Filed 5/10/23 P. v. Bolden CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G061114
v. (Super. Ct. No. 06WF0473)
FREDERICK RANNEL BOLDEN, OPI NION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Cheri T. Pham, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Aaron Spolin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Christine
L. Bergman and Kelley Johnson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Frederick Rannell Bolden appeals a denial of his postjudgment
motion for a hearing, pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), to
preserve youth-related evidence that will be relevant to any parole hearing he receives in
the future. Bolden was 23 years old when he committed the crimes central to this appeal
and, because of earlier convictions, was sentenced pursuant to the Three Strikes Law.
Although the trial court correctly concluded a “third strike” offender is
ineligible for the sought hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 3051 (all further
undesignated statutory references are to this code), the Attorney General agrees with
Bolden on appeal that youthful offenders ineligible under that section should nevertheless
be entitled to a proceeding to preserve evidence for a future parole hearing, pursuant to a
related legislative provision, section 4801, subdivision (c). We agree, reverse the denial
order, and remand the matter with directions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The details of Bolden’s convictions underlying this case were discussed in
our earlier opinion affirming them. (People v. Bolden (Dec. 18, 2008, G038374 [nonpub.
opn.].) An automobile was stolen and used in an attempted bank robbery that concluded
in a police chase apprehending the vehicle’s occupants, which included then 23-year-old
Bolden. In 2006, a jury convicted Bolden of conspiring to commit robbery, unlawfully
taking a vehicle, street terrorism, and felony evading. (Penal Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1),
186.22, subd. (a), 211, 212; Vehicle Code, §§ 2800.2, 10851, subd. (a).) Because of prior
convictions, the trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison, pursuant to the
Three Strikes Law. (§§ 667, subd. (c), 1170.12.)
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Subsequently, in 2013, “the Legislature enacted section 3051, which
authorizes a [youth offender parole hearing] for defendants who were 25 years of age or
younger at the time of their controlling offense.” (People v. Delgado (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 95, 100 (Delgado); § 3051, subd. (a)(2)(B) [“‘Controlling offense’ means
the offense or enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed the longest term of
imprisonment”].) Through the same legislative bill, “[l]ike section 3051, section 4801,
subdivision (c) was enacted . . . as part of the Legislature’s effort to bring California law
into conformity with Supreme Court precedent respecting juvenile sentencing.
[Citation.]” (Delgado, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p.103; see Stats.2013, ch. 312, §§ 4 & 5
1
[Senate Bill No. 260 adding section 3051 and amending section 4801].)
In 2016, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in Franklin
holding that the enactments of sections 3051 and 4801, subdivision (c), mooted a
contention that a 50 to life sentence for homicide violated the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of a life-without-parole sentence for a youthful offender. (Franklin, supra,
63 Cal.4th at pp. 279-280.) Shortly after, the high court held a “Franklin proceeding”
should be made available to all eligible youthful offenders to provide “‘an opportunity for
the parties to make an accurate record of the juvenile offender’s characteristics and
circumstances at the time of the offense so that the [parole] Board, years later, may
properly discharge its obligation to “give great weight to” youth-related factors (§ 4801,
subd. (c)) in determining whether the offender is “fit to rejoin society” . . . .’ [Citation.]”
(In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 449-451 [regardless of case “‘finality’” status].)
DISCUSSION
Bolden asserts he is entitled to “a Franklin [proceeding] so that he may
make a record of youth-related factors for the [parole b]oard’s consideration when he is
1
We do not discuss amendments to the sections that shifted the maximum eligibility age
from 18 years old to the present 25 years old. (See, e.g., Stats.2015, ch. 471, §§ 1 & 2.)
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eventually eligible for parole.” (Italics added.) As noted, the Attorney General agrees
with Bolden that youthful offenders who are statutorily ineligible for early parole
consideration because of section 3051 should nevertheless be entitled, under section
4801, to a Franklin proceeding to preserve evidence for a future parole hearing. We
review the issue de novo (Ribakoff v. City of Long Beach (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 150, 163
[questions of applying statutory interpretation to undisputed facts]; People v. Jefferson
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 94 [“‘The goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and
effectuate the intent of the legislature’”]) and agree with the parties.
Section 3051, subdivision (h), states in relevant part that the “section shall
not apply to cases in which sentencing occur[ed] pursuant to Section 1170.12,
subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, of Section 667.” Section 4801, subdivision (c), however
states as follows: “When a prisoner committed his or her controlling offense, as defined
in subdivision (a) of Section 3051, when he or she was 25 years of age or younger, the
[Board of Parole Hearings], in reviewing a prisoner’s suitability for parole pursuant to
Section 3041.5, shall give great weight to the diminished culpability of youth as
compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and
increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.”
In Delgado, this court held that even though the defendant was disqualified
from a Franklin proceeding because of the Three Strikes Law and section 3051,
subdivision (h), the defendant was nonetheless entitled, pursuant to section 4801,
subdivision (c), to a proceeding where he could preserve evidence that would be relevant
at a future parole hearing. (Delgado, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 103-104; see Franklin,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 273 [discussing general minimum incarceration periods before
parole eligibility].) Indeed, without this proceeding, there would be no mechanism to
secure “a meaningful baseline of [defendant’s] characteristics and circumstances so
the parole board can someday judge the extent to which he has matured and
rehabilitated himself while in custody.” (Delgado, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 104.)
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Here, Bolden committed his “controlling offense” when he was 23 years
old. (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(B).) Accordingly, his offense satisfies Section 4801,
subdivision (c)’s criteria and we hold the same as in Delgado: notwithstanding his
sentence imposed by the Three Strikes law, the defendant is entitled “to a limited remand
to make a record of youth-related factors for his future parole hearing.” (Delgado, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 104.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying appellant’s request for a Franklin
proceeding is reversed and the matter is remanded for such a proceeding.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
MOTOIKE, J.
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