Dixon v. United States

Case: 22-1564 Document: 50 Page: 1 Filed: 05/10/2023

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________

ALAN C. DIXON,
Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________

2022-1564
______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:20-cv-01258-DAT, Judge David A. Tapp.
______________________

Decided: May 10, 2023
______________________

TIFFANY MICHELLE HUNT, Hunt Tax Law, PLLC, Dal-
las, TX, argued for plaintiff-appellant.

ISAAC B. ROSENBERG, Tax Division, Appellate Section,
United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, ar-
gued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by BRUCE R.
ELLISEN, DAVID A. HUBBERT.

KEITH FOGG, Federal Tax Clinic at Legal Services Cen-
ter, Harvard Law School, Jamaica Plain, MA, for amicus
curiae The Center for Taxpayer Rights. Also represented
by ANDREW WEINER, Beasley School of Law, Temple Uni-
versity, Philadelphia, PA.
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2 DIXON v. US

______________________

Before TARANTO, CLEVENGER, and HUGHES, Circuit
Judges.
TARANTO, Circuit Judge.
Alan C. Dixon seeks a refund of taxes he paid to the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In 2017, his tax preparer
filed amended tax returns for him, within the time permit-
ted by law, claiming a refund of amounts paid for tax years
2013 and 2014, but, after an audit, the IRS denied the re-
fund claims and instead assessed additional taxes. Mr.
Dixon then filed an action in the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims (Claims Court), and during that litigation, it be-
came clear that Mr. Dixon had not personally written the
signatures of his name on the 2017 amended returns—the
tax preparer had signed Mr. Dixon’s name—and no author-
izing power-of-attorney documentation accompanied the
amended returns. Because 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) prevents a
taxpayer from filing suit to claim a refund without having
earlier submitted a “duly filed” refund claim to the IRS,
and the 2017 amended returns were for the above reason
not “duly filed,” the Claims Court dismissed the case in
February 2020. See Dixon v. United States, 147 Fed. Cl.
469, 472–75 (2020) (Dixon I).
Within days of that dismissal, Mr. Dixon filed with the
IRS duly signed amended returns for the 2013 and 2014
tax years, though the time allowed for amended returns
claiming a refund for 2013 and 2014 had long passed. He
shortly proceeded to file a timely appeal of the dismissal to
this court, but after briefing, he voluntarily dropped the ap-
peal in September 2020. Then, only days later, he filed a
second action in the Claims Court based on the IRS’s fail-
ure to act on his duly signed 2020 amended returns. The
Claims Court again dismissed Mr. Dixon’s case, concluding
that the 2020 amended returns were untimely and that the
“informal claim” doctrine was inapplicable here to allow
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DIXON v. US 3

the untimely (but proper) 2020 filings to relate back in time
to the timely (but defective) 2017 filings. See Dixon v.
United States, 158 Fed. Cl. 69, 75–78, 80 (2022) (Dixon II).
Mr. Dixon appeals. For the reasons that follow, which
are different from the reasons set forth by the Claims
Court, we affirm.
I
A
If a taxpayer has filed a return as required by 26 U.S.C.
§ 6011(a) and paid taxes based on the return, and it later
turns out that the amount paid was more than owed, then,
as a “[g]eneral rule[,]” the IRS—more precisely, the Secre-
tary of the Treasury—“within the applicable period of lim-
itations, may credit the amount of such overpayment”
against other tax liabilities of the taxpayer “and shall, sub-
ject to [certain limitations], refund any balance to such per-
son.” 26 U.S.C. § 6402(a). 1 The “period of limitations” for
securing a credit or refund is keyed to the previous tax re-
turn or payment: A “[c]laim for credit or refund . . . shall be
filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the re-
turn was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid,
whichever of such periods expires the later.” Id. § 6511(a).
Generally, failure to timely file a refund claim forecloses
recovery. See id. § 6511(b)(1) (“No credit or refund shall be
allowed or made after the expiration of the period of limi-
tation . . . for the filing of a claim for credit or refund, unless
a claim for credit or refund is filed by the taxpayer within
such period.”); id. § 6514(a)(1)–(2) (“A refund . . . shall be
considered erroneous . . . [i]f made after the expiration of
the period of limitation for filing claim therefor, unless
within such period claim was filed[,] or . . . [i]n the case of
a claim filed within the proper time and disallowed by the

1 We hereafter refer interchangeably to the Secre-
tary, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and the IRS.
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4 DIXON v. US

