In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-22-00069-CV
___________________________
MANISH MEHTA, Appellant
V.
HANNAH MEHTA, Appellee
On Appeal from the 367th District Court
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. 19-2889-367
Before Kerr, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Manish Mehta (Husband) appeals from the trial court’s final divorce decree. In
two issues, he complains that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) awarding
spousal maintenance to Hannah Mehta (Wife) because the evidence was legally
insufficient to support the award and (2) failing to make a just and right marital-estate
division because the evidence was factually insufficient to support disproportionately
dividing the estate in Wife’s favor. We will affirm the trial court’s property division
but reverse the spousal-maintenance award.
I. Background
Husband and Wife married in July 2000. In September 2007, Wife gave birth to
29-week, preterm male triplets. One of the boys—A.M. (Andy)—is a “medically
fragile child” because he was born with complex medical issues—both physical and
neurological—that required, and continue to require, extensive medical care. 1 After
the boys were born, Wife left outside employment to care for them. Husband
continued to work.
Wife was the boys’ primary caregiver and made medical decisions for them.
Facilitating Andy’s medical and educational needs and providing care to Andy—which
was left entirely to Wife—required a substantial amount of time. Wife unilaterally
made all of Andy’s educational decisions but made educational decisions concerning
1
We use a fictious name to identify A.M. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 109.002(d).
2
the other two boys jointly with Husband. In 2016, Wife co-founded and began
volunteering for Protect TX Fragile Kids, a nonprofit that advocates for medically
fragile children in Texas.
In March 2019, Husband filed for divorce. The trial court signed temporary
orders granting Wife exclusive use of the marital residence and required her to pay all
monthly living expenses for the residence. The trial court also ordered Husband to
pay Wife $2,760 per month in child support, as well as spousal maintenance of
$2,000 per month from March 1, 2020, to October 1, 2020, and then $1,000 per
month from November 1, 2020, to January 1, 2021.
While the divorce was pending, Wife negotiated a paid executive-director
position with Protect TX Fragile Kids. The $30,000-per-year position was guaranteed
for a year, effective June 15, 2021.
During a three-day bench trial in August 2021, the trial court heard from
13 witnesses and received testimony and exhibits regarding, among other things,
Husband’s and Wife’s parenting skills; Andy’s health conditions; Husband and Wife’s
disagreements over medical decision-making for Andy and over the severity of his
medical conditions; Husband’s and Wife’s salaries; the community estate’s assets and
debts; and attorneys’ fees. Both parties submitted proposed divisions of the
community estate, with Husband proposing a 50/50 split and Wife proposing a
58/42 split in her favor.
3
The trial court’s final divorce decree appointed Husband and Wife as joint
managing conservators, awarded Wife the exclusive right to designate the children’s
primary residence, and set out a possession and access schedule for the children. The
decree also awarded Wife $2,000 in monthly spousal maintenance for 36 months and
ordered Husband to pay Wife $2,760 per month in child support. Finally, the decree
divided the marital property, with Wife receiving a larger portion of the community
estate.
At Husband’s request, the trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of
law to which Husband later objected, seeking additional findings and conclusions. His
request consisted of asking “what is the legal basis” for 14 of the trial court’s legal
conclusions. The trial court made no additional findings and conclusions.
Husband timely appealed and challenges the spousal-maintenance award and
the marital-property division.
II. Standard of Review
We apply the same standard of review—abuse of discretion—to both
challenges. E.g., Sherman v. Sherman, 650 S.W.3d 897, 899 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2022, no pet.) (spousal maintenance); Neyland v. Raymond, 324 S.W.3d 646, 649 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (property division).
A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably or if it
does not analyze or apply the law properly. Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011).
Although a trial court does not abuse its discretion by deciding based on conflicting
4
evidence, sufficient evidence must nevertheless support the decision; therefore, the
traditional sufficiency-review standards are relevant to our review. Hamilton v.
