UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LAWRENCE LOGGINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civ. Action No. 21-1129
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER (EGS/MAU)
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
Mr. Lawrence Loggins (“Mr. Loggins” or “Plaintiff”) brings
this lawsuit against National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(“Amtrak” or “Defendant”), alleging racial discrimination and
hostile work environment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See
Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 26. 1
Amtrak moved to dismiss Mr. Loggins’ Second Amended
Complaint. See Def. National Railroad Passenger Corporation’s
Mot. Dismiss Pl. Lawrence Loggins’ Second Am. Compl., or
Alternatively, Mot. Transfer Venue, ECF No. 27. The Court
thereafter referred this case to a magistrate judge for full
case management, see Minute Order (June 16, 2022); and the case
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
Court refers to the ECF page numbers, not the page numbers of
the filed documents.
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was later directly assigned to Magistrate Judge Moxila A.
Upadhyaya, see Docket Civ. Action No. 21-1129. On December 1,
2022, Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya issued a Report and
Recommendation (“R. & R.”) recommending that the Court grant
Amtrak’s Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for
failure to state a claim or in the alternative that the Court
transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois. See R. & R., ECF No. 32.
Pending before the Court is Mr. Loggins’ Objections to the
R. & R., see Objs. Magistrate Judge’s Proposed Findings &
Recommendations (“Pl.’s Objs.”), ECF No. 33. Upon careful
consideration of the R. & R.; the objections, opposition, and
reply thereto; the applicable law; and the entire record herein,
the Court hereby the Court hereby ADOPTS IN PART Magistrate
Judge Upadhyaya’s R. & R., see ECF No. 32; and GRANTS Amtrak’s
Motion to Transfer Venue, see ECF No. 27.
II. Background
A. Factual
Mr. Loggins is a Black man who lives in Chicago and
formerly worked as a conductor for Amtrak. See Second Am.
Compl., ECF No. 26 at 1 & ¶ 10. During his employment, he
admitted that he had sold cash fare tickets and failed to turn
in the proceeds of those sales. Id. ¶ 13. Amtrak removed him
from service. Id. Following an audit of his account, Amtrak
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found that he had failed to transmit $4,331.25 for a two-year
period but permitted him to return to his position if he made
restitution and accepted discipline. Id. ¶ 14. Mr. Loggins
agreed to these terms and also waived the investigation. Id. ¶
15.
Amtrak continued to audit Mr. Loggins despite his
understanding that the waiver included “all outstanding
deficiencies in his account.” Id. ¶¶ 15-16. The audit revealed
additional cash fares that he had failed to transmit. Id. ¶ 16.
Amtrak investigated and dismissed him from service. Id. ¶ 17.
Mr. Loggins appealed his dismissal to the Public Law Board.
Id. ¶ 18. The Public Law Board directed Amtrak to rehire him but
required him to make restitution for the remaining deficiency in
his account. Id. ¶ 18. Mr. Loggins does not allege whether he
failed to turn in other funds or whether he paid any additional
restitution to Amtrak. See generally id. ¶¶ 1-26.
In the Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Loggins alleges that
“White employees engaged in similar misconduct but were not
similarly disciplined.” Id. ¶ 19. He points to one example for
comparison: Mr. Lonnie Lavoie (“Mr. Lavoie”), a White man who
worked as a conductor and revenue instructor in Chicago. Id.
According to Mr. Loggins, Mr. Lavoie failed to turn in $1,652.00
of proceeds from cash fare sales but did not disclose this
information to Amtrak. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. Mr. Loggins also alleges
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that Amtrak dismissed Mr. Lavoie but later rehired him and
expunged his charges without requiring that he repay the
company. Id. ¶¶ 22-24.
Mr. Loggins’ remaining allegations are conclusory and
devoid of factual content, so the Court will not recount them
here. See id. ¶¶ 12, 25-31.
B. Procedural
On April 13, 2022, Amtrak moved to dismiss Mr. Loggins’
Second Amended Complaint or, alternatively, to transfer the case
to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. See Def. National Railroad Passenger Corporation’s
Mot. Dismiss Pl. Lawrence Loggins’ Second Am. Compl., or
Alternatively, Mot. Transfer Venue, ECF No. 27 at 1. Mr. Loggins
filed a brief in opposition on April 27, 2022, see Pl.’s Mem. P.
& A. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Pl. Loggins’ Second Am. Compl.,
or Alternatively, Mot. Transfer Venue, ECF No. 28; and Amtrak
filed its reply brief on May 4, 2022, see Def.’s Reply Supp.
Mot. Dismiss Second Am. Compl., or Alternatively, Mot. Transfer
Venue, ECF No. 29. On December 1, 2022, Magistrate Judge
Upadhyaya issued her R. & R. recommending that the Court grant
Amtrak’s Motion to Dismiss or transfer the case to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. See R. &
R., ECF No. 32 at 9.