Secretary, if the credit or refund was made after the expi-
ration of the period of limitation for filing suit, unless
within such period suit was begun by the taxpayer.”). A
taxpayer and the IRS may agree, however, to extend the
time in which the IRS may assess taxes and in which the
taxpayer may file a refund claim. See id. §§ 6501(c)(4)(A),
6511(c)(1).
Just as there are timing requirements for filing refund
claims with the IRS, there are both timing and other re-
quirements for filing refund claims in court. “Under 26
U.S.C. § 6532 and § 7422(a), a suit may be brought in [a]
. . . [c]ourt after an administrative claim has been filed and
either the taxpayer waited six months before filing suit or
the IRS took final action on the claim.” Brown v. United
States, 22 F.4th 1008, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2022). A refund ac-
tion may be brought “either in United States district court
or in the [Claims Court].” United States v. Clintwood
Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 4 (2008) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a)(1); EC Term of Years Trust v. United States, 550
U.S. 429, 431 & n.2 (2007)).
Section 6532(a) states two rules for the timing of the
action in court. First, no such suit “shall be begun before
the expiration of 6 months from the date of filing the claim
required under such section unless the Secretary renders a
decision thereon within that time.” 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1).
Second, “nor [shall such suit be begun] after the expiration
of 2 years from the date of mailing by certified mail or reg-
istered mail by the Secretary to the taxpayer of a notice of
the disallowance of the part of the claim to which the suit
or proceeding relates.” Id. The latter limit may be ex-
tended by written agreement with the Secretary. Id.
§ 6532(a)(2).
Timeliness is not the only requirement for a judicial ac-
tion for a refund. “No suit or proceeding shall be main-
tained in any court for the recovery of” a tax refund “until
a claim for refund . . . has been duly filed with the
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DIXON v. US 5

Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that regard,
and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursu-
ance thereof.” Id. § 7422(a). Two statutes are noteworthy
here for determining whether claims were “duly filed.” Sec-
tion 6061(a) says: “Except as otherwise provided . . . , any
return, statement, or other document required to be made
under any provision of the internal revenue laws or regu-
lations shall be signed in accordance with forms or regula-
tions prescribed by the Secretary.” Section 6065 says:
“Except as otherwise provided by the Secretary, any re-
turn, declaration, statement, or other document required
to be made under any provision of the internal revenue
laws or regulations shall contain or be verified by a written
declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury.”
In Brown, we explained the effect of those provisions in
light of existing regulations. We stated: “Sections 6061(a)
and 6065 thus impose a default rule that individual tax-
payers must personally sign and verify their income tax re-
fund claims.” Brown, 22 F.4th at 1012. “To be sure,” we
added, Ҥ 6061(a) gives the Secretary the authority to pre-
scribe how individual taxpayers may satisfy the statute’s
requirement,” and “[s]imilarly, § 6065 gives the Secretary
discretion to suspend the verification requirement in cer-
tain cases.” Id. at 1013. But those statutes’ “implementing
regulations echo the statutory default rule. They presump-
tively require individual taxpayers to execute their own re-
fund claims and returns. And, by regulation, the person
who signs a return or other document must also verify it.”
Id. (citing 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.6012-1(a)(5), 1.6065-1(a),
301.6402(e)). As a result:
[A] taxpayer must satisfy the statutory default rule
or else comply strictly with the implementing reg-
ulations. If they do neither, the document is effec-
tively unsigned and unverified under §§ 6061(a)
and 6065 and the taxpayer has not “duly filed” the
refund claim.
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6 DIXON v. US

Id. 2 Based on that analysis, the court in Brown ruled that
“[b]ecause the taxpayer signature and verification require-
ments derive from statute, the IRS cannot waive those re-
quirements” under the waiver doctrine of Angelus Milling
Co. v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 293, 296 (1945). Brown, 22
F.4th at 1013. “In the alternative,” the court then held, the
taxpayer did not meet the requirements of the waiver doc-
trine in any event. Id.
Finally, determining whether a judicial action is proper
also requires looking at the taxpayer’s compliance with the
timing requirements that govern the administrative claim,

2 The court in Brown had earlier quoted another reg-
ulatory provision, 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-2(b)(1)—not cited
in the just-summarized reasoning—as stating the verifica-
tion requirement for a claim to be “duly filed.” Brown, 22
F.4th at 1012. That provision reads (with the emphasis
given in Brown when it quoted the provision):
No refund or credit will be allowed after the expi-
ration of the statutory period of limitation applica-
ble to the filing of a claim therefor except upon one
or more of the grounds set forth in a claim filed be-
fore the expiration of such period. The claim must
set forth in detail each ground upon which a credit
or refund is claimed and facts sufficient to apprise
the Commissioner of the exact basis thereof. The
statement of the grounds and facts must be verified
by a written declaration that it is made under the
penalties of perjury. A claim which does not comply
with this paragraph will not be considered for any
purpose as a claim for refund or credit.
26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-2(b)(1). The court in Brown did not
highlight or rely on the last (“considered for any purpose”)
sentence.
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DIXON v. US 7

i.e., the filing made to the IRS—requirements that, as
noted, for refund claims like those at issue here, generally
demand filing within three years of when the earlier return
was filed or two years of when the tax was paid. See Com-
putervision Corp. v. United States, 445 F.3d 1355, 1362–63
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a)). The Supreme
Court has ruled that failure to file with the IRS within the
prescribed time deprives the court of “jurisdiction over
[the] suit for refund.” United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596,
608–10 (1990). This court in Brown ruled that Dalm’s ju-
risdictional characterization applies to “the fact of filing” in
the time allowed, but not to § 7422(a)’s “duly filed” require-
ments governing “the adequacy of the filing” if timely
made, and held the latter not to be jurisdictional in nature.
Brown, 22 F.4th at 1011–12. 3