Hamilton, No. 02-19-00211-CV, 2020 WL 6498528, at *3 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth
Nov. 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re S.C., No. 02-17-00377-CV, 2018 WL 5289370,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). Stated another way,
when we review if the trial court abused its discretion by ruling based on legally or
factually insufficient evidence, “we must determine (1) whether the trial court had
sufficient evidence on which to exercise its discretion and (2) whether the trial court
acted reasonably in applying its discretion to those facts.” Hamilton,
2020 WL 6498528, at *3.
When, as here, the trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
fact-findings have the same force and dignity as a jury’s answers to jury questions.
Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991). As with jury findings,
a trial court’s fact-findings on disputed issues are not conclusive, and, when the
appellate record contains a reporter’s record, an appellant may challenge those
findings for evidentiary sufficiency. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex.
1994). We review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting challenged findings using
the same standards that we apply to jury findings. Catalina, 881 S.W.2d at 297.
We may sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge—that is, a no-evidence
challenge—only when (1) the record bears no evidence of a vital fact, (2) legal or
evidentiary rules bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to
5
prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere
scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn
v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018). In determining whether legally sufficient
evidence supports the challenged finding, we must consider evidence favorable to the
finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we must disregard contrary evidence
unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas,
228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.
2005). We indulge “every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence” in
support of the challenged finding. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658 (quoting Bustamante v.
Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)). Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is
legally sufficient to support a finding. Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 727–
28 (Tex. 2003).
When reviewing whether the evidence is factually insufficient to support a
finding, we set aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all the
pertinent record evidence, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the
finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that
the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor Co.,
715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175,
176 (Tex. 1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965). When the party
with the burden of proof appeals from a failure to find, the party must show that the
failure to find is against the great weight and preponderance of the credible evidence.
6
Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001); Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Tex. 1988); see Gonzalez v. McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc.,
195 S.W.3d 680, 681–82 (Tex. 2006).
We begin with Husband’s second issue—the factual sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the property division—because the trial court’s property division is a
factor that we consider in reviewing the trial court’s spousal-maintenance award. See
Smith v. Smith, No. 02-20-00370-CV, 2022 WL 1682427, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth May 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Kelly v. Kelly, 634 S.W.3d 335,
368 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.)).
III. Property Division
In his second issue, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to make a just and right division of the marital estate because the evidence is
factually insufficient to support disproportionately dividing the community estate in
Wife’s favor.
A. Applicable Law
In dividing a marital estate, the trial court must do so in a manner that it
“deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children
of the marriage.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001. A trial court has broad discretion in
making a just-and-right division. Halleman v. Halleman, 379 S.W.3d 443, 452 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.); Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 610 (Tex. App.—Fort
7
Worth 2004, no pet.). Without a clear abuse of discretion, we will not disturb that
division. Halleman, 379 S.W.3d at 452; Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 610.
“Community property does not have to be divided equally, but the division
must be equitable.” Halleman, 379 S.W.3d at 452. The trial court may consider “the
disparity of incomes or of earning capacities of the parties,” as well as “the spouses’
capacities and abilities, benefits which the party not at fault would have derived from
continuation of the marriage, business opportunities, education, relative physical
conditions, relative financial condition[s] and obligations, disparity of ages, size of
separate estates, and the nature of the property.” Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698–
99 (Tex. 1981). “[N]o one factor is determinative,” and “it is the overall property
division that is important.” Felix-Forbes v. Forbes, No. 02-15-00121-CV,
2016 WL 3021829, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 26, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
A disproportionate division, however, must have some reasonable basis. Halleman,
379 S.W.3d at 452.
B. The trial court’s property-division findings
Regarding dividing the community estate, the trial court found2 that “there are
no disputes as to the characterization and value of the community estate, save and
except the following,” which we summarize:
• Husband has a $8,194.11 judgment in his favor.
2
In its findings and conclusions, the trial court stated that “[a]ny finding of fact
that is a conclusion of law shall be deemed a conclusion of law” and vice versa.
8
• Wife “did not sign a document titled ‘Promissory Note’ in which
[Husband]’s parents allegedly loaned [him]” $100,000. “Therefore, the
Court did not assign a value to that alleged Promissory Note. Further, no
evidence was produced or presented that this alleged Promissory Note
was secured by any property of the parties.”
