaliation claims

under both the ADA and Title IX.” Opening Br. at 31–32. The “burden-shifting scheme set

forth in McDonnell Douglas” proceeds in three steps. Hux v. City of Newport News, Va.,

451 F.3d 311, 314 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973)).

Lashley must first make a prima facie showing of retaliation—i.e., she engaged in

a protected activity and was retaliated against because of it. Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 578. The

9
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 10 of 23

“employer then has the burden to rebut the presumption of retaliation by articulating a

legitimate nonretaliatory reason for its actions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

“The burden then shifts back to [Lashley] to show that the proffered reason is pretext.” Id.

Importantly, Lashley “always bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that

she was the victim of retaliation.” Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373, 392 (4th Cir. 2001).

When we analyze the case through this well-settled framework, it becomes clear

that Lashley’s retaliation claims cannot succeed. SMC offers nonretaliatory reasons for not

renewing Lashley’s contract and terminating her employment, and she is unable to

demonstrate that SMC’s reasons are pretextual. We therefore need not decide whether

Lashley established a prima facie case, for assuming arguendo that she satisfied the first

step of the burden-shifting framework, her retaliation claims still fall short. See Hux, 451

F.3d at 314 (assuming prima facie case when pretext was dispositive); see also Engler v.

Harris Corp., 628 F. App’x 165, 168 (4th Cir. 2015) (same in retaliation context). We first

discuss SMC’s proffered reasons before turning to pretext.

A.

The record contains ample evidence of legitimate reasons not to renew Lashley’s

contract and to terminate her employment. SMC offered evidence showing the reason

behind Lashley’s contract non-renewal was that she was not a good fit for SMC.

Additionally, SMC put forth evidence that the decision to terminate Lashley was based on

reports of threatening and unprofessional behavior. We address each in turn.

10
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 11 of 23

1.

Regarding the decision not to renew Lashley’s contract, SMC proffered evidence

that Lashley had a hard time performing to its expected level of professionalism and

collegiality. As noted earlier, several sources reported that Lashley was often at the center

of conflicts with students and faculty, revealing that she struggled to form healthy

relationships at SMC.

Multiple people at SMC complained of Lashley’s unprofessional relationships with

students. Faculty members complained that Lashley’s office, which she shared with

another professor, had become a “student lounge.” Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *2.

Students reported that Lashley was playing favorites with their classmates, requesting, for

example, that a favored student drive to her house far from SMC. And Lashley’s direct

supervisor observed that Lashley was excessively fraternizing with students in ways that

went beyond constructive mentoring and educational guidance. While there is obviously

nothing wrong, and much that is right, with faculty conversing with students outside of

class, Lashley’s supervisor worried that the excessive familiarity inhibited Lashley’s

ability to prepare and consequently made her classes disorganized.

Lashley also clashed with multiple members of the faculty at SMC. For example,

Gibbs observed that Lashley had difficulty working with her colleague Dale Hyder.

Although she was Hyder’s direct supervisor, she declined to talk through their problems.

While the issues apparently arose from a personality conflict, the personal spat negatively

impacted Lashley’s job performance according to Gibbs. This and other repeated problems

led Lashley’s supervisor to describe her as “emotional, volatile, and [] uncontrollable.”

11
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 12 of 23

Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *2. What’s more, the record shows that Lashley herself was

dissatisfied during her time at SMC, often complaining to Gibbs about various people and

incidents. J.A. 575, 884. She sent emails in January stating that she “just ha[d] to get out

of SMC” and that she was applying for new jobs “everywhere and determined to get the

f*** out of there.” Lashley R&R, 2021 WL 8014689, at *5.

Problems such as these are not unknown in institutional settings, and assessing fault

and blame can become a complicated undertaking. At the same time, it was not wrong,

much less unlawful, for a supervisor to conclude that Lashley’s conflicts with faculty

demonstrated a lack of conflict-resolution skills needed in a professional setting where

interactions with colleagues are frequent and essential. Lashley’s relationships with

students similarly displayed a lack of professionalism and hurt her teaching abilities. An

educational institution like SMC is justifiably sensitive to how its professors interact with

students and faculty, relationships that often spell the difference between educational

progress and its absence.

