USCA11 Case: 22-12883 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 05/24/2023 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12883
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILFREDO RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:03-cr-20759-MGC-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12883
Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Wilfredo Rodriguez, who is counseled on appeal, appeals
the District Court’s denial of his motion for compassionate release
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by § 603(b) of the First
Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (Dec. 21,
2018) (the “First Step Act”). He argues that the District Court erred
when it found that he did not establish an extraordinary and com-
pelling reason for compassionate release based on the availability
of COVID-19 vaccines and that it abused its discretion when it
weighed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors because it disregarded
highly relevant and significant factors.
We review de novo a district court’s determination about a
defendant’s eligibility for an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) sentence reduction.
United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021), cert. de-
nied, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021). However, we review a district court’s
denial of a prisoner’s 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion under an
abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908,
911 (11th Cir. 2021). A district court abuses its discretion when it
applies an incorrect legal standard or makes a clear error of judg-
ment. Diveroli v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2015).
A concession of law is not binding on us. United States v.
Colston, 4 F.4th 1179, 1187 (11th Cir. 2021). Under the prior panel
precedent rule, we are bound by prior published decisions that
have not been overruled by the Supreme Court or this Court sitting
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22-12883 Opinion of the Court 3
en banc. United States v. Romo-Villalobos, 674 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th
Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a term
of imprisonment but may do so within § 3582(c)’s provisions.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1251. As amended by
§ 603(b) of the First Step Act, § 3582(c) now provides, in relevant
part, that:
[t]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bu-
reau of Prisons [(the “BOP”)] or upon motion of the
defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP]
to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the
lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by
the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is
earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . af-
ter considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable if it
finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons
warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduc-
tion is consistent with applicable policy statements is-
sued by the Sentencing Commission . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing
Guidelines provides the applicable policy statement for
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. The application notes to
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 list four categories of extraordinary and compel-
ling reasons: (A) the defendant’s medical condition, (B) his age,
(C) his family circumstances, and (D) other reasons. Id., comment.
n.1(A)–(D). The defendant’s medical condition qualifies as an
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12883
extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release if
he is “suffering from a serious mental or physical condition” that
“substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide
self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from
which he or she is not expected to recover.” Id., cmt. n.1(A). In
addition to determining that extraordinary and compelling reasons
warrant a reduction, § 1B1.13 states that the district court must also
determine that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of others
or the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Id.
§ 1B1.13(2).
In Bryant, we held that § 1B1.13 “is an applicable policy state-
ment that governs all motions under Section 3582(c)(1)(A),” includ-
ing those filed by defendants. 996 F.3d at 1262. Likewise, we held
that, following the enactment of the First Step Act, § 1B1.13 con-
tinued to constrain a district court’s ability to evaluate whether ex-
traordinary and compelling reasons were present and that Applica-
tion Note 1(D) did “not grant discretion to courts to develop ‘other
reasons’ that might justify a reduction in a defendant’s sentence.”
Id. at 1248.
Additionally, § 3582(c)(1)(A) requires the district court to
consider the § 3553(a) factors before granting a motion for compas-
sionate release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The § 3553(a) factors
include: (1) the offense’s nature and circumstances and the defend-
ant’s history and characteristics; the need to (2) reflect the offense’s
seriousness; (3) afford adequate deterrence; (4) protect the public;
(5) provide the defendant with educational or vocational training
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22-12883 Opinion of the Court 5
or medical care; to reflect (6) the kinds of sentences that are availa-
ble; (7) the advisory guideline range; (8) the pertinent U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission policy statements; and the need to (9) avoid un-
warranted sentencing disparities, and (10) provide victims with res-
titution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(a)(7).
Nevertheless, a district court does not need to specifically
articulate the applicability of each of the § 3553(a) factors, “as long
as the record demonstrates that the pertinent factors were taken
into account by the district court.” United States v. Eggersdorf,
126 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1997). Further, “[t]he district court
has discretion to determine how much weight to grant to a specific
§ 3553(a) factor.” United States v. Frazier, 823 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th
Cir. 2016). Although the district court need not exhaustively ana-
lyze every factor in its order, it must provide enough analysis for
meaningful appellate review, including what factors it relied on.
United States v. Cook, 998 F.3d 1180, 1184–85 (11th Cir. 2021). We
have held that, although a district court “made no mention of evi-
dence that arguably mitigated in [defendant’s] favor under
§ 3553(a), we [could not] say that the court’s failure to discuss this
mitigating evidence means that the court erroneously ignored or
failed to consider this evidence in determining [his] sentence.”
United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007) (quota-
tion marks omitted) (addressing a direct criminal appeal).
“Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court must find that all necessary
conditions are satisfied before it grants a reduction.” United States
v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12883
Accordingly, the absence of any one of the necessary conditions—
support in the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, extraordinary and com-
pelling reasons, and adherence to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13’s policy state-
ment—forecloses a sentence reduction. Id. Additionally, we have
held that nothing on the face of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) requires
a court to conduct the compassionate release analysis in any partic-
ular order. Id.
Here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Rodriguez’s motion for compassionate release. The District
Court provided sufficient analysis for meaningful appellate review
because it explained which factors it relied upon, including the vi-
olent nature and circumstances of Rodriguez’s offense, his violent
history both in and out of custody, and the need to reflect the seri-
ousness of his offense, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the
public. Further, the District Court’s failure to discuss his mitigating
evidence—such as Rodriguez’s enrollment in courses in the past
twelve years, his improved discipline history since 2009, his work in
UNICOR, and his stellar work observations—is not evidence that
it failed to consider or ignored such evidence.
The Court pointed to the violent nature of Rodriguez’s con-
viction; specifically, that he and his associate brought semi-auto-
matic pistols, handcuffs, and gloves to commit a planned robbery.
The Court also noted that many of Rodriguez’s sixteen prior con-
victions involved violent conduct, and that Rodriguez’s conduct did
not improve while he was incarcerated—he smuggled heroin into
the Federal Detention Center, and was disciplined for setting a fire,
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22-12883 Opinion of the Court 7
fighting, and possessing a dangerous weapon. He was also con-
victed of assaulting another inmate. Referencing other § 3553(a)
factors, the Court said: “Early release would not promote respect
for the law, just punishment, or the deterrence objectives of sen-
tencing.”
Rodriguez also argues that the District Court abused its dis-
cretion when it disregarded the government’s concession that he
exhibited an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassion-
ate release. As an initial matter, this Court is not bound by the gov-
ernment’s concession of law. See Colston, 4 F.4th at 1187; United
States v. Linville, 228 F.3d 1330, 1331 n.2 (11th Cir. 2000) (per cu-
riam). But beyond that, this concession does not tell the whole
story. Even though the government conceded that Rodriguez’s
medical conditions qualified as an extraordinary and compelling
reason for early release, the government opposed Rodriguez’s mo-
tion for compassionate release based on the § 3553(a) sentencing
factors and the continuing danger it argued that Rodriguez posed
to the community. And in any case, to be eligible for relief, Rodri-
guez needed to show all three of the necessary conditions. See
Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237. We have already held that the District
Court did not err in holding that the § 3553(a) factors did not sup-
port Rodriguez’s compassionate release. Because that finding
alone means that one of the necessary conditions for relief is miss-
ing—and thus Rodriguez’s requested relief is foreclosed—we need
not address whether he demonstrated an extraordinary and com-
pelling reason for compassionate release.
AFFIRMED.