Adoption of Augustin.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-949

ADOPTION OF AUGUSTIN.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The mother of Augustin appeals from a decree entered in the

Juvenile Court terminating her parental rights. She contends

that the judge's decision was based on stale evidence, an

inadmissible affidavit, and an error of fact, and that the judge

abused her discretion by declining to order postadoption

visitation. We affirm.

Background. Augustin was born in September 2007, the

second of the mother's three children.2 The identity of

Augustin's father was never established. The mother's third

child, Sarah (a pseudonym), with a different father, was born in

December 2011. The Department of Children and Families

(department) received a number of reports submitted pursuant to

1 A pseudonym.
2 The mother's parental rights as to her oldest child were
terminated in 2002.
G. L. c. 119, § 51A, alleging abuse and neglect of Augustin and

Sarah in 2015 and 2016.

The department commenced these proceedings on April 19,

2016, after receiving a report that Augustin witnessed his

mother being stabbed by a boyfriend. According to the affidavit

attached to the petition, an investigator and social worker from

the department went to Augustin's school to interview him about

the incident. Augustin said that he was present when his mother

and the boyfriend, Adam (a pseudonym), got into a fight;

although his mother lied to him about being stabbed, he

remembered seeing a knife, and going outside to look for help

because his mother screamed to call for the police. His mother

told him that "if [Adam] gets his 'boys' they will try to shoot

her, and if they do, Augustin needs to run for his life."

During the interview Augustin also disclosed that his maternal

grandmother had sexually abused him in the past. Augustin and

Sarah were removed from the mother's custody and placed in the

custody of the department.

The department provided the mother with an action plan that

recommended that she refrain from substance use, engage in

mental health treatment and domestic violence services, and meet

with the department monthly. The mother made no appreciable

progress during the next two years. She was resistant to mental

health and substance use treatment, refused urine screens, and

2
failed to address the presence of domestic violence in her life,

and she was uncooperative, disruptive, and deceptive in her

dealings with the department. She was manipulative in her

interactions with Augustin as well. In October 2016, Augustin

ran away from his foster home, and the department could not

locate him; the mother did not answer the department's numerous

phone calls or answer the door when police officers visited her

home looking for Augustin. Augustin appeared at school the next

day and explained that he had used public transportation to go

to his mother's home and that they were home when the police

rang the doorbell. The mother denied seeing Augustin, claiming

she had been in the hospital and unable to receive the

department's messages.3

In September 2017, during a family therapy session,

Augustin told his mother that he was going to a preadoptive

home; she yelled at him and told him that he needed to write a

letter to his lawyer and whispered in his ear what to write.

Augustin did not want to write the letter and felt that he

needed to tell lies to make his mother happy. Family therapy

was terminated shortly thereafter due to the mother's

inconsistency in attending the meetings and inappropriate

3 The judge did not specifically discredit the mother's denial,
but it is apparent that the department and the judge did not
find the mother's denial to be credible.

3
behavior. Augustin was placed in a preadoptive home in November

2017, where he has remained ever since. On May 11, 2018, the

mother stipulated to her unfitness and the department was

granted custody of Augustin "until becoming an adult or until,

in the opinion of the department, the object of the commitment

has been accomplished, whichever occurs first."4

After the mother stipulated to unfitness, there were

recurring incidents in which she engaged in or was the victim of

violence. In January 2019 the police were called to the

mother's address based on a report that she had assaulted her

brother's girlfriend. In July 2019 the police responded to her

home when the mother reported that Adam had slapped her in the

face; he was charged with assault and battery on a household or

family member. In September 2019, the mother was arrested for

assaulting Sarah's father.

Mental health issues also plagued the mother. In March

2020, the police responded to the mother's apartment, where she

was screaming loudly. She told the officers that she wanted to

hurt herself and others because her boyfriend cheated on her;

the police found a butcher knife and scissors near the mother.

In October 2020, the mother's therapist reported that the mother

4 Sarah, originally a subject of this petition, was placed in the
permanent custody of her father. The mother does not raise any
issues concerning Sarah in this appeal.