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On December 16, 2022, Mr. Loggins submitted Objections to
the R. & R. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 33. Amtrak filed an
opposition brief on January 26, 2023. See Def. National Railroad
Passenger Corporation’s Opp’n Pl.’s Objs. Magistrate Judge’s R.
& R. (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 35. Mr. Loggins replied on
January 27, 2023. See Pls.’ Rep[l]y Def. National Railroad
Passenger Corporation’s Opp’n Pl.’s Objs. Magistrate Judge’s
Proposed Findings & Recommendations (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No. 37.
The objections are now ripe and ready for adjudication.
III. Legal Standard
A. Objections to a Magistrate Judge’s R. & R.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), a party
may file specific written objections once a magistrate judge has
entered a recommended disposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1)-(2).
A district court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended
disposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C) (“A judge of the court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made by the magistrate judge.”). A district court “must
determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition
that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
“If, however, the party makes only conclusory or general
objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments, the
Court reviews the [R. & R.] only for clear error.” Houlahan v.
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Brown, 979 F. Supp. 2d 86, 88 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). “Under the clearly erroneous
standard, the magistrate judge’s decision is entitled to great
deference” and “is clearly erroneous only if on the entire
evidence the court is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” Buie v. Dist. of Columbia,
No. CV 16-1920 (CKK), 2019 WL 4345712, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 12,
2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graham v.
Mukasey, 608 F. Supp. 2d 50, 52 (D.D.C. 2009)).
Objections must “specifically identify the portions of the
proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made
and the basis for the objection.” LCvR 72.3(b). “[O]bjections
which merely rehash an argument presented and considered by the
magistrate judge are not ‘properly objected to’ and are
therefore not entitled to de novo review.” Shurtleff v. EPA, 991
F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Morgan v. Astrue, No.
08-2133, 2009 WL 3541001, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2009)). The
Court reviews Mr. Loggins’ objections de novo.
B. Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) authorizes a court to transfer an
action to any other district where it might have been brought
“for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice.” The purpose of § 1404(a) “is to prevent
the waste of time, energy, and money, and to protect litigants,
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witnesses, and the public from unnecessary inconvenience and
expense.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964).
District courts accordingly have discretion under Section
1404(a) to transfer a case based on an “individualized case-by-
case consideration of convenience and fairness.” Berry v. U.S.
Dep’t of Just., 49 F. Supp. 3d 71, 74 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing
Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988)); see
also Beall v. Edwards Lifesciences LLC, 310 F. Supp. 3d 97, 102-
103 (D.D.C. 2018); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Harvey, 437 F. Supp.
2d 42, 45 (D.D.C. 2006). Section 1404(a) is meant to be a
“judicial housekeeping measure” rather than a “forum-shopping
instrument.” Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 636.
A defendant bears the “heavy burden of establishing that
[the] [p]laintiff[’s] choice of forum is inappropriate” such
that this Court should transfer this case out of this District
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Jalloh v. Underwood, 300 F.
Supp. 3d 151, 155-56 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Thayer/Patric of
Educ. Funding L.L.C. v. Pryor Res., Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 21, 31
(D.D.C. 2002)); Aracely, R. v. Nielsen, 319 F. Supp. 3d 110, 127
(D.D.C. 2018); see also Garcia v. Acosta, 393 F. Supp. 3d 93,
108 (D.D.C. 2019); Accurso v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Case No.
17-CV-02626 (APM), 2018 WL 4964501, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 15,
2018). To satisfy this burden, a defendant “must show that
considerations of convenience and the interest of justice weigh
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in favor of transfer.” Jalloh, 300 F. Supp. 3d at 155 (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
To justify a transfer, a defendant must make two showings.
Devaughn v. Inphonic, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 68, 71 (D.D.C.
2005). First, the defendant must establish that the plaintiff
could have brought suit in the proposed transferee district. Id.
at 71-72. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a suit may be brought
in a judicial district: (1) where “any defendant resides, if all
defendants are residents of the State in which the district is
located”; (2) where “a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”; or (3) if there is
no judicial district where the case may be brought as provided
by the first two categories, where “any defendant is subject to
the court’s personal jurisdiction.” Second, the defendant must
demonstrate that considerations of convenience and the interests
of justice weigh in favor of a transfer. Devaughn, 403 F. Supp.
2d at 71; Berry, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 75. “To determine whether
‘considerations of convenience and the interests of justice
weigh in favor of a transfer,’ courts consider several private-
interest factors, including: (1) the plaintiff’s choice of
forum, unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of
the defendant; (2) the defendant’s choice of forum; (3) whether
the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties;
(5) the convenience of the witnesses; and (6) the ease of access
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to sources of proof.” Beall, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 103. Courts also
consider whether certain public-interest factors weigh in favor
of transfer, including “(1) the transferee’s familiarity with
the governing laws, (2) the relative congestion of each court,
and (3) the local interest in deciding local controversies at
home.” Id.