• Husband “signed a document titled ‘Promissory Note’ and allegedly
took out a [$50,000] personal loan from his parents . . . . Therefore, the
Court did not assign a value to that alleged Promissory Note. Further, no
evidence was produced or presented that this alleged Promissory Note
was secured by any property of the parties.”
• Husband was able to pay all his pretrial attorney’s fees because he had
access to, and used, community funds. After trial, Husband owed
$14,000 in outstanding attorney’s fees.
• At the time of trial, Wife owed $62,000 in outstanding attorney’s fees
because she could not access community funds to pay them. According
to her attorney, “community funds existed that could be allocated to pay
those attorney’s fees.”
• According to a divorce-lending specialist’s testimony, Wife “would likely
be able to qualify for a refinance of the marital residence if she were
awarded the property division she requested and received child[-]support
payments.”
Husband has not challenged any of these fact-findings. Unchallenged fact-
findings are entitled to the same weight as a jury’s verdict and bind an appellate court
unless either the contrary is established as a matter of law or no evidence supports the
finding. McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986); Inimitable Grp., L.P.
v. Westwood Grp. Dev. II, Ltd., 264 S.W.3d 892, 902 & n.4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2008, no pet.). In other words, we defer to unchallenged fact-findings having some
evidentiary support. Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518,
523 (Tex. 2014).
9
We have closely reviewed the evidence—among it the parties’ proposed
property divisions, the judgment in Husband’s favor, the promissory notes signed
only by Husband, and Husband and Wife’s attorneys’ billing statements and testimony
regarding attorneys’ fees—and have determined that some evidence supports these
fact-findings.
C. Analysis
By Husband’s supposed calculations—which he does not include in his brief—
the trial court awarded $251,420.93 of the net community estate to Wife and awarded
$64,260.37 of the net community to him, yielding an 80/20 split in Wife’s favor.
According to Wife, who did include her calculations, the trial court awarded
$317,444.16 of the net community to her and $240,762.44 to Husband, yielding a
57/43 division in Wife’s favor.
Using the trial court’s valuations in the divorce decree,3 the trial court’s
findings, and the parties’ agreed values reflected in their proposed property divisions,
we arrived at a division much closer to Wife’s, with Wife receiving 54% of the net
community and Husband receiving the remaining 46%. We show our calculations
here:
Husband does not challenge these valuations.
3
10
ASSET VALUE HUSBAND WIFE
Chase Checking $19,282.00 $19,282.00
Chase Savings $720.77 $720.77
Citi Retirement $39,976.28 $39,976.28
Savings Plan
Janus Henderson $1,354.73 $1,354.73
Traditional IRA
Janus Vanguard $43,000.00 $43,000.00
IRA
GE 401(k) $47,611.52 $47,611.52
Toyota Motor $86,984.85 $10,000.00 $76,984.854
North America
Retirement
Benefits
1999 Lexus RX300 $500.00 $500.00
Chase Checking $1,635.27 $1,635.27
(Veritaz
Photography)
Camera $2,000.00 $2,000.00
Equipment
(Veritaz
Photography)
Verizon Stock $0.00 X
Options
Denton County $8,092.95 $8,092.95
Judgment
Delta SkyMiles Unknown X
2019 Income Tax $7,879.00 $7,879.00
Refund
COVID-19 $19,789.02 $19,789.02
Stimulus
AIG Term Life $1,478.55 $1,478.55
Insurance Policy
4
In the decree, the trial court explicitly awarded this portion of Husband’s
retirement benefits to Wife “[f]or attorney’s fees incurred by and awarded to [her]” in
the decree.
