In re J.A. CA2/3

Filed 5/23/23 In re J.A. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re J.A., a Person Coming B320295
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 21CCJP04641C
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.H.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Pete R. Navarro, Judge Pro Tempore of the Juvenile
Court. Affirmed.

Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant
County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________

Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating
her reunification services as to J.A. at the six-month review
hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21,1
as well as a restraining order that restricted mother’s visitation
with her then-infant son J.A. to virtual visits. Mother contends
the court erred in finding the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS) provided her with
reasonable reunification services. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother has three children: J.A. (born in 2021) and his half
siblings T.H. (born in 2008) and R.H. (born in 2009). T.H. and
R.H. are not the subject of this appeal, and J.A.’s father is not
a party to this appeal.
1. J.A.’s removal and the dependency petition
DCFS most recently became involved with the family 2 in
August 2021 when J.A.’s maternal half-sibling T.H. vandalized
mother’s home and ran away. Mother, who was nine months
pregnant with J.A., felt threatened by T.H., could not control
him, and did not want him in the home. Police also had been
called to the home that month in response to a domestic violence

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless indicated otherwise.
2 DCFS had investigated mother before.

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incident where J.A.’s father caused mother to fall while
showering.
Mother, a veteran, has bipolar disorder. She received
mental health and psychiatric services through the Veterans
Health Administration (VA) and saw a therapist outside of
the VA. She had stopped taking her psychotropic medication
due to her pregnancy, but her therapist and mental health team
were not concerned about her ability to parent. A DCFS social
worker spoke to mother’s VA case manager in late August 2021.
She confirmed mother had not displayed behavior that would
require a psychiatric hold and was meeting with her VA
psychiatrist and outside therapist.
Mother gave birth to J.A. in early September 2021. The
social worker spoke with mother’s VA case manager and with
the social worker from the hospital where J.A. was born. Both
were concerned about mother’s refusal to resume her medication.
The VA case manager also relayed the doctor’s concern that
mother might have postpartum depression. The VA planned
to monitor mother closely. They wanted to place mother on
“other medications,” but she refused because she wanted to
breastfeed J.A.
The social worker saw mother in the hospital shortly after
J.A.’s birth. The social worker tried to schedule a time to meet
mother in her home and to set up a child family team meeting,
but mother resisted. Over the next week, mother sent the
social worker text and video messages discussing various
personal issues, as well as screenshots of Facebook conversations.
For example, mother said she felt overwhelmed and didn’t know
if she had postpartum depression; sent a photograph of herself
driving with her children in the car; sent a video of herself on

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the toilet, talking about sex acts between herself and J.A.’s
father; and sent another video accusing J.A.’s father of stealing
things and then recanting that accusation. Mother also accused
the social worker of harassing her.
On September 22, 2021, T.H.’s and R.H’s father contacted
the social worker about his concern for mother’s mental health.
She had been “messaging a lot of nonsense” and did not sound
stable. That same day, the social worker contacted mother’s
new VA case manager. The case manager shared she had spoken
to mother two days earlier and mother was “doing okay without
her medication.” The case manager said she could not comment
further about mother’s mental health without a new release of
information from her.
On September 29, 2021, DCFS obtained an order
authorizing the removal of all three children. The social worker
contacted mother, but she would not meet the social worker to
release the children. Mother continued to send the social worker
messages, including videos of herself making bizarre comments.
On October 1, 2021, mother was involuntarily hospitalized
for evaluation and treatment under section 5150 after law
enforcement stopped her for driving erratically with J.A. in
her lap. Mother was naked. An individual had reported seeing
mother dance naked in the street and then get into a car with
the baby and drive off. Mother was incoherent, had difficulty
answering questions, and lacked awareness of her actions.
J.A. was taken into protective custody and placed with paternal
great aunt. Mother was hospitalized for about 10 days and
then arrested on October 12, 2021 for child endangerment
and released three days later.

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 On October 5, 2021, DCFS filed a section 300 petition
on behalf of all three children. Mother was not present at the
October 8, 2021 detention hearing, as she remained hospitalized.
Mother continued to refuse to take her medication. An attorney
unsuccessfully tried to contact mother before the hearing. The
juvenile court detained J.A. from parents and ordered monitored
visitation for mother once she contacted DCFS.
Mother called and then met with the social worker
on October 18, 2021. The social worker gave mother notices
for the upcoming November hearings and a “resource packet
for services.” Mother asked about visitation. She blamed her
mental health episode on the stress of dealing with the former
social worker. She wanted to get a restraining order against him.
On November 1, 2021, the social worker told the DCFS
dependency investigator (DI) that mother had been calling her
“ ‘dozens’ ” of times. Mother did not make sense and appeared
delusional and paranoid. The social worker said mother
“ ‘seem[ed] to be off her medication.’ ” The social worker learned
mother again had been involuntarily hospitalized at the VA.
The DI contacted mother’s VA case manager on November 4,
2021, but mother had forbidden the VA from talking to DCFS.
Mother left several messages for the social worker on
November 12, 2021 which suggested she had been released from
the hospital. Both the social worker and DI tried to call mother
back a few days later, but her voicemail was full. DCFS thus had
yet to arrange visitation for mother. The DI also had not been
able to interview her.
The court continued mother’s scheduled November 18, 2021
arraignment hearing because counsel had been unable to reach
her. Mother went to a DCFS office on November 23, 2021,