By the time Gibbs and others decided whether to renew Lashley’s contract, the

cumulative complaints from multiple sources had become “quite regular.” Lashley, 2022

WL 872604, at *3. Gibbs ultimately concluded that Lashley “would have difficulty

maintaining the professional relationships necessary to perform as a SMC professor.”

Lashley R&R, 2021 WL 8014689, at *4. When Gibbs informed Lashley that her teaching

contract would not be renewed, he explained it was because “she was not a good fit for

SMC.” Id. at *5. For the reasons noted above, SMC produced sufficient evidence of

legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for not renewing Lashley’s teaching contract.

12
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 13 of 23

2.

We next consider SMC’s reasons for terminating Lashley’s employment. Lashley

claims her termination was motivated by retaliatory animus. Here too, as we have

recounted, SMC puts forth evidence to show legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for firing

Lashley.

The decision to fire Lashley was made by President Cochran on February 16, 2018.

By that point in time, Cochran had received three independent reports of Lashley’s

inappropriate and threatening behavior. First, Gibbs reported that on the day Lashley was

informed her contract was not being renewed, she began to clear out her office and angrily

confronted him. Second, a professor overheard Lashley tell a group of students that she felt

like “blowing the school up.” Third, Lashley told a colleague that “[b]ad stuff happens

when people cross me. . . . They turn up dead.” Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *4.

Lashley denies ever making these comments. Her denial, however, does not negate

the fact that these reports of unprofessional and dangerous behavior made their way to

President Cochran, who naturally believed they revealed that Lashley was potentially

violent and a threat to campus safety. Importantly, the burden at this stage of the analysis

is “one of production, not persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment.” Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (internal quotation marks

omitted). So it does not suffice for Lashley to simply challenge the veracity of the evidence

SMC puts forth. Despite Lashley’s protestations, SMC’s evidence shows that Cochran

believed Lashley was dangerous—Cochran’s apparent motivation was not retaliation;

it was safety.

13
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 14 of 23

In sum, SMC advanced legitimate reasons for not renewing Lashley’s contract and

terminating her employment. SMC therefore carried its burden at this step of the

McDonnell Douglas framework to “produc[e] evidence that” it acted “for a legitimate,

non[retaliatory] reason.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).

B.

The burden then shifts back to Lashley to show that SMC’s proffered reasons were

a pretext for unlawful retaliation. At this final stage, “the McDonnell Douglas

framework—with its presumptions and burdens—disappears,” and the “employee must

prove” that the “legitimate reasons offered by the defendant[] were not its true reasons, but

were a pretext.” Westmoreland v. TWC Admin. LLC, 924 F.3d 718, 726 (4th Cir. 2019)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The analysis “has long demanded proof at the pretext

stage that retaliation was a but-for cause of a challenged adverse employment action.”

Foster v. Univ. of Maryland-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2015).

Lashley faults the district court at this step for applying an invalid “pretext plus”

standard. Opening Br. at 39. We disagree. A “pretext-plus” standard would require “that

an employee introduce new evidence, separate from her prima facie case, that not only

undercut the employer’s justification but also showed a specific and discriminatory [or

retaliatory] motive.” Westmoreland, 924 F.3d at 726–27. That is not required here.

Lashley’s claims fall short not only because she fails to provide evidence of retaliatory

motive, but because she does not offer evidence beyond mere conjecture to undercut

SMC’s justifications. Lashley’s claims therefore fail under the well-established pretext

standard for multiple reasons. We examine each below.

14
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 15 of 23

1.

First, Lashley’s claim of pretext is undermined by the fact that the primary

decisionmakers at SMC were not aware of Lashley’s ADA or Title IX protected activity.

Gibbs was the primary decisionmaker behind not renewing Lashley’s contract. Yet

Lashley failed to produce any concrete evidence that Gibbs was even aware that Lashley

helped students file Title IX complaints. Indeed, Gibbs’s decision was not influenced by

previous Title IX complaints because Lashley raised Title IX complaints in September and

December of 2017, yet in January of 2018, Gibbs extended her a separate contract to teach

an additional Spring semester class. The record is also devoid of evidence that Gibbs was

aware of Lashley’s request for an ADA reasonable accommodation form, which Lashley

had in fact requested remain confidential.