11
Toyota Motor Life Unknown X
Insurance Policy
Health Equity $7,585.27 $7,585.27
Account
Emergency Relief $58,000.00 $58,000.00
Distribution
Non-Roth Partial $45,000.00 $45,000.00
Lump Sum
Distribution
50% of 2/3 of Unknown X
Husband’s 2021
Bonus
Marital Residence $400,000.00 $400,000.00
Capital One Bank $48.62 $48.62
Account
Fidelity Rollover $2,753.30 $2,753.30
IRA
Janus Henderson $36,431.76 $36,431.76
Roth IRA #1
Ameritrade Roth $3,126.40 $3,126.40
IRA
Janus Henderson $99.89 $99.89
Roth IRA #2
Janus Henderson $98.22 $98.22
Traditional IRA
Verizon 401(k) $31,231.73 $31,231.73
Janus Henderson $17,893.04 $17,893.04
Investors Account
2018 Toyota $31,148.00 $31,148.00
Highlander
JetBlue Miles Unknown X
American Airlines Unknown X
Miles
50% of 2/3 of Unknown X
Husband’s 2021
Bonus
Mortgage Escrow $3,822.10 $3,822.10
Account Refund
TOTAL ASSETS $917,543.27 $313,905.36 $603,637.91
12
LIABILITY VALUE HUSBAND WIFE
Citi Credit Card $130.31 $130.31
Chase Credit Cards $171.58 $171.58
(Veritaz
Photography)
Alleged Debt No value assigned X
Owed to
Husband’s Parents
Pledge Owed to $2,000.00 $2,000.00
Gospel of Asia
Fidelity Loan $27,600.94 $27,600.94
Husband’s $14,000.00 $14,000.00
Attorney’s Fees
Mortgage Owed $179,603.04 $179,603.04
on Marital
Residence
Note Secured by $27,273.72 $27,273.72
2018 Toyota
Highlander
Gabriel Lawn $3,200.00 $3,200.00
Service
Wife’s Attorney’s $62,000.00 $62,000.00
Fees
Chase Credit Card $5,048.37 $5,048.37
2021 Estimated $9,068.62 $9,068.62
Property Taxes on
Marital Residence
TOTAL $330,096.58 $43,902.83 $286,193.75
LIABILITIES
Based on these calculations, the total net community estate was $587,446.69;
Husband received $270,002.53 (46%), and Wife received $317,444.16 (54%).
As noted, the trial court must divide community property equitably, not
equally, and if the division is reasonable, we will not disturb it on appeal. See Halleman,
13
379 S.W.3d at 452. Here, several factors support the unequal property division,
including:
• Husband has bachelor’s and master’s degrees in business while Wife has a
bachelor’s degree in secondary education.
• Wife left the workforce in 2007 to care for the couple’s children and did not
return to the workforce until becoming executive director of Protect TX
Fragile Kids in June 2021.
• A disparity exists between Husband’s $140,000 annual salary and Wife’s
$30,000 annual salary.
• Wife assumed responsibility for the mortgage.
• Wife is and has been the primary caregiver of the couple’s children, one of
whom has medically complex needs.
To successfully challenge a trial court’s property division, a party must
demonstrate from evidence in the record that the division was so unjust that the trial
court abused its discretion. Barber v. Barber, No. 02-21-00291-CV, 2022 WL 4105363,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 8, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Based on the factors
listed above, the trial court’s property division was not against the great weight and
preponderance of the credible evidence, and Husband has thus failed to show that the
slightly disproportionate property division in Wife’s favor was so unjust that the trial
court abused its discretion. Accordingly, we overrule Husband’s second issue.
IV. Spousal Maintenance
Husband argues in his first issue that the trial court abused its discretion by
awarding Wife spousal maintenance because the evidence was legally insufficient to
14
support that award. Within this issue, Husband asserts that the trial court failed to
make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to allow him to present his
appeal. We start by discussing the law regarding spousal maintenance. We will next
address whether the trial court’s findings and conclusions were sufficient. Finally, we
will address the merits of Husband’s complaint.