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however, asking for visitation. Mother was told to contact the
social worker, but she didn’t. Instead, mother called the DCFS
hotline claiming J.A.’s father told her he would suffocate the baby
if he didn’t stop crying. The social worker called J.A.’s caregiver.
Father was not in the home and another social worker was there
with the baby. The caregiver mentioned mother had “show[n]
up” with a suitcase at paternal grandmother’s home where J.A.’s
father was staying. When asked to leave, mother “ran up and
down the street yelling Black Lives Matter.”
The next day, mother called the DCFS office and
asked to speak to the social worker’s supervisor. Mother’s
thoughts appeared unclear, incoherent, and irrational. DCFS
recommended the court suspend mother’s visitation until she
had an Evidence Code section 730 (section 730) evaluation3
to ensure the children would be safe with her.
By the adjudication hearing on November 29, 2021,
mother still had not appeared in court and had not been
appointed counsel. The court sustained the petition, amended
by interlineation, finding J.A. and his half-siblings were at risk
of serious harm due to: J.A.’s father’s violent conduct toward
mother, and mother’s failure to protect the children; mother’s
inability to care for or appropriately supervise T.H., who had
emotional and behavioral problems and had run away several
times; mother’s endangerment of J.A. on October 1, 2021, when
she drove with him on her lap; mother’s history of mental and
emotional problems, including diagnosed bipolar disorder, her
involuntarily hospitalization on October 1, 2021, and failure to

3 Section 730 authorizes the court to appoint an expert to
investigate, render a report as ordered by the court, and testify.

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take her prescribed psychotropic medication; and J.A.’s father’s
history of mental and emotional problems.
At disposition, DCFS again recommended mother undergo
a section 730 evaluation before any visitation. Minor’s counsel
asked for DCFS to monitor visits. The court stated it would
allow virtual video visits “until we get information that mother’s
psychiatric disorder is in check, but mother’s behavior is clearly
psychotic and unpredictable” placing “the child, . . . staff, . . .
[and] mother at risk.”
The court declared J.A. a dependent of the juvenile court,
removed him from parents’ custody, and ordered DCFS to provide
family reunification services to parents. The court ordered
mother to participate in mental health counseling, including a
psychological assessment, psychiatric evaluation, and psychiatric
treatment, and to adhere to a psychotropic medication plan.4
The court also ordered mother to participate in a domestic
violence support group for victims, individual counseling to
address case issues5—if not provided through her mental health
treatment—and parenting classes. Mother’s visits with J.A.
were to be virtual. Mother could visit J.A. in person “upon proof

4 The signed case plan checked the boxes for psychiatric
assessment and psychiatric evaluation, but the court did not
mention an assessment or evaluation when making its orders
at the hearing. Rather, the court ordered mother “to participate
in psychiatric treatment including adherence to a psychotropic
medication plan.”
5 Those issues included: domestic violence, mental health,
safe parenting, and past trauma.

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that her psychiatric disorder is under control.” The court set a
six-month review hearing for May 31, 2022.
2. The six-month reunification period
Mother told DCFS she was receiving mental health services
through the VA. In December 2021, the social worker spoke to
mother’s previous case manager/therapist there, who described
mother as unstable.6 She was concerned about mother visiting
the children. When told visitation would be virtual, she agreed
“that was the best plan.” She explained mother’s behavior
was “so severe,” staff visited mother in pairs in a public setting.
It was “clear” to her that mother was not taking her medication.
Mother’s behavior continued to be erratic. She had
“show[n] up” at J.A.’s caregiver’s home “cursing and demanding
a visit,” and at J.A.’s father’s job where she “attempt[ed] to run
over the uncle.” In March 2022, J.A.’s counsel, on behalf of J.A.,
asked the juvenile court to issue a restraining order to protect
J.A., his caregiver, and the caregiver’s daughter from mother.
The application alleged that, on March 20, 2022, mother went
to paternal grandparents’ home and tried to take J.A. from his
car seat while paternal grandfather was holding it. Mother then
fought with other members of the paternal family, ultimately
striking paternal grandmother. J.A. and his caretaker were
in another room during the altercation and were not injured.
Mother was arrested. Earlier, on March 14, 2022, mother had
shown up outside paternal great aunt’s home, stating she would
take J.A. with her.

