Ingram v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: May 2, 2023

S23A0066. INGRAM v. THE STATE.

LAGRUA, Justice.

Appellant Tyree Ingram was convicted of felony murder and

other crimes in connection with the fatal shooting of LaMarcus

Brown during the early morning hours of September 13, 2019.1 On

appeal, Ingram contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

1In November 2019, Ingram was indicted by a Baldwin County grand
jury on charges of malice murder, three counts of felony murder, armed
robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a first offender,
possession of cocaine, and theft by receiving stolen property. In April 2021, a
jury found Ingram guilty of all counts except malice murder. The trial court
sentenced Ingram to life in prison, plus an additional 13 years. Two of the
felony murder counts were vacated by operation of law, and the armed robbery
count and aggravated assault count merged with the felony murder count for
sentencing purposes. On April 26, 2021, Ingram filed a timely motion for new
trial, which he amended twice through new counsel on December 17, 2021, and
January 7, 2022. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied
Ingram’s motion for new trial on February 18, 2022. Ingram filed a timely
notice of appeal to this Court on March 4, 2022, and the case was docketed to
the term of this Court beginning in December 2022 and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
assistance by (1) failing to object to good character evidence of the

victim; (2) failing to object to and redact the portion of Ingram’s

recorded statement to law enforcement officers where he mentioned

his juvenile criminal history; and (3) failing to object to the

classification of Ingram’s first offender sentence as a “conviction”

when it was tendered into evidence by the State. Ingram also

contends that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness

entitles him to a new trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm

Ingram’s convictions.

The evidence presented at Ingram’s trial showed that, on

September 12, 2019, Ingram and Brown arranged to meet for

Ingram to buy drugs from Brown. Ingram’s cousin, Quartarvius

Greene, gave Brown’s contact information to Ingram because

Greene “used to buy weed” from Brown. According to Ingram, who

testified in his own defense at trial, he and Brown decided to meet

“around like 12:00 [a.m.]” in the parking lot of the Georgia War

Veteran’s Home (the “Veteran’s Home”) in Milledgeville. Ingram

testified that “[t]he plan was that [Brown] was supposed to credit

2
[Ingram] an ounce of marijuana and an eight-ball of cocaine,” and

Ingram “was just supposed to pay him back” when Ingram got paid.

Around 9:00 p.m., Brown called his girlfriend, Deasia Parks,

and told her that he was going to drop his children off at their

mother’s house and then he was going to “make a play” 2 before he

came over to Parks’s house. Shanesia Ford, the mother of Brown’s

children, testified that Brown dropped their children off at her house

around 9:30 p.m. and told her “that he would be back around 12:00.”

Ford testified that Brown, who she knew sold drugs, “wasn’t acting

like himself” and had a “nervous look” in his eye she “had never seen

before.”

Ingram was living with his mother at the Edgewood

Apartments at this time and did not have a car. That night, Ingram

borrowed a gold or tan 2002 Grand Marquis from Lashala Fluellen, 3

the mother of his best friend, who also lived at the Edgewood

Apartments. Fluellen testified that she loaned Ingram her Grand

2 Parks testified that “make a play” meant “sell some drugs.”
3 Fluellen also owned a Chevrolet Trailblazer.
3
Marquis around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m., so he could “take one of his

friends to work” because “the guy was supposed to be at work like

12 that night.” Greene—who also resided at the Edgewood

Apartments—testified that he worked the midnight shift at the

Veteran’s Home as a security officer, and Ingram was supposed to

give him a ride to work in Fluellen’s car but did not pick him up.

Ingram admitted that he did not take Greene to work as planned

and instead used Fluellen’s Grand Marquis to meet Brown at the

Veteran’s Home.