4
was depressed with suicidal ideations. Police and emergency

medical personnel responded and found the mother walking outside

with a boxcutter in her back pocket. She was transported to the

hospital to be evaluated. After that incident, the mother

failed to communicate with the department or respond to the

department's phone calls; the department made two unannounced

home visits, but no one answered the door. She continued to

decline to participate in substance abuse evaluations.

The mother's last in-person visit with Augustin took place

in May 2019. She overslept and missed a visit in October 2019.

In February 2020 Augustin, then twelve years old, expressed that

he no longer wanted visits with his mother.5 He agreed to see

his mother if his sister was also present, but he preferred to

see his sister alone.

At trial in January 2022, the mother testified that she

refused urine screens because Augustin was not removed because

of her substance use disorder; she claimed to be six months

sober from crack cocaine. She later changed her testimony and

reported being sober for ten years, notwithstanding testing

positive for cocaine about five years earlier. The mother did

not know why her children were removed from her care. She

5 During the remainder of 2020, the department facilitated
telephone contact between the mother and Augustin.

5
recalled that the case started because of domestic violence, but

claimed that she had never experienced domestic violence.

The judge found that the department had demonstrated, by

clear and convincing evidence, that the mother remained unfit to

parent Augustin, that her unfitness was likely to continue into

the indefinite future, and that Augustin's best interests would

be served by termination of the mother's parental rights.6 The

judge declined to order postadoption visits. The mother

appeals.

Discussion. 1. Termination of parental rights. In

deciding whether to terminate a parent's rights, a judge must

determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that

the parent is unfit and, if so, whether the child's best

interests will be served by terminating the legal relation

between parent and child. See Adoption of Nancy, 443 Mass. 512,

515 (2005). Because the mother stipulated to unfitness, the

sole issue at trial was whether the termination of the mother's

parental rights was in Augustin's best interests, and the

critical question in that regard was whether the department

produced clear and convincing evidence that the mother would

likely remain unfit in the future. See Adoption of Ilona, 459

Mass. 53, 59-60 (2011). "We give substantial deference to a

6 The judge approved the department's proposed plan for Augustin
to be adopted by his current preadoptive mother.

6
judge's decision that termination of a parent's rights is in the

best interest of the child, and reverse only where the findings

of fact are clearly erroneous or where there is a clear error of

law or abuse of discretion." Id. at 59.

The mother argues that the judge abused her discretion in

terminating the mother's parental rights because the judge

relied primarily on stale, prestipulation evidence. While it is

true that the judge "must focus on present circumstances of the

parent and the child," Adoption of Paula, 420 Mass. 716, 731

(1995), evidence of past unfitness is relevant to current

unfitness. "A judge properly may consider a pattern of parental

neglect or misconduct in determining future fitness and the

likelihood of harm to the child." Adoption of Elena, 446 Mass.

24, 33 (2006). See Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass. 610, 621

(1986) ("The court is permitted to assess prognostic evidence

derived from prior patterns of parental neglect or misconduct in

determining future fitness and the likelihood of harm to the

child"); Adoption of Katharine, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 25, 32-33

(1997) (judge "may consider past conduct to predict future

ability and performance").

Here, the evidence supporting unfitness, to which the

mother stipulated, included domestic violence, see Adoption of

Talik, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 374 (2017), quoting Custody of

Vaughn, 422 Mass. 590, 595 (1996) ("It is well established that

7
exposure to domestic violence works a 'distinctly grievous kind

of harm' on children"); substance use disorder, see Adoption of

Helen, 429 Mass. 856, 860 (1999) ("unsuccessful attempts to

address substance abuse" issues properly considered in

termination proceedings);7 and failure to cooperate with the

department, see Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. 139, 146-147 (2020)

(failure to recognize need for or to engage consistently in

treatment is relevant to determination of unfitness); Care &

Protection of Vieri, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 402, 406 (2017) (negative

inference permitted from lack of cooperation with department);

Adoption of Rhona, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 126 (2005) ("refusal

to cooperate with the department . . . is relevant to the

determination of unfitness").