6 Mother must have signed a new release for the VA to be
able to talk to DCFS.

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 On March 24, 2022, the court signed the temporary
restraining order after a hearing at which mother’s appointed
counsel appeared. Mother was not present. The TRO authorized
mother to have monitored, virtual visits with J.A. Mother
appeared with counsel on April 14, 2022. Counsel asked for a
continuance, which the court granted. The court ordered DCFS
to prepare a written visitation schedule.
At the continued hearing on May 4, 2022—at which mother
appeared by telephone—the court made the terms of the TRO
permanent for three years. Mother’s counsel asked the court to
allow mother to visit J.A. in person at a DCFS office with a DCFS
employee monitor. Counsel noted such a young child—by then
J.A. was almost eight months old—likely would not benefit from
virtual visits. After recalling mother’s “extreme psychiatric
episode” where mother “disrobed” in the street and “took off” in
a car with J.A. unrestrained, the court found mother’s psychiatric
condition posed “a danger to not only the child but to [the] staff”
at the DCFS office. The court stated it would entertain a future
motion to modify visitation and would re-address visitation at the
upcoming review hearing. Mother filed a notice of appeal from
the May 4, 2022 order.
In its status review report filed May 19, 2022, DCFS noted
mother had not demonstrated progress or participation in her
court ordered services nor demonstrated any behavior changes.
The social worker had tried “to discuss and meet with mother
about her case plan” 10 times between December 2021 and April
2022. Mother refused to meet with the social worker. The report
noted mother continued to have unregulated emotions during
her conversations with the social worker and made statements
demonstrating she was not “attending to her mental needs.”

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 Before the restraining order, J.A.’s caretaker had
monitored mother’s virtual visits and was told to allow mother
at least 10 minutes to speak to J.A. The caretaker repeatedly
had to end visits early due to mother’s inappropriate conduct.
After the restraining order issued, mother’s twice weekly virtual
visits with J.A. were monitored at the DCFS office by the social
worker. After her visits, mother regularly would call the DCFS
office to make various allegations. She also called the DCFS
child abuse hotline about 14 times between December 2021
and April 2022.
Since January 2022, DCFS had been unable to discuss
mother’s progress with the VA. Mother had revoked her release
to permit the VA to disclose information to DCFS. She signed
a release on February 3, 2022 to allow DCFS to speak with her
psychiatrist but immediately revoked it.
On April 3, 2022, however, mother told the social worker
she had signed a new release that was good through the end
of May. Two weeks later, on April 18, 2022, the social worker
emailed the VA to confirm it had the release and to get the
name of mother’s psychiatrist but received no reply. That
same day, mother gave the social worker her psychiatrist’s name,
Dr. Widmark. The social worker called but could not leave a
message. A week later, the social worker tried again but was
told Dr. Widmark was out of the office until April 28, 2022.
On May 4, 2022, mother went to the DCFS office and gave
the social worker a letter from Dr. Widmark dated April 29, 2022.
The psychiatrist stated he had assumed mother’s psychiatric care
at the VA in December 2021 and saw mother on a weekly basis,
including that day. Mother was taking psychotropic medication
by injection every four weeks. The doctor stated he would

10
“continue to follow her on a frequent basis.” Mother told the
social worker she had signed a release but because the social
worker had been unable to confirm mother had done so, she
asked mother to sign a new one. Mother became agitated
and left.
DCFS recommended the court terminate mother’s
reunification services. When mother received the notice, she
called the social worker upset, stating, “ ‘I don’t believe the kid
I am doing visits with is even [J.A.], I don’t know what you did
with my son. It doesn’t make sense.’ ” The DCFS report notes
that, although she appeared to love J.A., mother had not been
able to show she could protect him and keep him safe. The
report continues, “Mother is continuously unable to be redirected
and lacks insight of the issues that brought her family to the
attention of DCFS.” The report notes the social worker had not
been able to consult with Dr. Widmark about mother’s progress
in her treatment but does not indicate the social worker tried
to call Dr. Widmark again.
3. Six-month review hearing
The juvenile court held the six-month review hearing
on May 31, 2022, as scheduled. Mother was present and
represented by counsel. The court admitted into evidence DCFS’s
status review report and attachments, and the notices for the
hearing. The court also admitted Dr. Widmark’s April 29, 2022
letter, and a May 23, 2022 letter confirming mother had enrolled
in a 10-session parenting class and completed one session.
Mother’s counsel asked the court to return J.A. to mother’s
care, or to grant her further reunification services as there was
sufficient evidence demonstrating a likelihood that J.A. would
be returned to mother within the next six months. Counsel noted

11
mother was taking medication, “actively working to engage
with the Department of Mental Health to receive individual
counseling,” and had enrolled in a parenting program. Counsel
argued the evidence showed mother was at least in partial
compliance with her case plan to the same extent as father, for
whom DCFS had recommended continued reunification services.
Counsel also asked that mother be permitted some
in-person visitation with J.A. Counsel noted the virtual visits
were not productive and not “serving the underlying purpose of
reunification” given the child’s young age and the earlier-issued
restraining order. Counsel “believe[d]” the court could “tailor” a
visitation order that allowed mother to visit J.A. in person while
“also keeping in mind the age of the child for safety and security.”
The court asked counsel why mother insisted on making
child abuse allegations about J.A. Counsel believed mother
simply was concerned for the well-being of her child, as she could
see him only briefly by video. The court responded, “This looks
like obsessive behavior.” Counsel noted mother had seen her
baby only virtually in the care of an individual with whom she
did not have a great relationship. Counsel asked the court to
allow mother to bond with her very young child.
Counsel then said he was surprised the court did not order
a section 730 evaluation at disposition. He argued, “It seems
that would have been beneficial in understanding and providing
preventive services for mother.” Counsel conceded he had not
been appointed until after disposition and thus had not been able
to make that argument. He asked the court either to continue
reunification services or to order a section 730 evaluation to
determine if “additional orders [were] needed based” on the
evaluation.