A. Applicable law
Spousal maintenance is “an award in a suit for dissolution of a marriage of
periodic payments from the future income of one spouse for the support of the other
spouse.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.001(1). Spousal maintenance’s purpose is “to
provide temporary and rehabilitative support for a spouse whose ability to support
herself has eroded over time while engaged in homemaking activities and whose
capital assets are insufficient to provide support.” Sherman, 650 S.W.3d at 899 (quoting
In re Marriage of Hallman, No. 06-09-00089-CV, 2010 WL 619290, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).
Section 8.051 of the Texas Family Code governs a spouse’s eligibility for
spousal maintenance. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.051. As relevant here, a trial court
may order spousal maintenance only if (1) “the spouse seeking maintenance will lack
sufficient property, including the spouse’s separate property, on dissolution of the
marriage to provide for the spouse’s reasonable needs” and (2) the maintenance-
seeking spouse
15
(A) is unable to earn sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s
minimum reasonable needs because of an incapacitating physical or
mental disability;
(B) has been married to the other spouse for 10 years or longer and lacks
the ability to earn sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s
minimum reasonable needs; or
(C) is the custodian of a child of the marriage of any age who requires
substantial care and personal supervision because of a physical or mental
disability that prevents the spouse from earning sufficient income to
provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs.
Id. § 8.051(2). Here, the parties do not dispute that the trial court did not award
spousal maintenance under subsection (A), which does not apply here. See id.
§ 8.051(2)(A). We are thus concerned only with subsections (B) (the ten-year-marriage
subsection) and (C) (the disabled-child subsection). See id. § 8.051(2)(B)–(C).
A spouse seeking maintenance under the ten-year-marriage subsection must
rebut the presumption that maintenance under that subsection is not warranted unless
she has been diligent in
(1) earning sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s minimum
reasonable needs; or
(2) developing the necessary skills to provide for the spouse’s minimum
reasonable needs during a period of separation and during the time the
suit for dissolution of the marriage is pending.
Id. § 8.053(a). But if a spouse seeks maintenance under the disabled-child subsection,
“the presumption in [S]ection 8.053(a) does not apply and the spouse is not required
to present evidence that [she] ha[s] exercised diligence in earning sufficient income or
16
in developing the necessary skills to provide for [her] minimum reasonable needs.”
Kelly, 634 S.W.3d at 366.
B. Findings of fact and conclusions of law
In addition to its property-division fact-findings, the trial court made the
following findings and conclusions relating to the spousal-support award:
• The trial court made numerous fact-findings concerning how Andy is a
“medically fragile child” with special and chronic medical and educational
needs and describing the substantial care and supervision that Wife—as Andy’s
primary caregiver—provides.
• Wife is “gainfully employed as the Executive Director of the non-profit
organization she co-founded called Protect TX Fragile Kids,” her salary is
$30,000, and the “position is guaranteed for one year, starting June 15, 2021.”
• “The Court finds under the circumstances presented in this case, [Wife] is
eligible for maintenance under the provisions of Texas Family Code [C]hapter
8. Accordingly, [Husband] is ordered to pay as maintenance the sum of two
thousand dollars ($2,000.00) per month to [Wife] . . . .”
Husband objected to the trial court’s legal conclusion that Wife was eligible for
spousal maintenance under Chapter 8 of the Family Code because no evidence
supported the conclusion. In his request for additional findings and conclusions, he
asked the trial court to provide the legal basis for its spousal-maintenance legal
conclusion as well as for 13 other conclusions. The trial court made no additional
findings or conclusions. Husband complains that this failure has “left [him] to guess
as to the trial court’s decision on an ultimate issue in this case, where there are
17
multiple grounds for Wife’s award of spousal maintenance under Chapter 8 of the
Texas Family Code.” 5
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 298 provides that, within ten days after a trial
court files original findings and conclusions, any party may request specified
additional or amended findings or conclusions.6 Tex. R. Civ. P. 298. But additional
findings are not required if the original findings and conclusions properly and
succinctly relate the ultimate fact-findings and legal conclusions necessary to give
adequate information for the party to prepare its appeal. Pakdimounivong v. City of
Arlington, 219 S.W.3d 401, 412 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied). An
ultimate fact is one that would have a direct effect on the judgment. Id. There is no
reversible error if the lack of additional findings does not prevent a party from
adequately presenting an argument on appeal. Id. “The controlling issue is whether the
circumstances of the particular case require the party to guess at the reasons for the
Wife’s pleadings did not specify the statutory grounds within Chapter 8 upon
5
which she was relying in seeking spousal maintenance, nor did the divorce decree state
the specific statutory basis for the spousal-maintenance award.