3 The Court in Dalm based its jurisdictional charac-
terization on the notion that a proper “understanding of
sovereign immunity” prevents courts from “go[ing] beyond
the authority Congress has given [them] in permitting
suits against the Government.” 494 U.S. at 610; see id. at
608–10. Recently, the Supreme Court wrote that the “gen-
eral proposition . . . that a condition to the waiver of sover-
eign immunity . . . must be strictly construed[] . . . d[oes]
not mean that time limits accompanying such waivers are
necessarily jurisdictional.” Wilkins v. United States, 143 S.
Ct. 870, 879 (2023) (second ellipsis in original) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). We need not ad-
dress the effect of Wilkins on the jurisdictional characteri-
zation adopted by the Supreme Court in Dalm. That
characterization is immaterial here, as Mr. Dixon has not
raised any issue about equitable or comparable bases for
excusing noncompliance that are unavailable for jurisdic-
tional rules (but may be available for “nonjurisdictional
claims-processing rule[s],” Wilkins, 143 S. Ct. at 881; see
Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, 138
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8 DIXON v. US

B
As we have recognized, “[t]he Supreme Court has held
that in some circumstances a taxpayer’s claim” may or even
must be addressed by the IRS or heard in court “even
though the taxpayer did not timely file the formal, detailed
claim required by the regulations.” Computervision, 445
F.3d at 1363 (citations omitted). We have categorized the
different circumstances and noted that the relevant “aggre-
gation of rules” has been referred to “as the substantial var-
iance doctrine,” which “permits consideration of a claim for
refund despite failure to timely file detailed formal claims
with the IRS when a substantial variance from the require-
ments of the regulation is not involved.” Id. at 1363–64
(citations and footnote omitted). “[T]his doctrine applies
only in four limited situations,” and over time, each has
“come to be identified as a separate doctrine.” Id. at 1364.
One is the informal-claim doctrine, which is the only
doctrine at issue in the present matter; the waiver doctrine
of Angelus Milling, which was at issue in Brown, is not at
issue here. Under the informal-claim doctrine, courts treat
“a timely claim with purely formal defects [as] permissible
if it fairly apprises the IRS of the basis for the claim within
the limitations period” and is followed by “an untimely
amendment that complied with the regulations.” Id.; see
United States v. Kales, 314 U.S. 186, 193–97 (1941). Where
the doctrine applies, an untimely formal claim is allowed
to relate back, for timeliness purposes, to a timely informal
claim. See Kales, 314 U.S. at 190–97, relying on United
States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67–72 (1933)
(discussing “analogies suggested by pleadings in a law-
suit,” and specifically, “[t]he general rule . . . that an
amendment of a pleading will take effect by relation” back,

S. Ct. 13, 18 n.3 (2017)), and the Claims Court dismissed
in the alternative for failure to state a claim, see Dixon II,
158 Fed. Cl. at 71, 75, 80.
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DIXON v. US 9

and concluding that untimely formal claims can amend
timely informal ones).
Importantly for the present case, the Supreme Court
made clear in Memphis Cotton that, just as a plaintiff may
not amend a defective complaint after the complaint has
been dismissed, a taxpayer cannot “perfect” or “amend” a
timely informal claim that is no longer before the IRS. See
Memphis Cotton, 288 U.S. at 71–72 (“The Commissioner
has the remedy in his own hands if the claim as presented
is so indefinite as to cause embarrassment to him or to oth-
ers in his Bureau. He may disallow the claim promptly for
a departure from the rule. If, however, he holds it without
action until the form has been corrected, and still more
clearly if he hears it, and hears it on the merits, what is
before him is not a double claim, but a claim single and in-
divisible, the new indissolubly welded into the structure of
the old. . . . An argument is made that at the time of this
amendment the claim had been finally rejected and the
proceeding thereby ended. If so, it was too late. When cor-
rection is thus postponed, there is no longer anything to
amend, any more than in a lawsuit after the complaint has
been dismissed.” (citations omitted)). This court explained
the point in discussing one of the other doctrines in the sub-
stantial-variance family, stating that “to prevent surprise
and to [permit] . . . an administrative investigation and de-
termination,” a “formal amendment, if filed after the expi-
ration of the limitations period, must be filed while the
original claim is still being considered by the IRS.” Com-
putervision, 445 F.3d at 1371 (alterations in original) (in-
ternal quotation marks and citation omitted).
An amendment, i.e., a formal claim correcting defects
in an earlier claim, may be untimely, and so flunk the re-
quirement of “still being considered by the IRS,” in two
ways. Id. First, there can be no amendment once the IRS
has allowed or disallowed the refund claim. Id. at 1371–
72; see Memphis Cotton, 288 U.S. at 72. Second, we have
held that a taxpayer may not amend a refund claim after
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10 DIXON v. US