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 Minor’s counsel asked the court to terminate mother’s
reunification services. She was concerned by mother’s
inappropriate behavior during the virtual visits and mother’s
behavior that led to the restraining order. Counsel also did not
know whether mother was receiving regular therapy other than
her visits with her psychiatrist because mother refused to sign
the release for the VA. Counsel for DCFS also noted it could not
“get a true sense of any type of progress” for mother because she
had revoked her consent to share information with DCFS, and
DCFS had been unable to reach Dr. Widmark.
After hearing argument, the court found returning J.A.
to parents would create a substantial risk of harm to him. The
court found, “Although mother has been participating in the court
ordered functions, it does not appear that there has been any
benefit in these services to mother. Mother’s behaviors indicate
that there is still some very serious deep rooted psychiatric issues
that need to be addressed.” Mother then addressed the court,
“How would you feel if your newborn
baby was ripped away from you because your
wife was beating you? How would you feel?
And then your wife threatened to kill your
baby. Would you not call C.P.C. daily to make
sure that your baby was alive? And you see
witnesses on the video visits and that you
see your baby with red marks all over him.
Wouldn’t you be concerned, your Honor?
Because that is all[—]I was concerned with my
baby, my infant, because I have not been able
to hold him, touch him, smell him, to see if his
arms and legs are moving.”

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 “And I have been compliant with my
treatment [and] case plan. I have been doing
everything. And not to play the blame game,
but [the] DCFS office has not been very
resourceful for me, as they have been for
father.”
The court then found by clear and convincing evidence
that DCFS had complied with the case plan by making
reasonable efforts to return J.A. “to a safe home.” The court
also found there was not a substantial probability that the
child would be returned to mother in the next six months and
terminated her reunification services. Mother appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Applicable law and standard of review
“When a child is removed from a parent’s custody, the
juvenile court ordinarily must order child welfare services for the
minor and the parent for the purpose of facilitating reunification
of the family. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) For a child under three years
of age at the time of removal, as [J.A.] was, reunification services
are presumptively limited to six months.” (Tonya M. v. Superior
Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 843 (Tonya M.); § 361.5, subd.
(a)(1)(B) [court ordered services must be provided “for a period
of 6 months from the dispositional hearing . . . ., but not longer
than 12 months from the date the child entered foster care,”
unless the child is returned home].) This is because the
“ ‘ “unique developmental needs of infants and toddlers” ’
[citation] justifies a greater emphasis on establishing
permanency and stability earlier in the dependency process.”
(M.V. v. Superior Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 166, 175 (M.V.).)

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 The Department “must make a good faith effort to provide
reasonable services responsive to the unique needs of each
family, and the plan must be ‘ “ ‘specifically tailored to fit the
circumstances of each family’ ” ’ and ‘ “ ‘designed to eliminate
those conditions which led to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
finding.’ ” ’ ” (Patricia W. v. Superior Court (2016) 244
Cal.App.4th 397, 420 (Patricia W.).) The record must show
DCFS “identified the problems leading to the loss of custody,
offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained
reasonable contact with the parents during the duration of the
service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents
when compliance was difficult.” (Ibid.) The adequacy of a
reunification plan and the reasonableness of DCFS’s efforts
“are judged according to the circumstances of each case.” (Ibid.)
Moreover, “when a parent . . . has a mental illness or a
developmental disability, that condition must be the ‘starting
point’ for a family reunification plan.” (Patricia W., supra, 244
Cal.App.4th at p. 420.) “The standard is not whether the services
provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world,
but whether the services were reasonable under the
circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
DCFS must show by clear and convincing evidence that
reasonable reunification services have been provided. (§ 366.21,
subd. (e)(8) [juvenile court “shall determine by clear and
convincing evidence whether reasonable services . . . have
been provided or offered to the parent”].)
When a child cannot be returned to the parent at the
six-month review hearing, the court must “determine by clear
and convincing evidence whether reasonable services that were
designed to aid the parent . . . in overcoming the problems that

15
led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child
have been provided or offered to the parent.” (§ 366.21, subd.
(e)(8); § 366, subd. (a)(1)(B) [at each status review hearing the
court shall determine “[t]he extent of the agency’s compliance
with the case plan in making reasonable efforts . . . to return
the child to a safe home”].) If they were, the juvenile court may
terminate reunification services for the parent of a child under
three and set a section 366.26 hearing upon finding “by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent failed to participate regularly
and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment
plan.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3); M.V., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th
at p. 176 [juvenile court may but is not required to schedule a
section 366.26 hearing].)7 The court must continue reunification
services to the 12-month review hearing, however, if the court
finds (1) reasonable services were not provided, or (2) there is
a “substantial probability” the child “may be returned to their
parent . . . within the next six months.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3).)
We review the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable
services were provided for substantial evidence. (Patricia W.,
supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 419.) Because that finding had to
be established by clear and convincing evidence, we review the
record as a whole to determine if it “contains substantial evidence
from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly
probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.) In doing so, we must view the record in the
light most favorable to DCFS as the prevailing party, “and give
appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated

