In re E.W.

Filed 5/8/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re E.W. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY,
A165789
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (San Francisco County Super. Ct.
No. JD22-3070A–H)
D.W. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants;
A.W., a Minor, etc.,
Appellant.

In re J.W. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY,
A165933
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (San Francisco County Super. Ct.
No. JD22-3147)
D.W. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

In this consolidated appeal, appellants D.W. (Mother) and J.W.
(Father) ask us to review the jurisdictional findings and disposition orders in
the dependency proceedings regarding their nine children. One of the
children, A.W. (Minor), also appeals. None of these appellants claim any

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error requiring reversal of the findings or orders. Instead, they ask us to
conditionally affirm and remand the case for the San Francisco Human
Services Agency (Agency) to comply with its obligations under the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California
law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.).1
Specifically, appellants argue that the Agency failed its duty of initial
inquiry into the children’s possible Native American heritage. Mother first
indicated that the maternal grandmother had some Native American
ancestry, but then Mother reported she herself was not indigenous and had
completed genetic testing confirming she had no Native American ancestry.
Father reported he had no Native American ancestry, which he confirmed on
his ICWA-020 form, Parental Notification of Indian Status and in
representations to the juvenile court. The Agency subsequently interviewed
the maternal aunt (as the maternal grandmother is deceased) and the
paternal grandmother, who both denied any Native American ancestry. On
these facts, we reject appellants’ contention that the Agency was required to
interview five additional extended family members, and we affirm the orders
in their entirety.
BACKGROUND2
In March 2022, the Agency filed a petition on behalf of Mother and
Father’s eight children3 pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
The following brief background summary is intended to provide
2

context to the ICWA issue raised on appeal.
The petition also included an older child who is not a party to this
3

appeal because she turned 18 years old shortly after the petition was filed;
her case was dismissed in December 2022.

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protect), (c) (serious emotional damage), and (d) (sexual abuse). The Agency
subsequently amended the petition to include allegations under section 300,
subdivision (j) (abuse of sibling). The Agency alleged, among other things,
that the children were at risk of sexual abuse because Father had sexually
molested three of Minor’s siblings and Mother was aware of the sexual abuse
but did not take steps to keep her children safe.
The Agency’s detention report noted that on March 4, Mother indicated
that the maternal grandmother “had some Native ancestry, Blackfoot Indian
and Cherokee,” but Mother did not have additional details. Father reported
he had “no Native American ancestry.” On March 8, Mother reported that
“she is not Native American and she paid for genetic testing through
ancestry.com, and the results did not have any Native American ancestry,
nor do they belong to a tribe.” The report stated, however, that further
inquiry was necessary because there was reason to believe the children may
be Native American children. The report identified the paternal grandfather
and paternal aunt to be assessed for resource family approval.
At the March 9th detention hearing, Mother’s counsel represented that
“some of the basic information the court may want to know now is that the
mom has no Indian—no Indian ancestry as far as she knows.” The juvenile
court responded: “The detention report seemed to indicate she may have
Blackfoot and Cherokee ancestry. But based on your conversation today, I’ll
make a finding that since she is saying—maybe there was a
misunderstanding. I’ll make a finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act does
not apply, that there’s no reason to believe or know that these children are
Indian children.” The court ordered the children detained. The written
detention order, however, did not include the court’s oral ICWA finding.