filing a suit for refund, because that act causes authority
over the refund claim to transfer from the IRS to the De-
partment of Justice, such that “[t]he IRS no longer has the
authority to resolve the claim” or the “power to ‘allow’ or
‘disallow’ it.” Computervision, 445 F.3d at 1372 (citing
Exec. Order No. 6166, § 5 (June 10, 1933), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 901 (2000)); see id. at 1372 n.18 (quoting Exec. Or-
der No. 6166, § 5: “As to any case referred to the Depart-
ment of Justice for prosecution or defense in the courts, the
function of decision whether and in what manner to prose-
cute, or to defend, or to compromise, or to appeal, or to
abandon prosecution or defense, now exercised by any
agency or officer, is transferred to the Department of Jus-
tice.”). In either case, the “IRS’s jurisdiction” is “termi-
nate[d],” and the “amendment is ineffective.” Id. at 1371–
72.
II
A
Mr. Dixon is an Australian national and U.S. taxpayer
who, at the pertinent times, served as the managing mem-
ber and CEO of Dixon Advisory, USA, a subsidiary of Dixon
Advisory Group Pty Ltd. J.A. 134–35. After filing Form
1040 U.S. Income Tax Returns for tax years 2013 and 2014
(in October 2014 and October 2015, respectively), J.A. 134,
Mr. Dixon learned in 2016 that he might receive more fa-
vorable tax treatment were he to elect to classify Dixon Ad-
visory Group as a partnership rather than a corporation,
J.A. 135. He attempted to effect that change by filing a
Form SS-4 to request an Employer Identification Number
from the IRS for Dixon Advisory Group, J.A. 135, but he
never subsequently filed a Form 8832, which is necessary
to change an entity’s classification, see Dixon II, 158 Fed.
Cl. at 78–79 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3(c)).
In April 2017, Mr. Dixon sought to amend his previous
tax returns to reflect the new, more favorable tax treat-
ment that he believed he was eligible for due to the
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DIXON v. US 11

putative reclassification. J.A. 135–36; J.A. 149–51; J.A.
153–55. Specifically, in that month, his tax preparer, Mr.
Castro, filed Forms 1040X for tax years 2013 and 2014, re-
questing refunds of $137,656 and $1,588,653, respectively,
based on foreign tax credits and an adjustment to Mr.
Dixon’s net investment income tax. 4 J.A. 135–36; J.A. 149–
51; J.A. 153–55. The forms, however, did not contain Mr.
Dixon’s original signature; in each form, on the line for the
taxpayer’s signature, there appeared an illegible signature
written (as would later emerge) by Mr. Castro. J.A. 136;
see Dixon I, 147 Fed. Cl. at 472–73. Mr. Dixon also did not
submit “an effective power of attorney” for Mr. Castro.
Dixon I, 147 Fed. Cl. at 472. For simplicity, except where
otherwise needed, we describe the deficiency here as a fail-
ure to meet at least the signature requirement (discussed
in Brown). 5
In May 2018, the IRS began auditing Mr. Dixon’s 2017
filings, starting with the 2014 Form 1040X and later in-
cluding the 2013 Form 1040X. J.A. 136. Mr. Dixon partic-
ipated in the audit through Mr. Castro. Id. The IRS
ultimately denied the claimed refund and, in fact, assessed
an additional tax based on his reported business income.
See id.; Dixon II, 158 Fed. Cl. at 72.

4 For the tax on net investment income, Mr. Dixon
asserted that he overpaid by—and was entitled to refunds
of—$84,418 and $251,866, respectively. See J.A. 149 (line
9, box B); J.A. 153 (line 10, box B); see also J.A. 259–60
(motion for judgment on pleadings); J.A. 364 (reply brief).
5 No greater specificity is needed given the limited
basis for our decision in this appeal. Our simplification
should not be taken to limit arguments for the significance
of distinctions among signature, verification, power-of-at-
torney, or other requirements in other cases.
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12 DIXON v. US

B
In February 2019, Mr. Dixon challenged the denial of
the refund, as well as the assessment of the additional tax,
at the Claims Court. Dixon I, 147 Fed. Cl. at 473; Dixon II,
158 Fed. Cl. at 72. Upon determining that Mr. Dixon’s
forms failed to meet at least the signature requirement and
therefore were not “duly filed” with the IRS as required by
§ 7422(a) as a precondition to judicial consideration of the
refund claim, the Claims Court, on February 21, 2020, dis-
missed the case. See Dixon I, 147 Fed. Cl. at 473–75.
On February 25, 2020, Mr. Dixon resubmitted his two
Forms 1040X to the IRS—this time with his signature but
otherwise identical to the previous forms. J.A. 136; J.A.
157–59; J.A. 204–06; see Dixon II, 158 Fed. Cl. at 72. In
March 2020, he then noticed an appeal of the dismissal to
this court, and that appeal proceeded until, based on Mr.
Dixon’s unopposed request, it was dismissed under Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b) on September 21, 2020.
Three days later, on September 24, 2020, Mr. Dixon again
sued in the Claims Court, this time based on the IRS’s fail-
ure to act on his signed 2020 Forms 1040X. J.A. 15; J.A.
136–37.
In July 2021, the government moved for judgment on
the pleadings. J.A. 16; J.A. 252–79. The government ar-
gued that Mr. Dixon could not pursue his net investment
income tax claim. See J.A. 267–70 (opening brief in support
of motion); J.A. 362–63 (reply brief). In particular, the gov-
ernment noted, as is undisputed, that Mr. Dixon filed his
signed 2020 Forms 1040X concerning the 2013 and 2014
tax years long after the time allowed (three years from the
2014 and 2015 filing of the original returns, see J.A. 134–
36; J.A. 141–42; J.A. 144–45, and two years from payment,
which must have occurred—although the record is un-
clear—no later than April 2017, when Mr. Dixon filed
Forms 1040X seeking refunds of portions of that payment,
see J.A. 135–36; J.A. 149–51; J.A. 153–55). J.A. 268–69. It
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DIXON v. US 13