7 Here, as father’s reunification services were continued,
the court did not set a section 366.26 hearing.

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the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence,
and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Id. at
pp. 1011–1012.)
2. Mother did not forfeit her challenge to the reasonable
services finding
DCFS initially contends mother forfeited her challenge
to the adequacy of her reunification services because she did not
object to them or ask the court to make a finding of no reasonable
services. We disagree. Mother was neither present nor
represented at the disposition hearing, but she objected through
her counsel to the court’s termination of her reunification
services. Counsel also questioned why mother had not received
a section 730 evaluation. Counsel specifically asked the court to
continue reunification services or order a section 730 evaluation
to determine if mother required other services based on the
evaluation. In contrast, the parents in the cases on which DCFS
relies did not object at all. (See, e.g., In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158
Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110 [parent’s attorney did not object at time
services were terminated and, when asked, had no information to
give the court that would allow it to find a substantial possibility
that the child might be returned at the 12-month date]; In re
Kevin S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 882, 885 [parent, represented by
counsel, raised no objection when court terminated reunification
services and set matter for section 366.26 hearing and submitted
matter on DCFS’s recommendations].)
3. Mother forfeited her challenge to the May 4, 2022
restraining order and any challenge to its visitation
restriction is moot
Mother appealed from the May 4, 2022 restraining order
that limited her to virtual visits with J.A. During the pendency

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of this appeal, in January 2023, the juvenile court ordered
mother was authorized to have monitored, in-person visits with
J.A. for a minimum of two times per week, two hours per visit.
We asked the parties for supplemental briefing, which they
provided, as to whether we should take judicial notice of the
minute order, and whether mother’s objection to the May 4, 2022
order’s restriction of her visitation with J.A. to virtual visitation
is moot. The parties agreed we may take judicial notice of the
court’s January 6, 2023 minute order, and mother conceded her
challenge to the ordered virtual visitation is rendered moot by
that order.
We now take judicial notice of the court’s January 6, 2023
minute order granting mother in-person visitation with J.A.
(In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 676.) To the extent
mother’s request that we direct the court to order in-person
visitation is based on a viable challenge to the court having
ordered virtual visitation, that claim is moot as we can provide
no effective relief to her. (In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th
1313, 1315–1316.)
In any event, as DCFS noted, mother made no argument
in her opening brief as to why the court erred in entering the
May 4, 2022 order. We thus treat the appeal from that order
as forfeited and do not consider it. (Telish v. State Personnel Bd.
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1479, 1487, fn. 4 [failure to raise
argument in opening brief forfeits the issue on appeal]; see
also, e.g., In re Adrian L. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 342, 344, fn. 1
[although notice of appeal included appeal from order denying
section 388 petition, parent forfeited any claim of error where
opening brief presented no argument on that issue].)

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4. The record supports the court’s finding by clear
and convincing evidence that DCFS provided
reasonable services
Mother argues DCFS provided inadequate services because
it made no effort to secure a psychological evaluation for her to
assess her mental health diagnosis and to form a treatment plan
“that would be conducive to facilitating reunification with [J.A.].”
She also argues the virtual visitation ordered was not adequate
to foster a bond between her and her baby or to facilitate
reasonable reunification.
As an initial matter, to the extent mother argues the
juvenile court erred in not ordering a section 730 evaluation and
in-person visitation, mother has forfeited that argument. Virtual
visitation and the absence of a section 730 evaluation were part
of the court’s disposition order. Because mother did not appeal
from that order, she may not attack the case plan itself now.
(Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1018
[“ ‘By failing to appeal, [mother] has waived any complaint
she may have regarding the [reunification] plan as ordered.’ ”];
In re Jesse W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 349, 355 [“an unappealed
disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may
not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order”].)
Accordingly, we focus on DCFS’s actions in reviewing whether
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s reasonable
services finding. (Sara M., at p. 1018 [considering challenge
to agency’s actions in reviewing finding of reasonable services
rather than the services ordered].)
Mother’s discontinuance of her medication for a year due to
her pregnancy and failure to resume taking it after J.A.’s birth—
combined with possible postpartum effects—appears to be what