Similarly there is no evidence that President Cochran, who made the call to

terminate Lashley, knew of Lashley’s ADA request or her Title IX complaints when he

decided to fire her. To the contrary, the record shows Lashley’s ADA and Title IX

complaints went to Jenny Dunn, SMC’s Human Resources and Title IX Coordinator. See

Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *3 (describing that Lashley’s request for ADA

accommodation went to Dunn); Lashley R&R, 2021 WL 8014689, at *2 (showing that

Lashley’s Title IX complaints likewise went to Dunn). There is no evidence that Dunn was

even consulted in the decisions regarding Lashley’s contract or termination. See Lashley

R&R, 2021 WL 8014689, at *10, *13. Decisionmakers can hardly be accused of harboring

a retaliatory animus when they were unaware of the actions that allegedly led to the

retaliation. Without evidence on this score, the chain of causation is broken and Lashley

15
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 16 of 23

cannot show that retaliation was “a but-for cause” of the adverse action. Foster, 787 F.3d

at 252; see also Guessous, 828 F.3d at 217.

Second, any notion of pretext is further dispelled by the fact that SMC’s

explanations have been consistent throughout. Gibbs did not renew Lashley’s contract

because she was not a good fit for SMC. Cochran fired Lashley because of her threatening

interactions with colleagues. These were the very reasons communicated to Lashley back

in February 2018. See Lashley R&R, 2021 WL 8014689, at *5–6. The record lacks any

sign of deviating from these explanations to make SMC’s story seem more plausible. See

EEOC v. Sears Roebuck, 243 F.3d 846, 852–53 (4th Cir. 2001) (instructing that

inconsistent explanations for an adverse employment action are “probative of pretext”). A

straight and consistent line of explanation is more persuasive than one which wanders here,

there, and yonder.

Third, Lashley has not shown that Cochran did not honestly believe the reports of

Lashley’s threatening comments. While Lashley denies making any threats, three different

sources indicated that she did. We have previously explained that a plaintiff must rebut the

fact that the “decisionmaker[] honestly believed” the threats, “regardless of whether [the

plaintiff] did in fact issue the threats.” Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208,

217 (4th Cir. 2007). If Cochran sincerely believed the threats, then his decision to fire

Lashley was not a pretext for retaliation. An honest, nonretaliatory belief cannot by

definition be the basis for the imposition of retaliatory liability. Rather than refuting

Cochran’s sincere belief, the record supports the contention that he found the threats

credible. The professor who informed Cochran of Lashley’s “evil people” comment

16
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 17 of 23

testified that he was “genuinely concerned that she might be angry enough to harm

someone.” Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *4.

2.

We come then to the main thrust of Lashley’s pretext argument, namely that SMC’s

“good fit” justification is a thinly veiled disguise for retaliation. Lashley insists that

“Gibbs’s conclusory statement that she was not a ‘good fit’ for SMC . . . is itself compelling

evidence of retaliatory animus.” Opening Br. at 32.

This is too broad an assertion. Describing an employee as not a “good fit” is an

assessment that employers make all the time. Maybe someone’s skills do not match up with

the institution’s mission. Maybe someone’s work ethic falls short of expectations. Maybe

someone is just not a good team player. Though there may be circumstances where

evidence reveals that “good fit” is a subterfuge for discrimination or retaliation, it is also a

perfectly innocuous comment that an organization’s collaborative goals would not be

furthered, and in fact might be retarded, by a particular employee. Institutional success is

often a collective enterprise toward which an employer has entirely reasonable expectations

that each employee should contribute.