According to Ingram, between “11:45 and midnight,” he

stopped by a gas station for a few minutes and then drove to the

Veteran’s Home to meet Brown. 4 When Ingram arrived at the

Veteran’s Home, a grey Nissan Altima was already parked in the

lot. Ingram parked the Grand Marquis and waited outside the car

because he did not know that the Altima belonged to Brown. Ingram

testified that Brown got out of the Altima and walked over to

4Security footage from the gas station confirmed that a gold or tan Grand
Marquis pulled into the gas station at 11:52 p.m. and left the gas station at
11:57 p.m.
4
Ingram, asking if he was “the guy [Brown] was talking on the phone

with.” Ingram confirmed, and the men walked over to Brown’s car

“to make the transaction.” Ingram testified that he got into Brown’s

car, paid Brown $35 for an “eight-ball of cocaine,” “got out of the car”

and “left.” According to Ingram, after leaving the Veteran’s Home,

he drove through Milledgeville Manor—a nearby apartment

complex where his sister lived—stopped by a gas station to “thr[o]w

some trash out,” 5 and “went home.” Ingram testified that, when he

got home, he put the eight-ball of cocaine in Fluellen’s Trailblazer,

which was parked at the Edgewood Apartments.

Kimberlie Mason, Crystal Justice, and Mikelya West testified

that, late on the night of September 12, they were hanging out on

Mason’s front porch at Milledgeville Manor—where Mason and

Justice lived—when Ingram drove up and asked to see his “sister,”

Iyania Ingram, who is Mason’s daughter. According to Justice and

5 Security footage from the gas station confirmed that a gold or tan
Grand Marquis pulled into the gas station at 1:15 a.m. on September 13 and
that Ingram exited the vehicle, threw something into the trash can, and left in
the Grand Marquis.
5
West, Ingram was driving a Grand Marquis, and he told the women

that he needed to give his sister “a hug” because he “done shot this

man” about “five or six times” and was “about to go to jail.” At trial,

Mason refused to testify about what Ingram said to the women that

night, stating that she was “pleading the Fifth.” The State showed

Mason a copy of the written statement she had given to law

enforcement officers, which she identified as being in her

handwriting and bearing her signature, and the statement was then

admitted into evidence and read to the jury. In Mason’s statement,

she reported that, when Ingram arrived outside her apartment that

night, he “ask[ed] where his sister [was]” and “said he wanted to tell

his sister he love[d] her and she was not going to see him for about

30 years” because “he just shot” someone who “tried to rob him.”

Mason then went inside the apartment and woke Iyania, who was

sleeping. Iyania testified that when she came outside, Ingram was

standing there and told her that he loved her and that he “just shot

somebody four or five times.” After hugging Iyania, Ingram got back

into the Grand Marquis and left.

6
 Ford testified that she tried to call Brown on his cell phone

around 11:30 or 11:45 p.m. because she had not heard from him, but

“[h]is phone kept going straight to voicemail.” Parks testified that

she also tried calling Brown around midnight, but could not get

through to him. According to both women, they never spoke to or

saw Brown alive again.

Around 8:00 a.m. on September 13, Brown’s body was

discovered inside his Nissan Altima parked in front of the home of

Steven and Camesha Grant on Davis Street, a few blocks from the

Veteran’s Home. Camesha noticed the vehicle when she left for

work that morning, and Steven went outside to investigate.6 When

Steven looked inside the vehicle, he observed a man—later

identified as Brown—“slumped over” between the seats who

appeared to be “reaching to the backseat from the passenger seat.”

Steven testified that he could see blood on the man’s shirt, and when

he knocked on the window of the vehicle, the man was non-

6According to Steven, the vehicle was not parked in that location around
11:00 p.m. or 12:00 a.m. the night before.
7
responsive. Steven called Camesha and asked her to call 911.

Around the same time, Grady Jones was driving down Davis

Street and noticed a grey Nissan Altima parked along the roadway.

Jones recognized the vehicle as belonging to Brown, so he got out of

his car and looked through the driver’s side window of the Altima,

where he observed a man between the seats “almost like he was

trying to get in the back seat or something.” Jones opened the back

passenger side door, and when he saw the man’s face, he confirmed

the man was Brown.

Law enforcement officers with the Baldwin County Sheriff’s

Office arrived on the scene shortly afterwards. One of the first

officers to arrive, Deputy Melissa Condon, looked inside the Altima

and similarly observed Brown “slumped over between the passenger

and driver side seats,” with blood on his clothes and bullet wounds

on both sides of his body. Major Brad King, another responding

officer, noted that the driver’s seat of the Altima was “very far

forward,” and “[i]t appeared that it would have been very difficult to

drive the vehicle with the seat in that position.” Major King also

8
observed that the vehicle was “cool to the touch,” indicating that it

“had been sitting there for quite some time.”

