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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ANTWON A. STEELE :
:
Appellant : No. 159 MDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 21, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0002364-2016
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED APRIL 24, 2023
Antwon A. Steele brings this appeal from the order denying his petition
filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-
9546. Upon careful review, we affirm.
In addressing Steele’s direct appeal, this Court summarized the facts of
this case as follows:
On April 26, 2016, reports of shots fired at the Sherman
Hills housing complex in Wilkes-Barre prompted several patrol
officers to respond to the area. Officer[ James] Verdekal, [along
with Officers] Majikes, and Lada arrived and encountered [Steele]
as he exited Building 312 of the apartment complex. [Steele]
provided his name and stated that he was out on bail, and
uninvolved in any criminal activity.
The responding officers later reviewed surveillance footage
of Sherman Hills that recorded a man, whom the officers
recognized as [Steele], firing into Building 316. Using the video
footage as a guide, the officers recovered a bullet casing at the
location from which [Steele] fired a gun and a bullet fragment in
the windowsill of Building 316, Apartment 325.
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The investigating officers apprehended [Steele] based on
the GPS coordinates of his ankle monitor provided by his bail
agency. On August 23, 2016, the Commonwealth charged [Steele]
with one count each of Persons Not to Possess Firearms, Carrying
a Firearm Without a License, and Discharge of a Firearm into an
Occupied Structure.
Commonwealth v. Steele, 425 MDA 2018, 221 A.3d 282, at *1-2 (Pa.
Super. filed August 16, 2019) (unpublished memorandum).
On November 21, 2017, at the conclusion of a nonjury trial, the court
convicted Steele of all three charges. The trial court imposed an aggregated
judgment of sentence of ten to twenty years of incarceration on January 3,
2018.
Steele filed post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied. On
August 16, 2019, this Court affirmed Steele’s judgment of sentence on direct
appeal. See Steele, 425 MDA 2018, 221 A.3d 282.
Steele filed this timely PCRA petition, pro se, on March 18, 2020. The
PCRA court appointed counsel, who then filed an amended PCRA petition. The
PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on March 1, 2021. The PCRA court
denied relief and this timely appeal followed. Steele raises three challenges to
the effective assistance of trial counsel related to the suppression of evidence.
Our standard of review for an order denying PCRA relief is whether the
record supports the PCRA court’s determination, and whether the PCRA court’s
determination is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 A.3d
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317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011). The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed
unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. See id.
Each of Steele’s issues present claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Concerning ineffective assistance of counsel arguments, we presume
counsel is effective, and Steele bears the burden to prove otherwise. See
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 57 A.3d 1185, 1195 (Pa. 2012). To establish a
right to relief, Steele must demonstrate: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable
merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have
some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; and (3) but for
counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome
of the proceedings would have been different. See Commonwealth v.
Solano, 129 A.3d 1156, 1162-1163 (Pa. 2015).
We observe that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not self-
proving. See Commonwealth v. Wharton, 811 A.2d 978, 986 (Pa. 2002).
“[A] post-conviction petitioner must, at a minimum, present argumentation
relative to each layer of ineffective assistance, on all three prongs of the
ineffectiveness standard….” Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 812
(Pa. 2004) (citation omitted). “[A]n undeveloped argument, which fails to
meaningfully discuss and apply the standard governing the review of
ineffectiveness claims, simply does not satisfy Appellant’s burden of
establishing that he is entitled to relief.” Commonwealth v. Bracey, 795
A.2d 935, 940 n.4 (Pa. 2001) (citation omitted). “A failure to satisfy any prong
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of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the claim of ineffectiveness.”
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 963 A.2d 409, 419 (Pa. 2009) (citation
omitted).
Under the first prong of the ineffectiveness test, an appellant is not
entitled to relief if his underlying legal has no merit. See Commonwealth v.
Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1246 (Pa. Super. 2011). In short, counsel cannot be
deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim. See
Commonwealth v. Loner, 836 A.2d 125, 132 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc).