The evidence of the mother's conduct after her stipulation

of unfitness showed that she was either still experiencing these

issues or failing to acknowledge and address them. We discern

no clear error or abuse of discretion in the judge's

determination that the mother's longstanding issues were likely

to continue in the future such that termination of parental

rights was in Augustin's best interests. "It is in the best

7 The mother's failure to provide urine screens, both for
substance use evaluations and to allow the court clinician to
complete a mental health evaluation, was certainly a factor in
the judge's assessment of the evidence, but contrary to the
mother's argument, it was not the sole or decisive evidence.

8
interests of [Augustin] to have [a parent] who can and who will,

on a consistent, long-term basis, assume all parental

responsibilities and who can provide [Augustin] with the stable

and continuous care and nurturing [he] needs and will continue

to need as a child." Adoption of Gwendolyn, 29 Mass. App. Ct.

130, 136 (1990).

Citing G. L. c. 231, § 87, and Guardianship of A.R., 99

Mass. App. Ct. 349, 355-356 (2021), the mother also argues that

certain of the judge's factual findings improperly relied on the

affidavit attached to the department's care and protection

petition.8 However, "[n]othing in G. L. c. 231, § 87, supports

the assertion that materials submitted with a pleading thereby

become categorically inadmissible." Care & Protection of

Doretta, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 584, 590 (2022). "[F]irst- and

second-level hearsay contained within [department] reports and

official [department] records is admissible for statements of

primary fact, so long as the hearsay source is specifically

identified in the document and is available for cross-

examination, should the party challenging the evidence request

to do so" (footnotes omitted). Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. at

153. See Mass. G. Evid. § 1115(b)(2)(B) (2023). The parts of

8 We discern no basis for the mother's claim that the judge
relied on G. L. c. 119, § 51A, reports for anything other than
setting the stage.

9
the affidavit upon which the judge relied met these criteria for

admissibility.

Finally, the mother claims that the judge erred in finding

that the mother "stopped attending foster care reviews" and "has

not attended a foster care review." "A finding is clearly

erroneous when there is no evidence to support it, or when,

'although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court

on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Custody of

Eleanor, 414 Mass. 795, 799 (1993), quoting Building Inspector

of Lancaster v. Sanderson, 372 Mass. 157, 160 (1977). While the

mother is correct that the evidence does not support a finding

that she never attended a foster care review, her foster care

review attendance did not play a significant part in the judge's

ultimate conclusion. Even without this finding, the judge's

determination that the mother was likely to remain unfit is

supported by clear and convincing evidence. See Care &

Protection of Olga, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 821, 825 (2003); Petition

of the Catholic Charitable Bureau of the Archdiocese of Boston,

Inc., to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 18 Mass. App. Ct.

656, 662 (1984).9

9 "Despite the moral overtones of the statutory term 'unfit,' the
judge's decision was not a moral judgment or a determination
that the mother . . . do[es] not love the child." Adoption of
Bianca, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 428, 432 n.8 (2017).

10
 2. Visitation. The mother also argues that she was

present in Augustin's life, had a bond with him, and that the

judge should have ordered postadoption visitation. We discern

no error or abuse of discretion. To determine whether to order

such visitation, the judge must consider the relationship and

emotional bond between the child and the parent, see Adoption of

Vito, 431 Mass. 550, 562 (2000), as well as the child's age, see

Adoption Rico, 453 Mass. 749, 757 n.15 (2009). The judge should

also consider the child's relationship with the preadoptive

parent or parents, and whether visitation decisions should be

left to their judgment. See Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 64-

66.

Here, the evidence supported the judge's finding that the

mother had no significant relationship with Augustin. While the

mother may have had an initial bond with Augustin, the bond had

substantially diminished by the time of trial. "The purpose of

such contact is not to strengthen the bonds between the child

and his biological mother or father, but to assist the child as

he negotiates, often at a very young age, the tortuous path from

one family to another." Adoption of Vito, 431 Mass. at 564–565.

We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's determination

11
that ordering postadoption visitation was not in Augustin's best

interests.

Decree affirmed.

By the Court (Milkey,
Massing & Henry, JJ.10),

Clerk

Entered: May 26, 2023.

10 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

12