GBI Special Agent Brian Hargrove 7 processed the scene that

morning, and during his search of the interior of the vehicle and the

area surrounding the vehicle, he located two .40-caliber shell

casings 8—one on the driver’s side front floorboard and the other in

the roadway “very close to the driver’s door”—as well as bullet

fragments on the backseat. According to Special Agent Hargrove,

after examining Brown’s body at the morgue, he determined that

Brown likely died from “injuries that were consistent with

gunshots,” located “on each side of his body,” including one on

Brown’s upper right arm “that had what appeared to be sooting

around the defect,” demonstrating that the muzzle of the gun was

“close” to “the target surface” when it was fired. Special Agent

7 Special Agent Hargrove was admitted as an expert at trial in the areas
of crime scene examination and processing and bullet flight-path
reconstruction.
8 A firearms examiner for the GBI testified that these shell casings were

fired from a .40-caliber pistol, “most likely a Smith & Wesson.”

9
Hargrove also noted an irregular-shaped blood stain pattern on

Brown’s left arm, which was “very similar to the muzzle of a firearm,

in particular, a semi-automatic pistol.” According to the medical

examiner, a bullet traveled through Brown’s upper right arm and

entered into his chest through his right armpit, damaging his lungs

and ascending aorta. The medical examiner determined that “[t]he

cause of death [was] multiple gunshot wounds.”

After Special Agent Hargrove’s investigation, he concluded

that Brown “was sitting in the driver’s seat when he was shot” and

was then moved by someone else into the position in which he was

found. Special Agent Hargrove located two “usable latent prints” on

Brown’s vehicle—one on the front passenger side window and the

other on the front passenger side doorframe. Fingerprint testing

revealed that the fingerprint on the passenger side window belonged

to Ford, and the fingerprint on the passenger side doorframe

belonged to Ingram.

Detective Robert Butch, one of the investigating officers,

10
obtained “an exigent order” for Brown’s cell phone records, 9 and

after reviewing those records, he determined that there were 14 calls

between Brown’s cell phone and Ingram’s cell phone on the night of

September 12, beginning at 8:22 p.m. Six of the calls were from

Ingram’s cell phone to Brown’s cell phone, and eight of the calls were

from Brown’s cell phone to Ingram’s cell phone. The last call placed

from Brown’s cell phone was to Ingram’s cell phone at 12:13 a.m. on

September 13.

On the evening of September 13, law enforcement officers

found Ingram at the Edgewood Apartments, and Ingram went to the

sheriff’s office for an interview. After reading Ingram his rights

under Miranda 10 and obtaining a waiver of those rights, Detective

Butch asked Ingram what he was doing the night before, and

Ingram told Detective Butch that he borrowed Fluellen’s car and

was out driving around, stopping by a gas station once or twice

9 Brown’s cell phone was never recovered.
10 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694)
(1966).

11
between 11:45 p.m. and 1:30 a.m. Detective Butch asked Ingram if

he saw Brown that night, and Ingram denied meeting with Brown

or killing Brown. Ingram was released after this interview.

After further investigation, Detective Butch interviewed

Ingram a second time on September 17, 2019. Detective Butch read

Ingram his rights under Miranda, after which Ingram agreed to talk

to Detective Butch about what occurred on the night of September

12. Ingram also provided a written statement, in which he stated

the following:

I left Edgewood Apartments to go make a deal with
LaMarcus Brown. I stopped by [a gas station] across from
Sonic to get some gas for the car. I left the gas station and
went to the Veteran’s Home parking lot to meet [Brown].
He got out of his car to greet me. We shook hands and we
walked to his car. And when we got in the car, I left the
door open some and [he] showed me some drugs he had.
And I got them[,] and in the process of the transaction, we
started talking about buying and selling guns. And I
showed him the one I was selling. And when I let him hold
it, he pointed the gun at me trying to rob me. And I pushed
his arm up and twisted the gun and it fired off and hit him
and he started reaching for something under his seat. And
I ran and I shot two more times into the car. And I left. I
stopped by the Manor and seen my little sister. I told her
that I love her and I left. Went home. I came back to the
Veteran’s Home to move the body down the road. I got his

12
 phone, took the battery out and I threw them out the car
and I went home. I really didn’t mean to do it. It was all
self-defense with the shooting.