19
led to mother’s erratic and sometimes aggressive behavior.8
DCFS thus was required to make a good faith effort to provide
mother with services designed to help her ameliorate her
psychiatric symptoms so that she could safely parent J.A.
Substantial evidence in the record supports the finding that
it did.
First, the record shows DCFS made stabilizing mother’s
psychiatric symptoms the starting point for mother’s
reunification plan and tailored the plan to address her needs.
At the filing of the dependency petition, DCFS recommended
mother “[s]ubmit to a psychological/psychiatric evaluation
with follow-up treatment as recommended.” The court declined
DCFS’s later request to require mother to submit to a section 730
evaluation before visiting J.A.—finding virtual visitation would
ensure his safety—but ordered, as part of mother’s case plan,
a psychological assessment, a psychiatric evaluation, individual
counseling—if mother’s mental health treatment did not
provide it—and for mother to take all prescribed psychotropic
medications. The record also shows mother received referrals
for these court-ordered services. In its May 2022 status review
report, DCFS stated it gave mother “referrals for community

8 Indeed, during the investigation of the current case, R.H.—
then age 12—told the DI “ ‘everything was fine’ ” when mother
“ ‘was on her medication.’ ” Mother was “ ‘angry,’ ” however,
when “ ‘off her meds,’ ” and had slapped R.H. for the first time,
to R.H.’s shock.

20
resources,” including “[p]arenting classes,” “[i]ndividual
counseling,” and “[p]sychiatric assessment and treatment.”9
However, DCFS does not appear to have directed mother
to undergo a psychiatric or psychological assessment, nor does
its report state she received one. But mother already had
access to mental health services—including psychiatric care and
prescribed medication—through the VA. Indeed, Mother told
DCFS she was receiving mental health services through the VA.
Moreover, DCFS was aware of mother’s longstanding bipolar
diagnosis, that she had stopped her medication due to her
pregnancy, and that she had been—and continued to be—under
the regular care of the VA. Mother’s most recent hospitalization
before the adjudication hearing also had been at the VA.
The court thus impliedly could find DCFS reasonably relied
on mother’s existing mental health care team to provide her
court-ordered mental health services rather than require
mother to undergo an evaluation through one of its referrals.
In fact, mother had received mental health services from
the VA for her bipolar disorder since at least 2015. As noted in
the jurisdiction/disposition report, mother had a manic episode
triggered by the death of her grandfather in June 2015. The
report noted mother received weekly mental health services
through the VA, and her case manager confirmed mother was
compliant with her medication and stable. As mother was able

9 It’s not clear, however, whether those “community
resources” referred to the “resource packet for services” the social
worker gave mother on October 18, 2021, or if the social worker
gave mother referrals to the specified services at some later date.

21
to “stabilize[ ]” and safely care for her children, a dependency
case was not opened.
There is no evidence in the record suggesting mother had
another mental health crisis between 2015 and the 2021 events.
As the VA had been successfully providing mother with mental
health services to treat her bipolar disorder, apparently for years,
DCFS and the court could infer the VA was in the best position
to address mother’s current mental health issues and to help her
resume regular medication use.
The record also shows mother in fact received services
designed to remedy the problems that led to J.A.’s removal
through the VA. Moreover, DCFS was in contact with the VA
about mother’s diagnosis and treatment at the outset of its
involvement and continued to consult with the VA—to the
extent mother permitted—throughout the reunification period.
The VA closely monitored mother both during her
pregnancy and after J.A.’s birth when she would not take her
medication due to her pregnancy and desire to breastfeed. At the
beginning of the reunification period in December 2021, mother
was seeing her psychiatrist more often than other VA clients did
because “they [were] trying to get her stable.” Mother remained
noncompliant with taking her psychotropic medication, but her
providers at the VA continued to work with her as best they could
given her “severe” symptoms. And, according to Dr. Widmark’s
April 29, 2022 letter, mother continued to participate in weekly
psychiatric care up to the date of the letter. Thus, we can
infer the court impliedly found mother had been receiving
regular psychiatric care throughout the reunification period.
Significantly, by at least April 2022, the VA also had been
successful in getting mother to take her medication regularly

22
by giving her a monthly “depot formulation” injection.10 Her
psychiatrist was evaluating her medication needs on a frequent
basis. These were precisely the type of services “designed to
remedy” the problems that led to J.A.’s removal. (Patricia W.,
supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 420.)
Nevertheless, mother contends DCFS’s failure to secure
a psychological or psychiatric evaluation for her alone supports
reversal of the court’s reasonable services finding. Mother argues
DCFS’s “ ‘starting point’ ” should have included “ ‘an in-depth
examination of [her] psychiatric history, her present condition,
her previous response to drug therapy, and the potential for
future therapy with a focus on what [e]ffect her behavior has had,
and will have, on her children.’ ” (Quoting In re Jamie M. (1982)
134 Cal.App.3d 530, 540.)
But mother thwarted DCFS’s efforts. After December
2021, the social worker had no access to mother’s mental health
providers—despite having made several efforts to contact the VA
—because mother had revoked her release that allowed the
VA to disclose information to DCFS. DCFS’s hands were tied.
Without a release, the social worker could not assess whether
the VA was meeting mother’s specific needs or even if mother
was participating in the available services. Nor could the social
worker consult with mother’s mental health team about mother’s
medication regimen, whether her psychiatric condition had

10 An injection of a depot formulation is a slow-release form
of medication, allowing the medication to act for a longer period.
(See Oxford Reference (2023) [as of May 22, 2023], archived at .)