then argued that the informal-claim doctrine could not be
invoked to treat his signed 2020 Forms 1040X as if they
were filed at the time of his unsigned 2017 Forms 1040X,
J.A. 269; J.A. 362–63, because 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-2(b)(1)
says that “[a] claim which does not comply with this para-
graph,” including that it be “verified by a written declara-
tion that it is made under the penalties of perjury[,] . . . will
not be considered for any purpose as a claim for refund or
credit,” see supra n.2 (emphasis omitted) (quoting provi-
sion). (The government added that Mr. Dixon was pre-
cluded from asserting the invalidity or inapplicability of
§ 301.6402-2—an issue not raised on appeal. J.A. 269; J.A.
363, 370–77.)
The Claims Court granted the government’s motion
and dismissed Mr. Dixon’s net investment income tax
claim for lack of jurisdiction or, alternatively, failure to
state a claim. Dixon II, 158 Fed. Cl. at 71, 75, 80. The court
agreed with the government that § 301.6402-2(b)(1)’s “for
any purpose” language forbids the application of the infor-
mal-claim doctrine to Mr. Dixon’s unsigned Forms 1040X.
Id. at 75. The court looked back to the Supreme Court’s
informal-claim-doctrine Kales decision and reasoned that
the Court in Kales “emphasiz[ed] that valid informal
claims are only those that ‘[have] not misled the [IRS] and
[have been] accepted and treated’ by the IRS as valid
claims.” Id. at 76 (emphases and second, third, and fourth
alterations added by Claims Court) (quoting 314 U.S. at
194). The Claims Court also reasoned that § 301.6402-
2(b)(1)’s language meant that tax returns that fail to meet
at least the signature requirement “can never be accepted
and treated as valid claims by the IRS and, as such, they
cannot constitute informal claims under Kales.” Id. Turn-
ing from the regulation, the court briefly stated that the
IRS “cannot waive” the signature requirement, because
that requirement is statutory. See id. at 76 & n.3 (citing
the principal Supreme Court waiver-doctrine decision, An-
gelus Milling, 325 U.S. at 296, and 26 U.S.C. §§ 6061(a),
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14 DIXON v. US

6065). On that basis, the Claims Court concluded that “un-
signed tax returns present a more serious deficiency than
garden-variety technical deficiencies that are normally
protected under the informal claim doctrine.” Id. at 76.
The Claims Court further concluded that “[t]here is
reason to believe that Section 7422(a) should be deemed ju-
risdictional,” id. at 77, and that in any event, Mr. Dixon
could not establish any equitable exceptions (e.g., waiver
by the IRS) to excuse his failure to duly file a refund claim,
id. at 77–78. The court thus granted the government’s mo-
tion for judgment and dismissed Mr. Dixon’s suit. Id. at
80. The same day, the Claims Court denied Mr. Dixon’s
motion for leave to amend for futility. See Dixon v. United
States, 158 Fed. Cl. 80, 82–86 (2022) (Dixon III).
The Claims Court entered judgment on January 19,
2022, and Mr. Dixon timely appealed. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
III
We decide the correctness of the Claims Court’s legal
determinations de novo, and we review its factual findings
for clear error. See Palladian Partners, Inc. v. United
States, 783 F.3d 1243, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Where juris-
diction was not determined based on resolution of factual
disputes, we decide de novo the correctness of a dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim. See
Golden v. United States, 955 F.3d 981, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2020);
Shoshone Indian Tribe of Wind River Reservation v. United
States, 672 F.3d 1021, 1029–30 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
A
The Claims Court held that the informal-claim doctrine
does not apply here. To the extent the Claims Court relied
on its view of Kales and on the sentence of 26 C.F.R.
§ 301.6402-2(b)(1) stating that “[a] claim which does not
comply with this paragraph,” including its verification re-
quirement, “will not be considered for any purpose as a
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DIXON v. US 15

claim for refund or credit,” we reject the Claims Court’s
reasoning.
The Claims Court misread Kales as stating “that valid
informal claims are only those that ‘[have] not misled the
[IRS] and [have been] accepted and treated’ by the IRS as
valid claims.” Dixon II, 158 Fed. Cl. at 76 (emphases and
other alterations added by Claims Court) (citation omit-
ted). The Supreme Court did not so limit the doctrine. Ra-
ther, the Court wrote that it
ha[d] often held that a notice fairly advising the
Commissioner of the nature of the taxpayer’s
claim, which the Commissioner could reject be-
cause too general or because it does not comply
with formal requirements of the statute and regu-
lations, will nevertheless be treated as a claim
where formal defects and lack of specificity have
been remedied by amendment filed after the lapse
of the statutory period.
Kales, 314 U.S. at 194 (citing, e.g., Memphis Cotton, 288
U.S. at 62). It then said: “This is especially the case where
such a claim has not misled the Commissioner and he has
accepted and treated it as such.” Id. (citing, e.g., Memphis
Cotton, 288 U.S. at 70, and Bonwit Teller & Co. v. United
States, 283 U.S. 258 (1931)). “Especially” is not “only.”
The Claims Court also attributed far too much to the
regulatory sentence. For one thing, the Court in Kales held
the informal-claim doctrine to be applicable even though,
at the time, a regulation was in place containing language
materially identical to that of § 301.6402-2(b)(1). See 26
C.F.R. § 3.322-3 (1938) (“Claims for refund by taxpayers
. . . must set forth in detail and under oath each ground
upon which a refund is claimed, and facts sufficient to ap-
prise the Commissioner of the exact basis thereof. No re-
fund or credit will be allowed after the expiration of the
statutory period of limitation applicable to the filing of a
claim therefor except upon one or more of the grounds set
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16 DIXON v. US