In addition to providing the written statement, Ingram told

Detective Butch that Greene had given him Brown’s cell phone

number, and Ingram had set up the meeting with Brown to buy

drugs. Ingram admitted to communicating with Brown on

September 12 and to having deleted several text messages between

them, as well as a program he used to text Brown from his cell phone

on the morning of September 13. Ingram also told Detective Butch

that he brought a gun with him to the meeting with Brown and that

he had purchased this gun in July 2019. Ingram explained that the

gun and the cocaine he purchased from Brown could be located at

the Edgewood Apartments; specifically, the gun was located in the

bushes behind the exterior of one of the apartment buildings, and

the cocaine was stashed inside Fluellen’s Trailblazer. Ingram also

admitted that, after the shooting, he took Brown’s cell phone, broke

it apart, threw part of it out of the window while he was driving, and

then threw the back of the phone into a trash can at a gas station.

13
Ingram told Detective Butch that he threw away the clothes he had

been wearing that night.

Detective Haley Beckham testified that, while Ingram was

being interviewed on September 17, she was asked to look for a gun

and cocaine at the Edgewood Apartments. She located a “small

black handgun,” which she identified as a “.40 Smith & Wesson,” on

the rear side of the apartments underneath some shrubbery.

Detective Beckham also obtained consent from Fluellen to search

both of her vehicles—the Grand Marquis and the Trailblazer.

Detective Beckham located a small bag of cocaine in the center

console of the Trailblazer.

Quinshoun Henderson testified at trial that his .40-caliber

Smith & Wesson was stolen on July 30, 2019. According to

Henderson, he typically left his gun in his car or his bedroom, and

on July 30, after waking up from a nap, he discovered that the gun

was missing. Henderson immediately reported the theft of his gun

to the police. Henderson testified that Ingram was living with him

during this timeframe. At trial, Henderson identified the gun

14
located by law enforcement at the Edgewood Apartments on

September 17 as the gun that was stolen from him. An officer with

the Milledgeville Police Department also testified that the gun found

at the Edgewood Apartments had the same serial number as the gun

Henderson reported as stolen in July 2019.11

At trial, Ingram acknowledged that several photographs of a

gun found on his cell phone were similar to the “type of gun” that

had been stolen from Henderson. However, Ingram insisted that he

did not steal Henderson’s gun, but “went and bought it” from

someone else the day after it was stolen. Ingram also testified that

he did not bring a gun to the meeting with Brown and that he only

knew about the gun hidden at the Edgewood Apartments because

someone else had hidden it there at his suggestion. Ingram testified

that when he left the Veteran’s Home after the drug transaction on

the night of September 12, Brown was still alive. As for the

conflicting statements Ingram gave to Detective Butch during his

11 No blood or other evidence of significance was found on the gun
recovered at the Edgewood Apartments.
15
September 17 interview, Ingram stated that he did not remember

participating in that interview or writing any of his written

statement. Ingram insisted he was telling the truth at trial and that

“all the other statements [were] lies.”

1. On appeal, Ingram contends that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance by failing to: (a) object to irrelevant and

prejudicial good character evidence of the victim; (b) object to and

redact the portion of Ingram’s recorded statement to law

enforcement in which he mentioned his juvenile criminal history;

and (c) object to the prosecutor calling Ingram’s first-offender

sentence a “conviction” when a copy of the sentence was tendered

and admitted into evidence. We will address each contention in

turn, applying the constitutional standard set forth in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

“In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel,” Ingram “must show both that counsel’s performance was

deficient, and that the deficient performance was prejudicial to [his]

defense.” Taylor v. State, 312 Ga. 1, 15 (6) (860 SE2d 470) (2021)

16
(citation and punctuation omitted). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687 (III). “To prove deficient performance,” Ingram “must show that

his counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable way

considering all the circumstances and in light of prevailing

professional norms.” Ward v. State, 313 Ga. 265, 273 (4) (869 SE2d

470) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

The reasonableness of counsel’s conduct is examined from
counsel’s perspective at the time of trial and under the
particular circumstances of the case, and decisions
regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for
an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently
unreasonable that no competent attorney would have
followed such a course.

Taylor, 312 Ga. at 15-16 (6) (citations and punctuation omitted).