23
stabilized so that she could safely visit J.A. in person, or if she
required other services to enable her to do so. And, as mother
refused to discuss her case plan with the social worker—despite
the social worker’s repeated attempts to do so—DCFS could
not find out any of that information directly from mother.11
Not until April 3 and April 18, 2022, respectively, did
mother purportedly sign a new release for the VA and give
the social worker Dr. Widmark’s name. Yet, after the social
worker could not confirm that information with the VA, or
reach Dr. Widmark, mother would not sign another release
despite the supervising social worker’s explanation that, as
the client, mother could ask for a letter from her psychiatrist
but DCFS required a release to consult with him.
Thus, as DCFS asserts, “[t]here was no way for DCFS
to assist mother or to better tailor services to mother’s specific
needs where mother made it impossible for DCFS to work with
herself or her service providers.” Mother’s repeated failures
to cooperate with DCFS’s efforts to ensure she received
the services she needed did not render those efforts or the
services she received unreasonable. (See In re K.C. (2012) 212
Cal.App.4th 323, 330 (K.C.) [recognizing the “reasonableness
of the services provided may depend to some degree upon the
parent’s willingness to cooperate in the completion of his or her
reunification plan”]; see also In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th
1217, 1233 [agency cannot force parents to participate in services
offered as part of their case plan].)

11 The social worker tried to discuss mother’s case plan with
her twice in late December 2021, twice in January, four times in
February, once in March, and once in April 2022.

24
 The cases on which mother relies to support reversal of the
juvenile court’s reasonable services finding, K.C. and Patricia W.,
are distinguishable. In K.C., a child welfare agency directed
a father, who appeared to suffer from mental health issues,
to undergo a psychological evaluation and follow any treatment
recommendations. (K.C., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 326, 329.)
The evaluation recommended father undergo a psychiatric
examination to determine if psychotropic medication might
alleviate the psychological conditions the evaluation had
identified. Citing father’s initial opposition to taking medication,
the agency made no effort to help him secure the pharmacological
evaluation after a public mental health clinic found he did not
meet their treatment criteria. (Id. at pp. 329, 331.)
The appellate court found that, while the agency identified
the mental health issues that likely led to the removal of the
father’s children, it failed to provide him reasonable services to
ameliorate those issues. (K.C., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 330.)
The court noted the agency essentially had delegated “the burden
of finding and obtaining suitable services to [f]ather himself—
despite the high likelihood that the very issues necessitating
treatment would interfere with his ability to obtain it.” (Ibid.)
Moreover, father’s initial reluctance was not “an excuse for
[the agency’s] own inaction,” and father in fact had tried to get
the recommended evaluation. (Id. at pp. 331–332.) The court
noted the agency “was required to make a ‘good faith effort,’
including ‘ “reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas
where compliance proved difficult,” ’ . . . regardless of ‘the
prospects of success.’ ” (Id. at p. 332.)
In Patricia W., the appellate court similarly held the
record did not support finding a social services agency provided

25
reasonable reunification services to a mother whose child was
removed after the mother ran out of her psychotropic medication
and experienced a relapse of “schizophrenic episodes” involving
violent delusions, including voices telling her to kill her child.
(Patricia W., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 401.) The mother
there had received “vague[ ] and inconsistent[ ]” diagnoses (id.
at pp. 406, 423) and had tried various medications (id. at p. 410).
Her difficulty with taking her medication consistently, which
precipitated her relapse, was the main issue that had led to
her child’s detention. (Id. at pp. 401, 422.)
The court observed “the [a]gency was required, first,
to identify mother’s mental health issues and provide services
designed to enable her to obtain appropriate medication and
treatment that would allow her to safely parent [her child]
[citation] and also, second, to provide services designed to
help her stay on her medication.” (Patricia W., supra, 244
Cal.App.4th at p. 422.) The agency failed to show it took either
step. (Ibid.) Specifically, there was no evidence the agency
“sought to diagnose mother’s mental illness and her medication
needs,” or secure a psychological evaluation, as part of a case
plan. (Id. at pp. 401, 422–424.) Nor did the agency show
“it consulted with, and provided mother with access to,
mental health professionals who diagnosed and prescribed her
appropriate medication,” or consulted with medical experts about
whether mother would pose a risk to her son if she remained
medicated or if she could be expected to remain compliant. (Id.
at p. 425.) Nor did the agency demonstrate it did anything to
investigate or ameliorate mother’s failure to take her medication.
(Ibid.)