Any institution, especially a place of higher education whose “core . . . mission” is

to foster a certain community and advance a unique pedagogical vision, is well within its

rights to want people who can work well with others to achieve those goals. Our Lady of

Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2064 (2020). To wit, SMC has such

a mission. SMC’s President explained that a good fit “for us is someone who is able and

willing to effectively teach the demographics we teach with great success and academic

17
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 18 of 23

integrity,” who possesses the “[a]bility to be a good colleague with your faculty and staff,”

as well as the ability to exhibit the “appropriate behavior with students and a level of

professionalism with the appropriate boundaries between students and faculty.” J.A. 1041.

This decidedly does not mean that every employee hold the same views or teach the

same way or refrain from the kind of individual expression and opinions that make for

genuine mutual respect. The record here indicates SMC was seeking cooperation, not

conformity. Respect for individuality within a healthy institutional whole was a valid

aspiration for the college to adopt.

Lashley attempts to refute SMC’s “good fit” reasoning by portraying herself as the

embodiment of the ideal whistleblower, intent on bringing to light misbehavior by students

and employees. See Oral Arg. at 0:41. Whistleblowers certainly play a salutary role in our

society. They can point out deficiencies and dishonesty within an organization that would

otherwise go unnoticed and unrevealed. Their status is often protected under law, and for

good reason. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 218c; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-

6(a)(6); Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 436 (2014) (referencing “some 20 United

States Code incorporated whistleblower protection provisions”). Plaintiff, however, cannot

claim that mantle. We have accorded her the benefit of the reasonable inferences due her

under the summary judgment standard. But at the end of the day, the record reveals

unrelieved personality conflicts, unprofessional favoritisms, unwarranted threats, and

contempt for what the defendant institution was attempting to accomplish. We cannot see

how addressing those problems was a pretext for retaliatory or discriminatory animus.

18
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 19 of 23

III.

Lashley finally brings several claims under the ADA.

A.

The ADA prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual

on the basis of disability in regard to . . . the hiring, advancement, or discharge of

employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination can include failing to make “reasonable

accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified

individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

We thus address Lashley’s claim that SMC discriminated against her by failing to

accommodate her disability. To prevail on a failure-to-accommodate claim, “a plaintiff

must show (i) she was disabled, (ii) the employer had notice of her disability, (iii) she could

perform the essential functions of her position with a reasonable accommodation, and (iv)

the employer refused to make such accommodation.” Cowgill v. First Data Techs., Inc.,

41 F.4th 370, 378 (4th Cir. 2022). 1

The ADA defines “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially

limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). The

district court found that Lashley’s gastrointestinal issues could arguably qualify as a

disability as defined by the ADA. Lashley insists that she also suffered from PTSD and

1
Lashley also claims she suffered an adverse employment action when SMC
rescinded its promise to pay her salary and benefits through the end of her contract year.
The record shows, however, that SMC paid the full salary and benefits owed to her. See
J.A. 600.

19
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 20 of 23

Lupus. The record is devoid of evidence, however, that PTSD and Lupus “substantially

limit[ed] one or more” of Lashley’s “major life activities.” Id. Though she claims she

informed Gibbs of these ailments in a meeting, no evidence indicates that she informed

Gibbs or anyone else at SMC how these medical issues were significantly impairing her

life activities. Lashley’s claims of additional disabilities beyond gastrointestinal issues

therefore do not survive the first step of the analysis.

Regardless of the district court’s conclusion on the first prong of Lashley’s failure-

to-accommodate claim, her argument falters on the subsequent prongs. The ADA’s

implementing regulations instruct that to “determine the appropriate reasonable

accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal,

interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation,”

which “should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential

reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 16 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(o)(3).

Any failure here to engage in such an interactive process was not caused by SMC.

Lashley contacted HR personnel to request an accommodation form and informed them

that she had been diagnosed with Crohn’s Disease, which was causing her gastrointestinal

issues. From that point, however, the record reveals that Lashley failed to engage in the

interactive process in several ways. She did not tell SMC how the diagnosis limited her

ability to work. She neglected to inform SMC of the accommodation she would need to

perform the essential duties of her job. See Cowgill, 41 F.4th at 378. She did not request

20
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 21 of 23

any measures that would mitigate the effects of her Crohn’s Disease. Worse still, Lashley

never returned the accommodation form. Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *3.