See also Robinson v. State, 278 Ga. 31, 36 (2) (d) (597 SE2d 386)

(2004) (“As a general rule, matters of reasonable trial tactics and

strategy, whether wise or unwise, do not amount to ineffective

assistance of counsel,” and “[a] reviewing court evaluates trial

counsel’s performance from counsel’s perspective at the time of

trial.”). “To prove prejudice,” Ingram “must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

17
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Ward, 313

Ga. at 273 (4) (citations and punctuation omitted).

“An appellant must prove both prongs of the Strickland test,

and if he fails to prove one prong, it is not incumbent upon this Court

to examine the other prong.” Winters v. State, 305 Ga. 226, 230 (4)

(824 SE2d 306) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). “In

reviewing either component of the inquiry, all factual findings by the

trial court will be affirmed unless clearly erroneous.” Id. See also

Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 (586 SE2d 313) (2003) (“We accept

the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations

unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal

principles to the facts.”).

(a) Ingram first contends that his trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to object after two of the State’s witnesses placed Brown’s

good character in issue. We conclude that, even if counsel performed

deficiently in this respect, the failure to object to this evidence was

not prejudicial. See Revere v. State, 302 Ga. 44, 48-49 (2) (a) (805

SE2d 69) (2017).

18
 The record reflects that, during trial, the prosecutor asked

Ford—the mother of Brown’s children—how she would describe

Brown as a person, and she said that Brown was “a good person”

and a “good father.” Ford further testified that Brown was “not

violent” and “would give you literally the shirt off his back.” The

prosecutor later asked Parks—Brown’s girlfriend—how she would

describe Brown, and Parks testified, among other things, that

Brown was “a very caring person, loved to laugh” and “[w]anted

everybody to be happy around him.” Parks said Brown was “[v]ery

positive,” “loved his family, adored his children,” and was “just a

really nice person, definitely raised right.” Ingram’s trial counsel

did not object to either witness’s testimony.

At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that

he did not object to Ford’s testimony because he viewed it “as maybe

more harmless or general information” about Brown. And, with

regard to Parks’s testimony, trial counsel testified that he was

“having trouble remembering what was going through his mind at

the time,” but he could not affirmatively state that his decision not

19
to object “was not based on trial strategy.” In denying the motion

for new trial, the trial court held that Ingram “did not show that his

trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to this evidence,” but

that “even if [trial counsel] were ineffective in failing to object to this

testimony, there is no reasonable probability that but for that

defici[en]t performance, the jury would have reached a different

result in this case.”

The admissibility of the testimony at issue is governed by

OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (2), which provides that

[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of character
shall not be admissible for the purpose of proving action
in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except
for . . . evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused or by the
prosecution to rebut the same; or evidence of a character
trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the
alleged victim was the first aggressor.

In accordance with this statute, “the State may only introduce

evidence of a victim’s good character to rebut evidence of a pertinent

character trait of the victim after the defendant has first introduced

such evidence at trial.” Revere, 302 Ga. at 47 (2) (a). See also OCGA

20
§ 24-4-404 (a) (2).

On appeal, Ingram asserts that, when the State elicited the

subject testimony from Ford and Parks, Ingram had not yet

presented any evidence regarding Brown’s character or any evidence

to suggest that Brown was the first aggressor. Ingram thus

contends that Ford’s and Parks’s testimony was inadmissible

evidence of Brown’s good character, and Ingram’s trial counsel

should have objected to its admission.

Even assuming, without deciding, that Ingram’s contention in

this respect was correct and thus assuming that counsel performed

deficiently, we conclude that Ingram has not carried his burden of

proving prejudice under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (III). Again, to

prove prejudice, Ingram is required to show that, “but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Ward, 313 Ga. at 273 (4) (citations and punctuation

omitted). And “[t]he burden of showing a reasonable probability

that the outcome” of Ingram’s trial would have been different,

“though not impossible to carry, is a heavy one.” Revere, 302 Ga. at

21
49 (2) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted).

The evidence of Ingram’s guilt in this case was strong. During

Ingram’s custodial interview with Detective Butch, he told Detective

Butch that, on the night of September 12, 2019, he met Brown at the

Veteran’s Home to conduct a drug transaction and that he shot and

killed Brown when Brown pointed a gun at him and tried to rob him.