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 Mother filed an ICWA-020 form, Parental Notification of Indian Status
on March 9, indicating “no Indian ancestry as far as I know.” Father filed his
form on March 14, checking the box “None of the above apply.”
The Agency’s jurisdictional and disposition report noted that on
March 17, both parents again denied any Native American ancestry. The
maternal grandmother is deceased; the maternal aunt and uncle reside out of
state. On March 18, the social worker spoke with the maternal aunt, who
reported, “there was no documented information about the family having any
Native American ancestry.” On March 31, the social worker spoke with the
paternal grandmother, who also reported that there was no Native American
ancestry. The report concluded there was no reason to believe or know that
the children may be Native American.
After the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing in June 2022,
the juvenile court found true allegations under section 300, subdivisions (b),
(c), (d), and (j), declared dependency, and ordered reunification services for
the parents as outlined in the Agency’s case plan. The maternal cousin had
attended the hearing remotely as a support person for Mother. The paternal
grandfather also attended. The maternal aunt testified at the hearing;
among other things, she explained that the maternal uncle is “mentally
disabled” and is in her care. Mother, Father, and Minor filed notices of
appeal from these jurisdictional findings and disposition orders.
Mother gave birth to another child on May 22, 2022. The Agency filed
a petition that was subsequently amended to include only section 300,
subdivision (j). The detention report noted that on June 2, Mother stated
that neither she nor Father had any Native American ancestry and there was
no reason to believe or know that the newborn may be a Native American
child. At the June 7 detention hearing, Mother’s counsel stated, “I think the

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court’s already gone over her ICWA status, which is no [N]ative American
heritage.” The juvenile court asked both parents if they had any Native
American ancestry on their sides of the family. They responded no. The
court then found ICWA did not apply, and included this finding in the written
detention order. The court ordered the newborn detained.
The court held the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing in
July 2022. The court found the section 300, subdivision (j) allegations true,
declared dependency, and ordered reunification services for the parents as
outlined in the Agency’s case plan. Mother and Father filed notices of appeal
from these jurisdictional findings and disposition orders.
DISCUSSION
Appellants do not challenge the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings
that the children are persons described by section 300, or its dispositional
orders removing the children from the parents’ custody. Instead, they seek
“conditional affirmance and remand” because the Agency failed to satisfy its
initial duty of inquiry into the children’s possible Native American heritage
and, accordingly, the juvenile court’s findings regarding ICWA inapplicability
are not supported by substantial evidence. We begin with the applicable
legal framework.
I. Legal Framework
“Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 to address concerns regarding the
separation of Indian children from their tribes through adoption or foster
care placement, usually in non-Indian homes.”4 (In re D.S. (2020)

4 Since “ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ ” much of the case law does so as
well “for consistency, even though” the authors of those decisions “recognize
that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are preferred by
many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1 (Benjamin
M.).)

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46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048.) ICWA establishes “minimum standards for state
courts to follow before removing Indian children from their families and
placing them in foster care or adoptive homes.” (In re D.S., at p. 1048.)
California has adopted “various procedural and substantive provisions” to
supplement ICWA and, following the enactment of new federal regulations,
“California made conforming amendments to its statutes, including portions
of the Welfare and Institutions Code related to ICWA notice and inquiry
requirements.” (In re D.S., at p. 1048.)
The juvenile court and the Agency have “an affirmative and continuing
duty” to inquire whether a child for whom a section 300 petition has been
filed “is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) When a child is
placed into temporary custody, the Agency has a duty of initial inquiry that
“includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian,
Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in
the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is,
or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian
custodian is domiciled.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) The phrase “extended family
members” is defined to include adults who are the child’s “grandparent, aunt
or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew,
first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 224.1, subd. (c) [adopting ICWA definition of “extended family
member”].)
If the initial inquiry creates a “reason to believe” the child is a Native
American child, but there is not sufficient information to determine that
there is “reason to know that the child is an Indian child,” the Agency must
make “further inquiry . . . as soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).)
Further inquiry includes, but is not limited to, interviewing the parents,