26
 First, in contrast to the parents in both these cases,
mother’s bipolar disorder diagnosis was longstanding and
well-known to both the VA and DCFS. And, from what we can
tell, she had been successfully controlling her symptoms with
medication prescribed through the VA since at least 2015 until
she stopped in 2021 due to her pregnancy. In contrast, the father
in K.C. never was assessed to determine whether medication
would help his newly-diagnosed conditions, and the mother
in Patricia W.—who had a history of difficulty with her
medication—didn’t receive access to professionals who could
evaluate whether her diagnosis and prescribed medication
were appropriate.
Second, mother was not left to fend for herself, like the
father in K.C., to secure mental health services. As we said,
mother was an established client of the VA and had ongoing
access to—and had been receiving—mental health services
since before J.A.’s birth and throughout the reunification period.
Not only could DCFS and the court reasonably infer the VA had
evaluated mother’s diagnosis and prescription medication needs
during her ongoing care there—as evidenced by her psychiatrist’s
letter—they also could infer mother had received some type of
psychiatric/psychological evaluation and/or assessment when she
was involuntarily hospitalized. (See § 5152, subd. (a) [“A person
admitted to a facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation
under the provisions of this article[, including section 5150,]
shall receive an evaluation as soon as possible after the person
is admitted and shall receive whatever treatment and care
the person’s condition requires for the full period that they
are held.”].)

27
 Moreover, in stark contrast to the agency in Patricia W.,
the record demonstrates DCFS made reasonable efforts to consult
with mother’s health care professionals:
• in August 2021 DCFS consulted with the VA about
mother’s diagnosis and current treatment;
• in September the social worker consulted with the VA
and hospital after J.A.’s birth;
• in October the social worker spoke with the mental health
and hospital social workers when mother was placed on
an involuntary psychiatric hold;
• in November DCFS contacted the VA about mother’s
second hospitalization, and after being told mother would
not allow the VA to talk to DCFS, contacted a Ms. Donald
at the VA’s compliance office to request information;
• in December 2021 the social worker consulted with the VA,
as we discussed;
• in January 2022 the social worker contacted the VA only to
learn mother again had revoked her release of information;
• in February the social worker spoke to Ms. Donald to try
to get information;
• in April the social worker tried unsuccessfully to reach
Ms. Donald two times to confirm mother had signed a new
release for the VA and to confirm the name of mother’s
psychiatrist;
• in April the social worker also tried unsuccessfully to reach
mother’s psychiatrist, Dr. Widmark; and
• in May, the social worker left another two unreturned
messages for Ms. Donald.
Thus, despite mother’s resistance, DCFS did not give up on its
efforts—as the agency in K.C. had—to ensure she received the

28
services she needed. Nor is there any evidence that mother ever
was turned away from, or had difficulty securing, mental health
services or prescription medication.
We recognize mother was distraught over her inability
to see her baby in person—to physically hold and touch him.
And, her mental illness may have driven, at least to some extent,
her distrust of DCFS. (K.C., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 330
[parent’s “less-than-full cooperativeness was itself a product
of psychological conditions”].) But here, mother was receiving
psychiatric services designed to help her overcome her unstable
mental health so that she could reunify with J.A. Yet, mother
refused—for some unknown period—to take the medication
prescribed to her, refused to cooperate with DCFS’s attempts to
consult with the VA for a significant portion of the reunification
period, and would not discuss her case plan with the social
worker. (See, e.g., ibid. [explaining that “[h]ad [f]ather refused
to submit to the recommended medication evaluation, or refused
to take such medications as might be recommended, his refusal
would presumably have sustained a finding that reasonable
services were provided”].)
And, although mother participated in mental health
services mandated by her case plan—and eventually restarted
her medication—substantial evidence also supports the court’s
finding that the possibility of mother being able to take custody
of J.A. in the next six months was unlikely. Mother had
threatened to take J.A. and assaulted his grandmother only a
couple of months before the six-month review hearing. She also

29
continued to act inappropriately during virtual visits with J.A.,12
make unfounded calls to the child abuse hotline, and engage
inappropriately with the social worker. As of mid-May 2022
—when DCFS completed its status review report—mother
continued to demonstrate she was “not attending to her mental
needs,” which in turn “imped[ed] [her] progress in addressing
the case issues that brought her family to the attention of DCFS.”
Could DCFS have done more—perhaps made greater
attempts to reach mother’s psychiatrist and confirm she had been
properly evaluated or tried alternative methods to communicate
with mother? Certainly. But, “[i]n almost all cases it will be true
that more services could have been provided more frequently
and that the services provided were imperfect.” (In re Misako R.,
supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.) However, “[t]he standard is
not whether the services provided were the best that might
be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were
reasonable under the circumstances.” (Ibid.) Given mother’s
receipt of weekly psychiatric treatment and prescribed
medication—through her preferred and longstanding provider—
her refusal to discuss her case plan with DCFS, and her on-again-
off-again attitude toward allowing the VA to share information
with DCFS—and considering the record as a whole in the light
most favorable to DCFS—we conclude substantial evidence
supports the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing
evidence that DCFS made reasonable efforts to provide mother
reasonable reunification services.

12 Mother appears to have attended all her virtual visitation
sessions with J.A.

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 Mother’s situation is a sad one. But, as our high court
explained, “We have long recognized that providing children
expeditious resolutions is a core concern of the entire dependency
scheme. [Citations.] If this is true of dependency cases in
general, it is doubly true for the very young.” (Tonya M., supra,
42 Cal.4th at p. 847, fn. 4.)

DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s May 31, 2022 order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

BENKE, J.*

* Retired Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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