Ingram also stated in this interview that, after the shooting, he

stopped by Milledgeville Manor to see his sister to tell her that he

loved her. Several witnesses, including Ingram’s sister, testified at

trial that they saw Ingram at Milledgeville Manor on the night of

Brown’s murder and that he told them he had shot someone and

would be going to jail. Ingram also told Detective Butch that,

several hours after the shooting, he moved Brown’s body down the

road from the Veteran’s Home and took Brown’s cell phone,

throwing part of it away along the roadway and part of it away at a

gas station. Surveillance footage from the gas station confirmed

that Ingram stopped by this location during the early morning hours

of September 13 and threw something away. Evidence was also

22
presented to show that Ingram’s fingerprint was found on the

passenger side door of Brown’s vehicle; that numerous calls were

placed between Ingram’s cell phone and Brown’s cell phone on the

night of Brown’s shooting—Ingram also acknowledged exchanging

text messages with Brown during this timeframe; that a .40-caliber

handgun was used to kill Brown—“likely a Smith & Wesson”—and

that a .40-caliber Smith & Wesson was recovered by law

enforcement at the Edgewood Apartments where Ingram indicated

his gun would be located; and that this same weapon was stolen from

Henderson in July 2019 during the timeframe when Ingram was

residing with him. Ingram also explained to Detective Butch where

the cocaine he purchased from Brown could be located, and officers

were able to find the cocaine in that location. And Ingram’s trial

testimony conflicted significantly with what he told Detective Butch

during his custodial interview—shifting from an assertion that he

shot Brown in self-defense to an assertion that he was not present

for the shooting. Nevertheless, Ingram admitted at trial that he met

Brown at the Veteran’s Home to conduct a drug transaction on the

23
night Brown was shot.

“Considering the totality of the evidence, we find no reasonable

probability that, had trial counsel objected to the testimony” that

Ingram complains of, the outcome in Ingram’s case “would have been

different.” Revere, 302 Ga. at 49 (2) (a) (citation omitted). See also

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 (holding that “[i]n making [the

prejudice] determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim

must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury”).

We thus conclude that Ingram failed to show prejudice under

Strickland, and this ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.

(b) Ingram next contends that his trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to object to the admission of Ingram’s September 13

recorded interview with law enforcement where Ingram mentioned

his juvenile criminal history and for failing to ensure that this part

of the interview was redacted at trial. During Ingram’s September

13 interview with Detective Butch, Ingram briefly discussed his

juvenile record and that he had been accused of a delinquent act

involving a firearm after “a guy” accused Ingram of “pull[ing] a gun

24
on” him. At trial, this interview was played for the jury in its

entirety, including this brief reference to Ingram’s juvenile

delinquency history, and Ingram’s trial counsel did not object.

At the motion for new trial hearing, Ingram’s trial counsel

testified that Ingram’s juvenile record was one of the things that he

was trying to keep out. Trial counsel explained that it was a

“mistake” that this evidence was admitted, and he had no strategic

reason for it to come in at trial. Trial counsel further testified that

when Ingram’s interview was played for the jury and he heard

Ingram mention his juvenile history, he did not object because he

did not want to draw more attention to the statement.

In denying Ingram’s motion for new trial, the trial court

determined that Ingram’s counsel just “overlooked this portion of

[Ingram’s] statement,” which should have been redacted. The trial

court concluded that, while trial counsel’s performance in failing to

have this portion of the statement redacted was deficient, Ingram

was not prejudiced by the inadvertent admission because the

25
evidence against Ingram “was overwhelming, and the admission of

this statement did not affect the outcome of the case.” We agree.

Even assuming “deficient performance in the failure to object

or seek redaction” of Ingram’s statement during his September 13

interview, Phillips v. State, 285 Ga. 213, 219 (4) (a) (675 SE2d 1)

(2009), Ingram has not shown a reasonable probability that the

outcome of his trial would have been different had that portion of

his September 13 interview not been admitted. See Grant v. State,

305 Ga. 170, 175-176 (5) (b) (824 SE2d 255) (2019) (holding that,

“[e]ven assuming that trial counsel’s failure to seek redaction of the

video [played for the jury] was deficient, there was no prejudice”),

overruled on other grounds by Lane, 308 Ga. at 23. The prejudicial

effect of Ingram’s juvenile record was minimal, particularly given

the passing reference to it in the midst of a custodial interview

involving a far more serious crime, and the lack of any details or

discussion regarding the delinquent act at trial. In light of the

strong evidence of Ingram’s guilt detailed above, we cannot say that

Ingram was prejudiced by the admission of this evidence, and

26
Ingram has not shown otherwise. See Grant, 305 Ga. at 176 (4) (b).

Thus, Ingram “cannot show ineffective assistance of counsel on this

basis.” Id.