forth in a claim filed prior to the expiration of such period.
A claim which does not comply with this paragraph will not
be considered for any purpose as a claim for refund.” (em-
phases added)). 6 The principle of Kales, amounting to re-
quiring allowance of relation-back amendment for fairness
reasons in specified circumstances, applies readily to a reg-
ulatory provision such as this one. See Kales, 314 U.S. at
194 (“This Court, applying the statute and regulations, has
often held that a notice fairly advising the Commissioner
of the nature of the taxpayer’s claim, which the Commis-
sioner could reject because too general or because it does
not comply with formal requirements of the statute and

6 At the time the “letter of protest” at issue in Kales
was provided to the Commissioner, 314 U.S. at 190–91, the
regulatory requirements for refund claims do not appear to
have been meaningfully different in relevant respects from
the present requirements, see, e.g., I.T. 2228, 4-2 C.B. 104,
104 (1925) (“Claims for refund, unless sworn to before a
collector or deputy collector, are required to be executed be-
fore an officer authorized to administer oaths for general
purposes by the laws of the United States or of any State
. . . .”); L.O. 1116, 3-1 C.B. 350, 358 (1924) (“[I]t is evident
that the Treasury Department contemplated the presenta-
tion, in good faith, of refund claims on a form designed for
the purpose, or at least in a manner substantially as out-
lined on the printed form, and that the reasons or grounds
for refund would be set forth frankly and ‘completely,’ un-
der oath, so that, as so submitted, the Commissioner would
have before him all the grounds on which claimant relied
. . . . As the regulations prescribed that all the facts relied
upon in support of the claim be clearly set forth under oath
and the form of claim-affidavit required the claimant to
take oath that the claim made is ‘complete’ in substance, a
claim so submitted must be treated as a complete claim,
provided the other provisions of the regulations have been
followed in the preparation and presentation thereof.”).
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DIXON v. US 17

regulations, will nevertheless be treated as a claim where
formal defects and lack of specificity have been remedied
by amendment filed after the lapse of the statutory period.”
(citations omitted)); Computervision, 445 F.3d at 1364
(“First, formal compliance with the statute and regulations
is excused when the informal claim doctrine is applica-
ble.”).
Several circuit courts, as well as the IRS, have stated
that the regulation does not foreclose application of the in-
formal-claim doctrine. See generally Commissioner v.
Ewing, 439 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir. 2006), superseded on
other grounds, Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-432, div. C, § 408, 120 Stat. 2922, 3061–62,
as recognized in Wilson v. Commissioner, 705 F.3d 980, 984
(9th Cir. 2013); Kaffenberger v. United States, 314 F.3d
944, 954 (8th Cir. 2003); BCS Financial Corp. v. United
States, 118 F.3d 522, 524 (7th Cir. 1997); Claims for Credit
or Refund, 80 Fed. Reg. 43,949, 43,950 (July 24, 2015). And
the Claims Court’s view, which would categorically limit
the informal-claim doctrine to claims that are accompanied
by a written declaration made under penalty of perjury, is
inconsistent with a substantial body of case law, including
from this court and its relevant predecessor, recognizing
that the doctrine can apply, under proper circumstances,
even in the absence of: (1) any writing by the taxpayer, see
Western Co. of North America v. United States, 323 F.3d
1024, 1034–35 (Fed. Cir. 2003); (2) any writing signed by
the taxpayer, see, e.g., BCS Financial, 118 F.3d at 524;
United States v. Commercial National Bank of Peoria, 874
F.2d 1165, 1171–73 (7th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. United
States, 562 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1029–32 (E.D. Cal. 2021),
amended on reconsideration, 2022 WL 1524602, at *3 (E.D.
Cal. May 13, 2022); Hrcka v. Crenshaw, 140 F. Supp. 350,
352–53 (E.D. Va. 1956); or (3) any writing signed by the
taxpayer under penalty of perjury, see, e.g., Kales, 314 U.S.
at 190–97; Newton v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 614, 616,
618–20 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Night Hawk Leasing Co. v. United
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18 DIXON v. US