6
We express no opinion about whether Husband’s request directed at the trial
court’s spousal-maintenance-eligibility legal conclusion—“What is the legal basis for
Conclusion of Law 5?”—made alongside nearly identical queries directed at 13 other
legal conclusions is sufficiently specific. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 298; Stuckey Diamonds, Inc. v.
Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 93 S.W.3d 212, 213 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2002, no pet.) (“A request for additional findings must be specific; it cannot be buried
among minute differentiations or numerous unnecessary requests.” (citing Vickery v.
Comm’n for Law. Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241, 254 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999,
pet. denied))).
18
trial court’s decision.” In re Marriage of C.A.S. & D.P.S., 405 S.W.3d 373, 382 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.).
Here, the ultimate issue is whether Wife meets the statutory spousal-
maintenance-eligibility requirements under Chapter 8 of the Family Code. The trial
court divided the marital property and made findings and conclusions regarding the
characterization and value of the community estate, Wife’s annual salary, and Wife’s
eligibility for spousal maintenance under Chapter 8. And the parties agree that Wife
was theoretically eligible for spousal maintenance only under the ten-year-marriage or
the disabled-child subsection. We thus conclude that the trial court’s original findings
and conclusions are sufficiently specific to allow Husband to adequately present his
complaints on appeal—which he did by arguing Wife’s ineligibility for spousal
maintenance on all possible applicable bases—so we overrule Husband’s complaint
regarding the trial court’s not making additional findings and conclusions.
C. The Spousal-Maintenance Award
To be eligible for spousal maintenance, Wife—as the requesting spouse—had
to prove that (1) she would lack sufficient property post-divorce to provide for her
minimum reasonable needs and (2) she met the requirements of either the ten-year-
marriage or the disabled-child subsection. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.051(2)(B), (C).
Husband argues that the evidence is legally insufficient (1) to show Wife would lack
sufficient property going forward to meet her minimum reasonable needs; (2) to rebut
the presumption against a spousal-maintenance award under the ten-year-marriage
19
subsection; and (3) to prove that caring for Andy prevents her from earning sufficient
income to provide for her minimum reasonable needs.
Neither the Family Code nor caselaw defines “minimum reasonable needs.”
Martinez v. Martinez, No. 02-21-00353-CV, 2022 WL 17986023, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Dec. 29, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Slicker v. Slicker, 464 S.W.3d
850, 860 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.)). Rather, the trial court determines a
spouse’s minimum reasonable needs on a case-by-case, fact-specific basis. Id. “While a
list of expenses is helpful, such a list is not the only evidence upon which a trial court
can determine a person’s ‘minimum reasonable needs.’” Diaz v. Diaz, 350 S.W.3d 251,
254 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g). Still, the key word
here is “evidence.”
At trial, Wife provided no itemized list of monthly expenses, nor did she testify
about them. But some evidence exists concerning mortgage and property-tax
expenses of the marital residence that Wife was awarded. That evidence showed that
the monthly mortgage payment was about $2,032 and that based on the home’s
estimated 2021 property taxes, Wife could expect to pay about $756 per month in
property taxes. See Diaz, 350 S.W.3d at 255 (considering mortgage interest, property
taxes, and homeowner’s insurance costs in determining spouse’s minimum reasonable
needs). But no evidence established any other monthly expenses—although Wife
undoubtedly has them—such as food, utilities, clothing, medical expenses, child-care
costs, or the monthly automobile and insurance payments on the Toyota Highlander.