Concerning the third prong, we are mindful that prejudice requires proof
that there is a reasonable probability that but-for counsel’s error, the outcome
of the proceeding would have been different. See Commonwealth v. Pierce,
786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 2001). When an appellant has failed to meet the
prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the claim may
be disposed of on that basis alone, without a determination of whether the
first two prongs have been met. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 880 A.2d
654, 656 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Here, Steele first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to seek suppression of evidence obtained during his initial encounter with
police. See Appellant’s Brief at 5-6. We observe that “[t]he failure to file a
suppression motion under some circumstances may be evidence of ineffective
assistance of counsel. ... [T]he defendant must establish … there is a
reasonable probability the verdict would have been more favorable.”
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Commonwealth v. Watley, 153 A.3d 1034, 1044 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(citations & quotation marks omitted).
Specifically, he contends that “counsel should have filed a pre-trial
motion seeking to suppress his statements to the police.” Appellant’s Brief at
6. Steele claims that “he was forced to give up his identity and admit that he
was on bail during this custodial interrogation.” Id. Therefore, to address
Steele’s argument, we must first assess whether he was subjected to a
custodial interrogation.
To secure the right of citizens to be free from intrusions by police, courts
in Pennsylvania have long required law enforcement officers to demonstrate
ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with citizens as those
interactions become more intrusive. See Commonwealth v. Beasley, 761
A.2d 621, 624 (Pa. Super. 2000).
It is undisputed that:
[s]tate case law recognizes three categories of interaction
between police officers and citizens, which include: (1) a mere
encounter, or request for information, which need not be
supported by any level of suspicion, but which carries no official
compulsion to stop or to respond; (2) an investigative detention,
which must be supported by reasonable suspicion as it subjects a
suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve
such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent
of an arrest; and (3) arrest or custodial detention, which must be
supported by probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Bolton, 831 A.2d 734, 735 (Pa. Super. 2003). As the
first level of interaction between police and citizens, a mere encounter is itself
a “request for information,” which needs no level of suspicion.
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Commonwealth v. Acosta, 815 A.2d 1078, 1082 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en
banc).
“A mere encounter can be any formal or informal interaction between
an officer and a citizen, but will normally be an inquiry by the officer of a
citizen. The hallmark of this interaction is that it carries no official compulsion
to stop or respond.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa.
Super. 2005) (citation omitted). If the police action becomes too intrusive, a
mere encounter may escalate into an investigatory stop or a seizure. See
Commonwealth v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 336, 340 (Pa. 1998). However, “a
seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual
and asks a few questions.” Commonwealth v. McClease, 750 A.2d 320, 324
(Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has confirmed that,
without more, an officer’s request for a person’s identification does not
transform a mere encounter into an investigatory detention. See
Commonwealth v. Au, 42 A.3d 1002, 1009 (Pa. 2012).
The PCRA court addressed this claim as follows:
In the present case, Officer Verdekal responded to a report of
shots fired and upon arriving at the scene he and other officers
began to ask passers by what they were doing in the area or if
they had heard gunshots. (N.T. 11/21/2017 pg. 18) … After
having provided his name, [Steele] was frisked then permitted to
walk away from Officer Verdekal. (N.T. 11/21/2017 pg. 19) It was
not until Officer Verdekal reviewed video surveillance of the
shooting that [Steele] became a suspect. (Id. pg. 20-23) There is
no evidence in the record which indicates that law enforcement
drew their weapons on [Steele], physically restrained him or
otherwise demonstrated lawful authority in a way which would
objectively cause a reasonable person to believe that he or she
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was not free to leave. Accordingly, law enforcement’s interaction
with [Steele] was a mere encounter which requires no level of
suspicion.
PCRA Court Opinion, 5/13/22, at 8-9.
The record reflects that Officer Verdekal testified he was one of several
officers who responded to multiple 911 calls concerning gun shots being fired
at the Sherman Hills Apartment complex. See N.T., 11/21/17, at 16-17.
During the initial search of the area, the officer encountered Steele outside as
Steele exited the side door of one of the apartment buildings. See id. 17-18.
Officer Verdekal explained, “[W]e were stopping pretty much anybody that we
were able to come in contact with at that point.” Id. at 18.