States, 18 F. Supp. 938, 939–42 (Ct. Cl. 1937); New Eng-
land Electric System v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 636, 638–
39, 644–46 (1995); U.S. Br. at 27 (“[T]he informal claim
very likely was signed by the taxpayer and quite possibly
under penalty of perjury” in Kales, while the checks in
Night Hawk “presumably were signed.”).
We therefore reject the major underpinnings of the
Claims Court’s ruling.
B
In this court, the government’s principal defense of the
Claims Court’s dismissal expands on a distinct, briefly
stated rationale of the Claims Court. See Dixon II, 158 Fed.
Cl. at 76 & n.3. Specifically, it argues that at least the sig-
nature requirement (not met by Mr. Dixon’s unsigned 2017
Forms 1040X) is statutory and that the informal-claim doc-
trine applies only when the sole defects of the informal
claim are ones of regulatory compliance, not statutory com-
pliance. U.S. Br. at 19–29. The government relies on
Brown—decided two weeks before the Claims Court deci-
sion, but apparently not brought to that court’s attention—
to contend that, if statutory noncompliance (specifically
with the signature and verification requirements) cannot
be waived by the voluntary action of the IRS, as Brown con-
cludes, 22 F.4th at 1012–13, neither should statutory non-
compliance of a timely claim be curable by relation back of
an untimely compliant claim.
We do not accept or reject this contention. We need not
do so in light of an alternative basis of affirmance, set forth
infra. We choose that alternative basis of decision in part
because the present government contention presents sev-
eral substantial issues that would benefit from further ex-
ploration, in another case, where necessary for decision.
The government’s argument, at least on its face, is in
tension with decisions of both the Supreme Court and this
court. See Kales, 314 U.S. at 194 (“This Court, applying the
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DIXON v. US 19

statute and regulations, has often held that a notice fairly
advising the Commissioner of the nature of the taxpayer’s
claim, which the Commissioner could reject because too
general or because it does not comply with formal require-
ments of the statute and regulations, will nevertheless be
treated as a claim where formal defects and lack of speci-
ficity have been remedied by amendment filed after the
lapse of the statutory period.” (citations omitted)); Com-
putervision, 445 F.3d at 1364 (“First, formal compliance
with the statute and regulations is excused when the infor-
mal claim doctrine is applicable.”). And it is in tension with
the above-described case law, see supra pp. 15–18, which
has applied the informal-claim doctrine in the absence of
writings, signatures, and verification under penalty of per-
jury.
This court’s decision in Brown does not itself stand for
the proposition that the informal-claim doctrine is confined
to regulatorily noncompliant claims. Brown dealt solely
with a separate component of the substantial-variance doc-
trine—specifically, Angelus Milling waiver—and thus did
not rule on or even address the informal-claim doctrine. 22
F.4th at 1012–13. The government’s contention would re-
quire full consideration of the difference between a princi-
ple that simply forbids the IRS to depart in individual cases
from binding statutory requirements (as implemented
through formally adopted regulations lacking case-specific
waiver authority) and a principle that interprets the stat-
ute and regulations as generally allowing for relation-back
cures in specified circumstances. Insofar as the Supreme
Court, in interpreting the various provisions of Title 26,
has determined that the term “claim” may encompass a
timely yet technically deficient filing that is perfected by a
technically compliant yet untimely filing, see Kales, 314
U.S. at 190–97; Memphis Cotton, 288 U.S. at 67–72, then
application of the informal-claim doctrine in these limited
circumstances would not entail waiving violations of “stat-
utory commands,” Brown, 22 F.4th at 1012.
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20 DIXON v. US

Nevertheless, with respect to at least the signature re-
quirement at issue here, the court in Brown concluded that
the waiver doctrine was inapplicable generally (and, in the
alternative, on the particular facts of the case) because it
was based on a statute combined with implementing regu-
lations that were not subject to case-specific IRS waiver au-
thority. 22 F.4th at 1012–13. Less work than necessary
has been done in the present case to show whether, for the
specific requirement at issue, any conclusion of applicabil-
ity of the informal-claim doctrine could fit with Brown’s
conclusion of inapplicability of the waiver doctrine. It is
the courts’ duty “‘to make sense rather than nonsense out
of the corpus juris.’” Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct.
1918, 1926 (2017) (quoting West Virginia University Hospi-
tals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991)).
We flag these issues without prejudging the result of a
full consideration of these and other issues in a case where
deciding the question is necessary to the outcome.
C
We affirm the Claims Court’s decision on a separate
ground advanced by the government. Mr. Dixon’s “amend-
ment[s],” i.e., his signed 2020 Forms 1040X, were “too late”
when filed, Memphis Cotton, 288 U.S. at 72, because of his
initial Claims Court action.
1
We address this ground even though it was not mean-
ingfully presented by the government before the Claims
Court. See J.A. 267–70 (opening brief); J.A. 362–63 (reply
brief). In general, this court “has the discretion” to excuse
forfeiture and “to accept new arguments presented for the
first time on appeal.” Taha v. United States, 28 F.4th 233,
239 (Fed. Cir. 2022). After the government presented this
alternative ground for affirmance in its brief as appellee in
this court, Mr. Dixon, in his reply brief, did not object to the
consideration of this ground on its merits. The issue is
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DIXON v. US 21