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Native American custodian, and extended family members. (Id.,
subd. (e)(2)(A).) If this further inquiry establishes a “reason to know” the
child is a Native American child, notice must be provided to the pertinent
tribes. (§ 224.3.) With this framework in mind, we turn to appellants’
arguments in this consolidated appeal.
II. Analysis
Appellants raise a narrow question regarding the Agency’s duty of
initial inquiry under section 224.2, subdivision (b). They claim that ICWA
required the Agency to include five additional extended family members in its
initial inquiry: the maternal grandfather, the maternal uncle, the maternal
cousin, the paternal grandfather, and the paternal aunt.5
On its face, section 224.2, subdivision (b) requires that an initial
inquiry “be made of at least all of the following: (1) the child, (2) the parents,
(3) the legal guardian (presuming there is one, although the statute doesn’t
say that explicitly), (4) the Indian custodian (again presuming there is one,
although again the statute doesn’t say that), (5) all grandparents, (6) all
aunts and uncles, (7) all adult siblings, (8) all siblings-in-law, (9) all nieces
and nephews, (10) all first cousins, (11) all second cousins, (12) the reporting
party, and (13) all others who have an interest in the child.” (In Ezequiel G.
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1006 (Ezequiel).) But, “complying with the literal
language of the statute—that is, making an initial and further ICWA inquiry
of every member of a child’s extended family, including first and second
cousins, plus every other person who has an interest in the child—is absurd
at best and impossible at worst.” (Ibid.) The decision in Ezequiel explained

5 Mother originally listed the maternal grandmother in her opening
brief, but made no mention of her in the reply brief after the Agency noted
that the maternal grandmother is deceased.

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that family complexities counsel against mechanical application of the
statute, and that “determining compliance with ICWA requires a significant
exercise of discretion.” (Id. at pp. 1006–1007.) The Ezequiel decision
concluded, “the key” question on appeal “should be whether the ICWA
inquiry conducted has reliably answered the question at the heart of the
ICWA inquiry: Whether a child involved in a proceeding ‘is or may be an
Indian child.’ ” (Id. at p. 1009.)
Here, Mother initially indicated that the maternal grandmother had
some Native American ancestry and represented to the juvenile court at the
March detention hearing that she did not know of any Native American
ancestry. Father, on the other hand, was consistent from the outset that he
was not Native American. Father reported to the social worker that he had
“no Native American ancestry,” and confirmed this in his ICWA-020 form.
If the Agency had stopped its inquiry after Mother’s initial
representations, it would not have fulfilled its duty. The duty of inquiry “is
premised on the commonsense understanding that, over time, Indian
families, particularly those living in major urban centers . . . may well have
lost the ability to convey accurate information regarding their tribal status.”
(In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 295.) The Agency is not relieved of its
duty of inquiry when parents report that they do not know of any Native
American ancestry. (In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 554 (Y.W.).) Such
a rule “ignores the reality that parents may not know their possible
relationship with or connection to an Indian tribe.” (Ibid.)
In this case, however, Mother made repeated subsequent
representations that she lacked any Native American ancestry. Mother
declared this in her ICWA-020 form, and again denied any Native American
ancestry to the social worker on March 17. On June 2, Mother stated that

8
neither she nor Father had any Native American ancestry. At the June
detention hearing for her newborn child, Mother again confirmed that she
had no Native American heritage and no indigenous ancestry on her side of
the family. Mother also reported that she completed genetic testing on
ancestry.com, which revealed she had no Native American ancestry.
Mother’s reporting concerning testing is consistent with her subsequent
representations that she lacked any Native American ancestry.6
More importantly, after the Agency reported in its March detention
report that further inquiry was necessary because there was reason to believe
the children “may” be Native American children, it conducted a further
inquiry of extended family members on both sides of the family. The social
worker inquired about Native American ancestry with the maternal aunt and
the paternal grandmother. The maternal aunt stated there was no
documented information about the family having any Native American
ancestry. The paternal grandmother stated that there was no Native
American ancestry. Accordingly, in its May jurisdictional and disposition
report, the Agency concluded there was no reason to believe or know that the
children may be Native American children.