The officer testified that Steele was asked what he was doing in the
area, whether he heard any gunshots, and his identity. See id. at 18-19. In
addition, Steele was frisked for a weapon and permitted to leave. See id. at
19. Upon review, we agree with the PCRA court that the initial approach to
Steele by the police was a mere encounter and that no seizure occurred at
that time.1 Therefore, Steele’s claim that trial counsel should have sought
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1 As the Commonwealth aptly observed, Steele has suggested that he “was
detained without any specific suspicion and was surrounded by police when
questioned, thus feeling that he could not leave. (XX-XXXXXXX N.T. p 6, 12)
(11-21-2017 N.T. p. 19).” Appellant’s Brief at 6 (citations in original). If this
allegation was accurate, Steele’s contact with police would have been beyond
a mere encounter and required ascending levels of suspicion. “However,
[Steele’s] [citations to the record] do not indicate any testimony or other
evidence in support of that conclusion.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 14. We have
scoured the record for any reference to bolster the allegation that Steele was
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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suppression of his identification information lacks merit. Accordingly, because
there is no merit to the underlying claim, the allegation of ineffective
assistance fails.
Steele next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek
suppression of evidence of his historical location gained from his ankle bracelet
GPS device. See Appellant’s Brief at 6-7. Steele alleges that since he was
wearing the bracelet pursuant to a private contract with a bail bond company,
this evidence should be treated like GPS data derived from a mobile phone.
See id. Accordingly, he argues the police should have obtained a search
warrant prior to acquiring the GPS evidence from the third-party bail company.
See id.
Here, we conclude Steele has failed to establish that he suffered
prejudice from the admission of the GPS evidence. As the PCRA court
accurately observes, Steele’s claim “does not merit PCRA relief because the
GPS dat[a] was cumulative evidence and was not dispositive [of] the issue of
his guilt.” PCRA Court Opinion, 5/13/22, at 12. The PCRA court explained:
Multiple law enforcement officers saw [Steele] near the scene of
the crime. Later, after viewing a video of the shooting, Officer
Verdekal recognized the shooter in the video as [Steele]. Officer
Verdekal recognized the clothing of the person in the video as
being the same clothing that [Steele] was wearing during their
meeting. [Steele] even identified himself in the video of the
____________________________________________
surrounded by police officers during the encounter and have discovered no
such support. As such, we have no basis to conclude that trial counsel would
have been successful in arguing that the interaction between Steele and the
police was not a mere encounter.
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shooting though he did not admit to the shooting. Instead, he
explained that he was running because someone else was
shooting at him. See (N.T. 11/21/2017 pg. 65-66) In light of the
overwhelming evidence of [Steele’s] guilt, we do not hesitate to
conclude that he would have been convicted of these same
offenses even if the GPS evidence would have been suppressed.
Id.
Our review substantiates the PCRA court’s conclusion that Steele did not
suffer prejudice because of the admission of the GPS evidence. The police
arriving at the scene in response to the 911 calls identified Steele from their
initial encounter. See N.T., 11/21/17, at 17-19. Video footage taken from the
complex’s security cameras showed Steele walking around the scene and
ultimately firing a weapon. See id. at 20-28. Officer Verdekal testified that
Steele was wearing the same clothing in the video footage as he was wearing
when he was found by police. See id. at 28. Importantly, Steele admitted he
was the person seen on the video. See id. at 65-67. Hence, the GPS evidence
placing Steele at the apartment complex was cumulative of the evidence noted
above. Consequently, Steele has failed to establish that he suffered prejudice
from the admission of the GPS evidence and is not entitled to relief on this
claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
Steele last argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the admission of the GPS evidence at the trial. See Appellant’s Brief at 7-
8. Steele contends that counsel should have objected based on hearsay and
due to a lack of foundation. See id.
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In addressing the previous issue, we discussed the cumulative nature of
the GPS evidence and concluded that Steele failed to establish a reasonable
probability of a different verdict if the GPS evidence had been suppressed.
Similarly, we conclude that the admission of the GPS evidence at trial did not
result in prejudice to Steele. We agree with the PCRA court’s following
observation regarding the potential prejudice caused by the admission of the
GPS evidence: “[B]ecause the evidence of [Steele’s] guilt was overwhelming,
we also find that he has utterly failed to demonstrate that the court’s verdict
would have been different but for the GPS evidence. This evidence was
cumulative and merely corroborated the trial evidence which pointed to
[Steele’s] guilt.” PCRA Court Opinion, 5/13/22, at 15. Therefore, Steele has
not established the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance test, and his
claim fails.
Since none of Steele’s issues on appeal merit relief, we affirm the order
denying his PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 04/24/2023
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