purely legal as presented by the parties before us, there be-
ing no suggestion of a need for determinations of disputed
facts to resolve it. See Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava,
Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The issue in-
volves an aspect of the informal-claim doctrine itself, an as-
pect that is part and parcel of the core notion of relation-
back amendment that is before us. And we see no difficulty
in resolving it here and now.
2
On the merits, the Supreme Court in Memphis Cotton,
in articulating the informal-claim doctrine, stressed the
importance of any amendment to a deficient refund claim
being filed while the original claim remains before the IRS.
288 U.S. at 72. Only when the IRS “holds [a deficient
claim] without action until the form has been corrected” is
it true that “what is before [the IRS] is not a double claim,
but a claim single and indivisible, the new indissolubly
welded into the structure of the old.” Id. at 71. But “[w]hen
correction is . . . postponed, there is no longer anything to
amend, any more than in a lawsuit after the complaint has
been dismissed.” Id. at 72. This court reiterated that prin-
ciple in Computervision, where we noted that the IRS loses
jurisdiction over—and a taxpayer loses the ability to
amend—any refund claim that is allowed, disallowed, or
the subject of a suit for refund. 445 F.3d at 1371–73.
Mr. Dixon has not disputed the premise that, under the
Executive Order relied on in Computervision, the IRS loses
authority to act on an amendment of an unperfected claim
once suit is filed. That loss of authority occurred here. Mr.
Dixon’s sole argument against applying the “too late” prin-
ciple in this case is that the principle is limited to the ger-
maneness doctrine and is inapplicable to the informal-
claim doctrine. Dixon Reply Br. at 17–18. We reject that
argument.
Although this court in Computervision was discussing
termination of the IRS’s jurisdiction in the context of “the
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22 DIXON v. US

germaneness doctrine,” which is another component of the
substantial-variance doctrine, 445 F.3d at 1364, 1369–73,
we see no basis to disregard that principle when applying
the informal-claim doctrine. The principle originated in an
informal-claim-doctrine case. See Memphis Cotton, 288
U.S. at 64 (“The central question in the controversy can be
stated in a sentence: May a claim for a tax refund which
has been seasonably filed, but which fails to state the
grounds upon which the refund is demanded, be amended
by specifying the grounds at any time before the claim in
its original form has been finally rejected, though it be after
the time when a wholly new claim would be barred by lim-
itation?”). And the principle fits the rationale of “[t]he in-
formal claim doctrine,” which “is predicated on the
expectation that any formal deficiency will at some point
be corrected” to give the IRS “a full opportunity to address
the problem administratively.” Greene-Thapedi v. United
States, 549 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2008); see Computervi-
sion, 445 F.3d at 1371.
Mr. Dixon suggests that the Supreme Court in Kales
applied the informal-claim doctrine even though the tax-
payer filed her corrected form after filing a refund suit. But
that suggestion is incorrect, as it fails to distinguish two
different claims that were at issue in Kales.
Ms. Kales’s 1925 “letter of protest” challenged: (1) the
amount owed under the Commissioner’s 1925 “jeopardy de-
ficiency assessment,” which was based on Ms. Kales pur-
portedly overstating the price she had paid in 1913 for
certain stock she had sold in 1919; and (2) the “excessive”
tax she paid in her 1919 return because the Commissioner
had in fact underestimated the stock’s 1913 value. Kales,
314 U.S. at 190–91. Ms. Kales brought a suit limited to the
first matter, based on a refund claim specifically for “the
amount of the jeopardy assessment,” and she prevailed on
that refund suit in 1928. Id. at 191. Then she pursued the
second matter, which was not part of the earlier suit: She
“filed a formal claim for refund of the taxes paid in 1919”
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DIXON v. US 23

as “an amendment of the claim for refund contained in her
[1925] letter of protest.” Id. Only after the Commissioner’s
1935 rejection of her second refund claim—on the basis
that this claim “was merged into the [1928] judgment” on
the earlier claim—did she file suit on the second refund
claim. Id. at 192 (internal quotation marks omitted). For
each of her challenges, therefore, Ms. Kales filed suit only
after filing a formal claim, the second of which the Court
held was a valid amendment to a timely informal claim. Id.
at 192–97. Kales therefore did not address—and cannot be
read as permitting—amendment of an informal claim after
the taxpayer has already sued. 7
With no other arguments presented against applica-
tion of the “too late” principle here based on the filing of the
Claims Court action before the filing of the corrected re-
fund claims, we conclude that the principle bars Mr.
Dixon’s present action.
3
In short, Mr. Dixon’s first action in the Claims Court
was properly dismissed because the claims, though timely
filed, were not “duly filed” under § 7422(a). By the time
Mr. Dixon filed corrected claims with the IRS to cure the
identified defects, the time limits for filing with the IRS
had passed, unless the corrected claims related back to the
earlier claims under the informal-claim doctrine. For the
reasons we have given, however, we conclude that the doc-
trine does not apply here. It follows that the Claims Court
properly dismissed the present refund action.

7 Mr. Dixon also directs us to cases that never ad-
dressed the efficacy of any potential post-suit, post-dismis-
sal amendment. See Dixon Reply Br. at 18 (citing Greene-
Thapedi, 549 F.3d at 532); accord Johnson, 2022 WL
1524602, at *3. Such cases offer no help to Mr. Dixon.
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24 DIXON v. US

IV
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the
Claims Court.
The parties shall bear their own costs.
AFFIRMED