6 California courts have proceeded with caution in weighing the
significance, if any, of genetic analysis from Web sites like ancestry.com in
the ICWA context. (See In re J.S. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 678, 689.) In In re
J.S., for example, explicitly did not decide whether ancestry.com is even a
reliable source of Native American ancestry, and observed that results that
indicate a parent does have some generalized Native American ancestry but
do not identify a possible tribe or any specific geographic region are not
particularly helpful, given that ancestry.com purportedly defines the
“ ‘Native American Ethnicity’ group” to include both North and South
America. (In re J.S., at p. 689.) The court concluded that such information
has “little usefulness” in determining whether ICWA applies.
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 We are not persuaded that the Agency failed to satisfy its initial duty of
inquiry in reaching its conclusion. Mother’s repeated representations and
ICWA-020 declarations by both parents, and the interviews of extended
family members on both sides of the family, “reliably answered” the question
of whether the children were Native American children. (Ezequiel, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at p. 1009.) The Agency could not interview the maternal
grandmother because she is deceased. The maternal cousin and paternal
grandfather attended the June 2022 hearing, and the paternal aunt was
referenced in the earlier detention report. But appellants do not explain how
not interviewing additional relatives (as well as the maternal grandfather
and the maternal uncle, whose sister testified has a mental disability that
requires her care) casts any doubt on the reliability of the answers already
obtained from the parents and relatives.
None of the cases discussed by appellants compel a contrary conclusion.
The Y.W. decision determined that the children and family services
department failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into the mother’s Native
American ancestry because the mother reported she did not know of any such
ancestry but had been adopted, and the department did not make meaningful
efforts to locate and interview her biological parents even after learning of a
potentially viable lead to locate them. (Y.W., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 553–555.) In the Benjamin M. case, the social services agency conceded
that it had failed its duty of initial inquiry because, while the mother denied
Native American ancestry, the agency was unable to locate or contact the
father and failed to ask his known relatives about any Native American
ancestry. (Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 740.) In re A.C. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 1009 involved a similar concession by the children and family
services department because the mother reported she did not know of any

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Native American ancestry, but the department did not ask the father and did
not interview any extended relatives of either parent. (Id. at pp. 1011, 1013.)
Unlike these cases, the parents here not only reported and declared that they
had no indigenous ancestry, but this was confirmed by the interviews from
relatives on both sides of the family.
In sum, we conclude that the Agency satisfied its duty of initial inquiry
under section 224.2, subdivision (b). The juvenile court’s findings regarding
ICWA inapplicability were supported by substantial evidence.7
We reiterate, however, that the Agency and the juvenile court have an
“affirmative and continuing” duty of inquiry. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) The Agency
“must on an ongoing basis include in its filings a detailed description of all
inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all information
received pertaining to the child’s Indian status, as well as evidence of how
and when this information was provided to the relevant tribes.” (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5).) Even after its finding of ICWA inapplicability, the
juvenile court is required “to reverse its determination if it subsequently
receives information providing reason to believe that the child is an Indian
child and order the social worker or probation officer to conduct further
inquiry pursuant to Section 224.3.” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); see also Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 5.482(c)(2).)
DISPOSITION
The July 14, 2022 and August 4, 2022 orders are affirmed.

7 Given this conclusion, we need not address the parties’ arguments
regarding whether appellants must demonstrate prejudice from a failure to
satisfy the duty of initial inquiry.

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 _________________________
Markman, J.*

We concur:

_________________________
Richman, Acting P. J.

_________________________
Miller, J.

In re E.W. et al. (A165789, A165933)

* Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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Trial Court: San Francisco County Superior Court

Trial Judges: Hon. Monica Wiley
Hon. Braden C. Woods

Attorneys for Appellants: By Appointment of the Court of Appeal
under the First District Appellate Project
Joseph T. Tavano
Jamie A. Moran

Attorney for Minor: Carol Ann Koenig

Attorneys for Respondent: Office of the City Attorney
David Chiu
Kimiko Burton
Elizabeth McDonald Muniz

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