(c) Ingram also contends that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecutor’s

description of Ingram’s first-offender sentence as a “conviction”

when the prosecutor tendered and admitted a certified copy of that

sentence into evidence. During the prosecutor’s direct examination

of Detective Butch at trial, the prosecutor asked him whether he was

aware that Ingram was on probation when he went to Ingram’s

apartment on September 13. Detective Butch responded

affirmatively, and the prosecutor asked if Ingram was “on a First

Offender sentence” for the “offense of burglary.” Detective Butch

responded, “Yes, sir.” The prosecutor then said, “I’m going to show

you what’s been marked as State’s Exhibit No. 20, Your Honor. It’s

a certified copy of that burglary conviction I’m asking to be entered

into evidence.” The trial court asked whether Ingram’s trial counsel

had any objection, and trial counsel responded that he did not. The

27
exhibit was then admitted into evidence.

At the hearing on Ingram’s motion for new trial, Ingram’s trial

counsel testified that he did not recall hearing Ingram’s first-

offender sentence referred to as a “conviction” at trial, but he should

have objected to such a classification. And, in denying Ingram’s

motion for new trial, the trial court concluded that, even assuming

trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to object to the use of

the word “conviction” by the prosecutor, “there [was] absolutely no

showing” that this misstatement “prejudiced [Ingram] in any way,”

particularly since the prosecutor properly classified the sentence as

a first-offender sentence when questioning Detective Butch about it

at trial. The trial court further noted that the jury had a certified

copy of the sentence available to it during deliberations, which was

clearly marked as a first-offender sentence, not a conviction.

We similarly conclude that, even if trial counsel was deficient

in failing to object to the prosecutor’s characterization of Ingram’s

first-offender sentence as a “conviction” while tendering that

sentence into evidence, there was no prejudice. Given the other

28
evidence presented against Ingram at trial, the fact that the

prosecutor properly classified Ingram’s first-offender sentence when

questioning Detective Butch about it at trial, and the fact that the

jury had access to a certified copy of the first-offender sentence

during its deliberations, Ingram has not demonstrated a reasonable

probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different

had his trial counsel objected to the use of the word “conviction” at

trial. Therefore, this enumeration of error fails.

2. In Ingram’s final contention, he asserts that, because the

evidence presented against him at trial was “largely circumstantial

and certainly not overwhelming,” the cumulative effect of trial

counsel’s deficient performance “contributed at least within a

reasonable probability to the guilty verdicts” and resulted in

prejudice to Ingram that entitles him to a new trial. We see no merit

to this contention.

While we have assumed that Ingram’s trial counsel performed

deficiently in (1) allowing good character evidence of Brown to be

admitted at trial, (2) allowing Ingram’s statements about his

29
juvenile record into evidence, and (3) failing to object to Ingram’s

first-offender sentence being classified as a “conviction,” these

cumulative errors of trial counsel will not entitle Ingram to a new

trial unless “actual prejudice resulted.” Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga.

809, 811 (II) (642 SE2d 56) (2007) (holding that “[t]o prevail on his

claims,” the appellant “must show that his trial counsel rendered

constitutionally-deficient performance and that actual prejudice

resulted”), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308

Ga. 10, 23 (838 SE2d 808) (2020). “In order to find actual prejudice,

this Court must conclude that there is a reasonable probability

(i.e.[,] a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome) that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 811-812 (II)

(citation and punctuation omitted). As we have already concluded

above, the evidence presented against Ingram at trial was

substantial, and Ingram has failed to show that, absent “his trial

counsel’s alleged deficiencies,” there is a “reasonable probability”

that the outcome of his trial would have been different. Id. at 812

30
(II). Accordingly, Ingram “has failed to show prejudice [from the

combined effect of trial counsel’s errors] sufficient to sustain his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim(s)” or that the combined effect

thereof constituted reversible error, and this final enumeration of

error fails. Id at 816 (II).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

31