We cannot fault SMC for failing to accommodate plaintiff. Due to Lashley’s

communication breakdown, SMC was left guessing what an accommodation for Lashley

might entail. “Before an employer’s duty to provide reasonable accommodations—or even

to participate in the ‘interactive process’—is triggered under the ADA, the employee must

make an adequate request, thereby putting the employer on notice.” Wilson v. Dollar Gen.

Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d

1028, 1049 (10th Cir. 2011)). Lashley cannot show that SMC refused to make an

accommodation because she cannot show that she ever properly requested one. Her failure-

to-accommodate claim fails for this reason.

B.

Lashley’s last claim is that SMC violated the ADA by asking her unlawful health

questions. The ADA provides that an employer “shall not make inquiries of an employee

as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity

of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and

consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). Lashley argues that Gibbs

violated that ADA when he allegedly told Lashley—in an “angry” and “threatening”

tone—“tell me about your health issues.” Opening Br. at 45–46. Gibbs denies ever

demanding that Lashley tell him about her medical issues. J.A. 912.

Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Lashley, her bare testimony

cannot form a successful claim for unlawful health inquiry. See Webster, 38 F.4th at 410.

21
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 22 of 23

To begin with, “[w]hether a medical inquiry is job-related and consistent with business

necessity is an objective inquiry.” Coffey v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 23 F.4th 332, 339 (4th Cir.

2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). So how Lashley subjectively perceived Gibbs’s

tone is immaterial under that standard.

Furthermore, we have noted that the objective “standard is met if the employer

reasonably believes that an employee’s medical condition impairs [her] ability to perform

the essential functions of the job” and the inquiry “is no broader or more intrusive than

necessary.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Even assuming Gibbs had Lashley tell

him about her health, the inquiry satisfies this standard.

Lashley had told faculty, staff, and students at SMC about her various health issues,

usually in the context of missing or rescheduling classes. See Lashley R&R, 2021 WL

8014689, at *14 (cataloguing nearly a dozen examples of Lashley telling others about a

variety of ailments). In particular, Lashley told a colleague that she had “been sick since

she arrived and was going to see a pulmonary doctor to have her lungs swabbed” due to

the “unhealthy conditions” in her office building, referring to the alleged mold in the

ceiling. J.A. 585. These complaints came to Gibbs’s attention. 2

Given these circumstances, Gibbs acted reasonably in meeting with Lashley to

discuss her health issues. When a teacher tells others at the school that she is having

medical problems, causing her to cancel classes, it is only reasonable that one of her

2
We note that these generalized health complaints, as opposed to a more formal
request for an ADA accommodation, do not rise to the level of ADA-protected activity,
and indeed Lashley does not pursue them as such. See Opening Br. at 26.

22
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1447 Doc: 54 Filed: 04/18/2023 Pg: 23 of 23

superiors inquires about them. See Reynolds v. Am. Nat. Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143, 155 (4th

Cir. 2012) (holding summary judgment proper where health issues disclosed to others).

Moreover, to determine whether Lashley’s claimed issues threatened her ability to

perform the essential functions of the job, Coffey, 23 F.4th at 339, Gibbs needed to know

how he could accommodate her so that she could continue working. Lashley had

complained of unhealthy conditions in the building that housed her office and classes.

Gibbs therefore had to assess whether these conditions would obstruct her ability to teach

classes and hold meetings in that building. Gibbs offered Lashley an alternative office in

another building to address her concerns about mold, but Lashley rejected this option.

Last, Lashley fails to show that this inquiry was “broader or more intrusive than

necessary.” Id. The sole evidence put forth is her testimony that Gibbs demanded she tell

him about her health issues in an angry tone. There is no evidence of invasive follow-up

questions or demands for confidential medical information. Lashley’s assertions are not

enough to conclude that the query was unlawfully obtrusive, especially when viewed

against the objective evidence that Gibbs needed some information in order to alleviate

Lashley’s concerns. There is no indication that Gibbs crossed the line drawn by the ADA.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 3

AFFIRMED

3
Because we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment, we reject
Lashley’s contention that the court abused its discretion in failing to award her sanctions.

23