III. Analysis
Mr. Loggins objects to Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya’s
recommendation that the Court transfer this case to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. For the
reasons that follow, the Court ADOPTS the R. & R. as to this
issue.
Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya determined that the convenience
of the parties and the interests of justice weigh in favor of
transfer. See R. & R., ECF No. 32 at 9. To reach this
conclusion, she explained that the following factors support
transfer: (1) Mr. Loggins resides in Chicago; (2) the alleged
misconduct occurred in Chicago; (3) Mr. Lavoie—the proposed
comparator—worked in Chicago; and (4) the Public Appeal Board is
located in Chicago. See id. at 8. She further considered that
the location of Amtrak’s headquarters in the District of
Columbia did not weigh as heavily against transfer. See id. at
8-9.
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In his Objections to the R. & R., Mr. Loggins argues that
his residence in Chicago is immaterial to the venue analysis
because “[v]enue is his choice” and he chose to bring suit in
the District of Columbia. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 33 at 10. A
plaintiff’s choice of forum “traditionally receives deference,”
but diminished deference is accorded under several
circumstances, including where, as here, the plaintiff resides
in and the circumstances giving rise to the case occurred in the
transferee forum. Payne v. Giant of Md., L.L.C., No. CIVA
1:05CV00897 (GK), 2006 WL 1793303, at *3–4 (D.D.C. June 28,
2006) (citations omitted). Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya thus
appropriately considered factors other than Mr. Loggins’ choice
of forum in recommending transfer of this case.
However, Mr. Loggins fails to address those circumstances
and contends that several other factors counsel in favor of the
case remaining in the District of Columbia. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF
No. 33 at 10. Specifically, he argues that Amtrak often
litigates in the District of Columbia and that this venue is the
location of the company headquarters, lawyers, corporate
officers, personnel records, and human resources and labor
relations functions. See id. Amtrak disputes most of these
points. See Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 35 at 27. It explains that:
its paper personnel records are located in Delaware; the
relevant corporate officer works in Colorado; one of its
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attorneys is based in Georgia; another attorney is barred in
Illinois and admitted to practice in the transferee forum; and
its attorneys regularly litigate matters in other federal
district courts. Id. Given all these circumstances, the Court
agrees with Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya that only the location of
Amtrak’s headquarters weighs in favor of this case remaining in
the District of Columbia. See R. & R., ECF No. 32 at 8. Further,
the Court declines to find that this factor is significant, as
courts in this District regularly transfer cases against Amtrak
to other more appropriate districts despite the location of
Amtrak’s headquarters. See, e.g., Brown v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp. (“Amtrak”), No. 18-CV-02216 (APM), 2018 WL 11217191, at *1
(D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2018) (transferring case out of the District of
Columbia where the plaintiff resided in the transferee forum and
all the events occurred there); Wedge v. Potter, No. CIVA 06-
0422 (EGS), 2006 WL 3191232, at *2-3 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2006)
(transferring case out of the District of Columbia where all of
events in the complaint, the relevant witnesses, and the
documents were located in the transferee forum).
Mr. Loggins also argues that a new factor weighs against
transfer: “a change of venue will only disadvantage [his]
counsel, whose costs and efforts to prosecute the case will be
multiplied by a transfer to Chicago, and additional counsel will
have to be retained because [his counsel] is not a member of the
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bar of the state of Illinois.” Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 33 at 10. As
Amtrak points out in its opposition briefing, see Def.’s Opp’n,
ECF No. 35 at 27; Mr. Loggins cites no caselaw to support
consideration of this factor. Because the Court is not aware of
any authority suggesting that the convenience of a party’s
attorney is a public or private interest factor to consider, cf.
Beall, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 103 (discussing convenience of the
parties but not convenience of their attorneys); the Court will
not consider this issue in reviewing Magistrate Judge
Upadhyaya’s findings and recommendation.
Finally, Mr. Loggins disputes that other factors weigh in
favor of transfer. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 33 at 10. He argues
that Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya “has no idea” where Mr. Lavoie
currently works and that “the location of the Public Appeal
Board is irrelevant” to this case. Id. He has misread the R. &
R. and the caselaw. Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya correctly found
that the relevant events in this case—including Mr. Lavoie’s
alleged misconduct and the decision by the Public Appeal Board—
occurred in Chicago. See R. & R., ECF No. 32 at 8. The caselaw
makes clear that the location of events relevant to the
complaint is a factor that the Court should consider in deciding
a motion to transfer. See Brown, 2018 WL 11217191, at *1.
Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the R. & R. as to this issue
and TRANSFERS this case to the U.S. District Court for the
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Northern District of Illinois. 2
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the Court ADOPTS IN PART
Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya’s R. & R., see ECF No. 32; and GRANTS
Amtrak’s Motion to Transfer Venue, see ECF No. 27. An
appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
May 3, 2023
2 The Court declines to decide Amtrak’s Motion to Dismiss, see
ECF No. 27 and leaves the remaining issues to the transferee
forum. Cf. Brown, 2018 WL 11217191, at *1-2.
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