20
See Howe v. Howe, 551 S.W.3d 236, 257 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (reversing
award of post-divorce spousal maintenance where “record [was] devoid of
information about whether Wife lacked minimal reasonable needs without spousal
support,” and “[t]here was no development of her monthly fixed and variable
expenses”); Amos v. Amos, 79 S.W.3d 747, 750 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
2002, no pet.) (considering transportation, clothing, and child-care costs in
determining spouse’s minimum reasonable needs); In re Marriage of Hale, 975 S.W.2d
694, 698 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, no pet.) (considering utilities, automobile-
payment, insurance, gas, groceries, credit-card, credit-union-dues, medical, and
clothing costs). Without any evidence of her non-housing-related expenses, based on
the actual trial evidence Wife’s monthly minimum reasonable needs were only $2,788.
Regarding whether Wife’s property sufficed to meet her minimum reasonable
needs, Husband asserts that based on her salary and the property Wife received in the
divorce—the home, numerous retirement accounts, the investment account, child
support, and “various other assets”—Wife’s property was sufficient. In determining
the sufficient-property/minimum-reasonable-needs issue, courts consider the spouse’s
monthly income, the value of the spouse’s separate property,7 the value of the
property awarded to the spouse through dividing the marital estate, and child-support
payments. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.051; In re Marriage of Elabd, 589 S.W.3d 280,
7
The parties agreed that there was “no separate estate from either party.”
21
285 (Tex. App.—Waco 2019, no pet.); Howe, 551 S.W.3d at 257; Diaz, 350 S.W.3d at
255. Also as part of its inquiry, “the trial court may consider the liquidity of the assets
awarded and their ability to produce income.” Schafman v. Schafman, No. 01-20-00231-
CV, 2022 WL 962466, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 31, 2022, no pet.)
(mem. op.). But “[w]hen considering the assets awarded in a divorce, the law does not
require the spouse to spend down long-term assets, liquidate all available assets, or
incur new debt simply to obtain job skills and meet short-term needs.” Id. Wife was
thus not required to sell the home or the Toyota Highlander to meet her present
needs. See id.; see also Smith, 2022 WL 1682427, at *11 (“Husband cites no authority for
the proposition that Wife was required to sell her ten-year-old vehicle—her only
transportation source—to show that she did not have sufficient property for her
needs. Husband provided no evidence that Wife had other transportation available to
her and does not explain how Wife would be able to find a sufficient job without
transportation.”). Wife was similarly not required to incur the penalties and tax
consequences from liquidating retirement accounts. See Martinez, 2022 WL 17986023,
at *5; Smith, 2022 WL 1682427, at *11.
These assets aside, Wife was awarded (1) the $48.62 in cash in the Capital One
bank account; (2) the $17,893.04 in the Janus Henderson investment account; 8 and
(3) the $3,822.10 mortgage-escrow-account refund. After subtracting the $3,200 debt
According to the account statement, this is a non-retirement account.
8
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to the lawn service and the $5,048.37 in credit-card debt, Wife was left with about
$13,515 in liquid assets, which when divided over the 36-month-spousal-maintenance
term would leave her with about $375 per month in additional assets. Considering this
amount, along with monthly child support of $2,760 and Wife’s monthly salary of
$2,500,9 Wife has $5,635 in total monthly income, which exceeds her $2,788 in
evidence-based monthly minimum reasonable needs by $2,847. We must therefore
conclude that legally insufficient trial evidence supported the implied finding that
Wife would lack sufficient property on the marriage’s dissolution to provide for her
minimum reasonable needs. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by
awarding Wife spousal maintenance; we thus need not address Husband’s remaining
arguments within this issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. We sustain Husband’s first issue.
V. Conclusion
Having sustained Husband’s first issue, we reverse the spousal-maintenance
award in the final divorce decree and render judgment that Wife take nothing on her
spousal-maintenance claim. We affirm the remainder of the final divorce decree.
9
This amount represents Wife’s gross monthly salary. The only trial evidence of
her salary was of her gross annual salary ($30,000). No evidence of her net salary after
taxes and other deductions was presented.
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/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice
Delivered: May 18, 2023
24
Manish Mehta v. Hannah Mehta
Combined Opinion